



- e. On 28 November 2003, a second target letter was issued by the Chief Prosecutor to the Chief Defense Counsel regarding the Accused
- f. The Chief Defense Counsel detailed a military appointed counsel to the Accused on 28 November 2003.
- g. The target letter was subsequently extended beyond its original expiration date and subsequent extensions to allow continued discussions between the Defense and the Prosecution.
- d. On 9 June 2004, charges were approved against the Accused, and the first hearing in this case occurred at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on 25 August 2004.
- e. The United States is engaged in a global war with al Qaida. In late June 2004, the Supreme Court of the United States also expressly recognized the existence of hostilities sufficient to continue application of the laws of war in Afghanistan: “Active combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan.” *Hamdi*, 124 S.Ct. at 2642 (2004).<sup>1</sup> Stating that hostilities in Afghanistan continue in date, the Secretary of Defense on 4 October 2004 marked the third anniversary of Operation Enduring Freedom. *See* Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, New York City, New York, 4 October 2004 (marking the third anniversary of Operation Enduring Freedom, and stating the war against al Qaida “will likely go on for years”), attached.

5. Legal Authority Cited:

- a. Article 10 UCMJ
- b. Article 2(a)(12) UCMJ
- c. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)
- d. Article 21 UCMJ
- e. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952)
- f. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)
- g. Article 36 UCMJ

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<sup>1</sup> In making this observation in *Hamdi*, The Supreme Court cited *e.g.*, Constable, U. S. Launches New Operation in Afghanistan, Washington Post, Mar. 14, 2004, p A22 (reporting that 13,500 United States troops remain in Afghanistan, including several thousand new arrivals); J. Abizaid, Dept. of Defense, Gen. Abizaid Central Command Operations Update Briefing, Apr. 30, 2004, <http://www.defenselinkmil/transcripts/2004/tr20040430-1402.html>. “If the record establishes that United States troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan, those detentions are part of the exercise of ‘necessary and appropriate force,’ and therefore are authorized by the AUMF.” *Id.*

- h. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633 (2004)
- i. United States v. Cooper, 58 M.J. 54 (C.A.A.F. 2003)
- j. United States v. Goode, 54 M.J. 836 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2001)
- k. United States v. Kossman, 38 M.J. 258 (C.M.A. 1993)
- l. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)
- m. United States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995)
- n. United States v. Verdugo Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)
- o. United States v. Reed, 41 M.J. 449 (C.A.A.F. 1995)
- p. United States v. Hatfield, 44 M.J. 22 (C.A.A.F. 1996)
- q. United States v. Reeves, 34 M.J. 1261 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1992)

6. Discussion:

The Defense moves to dismiss the charge against the Accused pursuant to Article 10 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (hereinafter “UCMJ”). The Defense’s claim lacks merit for numerous reasons. First, the President has designated the Accused for trial by a military commission for violation of the laws of war or other crimes triable by military commission, so provisions of the UCMJ governing courts-martial do not apply to him. Second, as a combatant who is subject to detention for the duration of the ongoing armed conflict, the Accused has no legal basis to raise a speedy trial claim. Third, even if Article 10 were applicable to the Accused, he would not be entitled to any relief because he has failed to show that the military did not act with “reasonable diligence” in bringing and approving charges against him, much less that he has been prejudiced by the alleged delay.

a. United States Supreme Court case law establishes that Article 10 does not apply to military commissions.

The Defense argues that the Accused’s detention is subject to the constraints of Article 10 of the UCMJ. This argument is simply incorrect. The rules set out in the UCMJ, except where expressly states otherwise, apply to courts-martial, not military commissions. While the UCMJ recognizes the jurisdiction of military commissions to try violations of the laws of war<sup>2</sup> or other statutes, it does not purport to subject such commissions to its comprehensive set of rules governing courts-martial.

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<sup>2</sup> Article 21 UCMJ

Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that while Congress has prescribed the jurisdiction and procedures governing courts-martial, it properly has allowed the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to set the procedures for wartime military commissions, by recognizing and approving their use but not regulating their procedures.

In In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), the Supreme Court expressly rejected the contention that a military commission convened to try General Yamashita was subject to the procedures in the Articles of War (the precursor to the UCMJ) governing courts-martial. The Court explained that, by Article 15 of the Articles of War (now Article 21, UCMJ<sup>3</sup>), Congress “recognized military commissions in order to preserve their traditional jurisdiction over enemy combatants unimpaired by the Articles,” and “gave sanction . . . to any use of the military commission contemplated by the common law of war.” Id. at 19. Although the Court relied in part on the fact that General Yamashita did not fall within the categories of persons made subject to the jurisdiction of the courts-martial by the Articles of War, the Court also based its holding on the fact that “the military commission before which he was tried, though sanctioned, and its jurisdiction saved, by Article 15, *was not convened by virtue of the Articles of War, but pursuant to the common law of war.*” Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, the Court in Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952), subsequently rejected any suggestion that the Articles of War would apply to the trial by commission of a person subject to court-martial, upholding the trial by military commission of a U.S. citizen subject to the jurisdiction of courts-martial, notwithstanding that the commission trial was not conducted in strict accordance with the specific Articles of War governing courts-martial.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Article 15 of the Articles of war reads:

The provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial shall not be construed as depriving military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.

Id. The text of UCMJ Article 21 reads:

The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial shall not be construed as depriving military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.

Id.

<sup>4</sup> In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), a plurality of the Supreme Court ruled that a U.S. citizen civilian spouse of a serviceman could not be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court-martial during peacetime. The Reid plurality concluded that Madsen was not controlling because Madsen involved a trial in occupied enemy territory, where “the Army commander can establish military or civilian commissions as an arm of the occupation to try everyone in the occupied area.” Reid at 35, note 63. Madsen remains good law today, and the Supreme Court has limited Reid to its facts. See United States v. Verdugo Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270 (1990).

The Madsen Court characterized the unique nature and purpose of military commissions:

Since our nation’s earliest days, such commissions have been constitutionally recognized agencies for meeting many urgent governmental responsibilities related to war. They have been called our common law war courts. They have taken many forms and borne many names. *Neither their procedure nor their jurisdiction has been prescribed by statute.* It has been adapted in each instance to the need that called it forth.

Id. at 346-348 (footnotes omitted)(emphasis added). The Court went on to hold that, “in the absence of attempts by Congress to limit the President’s power, it appears that, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, he may, in time of war, establish and prescribe the jurisdiction and procedure of military commissions . . .” Id. at 348. The Court explained that, in contrast to Congress’ active regulation of “the jurisdiction and procedure of the United States courts-martial,” Congress had shown “evident restraint” with respect to making rules for military commissions. Id. at 349. The Court further explained that Article 15 (now Article 21 UCMJ) reflected Congress’ intent to allow the Executive Branch to exercise its discretion as to what form of tribunal to employ during wartime. Id. at 353.

When the President established military commissions to try members of al Qaida and set out the procedures that will govern them, he exercised the very discretion that the Madsen Court held was implicit in his powers as Commander-in-Chief and was left unrestricted by Congress. Because, as Madsen explained, Congress did not purport to apply the numerous UCMJ provisions regulating courts-martial to the common law military commissions, Article 10 of the UCMJ, which sets out a speedy trial standard for courts-martial, is inapplicable to the military commission of the Accused.

Additionally, the President invoked the provisions of the UCMJ that recognize his authority to use military commissions to try violations of the laws of war, Article 21, and to create a set of procedures to govern them, Article 36. Reliance on that authority, which the Supreme Court has construed to set military commissions apart from courts-martial and the UCMJ rules that govern them, could not logically trigger application of the entire UCMJ. Indeed, that is essentially the argument the Court rejected in Yamashita and Madsen.<sup>5</sup> In any event, that those subject to military commission do not receive the protection of Article 10 is not “contrary to or inconsistent with” the UCMJ because, as Congress recognized in taking a hands-off approach, military commissions convened during wartime to try violations of the laws of war must deal with military exigencies in

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<sup>5</sup> It should be noted that Article 38 of the Articles of War during the Yamashita and Madsen cases was the forerunner of the current Article 36, UCMJ. Like Article 36 UCMJ, Article 38 of the Articles of War prohibited commission procedures contrary to or inconsistent with the Articles of War. Yet Yamashita and Madsen still allowed substantial differences between courts-martial and military commission procedure. As such, no argument can be made that Article 36 requires the application of Article 10 UCMJ to current military commissions.

administering justice. Because of the unique context in which the commissions operate, and the need for flexibility that context presents, it is not “contrary to or inconsistent with” the UCMJ for the commissions to try persons subject to its jurisdiction for violations of the laws of war without adhering to the speedy trial rules that apply to courts-martial.

b. Assuming Article 10 applicability, there is no violation.

Moreover, assuming Article 10 did apply to the military commissions, the Accused’s claim for dismissal would also fail because the Defense cannot establish any violation. In order to prevail on an Article 10 claim, the Accused must establish that the Government has failed to proceed against him with “reasonable diligence.” United States v. Cooper, 58 M.J. 54, 58 (2003). All that petitioner states on this score is that “the Government simply did not need over two years to gather evidence.” That conclusive statement is patently insufficient. To begin with, to the extent that there is any relevant time period for an individual lawfully detained as a combatant, the Article 10 clock would not begin to run until the detainee is “ordered into arrest or confinement” pursuant to a charge. Article 10, UCMJ. To date the Accused has not been so ordered. He is and remains an enemy combatant and is first and foremost, detained as such. While lacking merit, the best position the Defense can assert is that any speedy trial clock would not have begun to run until July 2003, when the Accused was placed in Camp Echo to facilitate his ability to meet with counsel in connection with the impending charges<sup>6</sup> and to ensure the intelligence gathering function was not tainted.

Additionally, the amount of time that has elapsed, standing alone, does not suggest, much less establish, the absence of reasonable diligence. As the military courts have made clear, “there is no ‘magic number’ of days in pretrial confinement which would give rise to a presumption of an Article 10, UCMJ, speedy trial violation.” United States v. Goode, 54 M.J. 836 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2001); United States v. Kossman, 38 M.J. 258 (C.M.A. 1993). In the Goode case, the court held that a defendant who spent 337 days in pretrial confinement failed to make out an Article 10 or constitutional speedy trial violation. Id. at 838-840. Here, the Accused is charged with participating in a foreign-based, far-reaching conspiracy spanning a large time period. The breadth and complexity of the charge as well as the fact that it was brought during the ongoing war against terror refutes the overtone in Defense’s motion that the government was engaged in delay tactics. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972) (“The delay that can be

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<sup>6</sup> It is the Prosecution’s position that there is no relevant time period for consideration regarding an Article 10 UCMJ claim. The simple fact is that the Accused is not being detained because he is awaiting trial, but because he is an unlawful combatant. As mentioned above, that means that the Accused could be held until the end of hostilities under the existing laws of war. Whether or not the Accused was facing a military commission at this time and place, he would still be detained by U.S. forces. The fact that the Accused was moved after the President found him eligible for trial by military commission does not change the underlying reason for his confinement. In United States v. Reed, 41 M.J. 449 (C.A.A.F. 1995), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces made clear that Article 10 is triggered either by “*pretrial* restraint or preferral of charges.” Id. at 451. Because, according to Reed the Prosecution is not required to file charges as soon as probable cause exists and because the Accused is not in *pretrial* restraint there is no Article 10 violation.

tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.”).

Indeed, a far longer period would be justified in the current instance. The United States has undertaken painstaking intelligence-gathering and interrogation with respect to hundreds of enemy combatants and suspected members of al Qaida, a highly disciplined organization whose agents span the globe and operate in total secrecy. See generally al Qaida Training Manual (“Manchester Manual”), available at [www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm](http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm). It should, therefore, come as no surprise that more time has been required in this case than in courts-martial involving forcible sodomy, Goode, adultery, United States v. Hatfield, 44 M.J. 22, 23 (C.A.A.F. 1996), rape, Reed, or molestation, United States v. Reeves, 34 M.J. 1261 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1992) (462-day delay).

The Defense’s claim also founders on its failure to show prejudice from the alleged delay. See Barker at 533-534. A speculative claim cannot form the basis for a finding of prejudice.” United States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188, 1194 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Such “generalized assertions of the loss of memory, witnesses, or evidence are insufficient to establish actual prejudice.”

c. Delay in Detailing Defense Counsel does not Constitute Unreasonable Delay.

The Defense imputes the delay in detailing of Defense counsel to the Prosecution as a violation of Article 10, UCMJ. As stated earlier, Article 10, UCMJ does not apply to the Accused. Even if Article 10 was applicable to the Accused, the cause for delays in detailing of Defense counsel is misplaced. The Prosecution was under no obligation to serve a target letter on the Chief Defense Counsel. It did so purely as a means to obtain a Defense Counsel with whom to discuss the case. With or without a target letter, the Accused would have continued to be detained as an enemy combatant.

For the above-stated reasons, the Accused’s motion to dismiss due to violation of Article 10, UCMJ should be dismissed.

7. Attachments:

- a. Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, New York City, New York, 4 October 2004 (the war against al Qaida “will likely go on for years”)

8. Oral Argument: Although the Prosecution does not specifically request oral argument, we are prepared to engage in oral argument if so required.

9. Witnesses:

- a. Major XXXX
- b. Captain XXXX

c. Special XXXX (already Protected Information pursuant to Presiding Officer Order of August 27 2004).

We ask that the names contained in (a) and (b) above also be considered Protected Information. A proposed Protective Order has been sent via separate correspondence.

/original signed/  
XXXX  
Major, U.S. Army  
Prosecutor



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**Council on Foreign Relations**

*Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, New York City, New York, Monday, October 4, 2004.*

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Thank you very much, Lou, ladies and gentlemen, Pete, David, Richard. It's good to be back here, and as before it's a very full crowd in a small room, tightly packed in. So I thank all of you for being here as well.

Now, last month we observed the third anniversary of the day that awakened our country to a new world, a day that extremists killed so many innocent men, women and children. Thursday will mark the third anniversary of the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom, when America resolved to take the battle to the extremists, and we attacked the al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan. Three years into the global war on terror, some understandably ask, "Is the world better off? Is our country safer?" They're fair questions, and today I want to address them by taking a look at the last three years at what the world looked like then, compared to what we find today, and what has been accomplished, and to be sure what remains to be done.

It's been said that the global struggle against extremism will be the task of a generation, a war that could go on for years -- I should say will likely go on for years, much like the Cold War, which of course lasted for decades. We look back at the Cold War now as a great victory for freedom, and indeed it was. But the 50-year span of battle between the free world and the Soviet empire was filled with division, uncertainty, self-doubt, setbacks and indeed failures along the way as well as successes. Territories were seized, wars were fought. There were many times when the enemy seemed to have the upper hand. Remember when euro-communism was in vogue, when the West considered withdrawing. I was ambassador to NATO in the early '70s and had to fly back to testify against an amendment in the Senate to withdraw all of our troops back in the '70s. And a lot of people from time to time over that long span considered withdrawing from the struggle exhausted. The strategies varied -- from co-existence to containment to detente to confrontation. Alliances wavered. In NATO there were disputes over diplomatic policy, weapons deployments, military strategies, the stance against the Soviets.

In the 1960s, France pulled out of the military organization of NATO and asked NATO out of France. In America, columnists and editorialists questioned and doubted U.S. policies. There were vocal showings of support for communist Russia, marches against military build-up, proposed freezes -- even instances where American citizens saw their own government challenges as warmongers and aggressors. Clearly many did not always take seriously the challenge posed by communism or the Soviet appetite for empire. But our country, under leaders of both political parties over a sustained period of time, and with our allies, again of mixed political parties over time, showed perseverance and resolve.

Year after year they fought for freedom. They dared to confront what many thought might be an unbeatable foe, and eventually the Soviet regime collapsed.

That lesson has to be relearned throughout the ages, it seems, the lesson that weakness can be provocative. It can entice people into doing things they otherwise would avoid, that a refusal to confront gathering dangers can increase rather than reduce future peril. That while there are risks to acting, to be sure, there also can be risks to not acting, and that victory ultimately comes to those who are purposeful and steadfast. It's with those lessons in mind that the president and a historic coalition of some 80 or 85 countries have sought to confront a new and perhaps even more dangerous enemy, an enemy without a country or a conscience, and an enemy who seeks no armistice or truce --

with us or with the civilized world.

From the outset of this conflict it was clear that our coalition had to go on the offense against terrorists. The goals included the need to pursue terrorists and their regimes that provide them aid and comfort, havens; to establish relationships with new allies and bolster international coalitions to prosecute the war; to improve considerably America's homeland defense; and to advance freedom and democracy, and to work with moderate leaders to undermine terrorism's ideological foundation.

In the last three years progress has been made in each of these areas. Four years ago al Qaeda was already a growing danger well before 9/11. Terrorists had been attacking American interests for years. The leader, Osama bin Laden, was safe and sheltered in Afghanistan. His network was dispersed around the world. Three years later, more than two thirds of al Qaeda's key members and associates have been detained, captured or killed. Osama bin Laden is on the run. Many of his key associates are behind bars or dead. His financial lines have been reduced, but not closed down. And I suspect he spends a good deal of every day avoiding being caught.

Once controlled by extremists, Afghanistan today is led by Hamid Karzai, who is helping to lead the world in support of moderates against the extremists. Soccer stadiums in Kabul, once used for public executions under the Taliban, today are used for soccer.

Three years ago in Iraq, Saddam Hussein and his sons brutally ruled a nation in the heart of the Middle East. Saddam was attempting regularly to kill American air crews and British air crews that were enforcing the northern and southern no-fly zones. He ignored more than a dozen U.N. Security Council resolutions, and was paying some \$25,000 to the families of suicide bombers to encourage and reward them.

Three years later, Saddam Hussein is a prisoner awaiting trial by the Iraqis, his sons are dead, most of his senior associates are in custody. Some 100,000 trained and equipped Iraqis now provide security for their fellow citizens. Under the new prime minister, Mr. Allawi, and his team, Iraq is a new nation, a nation determined to fight terrorists and build a peaceful society.

And Libya has gone from being a nation that sponsored terrorists and secretly sought a nuclear capability to one that has renounced its illegal weapon programs, and now says that it's ready to reenter the community of civilized nations.

The rogue Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan's nuclear proliferation network was providing lethal assistance to nations such as Libya and North Korea today has been exposed and dismantled, and is no longer in operation.

Pakistan three and a half or four years ago was close to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Today under President Musharraf, Pakistan is working effectively and closely with the global coalition against terrorism. Thanks to the coalition, terrorist safe havens have been reduced, major training camps have been eliminated. Their financial support structures have been attacked and disrupted, and intelligence and military cooperation with countries all around the world has dramatically increased.

NATO is now leading the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and is helping to train Iraqi security forces. This is an historic move for NATO. Not only is it out of the NATO treaty area, but it's out of Europe this activity on their part. The U.N. has taken a role in helping the free elections in both Afghanistan and Iraq, which are coming up very soon in Afghanistan later this week, and we anticipate in Iraq in January.

And over 60 countries have expressed support for an effort to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Here at home the demands of the global war on terror have accelerated the need to transform our armed forces, and to undertake an increasingly complex array of missions around the world. We've increased the size of the active duty army by about 30,000 troops, and we're reorganizing it into more agile, lethal and deployable brigades

with enough protection, fire power and logistics assets to sustain themselves. And we're increasing the number of these brigades from currently 33 to 43 or possibly 48 over the coming two and a half to three years. We're re-training and re-structuring the active and reserve components to achieve a more appropriate distribution of skill sets, to improve the total force responsiveness to crises, and so that individual Reservists and Guardsmen will mobilize less often for shorter periods of time, and with somewhat more predictability.

We're increasing the ability of the branches of the armed services to work seamlessly together. Joint operations are no longer an exception. They must become the rule. Communications and intelligence activities have been improved in the department. We've significantly expanded the capabilities and missions of the special operations forces and much more.

Since the global war on terror began, we have sought to undercut the extremists' efforts to attract new recruits. The world has been divided between regions where freedom and democracy have been nurtured and other areas where people have been abandoned to dictatorship or tyranny. Yet today the talk on the street in Baghdad and Kabul is about coming elections and self-government. In Afghanistan over 10 million people have registered to vote in this month's election. They estimate that some 41.4 percent of them are women. Iraq has an interim constitution that includes a bill of rights and an independent judiciary. There are municipal councils in almost every major city and most towns and villages and provincial councils for the provinces.

Iraqis now are among those allowed to say and write and watch and listen to whatever they want, whenever they want. And I sense that governments and people in the Middle East are taking note of that. Have there been setbacks in Afghanistan and Iraq? You bet. It is often on some bad days not a pretty picture at all. In fact, it can be dangerous and ugly. But the road from tyranny to freedom has never been peaceful or tranquil. On the contrary, it's always been difficult and dangerous. It was difficult for the United States. It was difficult with respect to Germany and Japan and Italy.

The enemy cannot defeat the coalition in a conventional war on any battlefield. But they don't seek conventional war. Their weapons are terror and chaos, and they want us to believe that the coalition cannot win; that the free Iraqi and Afghan governments cannot win; that the fight is not worth it; that the effort will be too hard and too ugly. They attack any sort of hope or progress in an effort to try to undermine morale. They are convinced that if they can win the battle of perception -- and they are very good at managing perceptions -- that we will lose our will and toss it in. I believe they are wrong. Failure in Afghanistan or Iraq would exact a terrible toll. It would embolden the extremists and make the world a far more dangerous place. These are difficult times.

From Baghdad, Kabul, Madrid, Bali, the Philippines, the call to arms has been sounded and the outcome of this struggle will determine the nature of our world for some decades to come. Our enemies will not be controlled, or contained or wished away. They do seek to enslave, and they have shown that they are willing to die to achieve their goals. The deaths of innocent people are not incidental in this war. Innocent people indeed are in fact their targets, and they will willingly kill hundreds and thousands more.

The world has gasped at the brutality of the extremists -- the hundreds of children in Russia who were killed or wounded on their first day of school; the commuters blown up in the trains in Madrid; innocents murdered in a night club in Bali; the cutting off of heads on television. And should these enemies acquire the world's more dangerous weapons, more lethal weapons -- and they are seeking them, to be sure -- the lives of hundreds of thousands could be at stake.

There have been costs, and there will be more. More than 1,000 U.S. soldiers, men and women, have died, killed or in accidents in Iraq, and some number more since the global war on terror began. Every loss is deeply felt. It is in freedom's defense that our country has had the benefit of these wonderful volunteers deployed, these the most courageous among us. And whenever freedom advances, America is safer.

And amid the losses, amid the ugliness, the car bombings, the task is to remain steadfast. Consider the kind of world we would have if the extremists were to prevail.

Today, as before, the hard work of history falls to our country, to our coalition, to our people. We've been entrusted with the gift of freedom. It's ours to safeguard. It's ours to defend. And we can do it, knowing that the great sweep of human history is for freedom, and that is on our side.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

*For a complete transcript, including questions and answers, please visit:*

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