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ODDR&E
Washington 25, D. C.

ENCLOSURE "F"

ESTIMATED COSTS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEMS

WSEG REPORT NO. 50

30 September 1960

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Enclosure "F"
WSEG Report No. 50

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ENCLOSURE "F"

ESTIMATED COSTS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEMS

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ENCLOSURE "F"

ESTIMATED COSTS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEMS

PURPOSE

1. To present estimates of the costs of strategic offensive weapon systems during the FY 1961 to 1967 period.

SCOPE

2. This Enclosure contains estimates of the costs of strategic offensive weapon systems in being and scheduled to attain operational status in this period. Costs are given for both delivery systems and nuclear weapons.

3. The reliability of these estimates is discussed and examples are given showing changes in estimates as weapon systems progress from developmental to operational status.

4. Because of the particular importance of the MINUTEMAN and POLARIS weapon systems, their costs are examined in detail and the results of the analysis appear in Appendices "B" and "C" respectively.

SUMMARY

5. In FY 1961 the total costs directly attributable to strategic offensive weapon systems amount to about $10.4 billion or about 25 percent of the total Defense budget. If the force projections in this report are implemented, and if the estimates of costs are correct, the total funds for strategic weapons considered will amount to about $10.7 billion in each of the Fiscal Years 1962, 1963, and 1964, and will fall thereafter to a low of less than $5 billion in FY 1967. However, it can be expected that funds required for strategic systems in the later years of the period 1961 to 1967 will be increased by: (1) more funds for procurement and operation of systems now under development; (2) increases in

estimates of costs, especially for those systems now in the early stages of development; and (3) additional funds for development and procurement of new weapons systems.

6. The costs of strategic surface-to-surface missile systems have now begun to exceed the costs of strategic aircraft and related systems. Present plans indicate that by FY 1967 surface-to-surface missiles will absorb more than twice the funds allocated to aircraft.

7. The unit cost of bombs and warheads, after deducting the salvage value of nuclear materials, is relatively low as compared with the unit cost of the weapon system. In most cases the net cost of the warhead and/or bombs is less than 10 percent of the cost of its carrier.

8. The weapon system costs presented in this Enclosure are of varying reliability.

a. Cost estimates based on production contracts and operational experience are quite accurate.

b. For systems for which overall system designs are not firm, or for systems where estimated costs are contingent on meeting stipulated system reliability, etc., considerable uncertainty exists. 1/

c. Cost estimates for systems which are in earlier stages of development are subject to even more uncertainty. Based on past experience such estimates are likely to be too low. 2/

9. The estimates available to WSEG indicate that the POLARIS missile is, for equivalent numbers procured, greater in cost than the MINUTEMAN missile. No reason has been found to fully account for the anomaly.

1/ See paragraph 22 for examples.
2/ Ibid.

DISCUSSION

BACKGROUND OF THE COST AND FORCE LEVEL ESTIMATES

10. The estimates of projected force levels and associated cos employed in this report were obtained from the Services through the mechanism of the Military Systems (MS) Reports. Submitted specifically for this WSEG study were: (a) Air Force MS-3½, "Report on Selected Strategic and Tactical Weapon Systems" (Prepared for the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, 11 April 1960), and (b) Navy, CNO, MS-3.2, "FBM Weapon System Cost Estimates," 27 April 1960. Data on force schedules in all cases were report through FY 1967. Funding data were reported through FY 1965 in the Air Force submission and through FY 1967 in the Navy submis The funding estimates for Air Force systems in FY 1966 and FY 1 are extrapolations by WSEG of the Air Force data.

11. The MS series in its present form was initiated in WSEG a represents the joint efforts of WSEG, the Joint Staff, OSD Comptroller, and most importantly, the Services themselves. Th purpose of the MS series is to secure periodically, on a comparable basis amongst systems and Services, the estimated costs of all weapon and supporting systems for stipulated force sched over a period of years into the future in the context of total Departmental budgets. The instructions governing the preparati of these reports were prepared by OSD Comptroller with the ass ance of WSEG and the Joint Staff.

12. Two main types of cost estimates appear in the MS series The first of these shows the amounts of funds allocated annual to each weapon system, by OSD appropriation title and by weapo system, over a period of years. The current reports cover the period BY 1958-FY 1965 with force projections running through FY 1967. The OSD appropriation titles are as follows: Researc

Development, Test, and Evaluation; Procurement for Development, Test, and Evaluation; Procurement for Service Use; Industrial Facilities; Military Construction; Operation and Maintenance; and Military Personnel. The sum of the funds for these headings constitutes the total annual program cost of creating and maintaining the force schedules stipulated for the given weapon or support system. The separate headings can be conveniently regrouped and combined into three principal types of cost: Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation; Investment Costs; and Operating Costs.

13. The second main type of cost estimate shows the average investment embodied in an organizational unit (battalion, squadron, etc.) of a weapon or support system, and the average annual operating cost of such a unit. In this Enclosure the organizational unit costs of Air Force systems, reduced to a per aircraft or per missile basis, were derived from the Air Force MS-3½ A forms (see Appendix "A") and are not as reported on the MS-3½B forms. This procedure was followed in order to maintain consistency between organizational unit costs and the program amounts reported in the funding estimates.

NATURE AND RELIABILITY OF THE ESTIMATES

14. Several points need to be made concerning the nature of cost estimates. First, a given set of estimates pertains only to one stipulated force schedule for a weapon system. Any alteration in force projections requires an alteration in program costs and if such alteration be substantial, the costs per organizational unit will also change. Second, changes in system specifications and configuration, operational modes, or rates of activity also necessitate concomitant changes in cost estimates. Third, the estimates represent net costs and do not

include the costs of assets (airbases, facilities, equipment, trained personnel, etc.) inherited from previous systems. Fourth, no weapon system cost estimates are completely accurate or reliable and estimates pertaining to future systems are much less reliable than those on current systems. This last point will be expanded upon in the following paragraphs.

15. It is obvious that in the case of currently operational weapon systems, cost estimates are relatively reliable. Records exist showing the amounts paid out for procurement, construction, and so forth. On the basis of this experience, estimates of current and future costs can be made in which considerable confidence can be placed. Future changes in the weapon system program as to its size, hardware and base configuration, or alert status will still inject uncertainty into estimates of future costs, but the amount of error is relatively small and estimates vary within a narrow range over a period of years. Thus Air Force estimates of B-52 investment costs have been on the order of $13. to $14.5 million per aircraft, on a program cost basis (including air bases, trained personnel, etc.) from August 1958 to the present. 1/

16. Considerable uncertainty, however, attaches to cost estima for future systems. To a large degree this results from uncerta or lack of complete information as to the exact characteristics such weapon systems in their eventual operational form. Costs a sensitive to variations in program size, degree of hardness and dispersal, alert status, training specifications, maintenance

1/ a/ Department of the Air Force, Major Military Systems Cost Data (MS-1), 26 August 1958.
b/ Department of the Air Force, Report on Weapon and Support Systems, 25 June 1959.
c/ U.S. Air Force, Report on Major Military Programs (MS-3). 1 October 1959.
d/ Department of the Air Force, Report on Selected Strategic and Tactical Weapon Systems (MS-3½), 11 April 1960.

policy and equipment failure rates, communications patterns and many other factors. All these elements are for many reasons su ject to frequent changes, each of which necessitates a change i cost estimates. Thus, it is incumbent upon the user of such es mates to understand their nature and to employ them with cautio

17. An example of the manner in which cost estimates are influenced by different possibilities in system configuration is provided by the hardened and dispersed mode for MINUTEMAN. As presently planned, the early squadrons will require for communi cations and control an extensive network of buried cable interconnecting silos and launch control centers. The cost of such a cable network is obviously sensitive to terrain conditions. The Air Force estimates that the cost of the cable network will vary between $6 and $18 million per squadron, and that total co munications investment will vary between $9.8 and $21.8 millio per squadron. However, an intensive effort is being made to develop very low frequency ground wave propagation which would eliminate the cable network. If this effort should prove succe ful, communications investment would be reduced to the range o $4 to $6 million per squadron.

18. In addition to uncertainty induced by factors of configu ation and technology, considerable possibilities for error in cost estimates arise from the lack of firm information on the costs of industrial production of new hardware. In this conne tion it should be noted that puzzling anomalies exist in cost data on MINUTEMAN and POLARIS missiles (see Table I). Cumulat average cost per curves per missile are plotted in Figure 1 sh ing Navy estimates of the cost of POLARIS missiles, and Air Fo Ballistic Missile Division and preliminary WSEG estimates of t cost of the MINUTEMAN missile. The MINUTEMAN ICBM has one mor

FIGURE 1

CUMULATIVE AVERAGE COST CURVES FOR POLARIS AND MINUTEMAN MISSILES (UNIT COSTS, INCLUDING SPARE PARTS)

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CUMULATIVE AVERAGE COST CURVES FOR POLARIS AND MINUTEMAN MISSILES

(UNIT COSTS, INCLUDING SPARE PARTS)



FIGURE 1
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stage and is about 96 percent heavier than the POLARIS A-2 missile, yet the estimated average unit cost for the same quantity, in about the same period of time, is lower for MINUTEMAN. We are forced to the conclusion that either the POLARIS estimate is too high or the preliminary MINUTEMAN estimate is too low.

19. An analysis of component costs for POLARIS and MINUTEMAN missiles is given in Table I. Precise comparisons are not possible owing to differences in definition, but the estimate of MINUTEMAN propulsion on a per pound basis and guidance systems on a per missile basis should be, at least, roughly comparable to similar POLARIS costs.

TABLE I

AVERAGE UNIT COSTS OF MAJOR COMPONENTS OF POLARIS AND MINUTEMAN MISSILES

(Thousands of Dollars)

POLARIS (Navy Estimates)	A-1 (159 Units)	A-2 (570 Units)	A-3 (1005 Units)
Motors (Aerojet)	$ 386	$ 418	$ 595
Airframe	578	418	372
Guidance and Controls	356	210	223
Arming and Fuzing	(Nil)	(Nil)	50
Spare Parts	163	a/	a/
Total	$1,483	$1,046	$1,240

MINUTEMAN (Preliminary WSEG Estimates) b/	Average for 500 Units	Average for 1000 Units
Propulsion (Thiokol and Aerojet)	$ 293	$ 273
Airframe	256	240
Guidance and Controls	309	286
Other (Re-entry body and A.K.)	32	28
Spare Parts	90	83
Total	$ 980	$ 910

a/ Included in preceding items.
b/ See Appendix "B". A detailed explanation of the derivation of these estimates appears in Second Annual Review of WSEG Report No. 23, 14 August 1959.

20. As might be expected, motor costs for POLARIS increase with range, the A-3 motors costing 42 percent more than A-2 (in spite of the saving in A-3 unit cost due to quantity production). The three MINUTEMAN motors are almost double the weight of the two stages in the POLARIS A-2, but WSEG's estimate of motor costs for about the same quantity of MINUTEMAN missiles is 30 percent less. The spare parts allowance is about the same proportion of total missile costs for both missiles--about 11 percent for POLARIS and 9 percent for MINUTEMAN.

21. As shown in Figure 1, the WSEG estimate for MINUTEMAN is almost the same as the BMD estimate at 100 units, but at 1000 units the BMD average is only about 50 percent of the WSEG estimate. WSEG estimates for MINUTEMAN are preliminary and, in view of the wide disparity between costs of MINUTEMAN and POLARIS missiles (taking into account the great difference in size and range), it is necessary to reserve judgment on the validity of estimates for both missiles until better evidence is obtained on actual contract costs. There is no basis for rejecting the latest Navy estimates for POLARIS, and if they prove to be correct it can be expected that the earlier preliminary estimate for MINUTEMAN will be increased. 1/

22. While early estimates of the investment cost in a new weapon system may err on either the high or the low side, experience shows that they are apt to be lower, by a substantial amount, than

1/ The WSEG curve for MINUTEMAN has a 90 percent slope through unit number 300 and a 93 percent slope thereafter. As reported by the Air Force (Memorandum for Director, WSEG, 1 June 1959), the cost curve for ATLAS has an 89 percent slope through 300 units and a 95 percent slope thereafter; the TITAN cost curve has a 91 percent, and THOR an 85 percent slope. The slope of the BMD cost curve for MINUTEMAN is 72 percent between units 100 and 500, and 82 percent between units 500 and 1000. The slope of cost curves of this type is defined as the percentage which the cost of 2n units is of the cost of n units. Thus if a particular type of missile should cost $800,000 for 1000 units and $720,000 for 2000 units, its cost curve is said to have a 90 percent slope.

the actual cost which is finally incurred. Among the reasons for this phenomenon are: (a) the proponents of a system are optimistic about its future, (b) a system invariably becomes more complex as it progresses from conceptual and developmental stages towards operational status, and (c) price inflation during the period from early estimates to eventual payment of the bills increases the gap between them. Thus between 1957 and the present, Air Force estimates of the cost of the soft ATLAS squadron increased by 40 percent, and of a hardened TITAN squadron by 28 to 55 percent depending on configuration.[1] During the same period Navy estimates of total investment per POLARIS submarine have risen by 59 percent.[2] During a three-month period in 1959, Army estimates of the cost of a ZEUS battery increased by 20 percent.[3]

23. With the foregoing caveats in mind we will now proceed to set forth Service programs for strategic weapon systems and to examine estimates of their costs.

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEMS FORCE LEVELS

24. For the purpose of this report, WSEG requested the Services to provide MS-series estimates of force level projections on a reasonable basis, FY 1961-67. These force levels, which appear in Table II below, are the ones with which the cost estimates of this paper are associated. It should be noted that THOR and JUPITER do not appear in the table as no U.S. squadrons of these systems are now planned.

1/ Air Force estimates for 1957 are in Memorandum for Director WSEG, 9 December 1957. Air Force estimates for this study in "Report on Selected Strategic and Tactical Weapon System (MS-3½), 11 April 1960.

2/ Navy estimates for 1957 are in CNO, Op 515-B, Serial 00758P 18 December 1957. Navy estimates for this study are in CNO MS-3.2, "FBM Weapon System Cost Estimates," 27 April 1960 (see Appendix "C", p. 9-12).

3/ These estimates, reported from Army sources are in "Estimates Costs of CONUS Air Defense," WSEG, 22 June 1959 and WSEG Report No. 45, 23 September 1959.

TABLE II

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEMS FORCE PROJECTIONS, FY 1961-67

(Number of Units at End of Fiscal Year)[a]

Weapon System	No. of A/C or Missiles Per Unit	No. of Organizational Units (Sqdns/SSBN's) 1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
A/C Systems								
B-47	15	84	64	52	36	16	0	0
B-52	15	37	42	45	48	48	47	45
B-58	9	4	9	12	12	12	12	12
GAM-72	28	8	14	14	14	14	12	11
GAM-77	14[b]	16	29	29	29	27	18	8
GAM-87	30[b]	0	0	0	5	15	25	29
RB-47	15	6	3	3	3	3	2	0
KC-97	20	30	24	14	9	4	0	0
KC-135	10	40	46	53	62	70	70	68
C-124	16	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
B-70	n.a.	0	0	0	0	0	0	1[c]
Missile Systems								
ATLAS: 3x3 Soft	10	4	4	4	4	4	3	2
1x9 Hard	10	1	3	3	3	3	3	3
1x12 Hard	13	0	2	6	6	6	6	6
TITAN: 3x3 Hard	10	0	5	6	6	6	6	6
1x9 Hard	10	0	0	3	8	12	12	12
1x18 Hard	20	0	0	0	0	0	2	4
POLARIS/SSBN:	16	5	7	10	14	26	38	45
MINUTEMAN: Fixed	50	0	0	2.4	13	24.5	40	40
Mobile	30	0	0	1	5	10	10	10
SNARK:	30	1	1	1	0	0	0	0

a/ Figures on the number of organizational units at the end of each fiscal year shown in this table for the Air Force do not agree with those shown in Enclosure "D", Table I. The data above are taken from Department of the Air Force, Report on Selected Strategic and Tactical Weapon Systems (MS-3½), 11 April 1960. The data for Enclosure "D", Table I, were taken from the Air Force Program Guidance Document, P-62-1 and P-62-2. For further explanation see Enclosure "D", page 4, footnote 1.

b/ Interim planning figures for augmentation of B-52's on ground alert. Other numbers being considered are as follows: GAM-77, 18 for ground alert and 23 for airborne alert; GAM-87, 46 for both ground and air alert.

c/ The Air Force program for 12 development aircraft calls for recycling Nos. 2 through 12 to tactical status in the fall of 1966 (FY 1967).

25. While these force projections have as their foundation the FY 1961 President's Budget, it must be realized that many program changes will occur. Some of these changes will emanate from within the Services, while others will emanate from actions by the Executive Branch and the Congress.

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEM COSTS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

26. In this section are presented estimates of the average incremental investment and average annual operating costs per unit for complete weapon systems, with separate estimates of unit costs for the delivery systems and associated nuclear weapons. Estimates of unit costs for the delivery systems are based on funding data furnished by the Military Services,[1] and nuclear weapon costs are derived from data supplied by the Defense Atomic Support Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission.

27. Table III summarizes these costs for four different surface-to-surface missile systems. Table IV presents estimates of additional investment and annual operating costs for four strategic aircraft, with estimates of similar costs for tanker support. Table V provides estimates of the investment and annual operating costs of nuclear bombs and air-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads delivered by strategic aircraft.

28. The unit costs for various combinations of bombs and GAM's, given in Table V, can be combined with unit costs of the manned aircraft, given in Table IV, to obtain composite costs of strategic bombers with nuclear weapons.

29. The investment cost for each delivery system in Table III and Table IV, and for the two air-launched missiles in Table V, includes those initial costs which must be incurred to obtain

1/ With the exception of MINUTEMAN.

one additional delivery vehicle with all essential supporting equipment and facilities. Development costs and investment in industrial facilities are excluded here since such costs generally do not vary with the size of the force.[1]

30. It is important to note that investment costs for bombs and warheads, given in Tables III and V, are net after deducting the salvage value of oralloy, plutonium, and tritium. To account for the costs of these nuclear materials (since they can be recovered at virtually full value at the end of the useful life of the nuclear weapons), we have included, together with other operating costs, an annual "rental" charge, which, for lack of a better measure, is assumed to amount to [redacted] of the initial cost of the salvaged materials. Other annual costs attributable to bombs and warheads are ~~as~~ follows: (1) the average annual cost of tritium replacement averaging [redacted] of the initial value of tritium, and (2) the annual cost of maintenance, repair, and replacement, assumed to average about [redacted] of the non-nuclear cost of the bombs and warheads.

31. Unit investment costs given for delivery vehicles in Tables III and IV, multiplied by the maximum force levels, equal the total investment funds programmed for the specified systems.[2] Similarly, the annual operating costs per unit for the same weapons, times the cumulative total number of aircraft- or missile-years, equal the total amount of funds programmed for "Maintenance and Operations and "Military Personnel" in the same period.[3]

1/ Additional funds may be required for industrial facilities if there is a significant increase in the rate of production; but the actual force level may be increased substantially without altering the rate of production simply by extending the period of procurement.

2/ Investment costs for POLARIS in both the SSBN and Cruiser Systems include only one set of missiles, i.e., shipfill, shakedown, and support. See footnote b/; Table III.

3/ See Table II above for force levels, and Table III, Appendix "A". Note that no funds have been approved for POLARIS installations on cruisers, or for operational B-70 aircraft. Also, note that in a few cases the maximum force level was achieved before 1961.

TABLE III

SUMMARY OF INVESTMENT AND OPERATING COSTS FOR STRATEGIC SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS; AVERAGE COST PER MISSILE FOR DELIVERY SYSTEM AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

TABLE IV

ESTIMATED INVESTMENT AND ANNUAL OPERATING COST OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS WITH TANKER SUPPORT AND QUAIL DECOYS[a]

System	Average Cost per Bomber (Millions of Dollars)	
	Additional Investment	Annual Operating
B-52 - Ground Alert		
B-52 System	13.51	1.11
KC-135 Tanker Support[b]	3.11	0.24
Four GAM-72 QUAIL	2.55	0.07
Total B-52	19.17	1.42
B-52 - One-Fourth Air Alert		
B-52 System and Tanker Support	17.61	2.55
Four GAM-72 QUAIL	2.55	0.07
Total B-52	20.16	2.62
B-47		
B-47 System	3.99	0.59
KC-97 Tanker Support[b]	0.99	0.18
Total B-47	4.98	0.77
B-58		
B-58 System	33.21	0.85
KC-135 Tanker Support[b]	4.67	0.36
Total B-58	37.88	1.21
B-70		
B-70 System[c]	64.00	3.50
KC-135 Tanker Support[b]	4.67	0.36
Total B-70	68.67	3.86

a/ Summarized from Table I, Appendix "A". Note that QUAIL Decoys are used only with B-52's.

c/ Preliminary estimate prepared by WSEG; see paragraph 3, Appendix "A".

TABLE V

ESTIMATED INVESTMENT AND ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS PER UNIT FOR NUCLEAR BOMBS AND AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS a/

(Thousands of Dollars)

ITEM	Incremental Investment Per Unit	Annual Operating Cost Per Unit
A. Nuclear Bombs		
1. Mk 15, Mod 0		
2. Mk 28, Mod 0, Y1		
a. Internal		
b. External		
3. Mk 36, Mod 2, Y1		
4. Mk 39, Mod 1, Y1		
5. TX 41, Y1		
6. TX 43, Y1		
7. TX 53, Configuration 1		
B. Air-to-Surface Missiles With Warheads		
1. GAM-77, HOUNDDOG With Mk 28, Mod 0, Y1 Warhead		
2. GAM-87, SKYBOLT		
a. With Mk 49, Mod 1, Y2 Warhead b/		
b. With XW-56 Warhead b/		

a/ Summarized from Tables I, II, and III of Appendix "A". See paragraph 30 for basis of unit costs for nuclear bombs and GAM warheads.

b/ Warheads for the two GAM-87 configurations have not yet been selected. The Mark 49, Mod 1, Y2 weighing , and the XW-56 weighing about come nearest to meeting the specified weights and yields.

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Unit costs given here may, therefore, be used to derive rough estimates of fiscal requirements for alternative force levels of the specified systems for any given period of years.

32. The derived estimates of changes in funds associated with assumed increases or decreases in force levels will only be approximately accurate, since a major change in procurement will probably have a significant effect on the unit cost of the weapon and associated supporting equipment. If, for example, the number of operational POLARIS missiles and submarines were to be doubled we would expect: (1) a slight decrease in the unit cost of the missiles; (2) very little change in the unit cost of submarines; (3) more investment in overhaul facilities for both submarines and missiles; and (4) an expansion in the capacity of facilities for missile and submarine production.

33. Figure 2, based on Tables III and IV, shows the cumulative cost of one additional unit of six different systems over a ten-year period. Note that these costs exclude bombs and warheads. The cost at year "0" is the initial investment required for one specified unit, to which is added, each year, the annual operating cost per unit.

TOTAL ANNUAL PROGRAM COSTS

34. In this section are presented the total annual costs of achieving and maintaining the proposed forces of strategic offensive weapons. The cost estimates to be employed are in terms of program obligations. In the case of the Navy, program obligations represent the total amounts which the Department plans to place under contract each year for a given program, regardless of the year in which obligating authority was obtained. For the Air Force, the figures represent the total amounts required to fund the program increment authorized in a given year regardless of

FIGURE 2

AVERAGE INVESTMENT AND OPERATING COSTS FOR ONE ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT OR MISSILE OVER A TEN-YEAR PERIOD FOR SELECTED STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

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AVERAGE INVESTMENT AND OPERATING COSTS FOR ONE ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT OR MISSILE OVER A TEN-YEAR PERIOD FOR SELECTED STRATEGIC SYSTEMS *



* Costs include all supporting facilities and associated equipment except bombs, GAM-77 or GAM-87, and warheads.

FIGURE 2
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TABLE VI

KNOWN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEMS - SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED PROGRAM COSTS, FY 1961-67

(Millions of Dollars)

ITEM	1960 and Prior Years	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	Total 1961-67
A/C Systems[a] Including GAM's	28,215	3,931	3,894	2,742	2,520	1,943	1,272	1,174	17,476
RDT&E	1,591	474	624	674	400	234	69	14	2,489
Investment	21,776	1,730	1,597	471	597	282	-	-	4,677
Operating	4,848	1,727	1,673	1,597	1,523	1,427	1,203	1,160	10,310
Surface-to-Surface Missile Systems	10,952	4,137	4,422	5,568	5,773	4,203	2,859	2,604	29,566
RDT&E	5,853	1,467	1,211	936	521	248	75	57	4,515
Investment	4,899	2,471	2,933	4,224	4,461	2,584	666	77	17,416
Operating	200	199	278	408	791	1,371	2,118	2,470	7,635
Support Functions	n.a	2,331	2,414	2,413	2,408	1,785	1,199	1,097	13,647
Total	-	10,399	10,730	10,723	10,701	7,931	5,330	4,875	60,689

a/ Aircraft system funds would increase considerably, especially during the latter part of this period, if proposals for B-52 airborne alert were approved, and if procurement of operational ANP and B-70 were to begin.

the year in which the obligations are to be authorized or incurred. This difference in concept does not affect cost comparisons among weapon systems, although the time distribution of total obligations is affected to a minor degree. Overall summary data appear in Table VI above. Included with aircraft systems are the costs of GAM's and support aircraft (tankers, etc.).

35. In FY 1961 strategic offensive weapon systems costs amount to $10.4 billion. Presently foreseeable annual funding requirements for these systems reach a peak of $10.7 billion in FY 1962-1964.

36. The $10.4 billion for strategic offensive weapon systems in FY 1961 represents about 25 percent of the Defense budget. For comparative purposes it may be noted that the other military mission areas and their approximate portions of the FY 1961 budget are as follows: air defense, 18 percent; tactical air forces (Air Force and Navy), 18 percent; land and sea tactical forces, 33 percent. The remaining 6 percent is for overall departmental outlay, such as retirement pay, which cannot be attributed to any mission area.[1/]

37. Although the foreseeable funds requirements for the strategic offensive weapon systems considered here fall to a level of about $5 billion in FY 1967, it does not follow that this figure represents the amount that will actually be required for the strategic mission in that year. This is true because (a) the costs actually experienced in future years will probably be greater than

1/ The classification of mission areas is taken from the Mahon Reports, as follows: strategic includes Air Force strategic deterrent plus Navy strategic deterrent (POLARIS); air defense includes continental air defense for all three Services; tactical air forces include the attack carrier forces of Naval general purpose forces plus Air Force general purpose forces; land and sea tactical forces include all Army forces except continental air defense, and Naval general purpose forces except attack carrier forces. For document references of the Mahon Reports see footnote, paragraph 41.

estimated due to inflation and other factors, (b) weapon systems now under development will require procurement funding as they approach operational status, and (c) entirely new weapon systems will arise for which research and development funds will be needed. To greater or lesser degree the same factors affect the validity of the estimates for fiscal years 1962-66.

38. About $28 billion has been devoted to current strategic aircraft weapon systems up to the present time. Most of these funds (77 percent) were allocated to investment. Of the $17.5 billion scheduled for these systems in the next seven years, however, only slightly more than one-quarter is for investment, while nearly 60 percent is for the operation of these systems. Investment in currently operational aircraft systems is scheduled to end in FY 1965. RDT&E, mainly for the B-70 and ANP, represents a significant portion of total funds, especially in the earlier part of the FY 1961-1967 period. Procurement of operational B-70's and ANP aircraft, if approved, would require substantial amounts of additional investment funds during the latter part of this period.

39. Nearly $11 billion has been obligated for strategic surface-to-surface missile systems during the years prior to FY 1961. Over one-half of this amount has been for RDT&E, somewhat less than half for investment in operational units, and a small amount for annual operating expenses of these units. While investment will represent nearly 60 percent of total missile funds of $30 billion for the FY 1961-1967 period as a whole, it will have been largely completed by the end of FY 1965. RDT&E funds, for these systems are scheduled to decline to small amounts. As more units are activated, funds for the annual expenses of operational units will rise steadily throughout the period.

40. Strategic aircraft and related systems are now absorbing fewer funds than strategic surface-to-surface missile systems, which is a reversal of the situation at the beginning of FY 1960. By FY 1967 missile systems will be receiving more than twice the funds allocated to aircraft systems.

41. Funds for support functions represent outlays on training, logistics, communications, research and development and intelligence and other activities not allocable by weapon system. Estimates for these functions are very approximate and are largely based on the so-called Mahon Reports 1/ prepared by the Services in the autumn of 1959.

42. The program costs shown in Table VI exclude for the B-52 the costs of continuous airborne alert. Air Force estimates of the additional costs (over and above Table VI), including KC-135 tanker support, which would be incurred to achieve and to fly a one-eighth and a one-quarter continuous airborne alert are, in millions of dollars.

	FISCAL YEARS						
Mode	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
One-eighth	64	272	289	357	383	374	357
One-quarter	504	639	943	1,065	1,068	1,044	997

1/ Army: Department of the Army, Functional Category Presentation, FY 1960-1961 Budget Estimates, 12 October 1959, SECRET.
Navy: Department of the Navy, Memorandum from Secretary of the Navy to Secretary of Defense, 27 October 1959, Subject: Functional Costing, SECRET.
Air Force: Department of the Air Force Functional Category Presentation of FY 1961 Budget Estimates to Office, Secretary of Defense, 15 October 1959, SECRET.

43. One-eighth air alert means that an average of 6 combat-ready B-52's in each wing are airborne; similarly, on one-fourth air alert an average of 11.2 combat-ready B-52's in each wing are airborne. The schedule for airborne alert, as reported by the Air Force, is as follows:

FY Qtr.	A/A Sortie Rate Per Wing	No. of Sqdns C.R.B-52	No. of Aircraft Flying Alert
1/62	6	30	60
2/62	9	30	90
3/62	11.2	32	116
4/62	11.2	33	120

(Units phased into flying alert at the 6 rate for one quarter, the 9 rate for the second quarter, going to the 11.2 rate at beginning of 3rd quarter.)

44. Figures on total funding for each weapon system are shown in Table VII, and in Figure 3. Detailed estimates of RDT&E, investment, and operating funds by weapon system appear in Appendix "A", Table V.

TABLE VII

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEMS ESTIMATED PROGRAM COSTS FY 1961-67

(Millions of Dollars)

TABLE VII
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEMS ESTIMATED PROGRAM COSTS FY 1961-67 a/
(Prior years funding excluded)
(Millions of Dollars)

SYSTEMS	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	TOTAL FY 1961-67
Aircraft and Related Systems	3,931	3,894	2,742	2,520	1,943	1,272	1,174	17,476
Bomber Aircraft	2,548	2,360	1,263	1,209	1,103	880	855	10,218
B-47	635	508	402	305	180	0	0	2,030
B-52 b/	1,391	1,358	784	821	840	789	764	6,747
B-58	522	494	77	83	83	91	91	1,441
GAM's	290	203	318	312	276	51	54	1,504
GAM-72	63	5	6	6	6	6	5	97
GAM-77	167	41	18	18	17	15	8	284
GAM-87	60	157	294	288	253	30	41	1,123
Support Aircraft	691	766	546	599	330	272	251	3,455
KC-97	247	216	154	93	53	0	0	763
KC-135	372	498	356	470	241	241	240	2,418
C-124	24	16	11	11	11	11	11	95
RB-47	48	36	25	25	25	20	0	179
R&D Aircraft Projects	402	565	615	400	234	69	14	2,299
ANP	72	75	92	106	93	40	10	488
B-70	330	490	523	294	141	29	4	1,811
Surface-To-Surface Missile Systems	4,137	4,422	5,568	5,773	4,203	2,859	2,604	29,566
ATLAS	1,278	354	316	139	139	174	162	2,562
TITAN	1,039	945	954	1,084	888	278	331	5,519
MINUTEMAN	522	1,223	1,991	2,472	2,095	1,526	1,569	11,398
POLARIS	1,256	1,857	2,264	2,044	1,050	850	542	9,863
Other c/	42	43	43	34	31	31	0	224
Support Functions	2,331	2,414	2,413	2,408	1,785	1;199	1,097	13,647
TOTAL Strategic Systems	10,399	10,730	10,723	10,701	7,931	5,330	4,875	60,689

a/ Data do not reflect actions taken since April 1960 with respect to the FY 1961 budget.

b/ Excludes costs of continuous airborne alert, as follows:

One-eighth of combat force airborne	64	272	289	357	383	374	357	2,096
One-quarter of combat force airborne	504	639	943	1,065	1,068	1,044	997	6,260

To date $185 million in new funds (FY 1960 and 1961) have been approved for an "on-shelf" airborne alert capability program.

c/ SNARK, THOR, JUPITER.

FIGURE 3

TOTAL ANNUAL PROGRAM COSTS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS, FY 1961-1967

TABLE I (Continued)

c/ Represents the sum of "Procurement for Service Use", and "Military Construction" through FY 1965, divided by the peak number of unit equipment aircraft or missiles. Funds for "RDT&E" and "Procurement - Industrial Facilities" are excluded from this average.

d/ Represents the sum of "Operations and Maintenance" and "Military Personnel" for FY 1958 to FY 1965, divided by the cumulative number of aircraft or missile years in that period.

e/ The averages for A-1 or A-2 and for A-3 assume only one set of missiles, i.e., shipfill, shakedown, and support for each SSBN, while the investment costs based on total FBM funds include the cost of 729 additional A-2 and A-3 missiles to replace all of the A-1's by FY 1964 and all of the A-2's by FY 1968 (See Appendix "C" for details).

f/ See Annex "B", Appendix "C" for basis of estimates.

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RESTRICTED DATA

AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

TABLE III

WEIGHT, YIELD AND UNIT COST OF SELECTED WARHEADS FOR STRATEGIC MISSILE SYSTEMS[a/]

	Mk 28, Mod 0, Y1	XW-38-X1	Mk 39, Mod 1, Y1	TX-41 Y1	XW-47	Mk 49, Mod 1, Y2	TX-53	XW-56	Cluster WH of POLARIS[b/]
Weight (Lbs)	1,645	3,080	6,230	8,829	710	1,665	6,900	680	720
Yield (KT)									600
Cost per Unit ($1000)									
a. Nuclear Cost									
(1) Materials[c/]									
(a) Oralloy									
(b) Plutonium									
(c) Tritium									
(d) Li D									
Total Materials									
(2) Depreciation of Materials Facilities									
Total Nuclear Cost									
b. Non-nuclear Costs									
(1) Fabrication									
(a) Nuclear Materials Fabrication	7	36	11	26	26	17	25	26	70
(b) Other Materials and Fabrication	23	173	31	99	93	25	50	63	180
Total Fabrication	30	209	42	125	119	42	75	89	250
(2) Depreciation of Fabrication Facilities	3	5	4	4	3	3	4	3	12
Total Non-Nuclear Cost	33	214	46	129	122	45	79	92	262
c. Total Cost:									

a/ See footnote a/, Table II. The warhead elements of the TX-41 and TX-53 bombs are included here since they may be modified for use in advanced missile systems.

b/ All estimates for this weapon are preliminary.

c/ See footnote b/, Table II.

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RESTRICTED DATA
RESTRICTED DATA

TABLE IV

INVESTMENT AND OPERATING COSTS FOR STRATEGIC MISSILE SYSTEMS, INCLUDING DELIVERY VEHICLES AND WARHEADS; AVERAGE COST PER OPERATIONAL MISSILE AND WARHEAD

TABLE V

STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS - ESTIMATED RDT&E INVESTMENT AND OPERATING COSTS, FY 1960 - 1967, BY SYSTEM a/
(Million Dollars)

System and Class of Funds	1960 & PY	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Aircraft & Related Systems								
Bomber Aircraft								
B-47	7,570	635	508	402	305	180	0	0
RDTE	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Investment	5,416	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
Operating	2,145	634	507	402	305	180	-	-
B-52 (Ground Alert)	9,877	1,391	1,358	783	821	840	789	764
RDTE	205	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Investment	8,349	782	695	62	50	45	-	-
Operating	1,322	609	663	721	771	795	789	764
B-58	2,793	522	494	77	83	83	91	91
RDTE	85	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Investment	2,698	494	438	-	-	-	-	-
Operating	10	28	56	77	83	83	91	91
Bomber Aircraft Total:	20.240	2,547	2,360	1,263	1,209	1,103	880	855
RDTE	299	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Investment	16,463	1,276	1,134	62	50	45	-	-
Operating	3,477	1,271	1,226	1,201	1,159	1,058	880	855
Air-to-Surface Missiles								
GAM-72	206	63	5	6	6	6	6	5
RDTE	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Investment	192	60	-	-	-	-	-	-
Operating	3	3	5	6	6	6	6	5

TABLE V (Cont'd)

System and Class of Funds	1960 & PY	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
GAM-77	480	167	41	18	18	17	15	8
RDTE	43	11	5	-	-	-	-	-
Investment	432	150	22	-	-	-	-	-
Operating	5	6	14	18	18	17	15	8
GAM-87	38	60	157	294	288	253	30	41
RDTE	38	60	54	59	-	-	-	-
Investment	-	-	103	235	285	237	-	-
Operating	-	-	-	-	3	16	30	41
GAM Total	724	290	203	318	312	276	51	54
RDTE	92	70	59	59	-	-	-	-
Investment	624	210	125	235	285	237	-	-
Operating	8	10	19	24	27	39	51	54
Support Aircraft	2,419	247	216	154	93	53	0	0
KC-97	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RDTE	1,610	4	1	-	-	-	-	-
Investment	809	243	215	154	93	53	-	-
Operating	2,471	372	498	356	470	241	241	240
KC-135	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RDTE	2,261	240	337	174	262	-	-	-
Investment	209	132	161	182	208	241	241	240
Operating	271	24	16	11	11	11	11	11
C-124	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RDTE	177	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Investment	94	24	16	11	11	11	11	11
Operating	891	48	36	25	25	25	20	0
RB-47	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RDTE	641	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Investment	250	48	36	25	25	25	20	-
Operating								

TABLE V (Cont'd)

System and Class of Funds	1960 & PY	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Support Aircraft Total	6,053	690	766	546	599	330	272	251
RDTE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Investment	4,689	244	338	174	262	-	-	-
Operating	1,363	446	428	372	337	330	272	251
Aircraft Development Projects, Total	1,199	402	565	615	400	234	69	14
ANP (RDTE Only)	478	72	75	92	106	93	40	10
B-70 (RDTE Only)	721	330	490	523	294	141	29	4
Aircraft and Related Systems, Subtotal	28,215	3,931	3,894	2,742	2,520	1,943	1,272	1,174
RDTE	1,591	474	624	674	400	234	69	14
Investment	21,776	1,730	1,597	471	597	282	-	-
Operating	4,848	1,727	1,673	1,597	1,523	1,427	1,203	1,160
Surface-to-Surface Missile Systems	3,204	1,278	354	316	139	139	174	162
ATLAS	1,812	245	114	56	-	-	-	-
RDTE	1,301	961	155	140	-	-	-	-
Investment	91	72	85	120	139	139	174	162
Operating	2,182	1,039	945	954	1,084	888	278	331
TITAN	1,504	425	230	204	187	90	-	-
RDTE	656	575	646	662	763	621	-	-
Investment	22	39	69	88	134	177	278	331
Operating	559	522	1,223	1,991	2,472	2,095	1,526	1,569
MINUTEMAN	507	312	265	143	87	30	-	-
RDTE	52	210	958	1,795	2,050	1,249	208	-
Investment	-	-	-	53	335	816	1,318	1,569
Operating								

TABLE V (Cont'd)

System and Class of Funds	1960 & PY	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
POLARIS	2,496	1,256	1,857	2,264	2,044	1,050	850	542
RDTE	1,122	485	602	533	247	128	75	57
Investment	1,354	725	1,174	1,627	1,648	714	458	77
Operating	20	46	81	104	149	208	317	408
OTHER b/	2,511	42	43	43	34	31	31	0
RDTE	908	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Investment	1,536	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Operating	67	42	43	43	34	31	31	0
Surface-to-Surface Missile Subtotal	10,952	4,137	4,422	5,568	5,773	4,203	2,859	2,604
RDTE	5,853	1,467	1,211	936	521	248	75	57
Investment	4,899	2,471	2,933	4,224	4,461	2,584	666	77
Operating	200	199	278	408	791	1,371	2,118	2,470

a/ Data do not reflect actions taken since April 1960 on the FY 1961 budget.
b/ SNARK, THOR, and JUPITER.

APPENDIX "B" TO ENCLOSURE "F"

ESTIMATED COSTS OF THE MINUTEMAN WEAPON SYSTEM

APPENDIX "B" TO ENCLOSURE "F"

ESTIMATED COSTS OF THE MINUTEMAN WEAPON SYSTEM

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APPENDIX "B" TO ENCLOSURE "F"

ESTIMATED COSTS OF THE MINUTEMAN WEAPON SYSTEM

PURPOSE

1. To present estimates, developed by WSEG with the assistance of Air Force agencies of the costs of the MINUTEMAN weapon system.

SUMMARY OF THE ESTIMATES

2. The estimates in this paper are predicated upon force objectives of 2000 fixed-site missiles and 300 mobile missiles. Total program costs for the FY 1961-67 period are estimated at about $11.4 billion of which $7.6 billion represents research, development, test, and evaluation costs, outlays for industrial facilities, and investment in deployed missiles. The remaining $3.8 billion comprises the total of all operating costs of deployed squadrons during this program period. A summary of the estimates appears in Table I.

TABLE I

SUMMARY OF MINUTEMAN PROGRAM COST ESTIMATES, FY 1961-67
(Millions of Dollars)

Item	Cost
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation	837
Industrial Facilities	40
Missiles and Spare Parts	2,176
Support Equipment and Spare Parts	3,280
Construction a/	1,000
Other	230
Subtotal	7,563
Operating Costs (less training missiles included above)	3,835
Total Program Costs	11,398

a/ 100 psi silo and 500 psi LCC.

3. Estimated initial investment and annual operating costs per deployed missile, in millions of dollars, are:

	Fixed System	Mobile System
Investment Cost	$2.678	$3.443
Annual Operating Cost	0.646	0.924

4. Experience with several modern weapon systems has shown that cost estimates made prior to the time of operational deployment are often too low by a wide margin. Two years will elapse before the MINUTEMAN system becomes operational. There is a good possibility that by this time events will have proved that the cost estimates herein were optimistic.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

5. The specifications of this weapon system, and most of the numerical cost data and various factors for manipulating it were obtained from the Air Force, as follows:

a. Conference of AFBMD, AFABF, SAC, RAND, and WSEG personnel, 4-7 April 1960.

b. MINUTEMAN Briefing to Air Council and Air Weapons Board, 15-18 February 1960.

c. MINUTEMAN Development Plan, 15 August 1959.

d. Air Force MS-3 Report, October 1959.

e. Tabular materials prepared by AFABF-10 on 29 April 1960 and by AFBMD in July 1960.

6. The figures for only one major item of cost, the missile itself, were derived in WSEG. The WSEG cost estimates for the MINUTEMAN missile are based upon consultations with knowledgeable cost analysts in various organizations.

SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS

7. The cost estimates in this paper pertain to the MINUTEMAN weapon system essentially as it is described in the 15 August 1959 Development Plan.

8. The main departures from the Development Plan are:

c. Three missiles per train are currently stipulated for the mobile system.

d. A mean-time-to-failure objective of 7000 hours.

9. MINUTEMAN force tabs currently planned by the Air Force are as follows:

TABLE II

CURRENTLY PLANNED MINUTEMAN FORCE TABS

Fiscal Year	Number of Deployed Missiles at End of Year		
	Fixed	Mobile	Total
1961	--	--	--
1962	--	--	--
1963	120	30	150
1964	649	156	805
1965	1225	300	1525
1966	2000	300	2300
1967	2000	300	2300

As of the present, the Ballistic Missiles Committee of OSD has given its approval to the Air Force to initiate production commitments to achieve a force of 150 missiles by the close of FY 1963. Subsequent increments have not yet been approved, nor have the ultimate force objectives received approval from the Administration and the Congress.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESTIMATES

10. Classification of Costs. Costs are classified under the following main headings:

a. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

b. Industrial Facilities

c. Initial Investment Costs

(1) Major Equipment and Initial Spares (missiles and spare parts).

(2) Support Equipment and Initial Spares (GSE, communications, RR equipment, etc.).

(3) Construction (silos, launch control centers, roads, etc.).

(4) Initial Training

(5) Other (fuel, supplies, etc.).

d. Annual Operating Costs

(1) Personnel

Pay and Allowances

Replacement Training.

(2) Maintenance and Replacement

Missiles

GSE

Communications

RR Equipment

Operational Facilities

(3) Training Missiles

(4) Base Support

(5) Other.

e. Total Program Costs

11. Procedure. In this paper Air Force estimates of RDTE and Industrial Facilities costs as reported in MS-3A of October 1959 are accepted. The pages to follow will present, in detail,

the development of our estimates of the initial investment and annual operating costs of the MINUTEMAN system in both the fixed (hardened and dispersed) and mobile modes. These estimates were arrived at with the cooperation and assistance of the Air Force Director of Budget and the Ballistic Missiles Division. The discussion will proceed item by item in the same order in which the item apears above in the classification of initial investment and annual operating costs.

MAJOR EQUIPMENT AND INITIAL SPARES INVESTMENT

12. The cumulative average price of $743,000 per missile is taken from a cost-quantity curve developed in WSEG and is the price for a total of 2664 missiles through FY 1967. This procurement requirement is based upon the stipulated force schedules, a requirement for an initial training firing by each squadron and train, a proficiency firing program of two missiles per squadron annually, and a requirement for ninety test missiles.

13. The WSEG cost-quantity curve for this missile was derived from information obtained from industry on the costs of the major components; i.e., airframe, propulsion, guidance and control, and re-entry vehicle. The curve is actually a combination of two log-linear curves. The first segment runs through missile 300 and has a 90 percent slope. The formula for this curve is $\log y = 3.34541 - 0.15201 \log x$, where y is the cumulative average price and x is the cumulative missile number. The second segment has a 93 percent slope and the formula is $\log y = 3.22814 - 0.10471 \log x$.

14. According to BMD, initial missile spares are required equivalent to 10 percent of the value of the missile. The total cost of major equipment and initial spares is thus $743,000 per missile plus $74,000 for initial spare parts, a total of $817,000

per missile. This amounts to $40,850,000 per fixed squadron of 50 missiles, and to $2,451,000 per train of three missiles of the mobile system.

SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AND INITIAL SPARES INVESTMENT

15. Silo Equipment (less communications, guidance and control). BMD has supplied cost-quantity data on this equipment for up to 1000 units. Extrapolation of these data to 2000 units yields a figure of $70,000 per missile.

16. Launch Control Center Equipment (less communications, guidance and control). The BMD figure of approximately $5000 per missile for this equipment is derived from the cost-quantity data for LCC number 200, the required number for 2000 missiles.

17. Guidance and Control Equipment. The basis for this estimate is a BMD tabulation on the costs of the mobile system, the cost for the first unit of guidance and control equipment amounting to $1,050,000 per missile. This includes the sequencer monitor, autocolimator, control consoles, and guidance and contro couplers. This equipment, according to AFOOP, is essentially the same for both fixed and mobile systems. Application of a 95 per cent cost-quantity curve (log y = 3.02119 - 0.07408 log x) yields an estimate of $592,000 per missile for the 2300 missile of the fixed and mobile systems.

18. Strategic Missile Support Area Equipment. The SMSA, located at an existing Air Force base, provides squadron headquarters and support for three squadrons of the fixed system. Maintenance teams and targeting units are based at the SMSA and are equipped with vehicles for performing on-site fault isolati and "tinker-toy" type maintenance at the silos, and for target data insertion, missile rotation, and fuzing. In addition, re entry vehicles and warheads are received at the SMSA, and tran ported thence to the silos for mating with the missile. Guida

and control system maintenance is performed at the SMSA. The cost of the equipment for accomplishing these functions is estimated by BMD at $31,000 per missile for the fixed system. Lacking a better figure, $31,000 per missile is also employed in this paper per mobile system missile. It is assumed that personnel, maintenance, and storage facilities existing at the airbase will be adequate and no cost is included for these items.

19. Transporter-Erector for Fixed System. The transporter-erector is a large vehicle for transporting a MINUTEMAN missile, placing it in the silo and withdrawing it from the silo. This vehicle has an all-up weight of 54 tons. BMD estimates the average price of these vehicles, of which 35 are planned for each 1000 missiles, at $60,000 per missile. To this is added an arbitrary 5 percent initial spares factor bringing the total cost per missile to $63,000.

20. RR Equipment - Mobile System. The only RR equipment to be bought consists of the missile launch car, the control car, and the power cars. One launch car, costing about $900,000 according to AFOOP, is of course required for each missile. However, only one control car and two power cars, priced at $380,000 and $450,000 respectively by BMD, are required per three-missile train. The total cost of purchased rail equipment, including a 5 percent initial spares factor, then becomes $1,393,000 per missile. Other equipment, i.e., locomotives, dining cars, sleeping cars, etc., will either be taken from existing surplus military rolling stock or will be rented from the railroads.

21. Communications Equipment - Fixed System. The estimates of the costs of this equipment are taken from the MINUTEMAN Briefing

to the Air Council and Air Weapons Board, 15-18 February 1960. The data are reproduced in Table III.

TABLE III

ESTIMATED COMMUNICATIONS INVESTMENT COSTS PER HARDENED AND DISPERSED SQUADRON

Item	Cost
LCS Data Terminal ($55,000 per silo)	$2,750,000
LCC Data Terminal	650,000
Cable	6,000,000-18,000,000
SAC Command Radio Equipment	354,000
Augmentation of Base Telephone	54,000
Total:	$9,808,000-21,808,000

(N.B. If very low frequency ground wave propagation is successfully developed, communications costs may be in the range of $4-6 million per squadron.) Lacking further evidence, the mid-value of about $15.8 million per squadron or $316,000 per missile is employed here for fixed system communications equipment cost.

22. Communications Equipment - Mobile System. These are estimated by BMD at $217,000 per missile for a three-missile train.

23. Support Equipment Initial Spares. According to BMD personnel, the cost of initial spares for GSE would amount to between 15 percent and 25 percent of the initial investment. A figure of 20 percent is used in this paper, except in the cases of the transporter-erector and railroad equipment as already noted.

CONSTRUCTION INVESTMENT COSTS

24. Silos and Launch Control Centers. BMD has provided a figure of $360,000 for construction of a silo (100 psi) and one tenth missiles per LCC) of a launch control center (500 psi).

25. Roads. It is very difficult to estimate the costs of roads for a typical squadron since terrain features will vary widely and since the frequency of traffic cannot be accurately predicted. Some improvement of existing highways will be required. Based on data pertaining to ATLAS-TITAN squadron road costs, a figure of $100,000 per missile is selected. In addition, an access drive will be built from the highway to the silo, and the cost of this construction is estimated by BMD at $40,000 per missile.

26. Railroad Construction. The Air Force does not currently plan the construction of any sidings but will instead use existing sidings for the pre-surveyed firing sites. There will be no construction of buildings or other installations, except of a trivial nature, at these sidings.

INITIAL TRAINING AND OTHER INVESTMENT

27. Initial Training. This cost is estimated by the Air Force in its MS-3 Report at $72,000 per missile or $9,000 a man. The mobile system requires three times the number of personnel per missile and initial training costs amount to $216,000 per missile on a three-missile train.

28. Other. Initial investment in fuel and miscellaneous supplies is reported at $9,000 per missile in the MS-3 and this figure is also applied to the mobile system.

ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS - PERSONNEL

29. Pay and Allowances. The SAC estimate of $36,000 per missile per year is used for the fixed system and the AFABF figure of $134,000 per missile per year for the mobile system.

30. Replacement Personnel Training. The same sources, SAC and AFABF, provide estimates of $12,000 per missile annually for

fixed missiles and $36,000 per missile annually for mobile missiles. The estimates are based upon an assumption of a 25 percent per year personnel turnover rate and a replacement training cost factor of $6,000 per man.

ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS - RAILROAD RENTALS

31. AFABF estimates the cost of locomotives and car rentals, including RR personnel, at $73,000 per missile per year for the mobile system.

ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AND REPLACEMENT COSTS

32. Missiles. Maintenace costs are estimated by SAC at 15 percent of initial investment per year. Fifteen percent of the $812,000 initial cost is $122,600 per missile and this figure is applied in both the fixed and mobile cases.

33. Ground Support Equipment. SAC estimates that GSE maintenance will cost about 35 percent of the initial investment annually and that GSE replacement will cost about 15 percent of initial investment each year. Investment in fixed-system GSE is $698,000 per missile. Therefore, GSE maintenance and replacement will cost about $349,000 per missile per year. Transporter-erector maintenance and replacement at 20 percent of investment amounts to $12,000 per year bringing the GSE total to $361,000 per missile. Mobile system GSE investment of $623,000 per missile will require an annual maintenance and replacement expenditure of $312,000.

34. Communications Equipment. According to SAC, annual maintenance and replacement of communications equipment will cost about 10 percent of initial investment. This amounts to $32,000 per missile per year for the fixed system and to $22,000 per missile per year for the mobile system.

35. Railroad Equipment. AFABF estimates the fees for maintaining railroad equipment for the mobile system at $72,000 per year.

36. Operational Facilities. Maintenance and replacement of these facilities is estimated by SAC at 5 percent of initial investment per year. In the case of the fixed system, the investment in silos and LCC's is $360,000 per missile and the annual charge amounts to $18,000 per missile annually for these facilities. In the case of the mobile system AFABF provides a figure of $31,000 per missile per year for operational facilities and equipment. No investment is contemplated for mobile system firing site facilities and mobile unit support base facilities are assumed to exist at the host airbase. Maintenance and replacement charges on these facilities, plus similar charges for MUSB (SMSA) equipment purchased for this weapon comprise the $31,000 figure noted above.

ANNUAL TRAINING MISSILE COSTS

37. SAC stipulates that operational squadrons each perform two training firings a year in order to maintain proficiency in the use of the weapon. With 50 missiles per fixed and 30 missiles per mobile squadron, and at a unit price of $817,000 per missile the annual cost of training firings per squadron amounts to $33,000 and $54,000 on a per-unit equipment missile basis, respectively.

ANNUAL BASE SUPPORT COSTS

38. These costs, covering housing, medical service, transport etc., are estimated by SAC at $2000 per man annually. This amounts to $16,000 per year per fixed system missile and to $48,000 per mobile system missile.

TABLE IV

ESTIMATED INITIAL INVESTMENT COSTS FIXED MINUTEMAN SYSTEM[a]

Investment	Thousand $ Per Missile	Source
Major Equipment		
Missiles	743	Weapon Systems Evaluation Group
Initial Spares	74	WSEG Using BMD 10% Spares Factor
Total Major Equipment	817	
Support Equipment		
Silo Equipment Less Guidance and Control	70	BMD Data from AFABF
LCC Equipment Less Guidance and Control	5	BMD Data from AFABF
Guidance and Control	592	BMD Mobile System Tabulation and 95% Curve
SMSA	31	BMD
Communications b/	316	Air Council Briefing
Initial Spares for All Above	203	BMD 20% Spares Factor
Transporter-Erector and Initial Spares	63	BMD Plus 5% Spares Factor
Total Support Equipment	1,280	
Construction		
Silo and LCC	360	BMD
Roads - Highway Improvement c/	100	Bureau of Public Roads and Army Trans. Corps
- Silo Access	40	BMD
Total Construction	500	
Initial Training - Total	72	AF: MS-3
Other - Total	9	AF: MS-3
Total Investment Per Missile	2,678	

a/ These costs are applicable for 100 psi silos and 500 psi LCC's. Preliminary WSEG estimates for a configuration of 300 psi silos and 1000 psi LCC's come to a total investment of $2.78 million per missile.

b/ If ground wave propagation is successful, costs will approximate $1,000,000 per missile.

c/ Based on ATLAS-TITAN experience.

TABLE V

ESTIMATED ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS - FIXED MINUTEMAN SYSTEM[a]

Item	Thousand $ Per Missile	Source
Personnel		
Pay and Allowances	36	SAC
Replacement Training	12	SAC
Total Personnel	48	
Maintenance and Replacement		
Missiles (Maintenance only)	123	SAC
GSE	361	SAC
Communications	32	SAC
Operational and SMSA Facilities	18	SAC
Total Maintenance and Replacement	534	
Training Missiles - Total	33	Two Per Sqdn Per Year
Base Support - Total	16	SAC
Other - Total	15	SAC
Total Annual Operating Cost Per Missile	646	

a/ These costs are applicable for 100 psi silos and 500 psi LCC's. Preliminary WSEG estimates for a configuration of 300 psi silos and 1000 psi LCC's come to a total annual operating cost of $0.652 million per missile.

TABLE VI

ESTIMATED INITIAL INVESTMENT COSTS - MOBILE MINUTEMAN SYSTEM a/

ITEM	Thousand $ Per Missile	Source
Major Equipment		
Missiles	743	WSEG
Initial Spares	74	WSEG Using BMD 10% Spares Factor
Total Majoe Equipment	817	
Railroad Equipment		
Launch Car	900	BMD & AFOOP
Control Car	127	BMD
Power Car	300	BMD
Initial Spares	66	5% Initial Spares Factor
Total Railroad Equipment	1,393	
Support Equipment		
Guidance GSE	592	BMD Mobile Tabulation & 95% Curve
Control GSE		
Control Consoles	217	BMD
Communications Equipment	31	BMD
SMSA Equipment	168	BMD 20% Spares Factor
Initial Spares for Above		
Total Support Equipment	1,008	
Initial Training - Total	216	AF: MS-3 Factor
Other - Total	9	AF: MS-3
TOTAL INVESTMENT PER MISSILE	3,443	

a/ Three missiles per train.

TABLE VII

ESTIMATED ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS
MOBILE MINUTEMAN SYSTEM a/

ITEM	Thousand $ Per Missile	Source
Personnel		
Pay & Allowances	134	AFABF
Replacement Training	36	AFABF
Total Personnel	170	
RR Fees - Total	73	AFABF
Maintenance & Replacement		
Missiles	123	SAC 15% Factor
GSE	312	SAC 35% + 15% Factor
Communications	22	SAC 10% Factor
RR Equipment	72	AFABF
Facilities & Equipment	31	AFABF
Total Maintenance & Replacement	560	
Training Missiles - Total	54	WSEG at 2/Sqdn/yr
Base Support - Total	48	AFABF
Other - Total	19	AFABF
TOTAL ANNUAL OP. COST PER MISSILE	924	

a/ Three missiles per train.

OTHER ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS

39. Other annual operating costs are incurred for fuel, supplies, transportation of missiles, and services of technical representatives. For the fixed system, these costs are estimated by SAC at $15,000 per missile annually. In the case of the mobile system, these costs are estimated by AFABF at $19,000 annually.

TABULAR SUMMATION OF INVESTMENT AND OPERATING COSTS

40. The foregoing material is summarized in the following tables:

a. Table IV - Estimated Initial Investment Costs - Fixed MINUTEMAN System.

b. Table V - Estimated Annual Operating Costs - Fixed MINUTEMAN System.

c. Table VI - Estimated Initial Investment Costs - Mobile MINUTEMAN System.

d. Table VII - Estimated Annual Operating Costs - Mobile MINUTEMAN System.

ESTIMATES OF TOTAL PROGRAM FUNDING

41. Using the estimates developed here for initial investment and annual operating costs, and Air Force estimates of RDTE and Industrial Facilities costs, figures on total program funding have been derived and appear in Table VIII below.

TABLE VIII

ESTIMATES OF TOTAL PROGRAM FUNDING FOR MINUTEMAN: FY 1961-67
(Millions of Dollars)

Fiscal Year	RDTE Funds	Industrial Facility Funds and Other	Investment Funds			Operating Funds			Total Funds
			Fixed System	Mobile System	Total	Fixed System	Mobile System	Total	
1961	312	41	128	41	169	-	-	-	522
1962	265	5	727	226	953	-	-	-	1223
1963	143	12	1358	425	1783	39	14	53	1991
1964	87	15	1744	291	2035	249	86	335	2472
1965	30	8	1191	50	1241	605	211	816	2095
1966	-	-	208	-	208	1041	277	1318	1526
1967	-	-	-	-	-	1292	277	1569	1569
TOTAL	837	81	5356	1033	6389	3226	865	4091	11398

APPENDIX "C" TO ENCLOSURE "F"

ESTIMATED COSTS OF THE POLARIS WEAPON SYSTEM

APPENDIX "C" TO ENCLOSURE "F"

ESTIMATED COSTS OF THE POLARIS WEAPON SYSTEM

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APPENDIX "C" TO ENCLOSURE "F"

ESTIMATED COSTS OF THE POLARIS WEAPON SYSTEM

PURPOSE

1. To evaluate the latest available estimates of the costs of the POLARIS FBM/SSBN weapon system, and to furnish estimates of the cost of proposed POLARIS Cruiser programs. Estimates for POLARIS installations on cruisers are given in Annex "B" to this Appendix.

SUMMARY OF ESTIMATES

2. Total programmed obligations through Fiscal Year 1967, to achieve an operational force of 45 SSBN's equipped with POLARIS missiles are estimated at $12.4 billion according to official CNO estimates dated 27 April 1960. This total is about 57 percent higher than a similar estimate for the same force level and time period prepared by the same office in June 1959. Comparative data are given in Table I.

TABLE I

COMPARISON OF ESTIMATES OF POLARIS SYSTEM COSTS FOR 45 SSBN FORCE THROUGH FY 1967

	Special Projects Office (30 June 59)a/ (Millions)	MS-3/2A and Supplements (April-July 60) (Millions)	Increase	
			Millions	Percen
RDT&E and Related	$1,867	$3,225	$1,358	73
Procurement	4,128	4,749	621	15
Submarines (45)	538	2,032	1,494	278
Missiles	292	379	87	30
Tenders	112	154	42	38
Industrial Facilities	129	145	16	12
Military Construction	--	342	342	--
Other Investment				
Maintenance and Operations	610	1,124	514	84
Military Personnel	189	210	21	11
TOTAL	$7,865	$12,360	$4,495	57

a/ Submitted by SPO for use in WSEG Report No. 23, Second Annual Review.

3. Differences between certain cost elements are due in part to differences in the classification of costs, but the comparison

of totals for the entire system is valid. Most of the increase can be explained by: (1) a considerable increase in development costs mainly attributable to the A-3 missile, (2) revision of unit costs for both submarines and missiles, and (3) addition of 729 A-2 and A-3 missiles to replace all of the A-1's by 1964 and all of the A-2's by FY 1968.

4. The current funding schedules reported in this paper appear to be realistic and complete, and with one minor exception they cover all development, investment, and operating expenses for all facilities and activities which are uniquely associated with the POLARIS program. The only exception is the exclusion of military pay for crews of the two test ships (see paragraph 14).

5. The latest estimates of programmed obligations by fiscal years through 1967 are summarized in Table II. Obligations for RDT&E and investment, through the fiscal year 1960, account for about 22 percent of the nonrecurring costs required to establish an operational capability with A-3 missiles in 45 submarines. Operating costs, of course, rise steadily, reaching a peak at a little more than $400 million per year by 1967.

TABLE II

PROGRAMMED OBLIGATIONS FOR POLARIS WEAPON SYSTEM, BY FISCAL YEARS THROUGH 1967 a/

	Millions of Dollars			
Fiscal Year	RDT&E	Investment	Operating	Total
1957 & Prior	$113.9	$ 14.7	0	$128.6
1958	196.2	241.5	0.5	438.2
1959	389.8	601.6	7.5	998.9
1960	398.6	518.9	12.4	929.9
Subtotal:	$1,098.5	$1,376.7	$ 20.4	$2,495.6
1961	485.4	724.9	46.0	1,256.3
1962	602.3	1,174.2	80.6	1,857.1
1963	532.6	1,627.1	104.7	2,264.4
1964	247.0	1,648.0	149.0	2,044.0
1965	128.1	713.8	208.0	1,049.9
1966	74.7	459.0	316.7	850.4
1967	56.8	76.8	408.4	542.0
Total:	$3,225.4	$7,800.5	$1,333.8	$12,359.7

a/ U.S. Navy, CNO, MS-3/2A Form, 27 April 1960. RDT&E funds include "Procurement for DT&E." Operating funds include "Operation and Maintenance" and "Military Personnel."

6. Programmed force levels and total costs for the principal elements of this system by fiscal years through 1967, are presented in Table I of Appendix "A". The principal elements of cost (excluding warheads) through FY 1967 in millions of dollars, are as follows:

a. RDT&E and Related Procurement		$3,225
b. Initial Investment:		
(1) Submarines (45)	$4,749	
(2) Tenders (6)	379	
(3) Missiles (1,734)	2,032	
(4) Other equipment	342	
(5) Facilities	299	7,801
c. Operating Costs:		
(1) Operation and maintenance	$1,124	
(2) Military personnel	210	1,334
Total costs:		$12,360

7. This program provides for outfitting the submarines initially and after each overhaul period with the most advanced missile then available. This generates a requirement for three sets of missiles (A-1, A-2, and A-3) for each of the first 7 submarines, two sets of missiles (A-2 and A-3) for each of the next 19 submarines, and one set of missiles (A-3) for the last 19 submarines. By the end of FY 1964, all of the A-1 missiles will have been retired and all of the 14 submarines operational at that time will be equipped with A-2 missiles. By the end of FY 1968, all of the 45 submarines will have A-3 missiles. Altogether, a total of 1,940 POLARIS missiles will be procured as follows:

Flight test missiles		206
Shipfill, shakedown, support, and replacement:		
A-1 . . .	159	
A-2 . . .	570	
A-3 . . .	1005	1,734
Total Missiles		1,940

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8. The above costs exclude warheads, but they include the initial cost of reactor cores for the nuclear ship propulsion system and the cost of replacing the expended nuclear fuel materials.

9. Total development and investment costs from the inception of the program through the Fiscal Year 1967, and average costs per submarine and per shipfill missile, are therefore as follows:

	Millions of Dollars		
	Total Costs	Average Per SSBN	Average Per Missile
RDT&E	$ 3,225	71.7	4.5
Initial Investment (excl. of WH)1/	7,801	173.3	10.8
Total1/	$11,026	245.0	15.3

10. By the end of FY 1967 all of the submarines, tenders, and supporting facilities should be fully operational. The cumulative number of SSBN years should then be 126.1, and the cumulative cost of operations for the entire system will amount to $1,334 million (see Table I, Annex "A"). Dividing this total by the total SSBN years, the average annual operating cost per submarine is $10.6 million or about $661 thousand per shipfill missile.

INVESTMENT COSTS PER UNIT

11. Initial investment costs per SSBN, as reported by the Special Projects Office on 7 April 1960, are given below in Table III. These costs exclude warheads, RDT&E, and the cost of 729 A-2 and A-3 missiles for replacement of A-1's and A-2's. Also excluded (since they are considered as part of RDT&E) are the conversion and outfitting costs of the two EAG test ships and the three oceanographic survey vessels.

1/ Includes investment in industrial and development facilities.

TABLE III

POLARIS SYSTEM INVESTMENT COSTS PER SSBN FY 1967
AS REPORTED BY SPECIAL PROJECTS OFFICE

Item	Millions of Dollars
Major Equipment - SSBN's	$ 105.4
Shipfill Missiles	18.8
Shakedown and Support Missiles (6-1/3)	7.4
Other Equipment (including initial spares)	13.6
Personnel Transitional Training	0.3
Initial Ammo, Fuel and Supplies	a/
Site Acquisition and Base Construction	8.4
Total Initial Investment Cost	153.9

a/ Included in "Major Equipment - SSBN's."

12. The cost of replacement missiles must be included in POLARIS costs if the system is to be credited with the progressive improvement in effectiveness represented by the increases in range from [illegible] Replacement missile costs have in fact been included by the Special Projects Office in the programmed obligations summarized above in paragraphs 5 and 6, and given on Table I, Annex "A". The total cost of the replacement missiles is estimated at $873 million or about $19 million per SSBN. This amount, added to the $154 million per SSBN given above in Table III, brings the total initial investment per submarine up to $173 million, which is now consistent with the investment cost per submarine shown in paragraph 9.

OPERATING COSTS PER UNIT

13. The annual operating costs per submarine, as reported by the Special Projects office are given in Table IV.

TABLE IV

POLARIS SYSTEM OPERATING COSTS PER SSBN IN FY 1961 AND FY 1967, AS REPORTED BY SPECIAL PROJECTS OFFICE

Item	Millions of Dollars FY 1961	FY 1967
Personnel Pay and Allowances (SSBN only)	$ 1.1	$ 1.1
Replacement Personnel Training	0.2	0.2
Replacement of Equipment	2.5	5.1
Maintenance of Equipment	2.3	1.2
Replacement and Maintenance of Facilities	1.2	0.7
Replenishment of Ammunition, Fuel and Supplies	$ 0.9	$ 1.0
Total Operating Costs:	$ 8.2	$ 9.3

14. The item "Personnel Pay and Allowances" in Table IV amounting to $1.1 million per SSBN includes only the submarine crews. Other personnel uniquely associated with the POLARIS system are the tender crews and personnel at the Naval Weapons Annexes.[1/] The total cost of military personnel in FY 1967, reported on MS-3.2A forms, amounts to $66.9 million. This total, divided by the 43.2 SSBN's in that year (see Table I, Annex "A"), gives us an average of $1.54 million per SSBN-year, or $0.4 million more than in Table IV.

15. O&M costs, excluding personnel pay and allowances but including maintenance, repair, overhaul, fuel, supplies, replacement of equipment (except missiles), replacement training, etc., amount to $8.2 million per SSBN in FY 1967 according to Table IV. The total for Operation and Maintenance given in MS-3.2A for 1967 (see Table I, Annex "A") is $341.5 million for the system, or $7.91 million per SSBN-year.

1/ It should be noted that O&M costs associated with the EAG test ships and AGS survey vessels are included by Special Projects Office in POLARIS funds for RDT&E or related procurement, but military personnel pay and allowances for crews of the two test ships are not included in any of the POLARIS accounts. These ships are required only in the FBM development program and do not represent a recurring cost to the system. Each of the two EAG test ships has a crew of about 100 officers and enlisted men, and their average annual pay and allowances amount to about $0.5 million per ship.

16. The minor differences between the derived and reported operating costs are relatively unimportant and can be explained by differences in the definition of costs in MS-3.2A and MS-3.2B forms. We conclude that the best estimate of operating costs per SSBN per year will amount to about $10 million when the system is fully operational, and that the average annual operating cost per shipfill missile will be about $625,000, or about 11 percent more than the reported estimate for FY 1967 as given in Table IV.

SHIPBUILDING AND CONVERSION COSTS

17. Forty-five nuclear submarines, six tenders, two EAG test ships, and three survey ships are financed by the POLARIS program In the programmed obligations schedule given in Table I of Annex "A", the cost of submarine construction and tender conversion or construction is accounted for by investment funds, while the conversion costs for the two EAG test vessels and the three AGS survey ships are in RDT&E or related procurement.

18. Investment in submarines represents the most costly part of this system, accounting for $4,749 million or 38.4 percent of total programmed obligations through FY 1967. Included in the cost of submarines and tenders is an allowance for price inflation amounting to $443 million or about 8.6 percent of the total for both types of vessels. Submarine funds also include about $146 million which should be considered as research and development expense since development costs are charged to the lead ships of each class.

19. The latest cost estimates for submarines are as presented in Table V.

TABLE V

CONSTRUCTION AND OUTFITTING COSTS FOR 45 POLARIS SSBN

Number and Name	Thousands of Dollars
SSBN 598, George Washington	$ 180,429
SSBN 599, Patrick Henry	104,501
SSBN 600, Theodore Roosevelt	106,570
SSBN 601, Robert E. Lee	105,045
SSBN 602, Abraham Lincoln	102,786
SSBN 608, Ethan Allen	152,305
SSBN 609, Sam Houston	93,965
SSBN 610, Thomas A. Edison	99,158
SSBN 611, John Marshall	94,241
No. 10	116,400
No. 11	106,000
No. 12	106,000
Subtotal	$1,367,400
Plus 33 SSBN @ $102,475	3,381,600
TOTAL 45 SSBN	$4,749,000

20. The average cost per submarine for the first 9 "follow-on" ships (excluding #598, #608 and #10) amounts to $102,030 thousand. The principal elements of cost comprising this average are as follows:

	Thousands	Percent of Total
Ship construction	$ 69,533	68.1
Navigation	13,014	12.8
Fire control	7,974	7.8
Launching and handling	5,841	5.7
Missile checkout	2,855	2.8
Torpedo fire control	1,926	1.9
Test instrumentation	577	0.6
Training and technical direction	310	0.3
TOTAL	$102,030	100.0

21. In a ship construction program of this magnitude we would expect to find some reduction in unit costs at each shipyard in accordance with normal learning curves for the manufacture of military equipment. This, of course, assumes no major changes in design. Since the estimate of unit costs for the last 33 SSBN's is almost the same as the average for the first 9 "follow-on" submarines, it may be concluded that the allowance for price inflation has cancelled out at least part of the potential savings from large-scale production.

22. Table VI presents shipbuilding and conversion costs, including equipment, for 11 surface ships associated with the POLARIS program.

TABLE VI

SHIP CONSTRUCTION OR CONVERSION AND OUTFITTING COSTS FOR ELEVEN SURFACE SHIPS ASSOCIATED WITH THE POLARIS PROGRAM

SHIP	Thousands of Dollars
EAG-153, Compass Island (Conversion)	$ 19,600
EAG-154, Observation Island (Conversion)	72,800
T-AGS-21, USNS Bowditch (Conversion)	9,784
T-AGS-22, USNS Dutton (Conversion)	9,573
T-AGS-23, USNS Mickelson (Conversion)	10,343
AS-19, USS Proteus - Tender (Conversion)	33,200
AS-31, Tender (New Construction)	72,500
AS-3, Tender (New Construction) AS-4, Tender (New Construction) AS-5, Tender (New Construction) AS-6, Tender (New Construction)	 273,500
Total for 11 Ships:	$ 501,300

23. The ready-for-sea schedule for all POLARIS submarines and ships is presented in Table II, Annex "A".

ESTIMATES OF MISSILE COSTS

24. The total cost of 1,734 POLARIS missiles required for shipfill, replacement, shakedown, and support amounts to $2,032 million, or 16.4 percent of the total programmed obligations through FY 1967. These funds include spare parts, accounting for about 11 percent of the total missile cost.

25. The procurement schedule for missiles by type and programmed obligations through 1967 are shown in Table VII.

TABLE VII

NUMBER AND COST OF POLARIS MISSILES FOR SHIPFILL, SHAKEDOWN AND SUPPORT

Fiscal Year	Number of Missiles A-1	A-2	A-3	Total	Programmed Obligations (Millions)	Average Cost Per Missile (Thousands)
1960 & Prior	134	0	0	134	$187.5	$1,399
1961	25	34	0	59	81.7	1,385
1962	0	184	0	184	197.2	1,072
1963	0	318	0	318	285.1	897
1964	0	34	301	335	435.2	1,299
1965	0	0	352	352	420.2	1,194
1966	0	0	318	318	369.2	1,161
1967	0	0	34	34	55.4	1,629
TOTAL	159	570	1,005	1,734	2,031.5	1,172

26. The average cost per missile in the preceding table tends to fluctuate over the period--first falling then rising--because it is actually a composite of averages for three distinct types of missiles, differing in range, gross weight, and unit costs. Table VIII presents unit costs separately for each of the three types.

TABLE VIII

ESTIMATES OF POLARIS MISSILE COSTS BY TYPE

	Number of Missiles		Total Cost of Missiles ($ Millions)		Average Cost Per Missile ($ Thousands)	
	In Each Block	Cumulative	In Each Block	Cumulative	In Each Block	Cumulative
A-1 Missiles:						
Range: Gross Wt: 28,600 lbs.	(159 missiles costed at a lump sum of $235.8 million; average per missile = $1,483 thousand)					
A-2 Missiles:						
Range: Gross Wt: 33,225 lbs.	79	79	$107.3	$107.3	$1,358	$1,358
	45	124	55.0	162.3	1,223	1,309
	91	215	100.1	262.4	1,100	1,220
	181	396	179.2	441.6	990	1,115
	174	570	154.9	596.5	890	1,046
A-3 Missiles:						
Range: Gross Wt: 34,830	50	50	82.0	82.0	1,640	1,640
	100	150	147.6	229.6	1,476	1,531
	150	300	198.8	428.4	1,325	1,428
	300	600	358.8	787.2	1,196	1,312
	405	1005	458.9	1246.1	1,133	1,240

OTHER POLARIS FACILITIES

27. Programmed funds for this system finance a great many military and industrial facilities used in the development, production, maintenance, and operation of the submarines and missiles. The most important of these are as follows:

a. Submerged launch test facilities, San Clemente Island, California.

b. AFMTC facilities for POLARIS tests, Cape Canaveral, Florida.

c. Aerojet plant, Sacramento, California.

d. Lockheed plant, Sunnyvale, California.

e. Hypervelocity gun range.

f. Navigation test facility

g. Surface-current experimental facility

h. Three submarine overhaul facilities

i. Two missile assembly facilities

j. Three FBM training facilities

[redacted]

n. Graving dock, Charleston, S. C.

28. Some of these facilities are obviously useful only in the development and testing of operational POLARIS equipment, thus representing nonrecurring costs which are independent of the size of the force. Some installations, such as VLF and HARE stations, are shared with other Navy systems. Other facilities are clearly associated with POLARIS/SSBN maintenance and operation, so that their costs would tend to vary with the number of units in operation. In general, the construction or expansion of all of these facilities is financed by the Military Construction (MCON)

account, while procurement of their equipment may be covered either by the same funds or in Procurement of Aircraft and Missiles (PAMN), or Other Procurement, Navy (OPN).

29. Most of the initial costs of these facilities are covered by the following accounts, given by year in Table I of Annex "A".

	Total Initial Cost Through FY 1967 (Millions)
a. Industrial facilities (except equipment)	$ 153.6
b. Development facilities (MCON only)	28.0
c. Operations and other facilities (MCON only)	117.2
d. Equipment other than ships and missiles	342.0
Total above items:	$ 640.8

30. Although records currently available within WSEG do not reveal the amounts attributable to each of the 14 items listed above in paragraph 27, it is possible to show the approximate cost of seven of them from details given in the latest POLARIS budget for FY 1961.[1/] Total funds available through that year, in thousands of dollars, are as follows:

a. Submerged launch test facility (MCON)	$ 2,265
b. AFMTC facilities for POLARIS (MCON)	21,601
c. Aerojet plant:	
(1) Expansion (MCON)	5,750
(2) Equipment (PAMN)	26,630
d. Lockheed plant:	
(1) Expansion (MCON)	9,938
(2) Equipment (PAMN)	28,300
e. Submarine overhaul facility, Charleston, S. C. (MCON)	2,355
f. Missile assembly facility, Charleston, S.C.:	

1/ From POLARIS Fiscal Year 1961 Budget, submitted by the Special Projects Office, 1 February 1960.

(1) Construction (MCON)	11,025
(2) Equipment (PAMN)	21,074
g. VLF, Maine (MCON)	49,133

SSBN OPERATING CYCLE AND MISSILE FAILURE RATE

33. The above information was received 1 July 1960[1] by WSEG in response to a question submitted to the Special Project Office. The exact text of the SPO's statement is as follows:

"The operating cycle used in developing the costs was as follows:

		Sea		O'Haul		Sea		O'Haul
598 Class SSBN	1st	30M	-	6	-	30	-	10
	Later	35	-	4	-	35	-	10
608 Class		35	-	4	-	35	-	10

While at sea the SSBN's spend 60 days on patrol and 30 days at tender, of which one week is at sea for pre-patrol refresher training and can be considered patrolling. Percent of time on station for one complete cycle is therefore $\frac{(35+35)}{(35+4+35+10)} \times \frac{(60+7)}{(90)} \times 100$

= 62%

1/ See Memorandum for the Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group; (Op-723/nc, Ser 00276P72, 1 July 1960).

ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "C"

POLARIS FORCE LEVELS, PROGRAMMED OBLIGATIONS, AND READY-FOR-SEA SCHEDULE

TABLE I

POLARIS WEAPON SYSTEM FORCE LEVELS
AND PROGRAMMED OBLIGATIONS BY
FISCAL YEARS THROUGH 1967

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TABLE I

POLARIS WEAPON SYSTEM FORCE LEVELS AND PROGRAMMED OBLIGATIONS BY FISCAL YEARS THROUGH 1967

ITEM	FY 1960 and Prior Years	FY 1961	FY 1962	FY 1963	FY 1964	FY 1965	FY 1966	FY 1967	Total Through 1967	FY 1968
A. OPERATIONAL FORCES										
1. SSBN's ready for sea at End of Year	1	5	7	10	14	26	38	45		45
2. Average SSBN's During Each Year a/	0.1	3.0	5.9	8.9	12.0	20.5	32.5	43.2	126.1	45.0
3. Number of Missiles (Shipfill, Replacement, Shakedown and Support) Procured Each Year	134	59	184	318	335	352	318	34	1,734	-
4. Number of Operational Missiles, Including Shipfill and Support:										
A-1	21	107	139	109	-	-	-	-	-	-
A-2	-	-	8	104	299	544	426	187	-	-
A-3	-	-	-	-	-	8	385	773	-	960
TOTAL	21	107	147	213	299	552	810	960		960
B. PROGRAMMED OBLIGATIONS (Millions Of Dollars)										
1. RDT&E (Incl. Procurement for DT&E)	1,098.5	485.4	602.3	532.6	247.0	128.1	74.7	56.8	3,225.4	NA
2. Investment:										
a. SSBM	903.9	535.4	851.3	1,168.7	1,033.7	206.7	41.3	8.0	4,749.0	NA
b. Tenders	65.1	19.2	61.8	128.4	83.7	16.8	3.3	0.9	379.2	NA
c. Missiles Except Flight Test and Evaluation	187.5	81.7	197.2	285.1	435.2	420.2	369.2	55.4	2,031.5	NA
d. Other Equipment	55.4	48.8	31.0	30.2	86.1	46.3	37.0	7.2	342.0	NA
e. Industrial Facilities	74.2	25.3	16.0	10.0	5.0	14.0	6.0	3.1	153.6	NA
f. Development Facilities	22.6	2.2	1.0	0.9	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.2	28.0	NA
g. Operations and Other Facilities	68.0	12.3	15.9	3.8	3.9	9.4	1.9	2.0	117.2	NA
TOTAL	1,376.7	724.9	1,174.2	1,627.1	1,648.0	713.8	459.0	76.8	7,800.5	NA
3. Operating Costs:										
a. Operation and Maintenance	19.8	38.8	70.4	88.2	128.5	173.3	263.4	341.5	1,123.9	NA
b. Military Personnel	0.6	7.2	10.2	16.5	20.5	34.7	53.3	66.9	209.9	NA
Total O&M Mil. Personnel	20.4	46.0	80.6	104.7	149.0	208.0	316.7	408.4	1,333.8	NA
TOTAL Programmed Obligations	2,495.6	1,256.3	1,857.1	2,264.4	2,044.0	1,049.9	850.0	542.0	12,359.7	NA

Source: U.S. Navy, Special Projects Office.

a/ Based on Ready for Sea Schedule given in Table II of this Appendix.

TABLE II

POLARIS PROGRAM READY-FOR-SEA SCHEDULE

Ship	RFS Date	Ship	RFS Date	Ship	RFS Date
EAG#154	12/58	SSBN #15	7/64	SSBN #35	3/66
ENS # 1	10/58	" 16	8/64	" 36	4/66
" 2	11/58	" 17	9/64	" 37	5/66
" 3	12/58	" 18	10/64	" 38	6/66
SSBN#598	6/60	" 19	11/64	" 39	7/66
" 599	8/60	" 20	12/64	" 40	8/66
" 600	1/61	" 21	1/65	" 41	9/66
" 601	2/61	" 22	2/65	" 42	10/66
" 602	5/61	" 23	3/65	" 43	11/66
" 608	11/61	" 24	4/65	" 44	12/66
" 609	4/62	" 25	5/65	" 45	1/67
" 610	8/62	" 26	6/65	AS # 3	10/64
" 611	10/62	" 27	7/65	" 4	10/65
AS # 19	10/60	" 28	8/65	" 5	12/65
" 31	10/62	" 29	9/65	" 6	10/66
SSBN # 10	4/63	" 30	10/65	"	
" 11	8/63	" 31	11/65		
" 12	10/63	" 32	12/65	(See Table I, Annex "A", for SSBN years)	
" 13	4/64	" 33	1/66		
" 14	6/64	" 34	2/66		

NOTE: According to the Special Projects Office the above schedule is predicated on a FY 1961 building program of three SSBN's being fully funded and the procurement of long lead items for nine more to be fully funded in FY 1962. If the 5 by 7 FY 61 program, as agreed to by the House and Senate Committees, is approved for implementation, the RFS dates would be as follows:

SSBN's #1-9 - the same as given above
#10 - February 1963
#11 - April 1963
#12 - August 1963
#13 - November 1963
#14 - January 1964
#15 to # 23 - one per month March-November 1964
#24 and subsequent - one per month commencing February 1965.

This accelerated schedule would result in the following average SSBN years for the period through 1967.

FY	SSBN-Years	FY	SSBN-Years
1960	0.1	1965	23.4
1961	3.0	1966	34.5
1962	5.9	1967	44.2
1963	9.3		
1964	13.9	Total through FY'67	134.3

ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "C"

ESTIMATED COST OF POLARIS CRUISERS

ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "C"

ESTIMATED COST OF POLARIS CRUISERS

1. Estimates presented here are based on data previously reported by the Navy for use in WSEG Report No. 47, Evaluation of the POLARIS Cruiser System, 1 June 1960,[1/] modified to reflect more recent data on costs of POLARIS missiles as given in the preceding portions of this Appendix.

2. [redacted] It is important to note that in each case only those costs directly attributable to the POLARIS missile augmentation are given (including costs of alteration of the ship and installation of support equipment for the system), since other modification or construction and operating costs attributable to the basic cruiser and to its other weapon systems are assumed to be funded under other programs.

3. Construction of the CG(N) LONG BEACH and conversion of the four CG's has already been authorized and funded, with the exception of the POLARIS installation. Based on present scheduling, it appears that at least two FBM installations could be completed sometime in 1963, and that all five could be equipped for deployment by mid-1965.

4. Conversion of CA's, including installation of the FBM system would require twenty-four months, but scheduling of these conversions presents less of a problem inasmuch as the initial ships could be cruisers from the reserve fleet. Present estimates are that the first of these ships could be available by about February 1963, 3 ships could be completed by mid-1963,

1/ The costs of POLARIS installations on cruisers, reported by the Navy in October 1959 and used in WSEG Report No. 47, do not include any allowance for price inflation similar to that included in the costs of POLARIS submarines and tenders (see paragraph 18, page 65).

TABLE I

INCREMENTAL COST OF POLARIS CRUISER SYSTEMS
EXCLUDING WARHEADS
(Millions of Dollars)

Item	1 CG(N) and 4 CG's, each	12 CA's, each with
1. Incremental Investment Cost Attributable to POLARIS		
a. Cost of installing POLARIS equipment[a]	183.8	564.0
b. Cost of POLARIS missiles[b]		
(1) Shipfill missiles	41.8	200.8
(2) Pipeline and shakedown	18.8	79.5
c. Expansion of Naval Weapons Annex	0.2	5.0
d. Personnel training	0.3	0.6
e. Total incremental investment	244.9	849.9
Average cost per ship	49.0	70.8
Average cost per missile	6.12	4.43
2. Annual Operating Cost Attributable to POLARIS		
a. Personnel pay and allowances, including replacement training	1.3	3.1
b. POLARIS equipment maintenance	3.7	9.0
c. Missile replacement[b] and training	15.7	68.2
d. Base maintenance and replacement	0.1	0.7
e. Total annual operating cost	20.8	81.0
Average cost per ship	4.2	6.8
Average cost per missile	0.52	0.42

a/ Excludes $0.2 million of RDT&E costs for the 5-ship system and $24.0 million for the 12-ship system.

b/ The initial shipfill is assumed to comprise A-2 missiles in each case, costing an average of $1.046 million per unit. Replacement missile costs, as first reported by the Navy for use in WSEG Report No. 47, were based on a shelf life of 5 years, thus averaging 20 percent of the shipfill per year. In this study it is assumed that replacement would be at the same rate, but that A-3 missiles, averaging $1.24 million per unit, would be available for replacement.

and a total of 12 ships could be available for deployment by mid-1964. However, funds have not been approved either for conversion to CG or for the installation of the POLARIS system.

5. The POLARIS-Cruiser programs are assumed to be additional to the plan for 45 SSBN's. Implementation of the CG and CA cruiser programs would require the procurement of 2,292 missiles, excluding those for RDT&E, as follows:

45 SSBN program	1,734
17 Cruisers (with A-2 shipfill missiles replaced by A-3's in five years)	558
Total missiles	2,292

6. The estimated total cost of construction and outfitting of the CG(N) and the total cost of converting the other 4 CG's, including supporting equipment but excluding missiles, according to the Navy, is as follows:

	Millions of Dollars
CG(N)-9 Construction	300
CG-10 Conversion	168
CG-11 Conversion	164
CG-12 Conversion	139
CG-13 Conversion	152
Total five ships	923

As shown above in Table I, however, only $184 million of the $923 million is directly attributable to POLARIS equipment. The balance of the cost is attributable to other weapon systems, including TALOS, ASROC, TARTAR or TERRIER, new communications, Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS), and rehabilitation.

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ENCLOSURE "I"

CHANGES IN THE FREE WORLD

WSEG REPORT NO. 50

18 November 1960

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ENCLOSURE "I"

CHANGES IN THE FREE WORLD

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ENCLOSURE "I"

CHANGES IN THE FREE WORLD

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To identify and assess prospective changes in the Free World likely to affect U.S. strategic capabilities through the 1964 to 1967 time period.

FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group to "recognize changes. . .in the Free World situation" as part of a report evaluating "offensive weapons systems that may be utilized in a strategic role, with emphasis on the 1964 to 1967 time frame."[1/]

3. The relationship between this country and other nations of the Free World has a direct bearing on the scope of U.S. military responsibilities and the means -- including both strategies and weapons systems -- by which they may be fulfilled. This interaction stems from two of the basic assumptions that have guided U.S. foreign policy since the start of the cold war:

a. That the long-term security of the United States depends in large measure on the containment of communist power, and

b. That the United States needs the active cooperation of other Free World nations both to balance communist military, economic and industrial power and to deter and/or defeat communist military aggression.

1/ Memorandum for The Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, 9 July 1960. TOP SECRET.

4. The military collaboration of other nations is important to the United States in two general areas: for the projection of important elements of its military power into the exposed areas on the Bloc periphery (and into the Bloc itself in time of war) the United States requires that other nations agree to deployment of U.S. forces and installations on their territory. In addition, the scope of the containment task requires that other free nations make substantial military contributions of their own to supplement, and where practical, to substitute for deployed U.S. forces.

5. The degree of this military collaboration depends on what is here referred to as "allied solidarity": the extent to which other nations share common defense objectives with the United States and incentives to achieve them through a collective defense effort. The importance of this cohesion is emphasized by those recent and adverse changes in U.S. strategic programs -- such as the outcome of the IRBM deployment program and the withdrawal of nuclear strike aircraft from France -- brought about by political dissension within the Western alliance.

6. For these reasons, and because it is now impossible to foresee all those U.S. requirements for allied military collaboration that will arise by 1967, it becomes important to identify those trends and factors likely to influence the solidarity of the alliance in this period and, more particularly, to assess those factors that bear on the willingness of other free countries to cooperate militarily with the United States or at least to maintain a state of neutrality benevolent to the United States.

SCOPE

7. The emphasis in this study is on present trends and foreseeable changes in the relationship of the United States

to both military allies and uncommitted nations that bear on the degree of military collaboration the U.S. can expect from other members of the Free World through the mid-1960's.

8. Factors discussed in this regard include the attitudes of overseas governments and publics toward U.S. military strategy and the reliability of U.S. military protection, toward the presence of U.S. bases and nuclear strike systems on overseas territories, toward host nation controls over these bases and weapons, and toward the value of active participation in the collective defense effort.

9. Military implications of these trends and attitudes, and their possible effects on U.S. military capabilities, are discussed.

10. Prospective changes in the military posture of overseas free nations, such as the attainment of independent nuclear capability, are discussed primarily in terms of their effects on the alliance system. Military implications of these changes for the United States are recognized but no detailed predictions of national force levels, or of probable future contributions to the collective defense system, were made for this Report.

11. The discussion section of this Enclosure (Appendix "A") is supplemented by three Annexes. Annexes "A" and "B" are case studies of current trends in the United Kingdom and Japan that are likely to affect the future military collaboration of these nations with the United States.

12. The U.K. was chosen for detailed study because of its military importance to the United States and because it is the first secondary power to have developed its own independent

deterrent. Its experience here is suggestive of some of the problems likely to arise if other allies acquire strategic nuclear capability. Japan, although unique in several respects, was chosen because of its importance to maintenance of an on-the-scene military capability in the western Pacific. The elements of non-Communist neutralism present in Japan also reflect attitudes in other Asian countries.

13. Annex "C" reviews trends in military technology, and anticipated changes in the composition of the U.S. strategic strike force, that are likely to affect U.S. overseas base requirements and the need for the military collaboration of allies in the middle 1960's.

SUMMARY

14. The United States has, and will retain for the foreseeable future, a vital security interest in denying additional areas of the Free World to the Communist Bloc.

15. Both for this purpose and for the deterrence of attack on the North American continent itself, the United States requires the active military collaboration of its allies and, at a minimum, a disposition on the part of neutral or uncommitted nations to resist subversion and not to interfere with the collective defense effort.

16. Allied military contributions to U.S. security take several forms. They may consist solely of permission for the U.S. to use bases or to deploy military forces on territory of strategic importance. They may consist of indigenous forces for the defense of territory considered of military value to the United States, or whose denial to the Communist Bloc is important for other reasons. A third form of allied military

contribution takes the form of advance agreements to take specific wartime actions contributing to the effective use of U.S. military power.

17. In only one area, that of overseas bases for the peacetime deployment of strategic bombers, are U.S. requirements for allied military collaboration likely to diminish in this period. Requirements for other types of allied military collaboration, and particularly that of contributing indigenous forces for local defense, are likely to increase in this period.

18. Not all U.S. military allies, much less all of the non-Communist nations, have been willing to join fully with the U.S. in the collective defense effort. A number of the NATO nations are failing to meet their "minimum essential" force requirements despite an economic capacity to do so. Two NATO members, Norway and Denmark, have refused to permit IRBM launching sites on their territories. France, the administrative and geographical center of the NATO alliance, has declined to cooperate adequately in several areas of military importance. Outside the NATO area, the refusal of Japan to allow nuclear weapons on her territory bears on the ability of the U.S. to defend that country and its own interests in the Far East. There is, in short, ample evidence that other Free World nations could contribute more effectively to their own defense -- and therefore to that of the United States -- should they be willing to do so.

19. Although many political, economic and psychological factors influence the attitudes of other nations toward the alliance with the United States, by far the most important is their confidence in U.S. military protection. Any decline in that confidence tends to undermine the cohesion of the alliance,

despite nonmilitary influences (such as hope of economic gain or a general sympathy with U.S. objectives) that work in the opposite direction.

20. Allied estimates of this protection, and their own willingness to contribute to collective defense, have varied significantly in the course of the cold war. Confidence in the alliance system was highest when there was no significant threat to the security of the U.S. itself, and when U.S. atomic superiority seemed adequate for the protection of overseas territory from aggression. In more recent phases of the cold war the growth of Soviet strategic power has severely increased the threat to the U.S. and brought corresponding strains on the alliance system.

21. These strains are rooted in a widespread belief that the Soviet Union is now capable of inflicting the most severe destruction upon the United States, and that, as a consequence, the threat of U.S. strategic intervention is now a less credible (and therefore less effective) deterrent to communist aggression. Even in Western Europe, where the U.S. commitment is strongest, doubts about the reliability of U.S. protection have been an important factor in the decisions of Britain and France to develop their own nuclear deterrent forces.

22. Adding to this strain on the alliance system is a perceptible increase in public fears of war, particularly of involvement in a nuclear war through presence of nuclear strike systems on national territory or through rash military actions that might lead to "war by accident." The extent of these fears, and their effect on the policies of national governments, vary sharply from country to country. As such fears seem related to a growing public knowledge of nuclear weapons effects, however, they are likely to increase in the years ahead.

23. From the viewpoint of the United States these fears and attitudes have had, and will probably continue to have, adverse effects on the cohesion of the alliance. There has been increased questioning of military ties with the U.S., pressure for tighter host nation controls over U.S. bases and weapons systems, and -- particularly in Britain -- some sentiment for removal of all nuclear strike systems from national territory. In most instances these pressures are, by themselves, insufficient to cause a military ally of the United States to "go neutral", much less to voluntarily join the Communist Bloc, but they forecast increasing difficulties for the U.S. in eliciting allied military collaboration. They may also raise doubts about the performance of an allied nation in time of war, or in a crisis of such proportions that war appeared to be imminent. Particularly in the area of host nation controls over deployed U.S. strike systems, these pressures conflict with increasing U.S. military requirements for the assurance of rapid reaction from weapons systems.

24. Other influences on the propensity of Free World nations to collaborate militarily with the United States include their official estimates of the Sino-Soviet threat to their security, the contemporary public image of U.S. economic and military power relative to that of the Soviet Bloc, the value assigned uniquely national objectives (such as the retention of a colonial possession) and the future economic relationship of the United States to regional trade blocs.

25. Among the foreseeable changes in the Free World that are also of relevance to U.S. military capabilities are a further reduction in the colonial empires of our European allies and the consequent control of certain strategically important

areas by governments both less able and less willing to resist Communist pressure. Another change that is likely to increase both U.S. military responsibilities and the difficulties of fulfilling them is the possibility that several of the authoritarian governments now militarily allied to the U.S. will be replaced in this time period by regimes more responsive to public opinion. While this by no means implies that popular regimes are more likely to side with the Communist Bloc, it is doubtful if the United States will be able to count on receiving as much support in these countries as it does today.

26. Appreciable increases in the military strength of some Free World nations can be expected by 1967, particularly in the nuclear weapons field. On balance, however, these additions do not now promise to be of sufficient magnitude to relieve the U.S. of its basic responsibility to deter all-out attack on the Free World, or to alter radically the military status of these nations relative to the United States or to the Communist Bloc. This applies particularly to the spread of independent deterrent forces. The military effectiveness of these forces must be heavily qualified, and their political effects are likely to bring additional strains on the alliance system.

27. Trends favorable to military collaboration with the U.S. that can be expected to endure through this time period include a widespread recognition that Sino-Soviet aggression is the principal threat to the security of Free World nations, and that the United States is the locus of countervailing power. This recognition, coupled to sympathy with the values upheld by the United States, establishes a fundamental tie between Free World nations and the U.S. but is not, by itself, sufficient to assure those military agreements which the U.S. may wish to obtain.

CONCLUSIONS

28. In view of the present and prospective strains on the alliance system, and the intensity of the pressures likely to be placed on allied governments in a war crisis situation, United States strategic capabilities -- including offensive weapons systems and their associated command, control and communications systems -- should be made as independent as possible from the control of other nations.

29. Only those U.S. strategic weapons not dependent on the use of overseas territory or facilities should be relied upon for coverage of targets that pose a military threat to the continental United States. These targets include Sino-Soviet strategic weapon bases and associated command, control and warning systems. While some overlap here may be politically desirable, allied nuclear strike systems should not be assigned sole responsibility for such targets.

30. A policy of combined control over U.S. strike systems deployed on overseas territory should be adopted if host nation anxieties on this point become so severe as to jeopardize other aspects of military and political collaboration.

31. In view of declining allied confidence in U.S. strategic protection, it will become increasingly important for the solidarity of the Western Alliance that the U.S. increase the effectiveness of its own and allied defenses against limited aggression.

APPENDIX "A" TO ENCLOSURE "I"

POSSIBLE CHANGES OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE
IN THE FREE WORLD

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POSSIBLE CHANGES OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE
IN THE FREE WORLD

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APPENDIX "A" TO ENCLOSURE "I"

POSSIBLE CHANGES OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE IN THE FREE WORLD

THE ROLE OF OVERSEAS FREE COUNTRIES IN U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY

1. Changes in the character and intensity of the Sino-Soviet threat clearly have far-reaching effects on the military position and policy of the United States and of other countries of the Free World. The existence of this threat is, of course, the primary reason for almost all U.S. military and alliance policies.

2. Changes within the Free World also affect the military position and military requirements of the United States. This relationship stems from the manner in which the Sino-Soviet threat impinges on U.S. interests and from the ways in which the United States has been compelled to counter this threat.

3. U.S. foreign and military policy in the cold war rests today on two basic assumptions:

4. First, that U.S. security interests encompass more than the deterrence of attack on the North American continent. In addition, the United States has a vital military interest in denying the territory and resources of other Free World countries to the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

5. Second, that in order to fulfill this dual defense task, the U.S. needs both the active collaboration of its allies abroad and the willingness of many uncommitted overseas nations to resist Communist domination or, at a minimum, not to obstruct the defense efforts of the Western alliance.

6. There is clear evidence that, in the conduct of the cold war, the United States has not been concerned solely with the protection of its homeland. Its rearmament and efforts to

create a system of military alliances got underway well before a direct threat to the North American continent came into existence. At least until the late 1940's, the Sino-Soviet Bloc possessed no significant striking power with which to hit North American targets. Now that this threat has come to exist, protection against it -- which in practice means deterrence through the threat of retaliation -- holds top priority in American military policy. But, rather than detracting from interest in the protection of overseas countries, this top priority objective has, in the present situation, enhanced American interest in those countries overseas that contribute militarily to deterrence of a direct attack on North America.

7. There are several reasons why it should be vital that Sino-Soviet expansion at the expense of overseas free countries should be prevented. Even if U.S. security interests were not involved, the United States is interested in the preservation of the independence of the non-Communist nations and is committed to the principle that world order and law rest on collective resistance to military aggression. However, because the cold war dictates that security considerations must necessarily prevail in the formulation of U.S. policies and because the overseas countries have more confidence in the reliability of American military support when it is grounded in U.S. security interests, this report will concentrate on those prospective changes in the Free World that bear directly on those security interests.

8. The United States has both a negative and a positive interest in denying overseas territories to the Sino-Soviet

Bloc. Negatively, the purpose of what has been called the containment policy is to prevent such further Sino-Soviet expansion as would upset the world balance of power. If this expansion were to take place, there would be danger that one country after another would fall under Sino-Soviet domination, until in the end the United States would find itself isolated in a sea of Communist continents. This does not mean that every inch of presently free territory is necessarily essential to a reasonable balance of military and economic power. If a country such as Laos fell under Communist control, measures might be taken to compensate for the loss. It does mean, however, that the long-run security and survival of a free America might be indirectly threatened by the Communist take-over, through military or non-military means, of those overseas territories that have strategic significance by reason of their geographical location or resources.

9. Positively, the American interest in denying overseas countries to Sino-Soviet control lies in the military benefits accruing from the active collaboration of many of these countries with the U.S. and the benevolent neutrality of others. These benefits facilitate the U.S. task of protecting both the overseas countries themselves and the North American continent. American realization of this need for military collaboration to promote U.S. security interests is responsible for the radical postwar break with the traditional American isolationist policies and the adoption instead of peacetime alliances with overseas nations.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF OVERSEAS COUNTRIES

10. The participation of overseas countries in the task of countering the Sino-Soviet threat is most important when it takes the form of direct military participation in a collective defense effort. The United States has sought to assure itself of such

military cooperation through alliances and mutual assistance and defense treaties, whereby allied countries promise contributions to the collective defense in return for U.S. commitments to assist in their military protection. Moreover, these alliance treaties are supplemented by other agreements which grant to the U.S. certain specific military rights, such as permission to establish bases on allied soil.

11. Allied military contributions can take several forms. They may consist solely of permission for the United States to place military forces or installations on overseas territory of strategic importance. In some cases, such as the provision of SAC airbases by Morocco and Spain, [redacted] Substantial economic assistance or military aid is often a necessary quid pro quo for such arrangements.

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12. A second major form of allied military contribution lies in the maintenance of indigenous forces for the defense of territory considered of strategic importance to the United States. In the case of Western Europe, these allied forces far exceed those which the United States is able to maintain there.

13. Allied and even neutral nations may also agree, in advance of military contingencies, to take specific wartime actions that contribute to the effective use of U.S. power. These may include such things as advance permission to overfly national territory, permission to use airfields not normally occupied by military forces, to protect U.S. military installations from sabotage or direct attack, or to conduct military operations that facilitate the use of U.S. strategic weapons systems. Whether these actions are in fact taken in emergency or wartime situations will depend on circumstances and pressures at the time.

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to U.S. military objectives through the United Nations and other international organizations. Sweden, for example, provided a hospital ship during the Korean War and has contributed ground forces to the U.N. Middle East and Congo operations. This is not to say, however, that the refusal to cooperate actively with the West in advance of hostilities does not make more difficult the tasks of containment.

17. It should be added that, if Sino-Soviet expansion is to be blocked, both allies and neutrals must make contributions in fields other than the military. Since this expansion could take place by means of infiltration or subversion or by voluntary shifts by free countries into the Soviet bloc, allied and neutral resistance to such forms of "indirect aggression" has come to be a prerequisite of successful U.S. security policy.

18. In view of the contributions, military and non-military, that overseas countries can make or refuse, and in view of the impact of their decisions on American security, it is important to identify the forces that shape these decisions and particularly any forces that tend to affect them in ways detrimental to U.S. security interests and the collective defense effort.

19. The military contributions that the United States can expect from its allies depends partly on their ability, but primarily on their willingness, to allow use of their territory by U.S. forces and to maintain effective military forces of their own. Their degree of cooperation in this regard is, of course, influenced by many non-military factors and is subject to change for political and economic reasons. In the case of equivocal or neutral countries, perhaps the most that can be expected in the near future is a disposition not to interfere with the collective defense effort and to maintain sufficient military power to assure at least internal stability.

20. No attempt will be made here to detail prospective changes in the ability of individual Free World nations to arm themselves, or to forecast levels of allied military forces for the period in question. Such an effort would involve predictions of the economic capacity and military technology of these nations, of the capacity and willingness of the U.S. to aid them, and of their ability to utilize and absorb specialized assistance.

21. Changes in the military posture of allied nations, particularly those changes involving nuclear weapons, may, however, have important effects on the policies pursued by their governments and therefore on the form and cohesion of the Western alliance. The implications of the independent nuclear deterrent forces are discussed later in this regard. It is also possible that improved allied capabilities may relieve the United States of some of the responsibilities for their defense and thus increase the military and economic resources that the U.S. can devote to other tasks. In other instances such as those of Denmark, Norway and Japan, the acceptance of tactical nuclear weapons could bring a substantial addition to the military capabilities of the alliance, but are less likely to be of such magnitude as to shift the overall balance of power between the Free and Communist worlds or to relieve the United States of its present responsibility to deter all-out attack on the Free World.

22. The emphasis here will be on the willingness of overseas countries to support -- or at least not to interfere with -- such military programs as the United States deems necessary for Free World security. In the case of U.S. military allies, their willingness to contribute to the collective defense effort will depend on what is here referred to as allied solidarity: the extent to which allied nations share common defense aims with the U.S. and are willing to achieve them through the collective

defense effort. This solidarity may rise or fall under the impact of the factors to be discussed in the following sections of this paper. In the case of the neutral countries, their willingness to make indirect contributions to the Western defense effort will depend largely on the extent to which they identify their own security interests with those of the Western alliance. Their disposition to sympathize and cooperate with U.S. security programs, where it is possible for them to do so, will be here referred to as their attitudes of benevolence towards the West.

23. Although the following sections will stress those forces that tend to undermine allied solidarity and neutral benevolence, it should not be forgotten that other forces may well be at work tending toward more favorable conditions of collaboration. Nevertheless, the adverse factors are here emphasized because those responsible for the planning and execution of U.S. military policy must be aware of any developments that might modify the current attitudes of the overseas free countries toward military collaboration with the U.S. It would be calamitous if the effectiveness of U.S. strategic systems were to depend on timely and specific actions by allied nations that, in a period of immediate crisis, might not be forthcoming.

FORCES AFFECTING ALLIED SOLIDARITY AND NEUTRAL BENEVOLENCE

24. Alliances are pacts of mutual military assistance. They can be expected to endure only as long as such assistance is mutually forthcoming. The crucial factor affecting the cohesion of the Western alliance has been the allies' confidence in the ability and willingness of the United States to afford them effective protection against aggression. Any decline in that confidence will therefore tend to undermine solidarity and possibly to destroy it altogether, even though other and less

tangible influences -- such as sympathy toward the U.S. or hope of economic benefits -- should be working in the opposite direction. No country can be relied upon to make those military sacrifices that expose it to the unparalleled risks of modern war, unless in return it anticipates a net gain in its own security from its collaboration. It cannot be said with similar certainty that an ally's expectations of increasing his security through alliance ties are sufficient in themselves to guarantee his continued support of the alliance. In some instances, rather than submit to what certain allies would view as humiliating subservience to the U.S. or American disregard for their vital interests, these countries have made it appear that they might forego the advantages of the alliance.

25. The behavior of neutrals is not solely determined by their sympathy with the cause of the bloc toward which they lean. Confidence in their military security also plays an important role. Neutrals will not choose to display any signs of partisan benevolence if they feel they would not, in turn, be protected against any retaliation that their actions might provoke. Regardless of their sympathy toward the Western alliance, the activities of certain neutral countries are limited by restrictions beyond their control: Finland and Austria are examples.

26. Although allied solidarity depends to a large extent on what expectations of American protection exist at a given time, it would be a mistake to assume that levels of future solidarity can be predicted and objectively measured by the actual ability and willingness of the United States to assist its allies in deterrence and defense. Expectations rest on estimates of this protection and on judgments affected by many psychological and political factors. People who, for whatever reason, distrust or

dislike the United States are likely to arrive at low estimates. Moreover, the value they attach to U.S. protection is in competition with other values. Some countries, or groups within a country, would prefer to forego protection against the Sino-Soviet block than to lose an element of national sovereignty in the alliance relationship. Others have put a higher value on uniquely national goals, like the retention of colonial possessions, than on the protection afforded by full cooperation with the Western alliance. The Sino-Soviet threat itself will tend to be downgraded by those who are more concerned, for example, with the dangers of nuclear war than with their own national independence.

27. Many of the neutral nations, particularly those in Asia or Africa, show greater sensitivity to factors other than military protection. The fact that these nations remain uncommitted is evidence in itself that their chief concerns lie elsewhere, although their own forces for defense, and even for the maintenance of internal security, are in many cases particularly deficient. Here, all the forces that make for antagonism against the West, against the present or former colonial powers, against "economic imperialism," against the white man -- particularly if he is known to discriminate against colored people -- militate against alignment with the West and have led in several instances to an attitude of benevolence toward the Soviet bloc and corresponding opportunities for the extension of Soviet power and influence.

28. In many of the underdeveloped countries, problems of economic progress and even the maintenance of internal stability are sufficiently pressing to preoccupy the national leadership. Such a focus on internal problems has absorbed their energies and resources and provides a strong incentive to avoid involvement in the cold war.

29. Other nations may enter into formal defense arrangements with the United States, but the degree of their cooperation is restricted in practice by pressures of nationalism, isolationism, and a desire to play East against West for economic benefit. Several of the Latin American countries might be placed in this category.[1/] Such attitudes are conducive to the expansion of Sino-Soviet economic and political influence. They are less likely to lead to the absorption of these nations by the bloc or to effective military collaboration against the United States, although the "destabilizing" of the areas involved and the possible loss of U.S. facilities and bases in these areas may create troublesome military problems.

30. It should be remembered that the scope and intensity of allied cooperation and neutral benevolence can vary greatly with time and circumstances, and that these variations can significantly affect U.S. military capabilities. An allied nation may be willing in principle to accept the deployment of U.S. forces and installations on its territory. But such a concession may be of little value for the United States unless that ally feels so strongly the need for cooperation that he is willing also to accept a specific weapons system, such as nuclear-armed IRBM's that may make it a target for Soviet attack. Similarly, a neutral country may close its eyes to U.S. or allied overflights over its territory, or, alternatively, it may not only protest against such flights but even threaten to enlist Soviet aid if they continue. An underlying sympathy with or commitment to the Western alliance is therefore no guarantee of military cooperation by the country concerned, and changes in the attitudes of overseas countries may have far-reaching implications for future American military plans.

1/ An example is Brazil's cautious neutralist approach to the Cuban problem during the summer of 1960, in contrast to past Brazilian efforts to marshall support for U.S. policies at inter-American meetings. It is said that President Kubitschek sees this new approach as a way to pry U.S. support for his plan for Latin American economic development, Operation Pan-America, which he regards as essential to Latin American security. SIMAB, No. 155, 10 August 1960, SECRET.

U.S. PROTECTION OF ITS ALLIES AND ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE, 1948-1960

31. Among the factors affecting allied solidarity, none is more influential than allied expectations concerning the effectiveness of American military capabilities for deterrence and defense against Sino-Soviet aggression, on the one hand, and concerning the military contributions demanded of them for collective defense on the other. In both respects there has been a series of changes since the start of the cold war, and there are likely to be others between the present and the 1964-67 period. It stands to reason that there is least strain on allied solidarity when allied confidence in U.S. protection -- particularly in the effectiveness of U.S. strategic deterrent -- is high, and when there are few demands on the allies either for the deployment of American forces or for the strengthening of their own local defense capabilities. In the following discussion, the period between 1948 and 1960 will be divided into four phases; a fifth phase, starting in 1960 and continuing to 1964, will be discussed in the next section. These phases are not chosen arbitrarily, but coincide with a particular set of circumstances pertaining to assumptions and expectations of U.S. protection of the overseas countries and of allied military contributions to the collective defense effort.

Phase No. 1: 1948-1950

32. During the opening period of the cold war, from 1948 to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the Soviet military threat was assumed to be directed primarily against Europe and, to a lesser extent, against the Middle East. Red China was still too weak to be regarded as a serious military threat. The North American continent was not in danger of a direct attack because the Soviet Union did not possess the means of striking North American targets with nuclear weapons.

33. Under these circumstances, the primary military problem for the West was the protection of Western and Southern Europe against Soviet aggression. Protection was sought along the lines of the experience gathered in World Wars I and II. Local forces in Europe, later called the NATO "Shield", were to bear the chief burden of deterrence and defense, while the United States would supply supporting sea and air power, the latter rendered more effective by the then small stock of U.S. atomic bombs. The United States was also to serve as the military arsenal for the alliance.

34. One might have expected that NATO's requirements for substantial European ground forces on the World War II pattern would have placed serious strains on the relations of the European NATO members with the United States, which was by all odds the richest and most powerful member of the coalition. It did not do so, however, both because so many people in Western Europe, outside of government and military circles, did not take the Soviet military threat seriously and because the American commitment to help defend Europe was interpreted as an American guarantee of Europe's security. The American atomic monopoly and the weakness of a war-exhausted Soviet Union supported these views. Western Europe's sense of security was further enhanced by the presence of American occupation forces in West Germany, even prior to their commitment to the NATO Shield at the time of the U.S. decision to participate in the defense of Europe. As a result, little effort was made before 1950 to put Western Europe on the road to rearmament.

Phase No. 2: 1950 to 1953-54

35. The attack by Communist North Korea on the Republic of Korea brought about a sudden change in outlook, at least temporarily, although it did not change the basic strategic

concept of NATO for the protection of Western Europe. The Korean attack was interpreted as convincing evidence that the Soviet Union, as well as Red China, was prepared to resort to military force for territorial expansion. Preceding the war in Korea, moreover, the Soviet explosion of its first atomic device in 1949 foreshadowed a direct and serious threat to the North American continent and provided another cause for the change in outlook. Hereafter, the United States would be faced with a dual military task: assisting the overseas countries to deter or defeat Sino-Soviet aggression against them, and deterring a direct Soviet attack on North America itself.

36. In view of these developments in the threat, three changes in the outlook of the U.S. and its allies occurred that were of significance for the alliance system.

37. First, both the West European and American governments were now convinced of the necessity of a very considerable rearmament effort to provide Europe with adequate Shield forces, allied and American. In accordance with the experience of World Wars I and II, it was to be the purpose of these forces to halt a Soviet drive to the West as far forward as conditions would permit. Accordingly, in 1950 it was proposed that West Germany should be invited and assisted to rearm, while at the Lisbon Conference of 1952, the NATO Council approved a Shield force goal of 96 divisions as the ultimate objective for its members.[1/]

38. Second, since Communist aggression had become possible, if not probable, in Asia, it was now deemed necessary that the U.S. should seek an alignment with the Asian nations along the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc that would assure them of American military support.

1/ Because of the failure of E.D.C., final approval of the 12-division West German contribution was delayed until early 1955. Moreover, out of the 96-division Lisbon goal, only about 40 were expected to be combat-ready in peacetime.

39. Third, while the apparent requirements for U.S. support of local defenses were greatly increased with the extension of the American defense perimeter along almost the length of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, the United States was simultaneously faced with the task of building adequate strategic power to deter direct attack on North America itself.

40. The decision to create a powerful NATO Shield placed heavy pressures on a Western European public that was still reluctant to consent to major military sacrifices. The planned rearmament of West Germany further strained relations between the U.S. and its NATO allies who still regarded Germany with suspicion, and, moreover, it aroused grave misgivings in Germany itself. As a result, hardly had the Korean shock been absorbed when the Lisbon goals proved unattainable. German rearmament was not to get off the ground for several more years.

41. The reaction of the Asian free nations to the Communist threat was characterized by two extreme positions. On the one hand, the governments of South Korea and the Republic of China favored a buildup of their own national forces, coupled with maximum American deployment in the Far East. On the other hand, the uncommitted Asian states, and Japan as well, were unwilling to substantially increase their own forces and showed the first signs of opposition to the overseas deployment of U.S. forces.

42. Already during this period, however, the buildup of the American strategic force (the Strategic Air Command) was paving the way for another change in the strategic picture that was greatly to relieve tensions between the U.S. and its overseas allies as long as its effects were felt.

Phase No. 3: 1953-54 to 1956-57

43. 1953 saw the beginning of a shift in U.S. strategy that came to be known as the "New Look".

44. With the development of its strategic nuclear power, the United States had attained a position of apparent military supremacy over the USSR. It was assumed, therefore, that the American threat of "massive retaliation" would suffice to deter Sino-Soviet aggression both against the United States itself and against its overseas allies, with the exception perhaps of marginal attacks or brushfire wars. On this assumption, the U.S. offensive or strategic force could bear the brunt of the dual task incumbent upon U.S. military power.

45. In Europe, where there was fear that any military conflict could lead to general war, there was now great if not complete confidence in the American "Grand Deterrent". Whatever incentive that had previously existed for the build-up of local European forces was thus undermined, and in fact a downward spiral then began in the levels of non-strategic forces maintained both by the United States and its allies. The European NATO nations concluded that they needed only to contribute enough forces to prove their active collaboration with the United States in the defense of Europe. This, in turn, would induce the U.S. to maintain forces on the Continent in sufficient numbers to trigger U.S. strategic intervention in the event of a Soviet attack confined to the European area.

46. It would be an exaggeration to say, however, that the NATO governments -- in contrast to the public in NATO countries -- had lost all interest in the Shield. But, in view of the public's reluctance to make the necessary sacrifices,

these governments failed to attain the force levels, established at Lisbon, that were required for an adequate NATO Shield. They therefore agreed with the United States at the 1954 NATO Council meeting that tactical nuclear weapons were a necessary substitute for the missing conventional firepower. Since this decision implied NATO's willingness to initiate the use of nuclear weapons on European soil in response to a Soviet conventional attack, the European public's acceptance of the decision with little or no distress is strong evidence of the general confidence placed in the efficacy of the U.S. Grand Deterrent, as well as evidence of a public downgrading of the gravity of the Soviet military threat to Europe.

47. Moreover, Europeans found it difficult to understand why large Shield forces would be required or what function they would serve in a war in which, it was assumed, strategic forces would both be used and would dominate. In this context, a strong NATO Shield was no longer thought indispensable to prevent a Soviet drive to the West. Thus, much of the pressure on Europe to make greater sacrifices for its own protection was removed, since, as it appeared, SAC had raised a protective umbrella over both the U.S. and its European allies. With this American guarantee of Europe's security, the strategy of the New Look was admirably suited to enhance the solidarity of the NATO alliance.

48. Despite this promising outlook, there was already clear evidence, unnoticed by the public, that the strategy of the New Look would encounter increasing difficulties. In the very year in which the strategy was announced, the Soviets exploded their first thermonuclear device and increased their efforts to achieve long-range strategic delivery capabilities.

Phase No. 4: 1957 to 1960

49. This period began with a shock to official and public opinion throughout the Free World that was to undermine confidence in the reliability of U.S. strategic protection. In the summer of 1957, the Soviet Union claimed to have tested an intercontinental ballistic missile; in the fall, the launching of the Soviet earth satellite demonstrated in a most spectacular way the level of Soviet achievements in missilry.

50. From this time on, with the addition of long-range missiles to the Soviet inventory, the threat against the North American continent assumed new and more serious dimensions, thus multiplying the risks that the U.S. would have to assume in deciding to intervene with its strategic force in response to Soviet aggression overseas. Massive retaliation, in the form of a future U.S. first strike against Soviet targets of perhaps uncertain location, would risk increasing levels of destruction to the United States in return. No matter how much determination the United States henceforth expressed in its threats of massive retaliation, the credibility of its strategic intervention on behalf of its overseas allies, and therefore the effectiveness of the deterrent were bound to diminish.

51. One of the consequences of the appearance of the Soviet "counterdeterrent" was that the means with which the United States could protect its homeland and defend the overseas territories were no longer identical. For the first of these tasks, the U.S. now needed enough secure second-strike power to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union after absorbing a Soviet strike on its strategic force. Such retaliatory power was regarded as the best insurance against a Soviet temptation to eliminate U.S. strategic power by a surprise attack.

52. For the protection of the overseas countries, however, now much more strategic power would be needed than even a secure second-strike capability could provide. Nothing short of a first-strike or counterforce capability could serve as a reliable deterrent to such overseas aggression as would leave the U.S. strategic force intact and with the option to intervene. A strategic force capable only of a strike at urban targets in the Soviet Union -- possibly the only strategy that a second-strike force could employ -- would fail to provide a credible deterrent against Sino-Soviet aggression overseas, because its very employment would invite the destruction of substantial areas of the United States.

53. Even in those allied countries where there had been few misgivings about the reliability of U.S. strategic protection prior to 1956-1957, attention now gradually turned to this problem. The alliances which were based on the expectation of this protection came under strain, although out of a common interest to preserve the deterrent value of the American strategic threat, official utterances remained necessarily guarded.

54. One effect of the change, however, was immediately obvious. The British committed themselves firmly to the achievement of an independent strategic nuclear force. The French followed suit, and interest in an independent nuclear deterrent capability spread even to countries with more limited resources. It remained an open question, however, whether the possession of such a capability was regarded primarily as a means of strengthening a nation's authority and freedom of action within the alliance, as a useful supplement to the American deterrent, or as a substitute for it, should the U.S. threat lose its credibility.

55. A further effect of the change was a growing interest, at least among some military and strategic analysts in allied countries, in non-strategic forces for deterrence of limited forms of Sino-Soviet aggression or for defense against such attacks, should they occur. The possibility that the Communists might be increasingly tempted to initiate limited wars, even in Europe, could no longer be disregarded, once doubts had been raised about American strategic intervention in such conflicts.

56. One novel feature of this phase, from 1957 to 1960, seemed to impress the allies very little and to disturb them, if at all, only because it appeared to lead the United States towards an excessive preoccupation with the dangers of a direct attack on North America. This feature was one that has come to be known as the "missile gap". One would have expected the allied countries to become alarmed at the prospect, widely discussed in American circles, that growing Soviet ICBM capabilities would expose the American bomber force to a devastating surprise attack. Should such an attack occur and be successful, the overseas free countries would be extremely vulnerable to Sino-Soviet takeover. The fact that this consideration aroused less initial concern in the allied countries than in the United States was due, in large measure, to their less apprehensive views of Soviet military intentions.

57. Much stronger reactions appeared against another new feature of the military situation -- the program initiated in 1957 in which the European NATO members were asked to accept IRBM launching sites on their territories. These weapons were to serve as a temporary response to the Soviet ICBM threat

until such time as the United States would possess similar long-range missile capabilities. Because these IRBM's were thought to supplement the Grand Deterrent in protecting the European countries as well as the U.S. itself, the United States expected that their deployment in Europe would be favorably received by the NATO powers. But, in fact, the response to this offer was much less enthusiastic than had been hoped. Largely because of fears of the Russian reaction, only three countries -- the U.K., Italy, and Turkey -- accepted the siting of IRBM's in their territories.

58. By the end of the period, moreover, it was evident that U.S. strategic power was becoming less dependent on the use of overseas bases as longer range missiles and aircraft entered U.S. inventories. This trend had equivocal effects on allied solidarity. On the one hand, it strengthened the alliance by reducing U.S. requirements for those installations that host countries regarded as certain targets of any Soviet counter-force strike. On the other hand, it aroused fears that the United States might lose interest in denying the overseas territories to the Sino-Soviet bloc and might eventually return to its former isolationist policies. Such doubts about U.S. intentions undermined allied confidence in the alliance, however unfounded these doubts might have been. For, as mentioned earlier, the original U.S. motivation for adopting a collective defense policy was not the need for the overseas deployment of U.S. strategic forces to deter a direct strike at the United States, but rather the desire to forestall the indirect threat to American security from the gradual extension of Sino-Soviet control over the Eurasian continent and adjoining insular territories. The security of the overseas free countries was, and remains, a primary objective of American policy for this

reason; if it fails, the United States would be isolated and exposed to dangers of military inferiority.

59. Another change that made itself felt during this fourth phase had distinctly adverse implications for the allies and thus for the cohesion of the alliance. The increased vulnerability of the U.S. strategic force to a Soviet strike meant that top priority in American defense efforts would have to go to the maintenance of secure retaliatory strength. This called for the rapid development of a missile force to supplement much of the present bomber fleet, and it was apparent that increasing efforts would be required to protect the retaliatory force by hardening, dispersal, mobility, and more adequate warning of attack. These efforts to enhance the U.S. second-strike capability had little bearing on the credibility or efficacy of the threat of U.S. strategic intervention against Sino-Soviet aggression overseas, since such intervention would require substantial first-strike counterforce power. If there were few signs during this phase that allied solidarity had been shaken by this particular development, it was because only a small group of experts abroad had come to appreciate, prior to 1960, the difference between first-strike and second-strike capabilities.

DECLINING CREDIBILITY OF U.S. STRATEGIC INTERVENTION: ITS EFFECTS ON ALLIED SOLIDARITY, 1960-64

60. From the preceding discussion which has traced the evolution of American strategic capabilities and allied expectations of U.S. protection from 1948 to 1960, it may be possible to extrapolate certain trends that are likely to affect the alliance during the 1960-64 period. From these, the trends that will predominate at the start of the subsequent 1964-67 phase may perhaps be predicted.

61. It must be stressed, however, that in this section only one factor -- the most important of those affecting allied solidarity -- is being considered; namely, the character of allied expectations concerning American strategic protection in view of developments in the balance of military power. Other influences which may either reinforce or counteract the effects of this single factor on the alliance will be discussed later, as will the effects of all of these factors on the attitudes of the neutral or uncommitted nations. With regard to the neutrals, it is enough to point out here that a decline in U.S. capabilities to offer protection to overseas territories will have less of an impact on the policies of these countries, which have demonstrated their greater concern for the expected advantages of "going it alone" than for American protection.

62. In order to make even tentative predictions about trends in allied expectations of American protection during 1960-1964, several assumptions are necessary. For the purposes of this discussion it is therefore assumed that:

a. The United States strategic deterrent will continue to hold its predominant position among the means by which the U.S. can and will offer protection to its allies.

b. No technological breakthroughs, now foreseen, will afford the U.S. strategic force immunity from attack or will so enhance U.S. strategic counterforce power that the credibility of American strategic intervention in defense of overseas territories will be unquestioned.

c. The United States will not become involved in a general nuclear war during this period.

63. If these assumptions prove realistic, it would seem inevitable that allied confidence in the deterrent effect of

the U.S. threat of strategic intervention on limited aggression overseas will decline yet further and that such a decline will erode the major foundation on which allied solidarity has heretofore been based.

64. Even if the dangers of a crippling Soviet first strike against SAC were to disappear by 1964, the anticipated growth in size and security of the Soviet strategic force may, by then, push the strategic balance closer to the point of stalemate, in the sense that opposing strategic forces may tend to neutralize each other. This does not mean that, under such conditions, the U.S. Grand Deterrent would no longer provide the overseas allies with any degree of protection. The Soviet Union and Red China could never be certain that the United States would not fulfill its threat of strategic intervention, despite the risk of self-destructive consequences, rather than abandon its allies.

65. Although such Communist uncertainties about American intentions may continue to deter major overseas aggressions, it is doubtful whether allied confidence in U.S. strategic intervention will remain sufficiently strong in all cases to provide a firm basis for faith in the Western alliance and thus to elicit all the allied contributions to the collective defense effort that the United States might desire. Already in 1960, there are indications that the dangers of the allies' position, resulting from the declining credibility of the American nuclear deterrent, are being recognized both in the United States and abroad.

66. One manifestation of this concern over the dangers presented by the changing strategic picture was the decisions of two major U.S. allies to develop strategic deterrents of their

own; additional countries are giving consideration to developing a nuclear capability.[1]

[redacted]

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67. The military import of these independent deterrents is qualified by the time necessary to achieve them, by their necessarily restricted capability, and by the proximity of the relevant allied nations to the Soviet Bloc. At least in their initial states, these forces are taking the form of "minimum" deterrents for retaliation against Soviet cities in case of war. Should they be used in an independent role, they would bring the almost certain destruction of the user nation.

1/ [redacted]

CIA

For this reason alone, it would be unwise for the United States to rely militarily on the employment of these allied strategic forces in time of war.

68. Another qualifying factor is the time requisite to achievement of indigenous nuclear capability. The French experience indicates that five or six years may be necessary for an "Nth country" to develop even a few nominal weapons suited to aircraft delivery. Development of high yield weapons for long-range missile delivery may take another three to five years.[1] This schedule may, of course, be shortened by the cooperation of other technologically advanced nations; it could be greatly accelerated by the active aid of an existing nuclear power.

69. The present French difficulties in acquiring a strategic missile, and the recent British cancellation of the BLUE STREAK missile program, show that provision of a modern delivery system is one of the greatest stumbling blocks to achievement of a militarily effective nuclear capability. Even were the most modern weapons systems provided these nations by the United States,[2] their proximity to the bloc makes more difficult the problems of protecting a strategic force. As has been frequently pointed out, these systems would be subject to a greater weight of attack by a greater variety of weapons, and with less warning time, than are those systems in the U.S. Proximity to the Bloc should also permit a shorter Soviet intelligence cycle for

1/ [redacted]

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2/ The desirability of providing the most advanced U.S. weapons systems to other nations is not considered here.

location of mobile weapons and make possible a wide range of Soviet espionage and sabotage techniques. Dispersal of these forces outside the European continent may avoid some of these difficulties at the cost of added command, control and communications problems. The territory available to even the major colonial powers for this purpose, however, is shrinking rapidly.

70. A militarily important side effect of these independent deterrents is that both the justification and the expense of such forces leads to a reduction in other areas of national military power. This has been the British experience and it may well be the course of development in France once settlement of the Algerian question removes a primary incentive for maintenance of large conventional forces. [redacted] The result may be an inefficient distribution of military effort within the alliance and more serious "shortfalls" in the NATO Shield.

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71. National deterrent forces, based on indigenous nuclear capability, are therefore unlikely to alter the basic East-West distribution of power in this time period, or to relieve the United States of any substantial responsibilities in deterrence of all-out attack on the Free World. The additional credibility that these forces may have as a deterrent to piecemeal Soviet aggression is balanced by their probable vulnerability and the fact that their actual use would be self-destructive. These problems are likely to exist whether these independent deterrents are controlled on a national basis or by regional blocs.

72. The political effects of these independent deterrent forces are likely to generate conflicting strains on the unity of the Western alliance. The decision to create such a force itself reveals dissatisfactions with the alliance system, particularly in the desire of the nation involved for a greater political voice in alliance matters and for greater military protection than the alliance now affords it.[1] To the extent that national strategic deterrents provide the possessor nations with a greater sense of security -- whether justified by the facts or not -- these nations may become less sensitive to the declining reliability of the U.S. Grand Deterrent. In this sense, national deterrents may remove a serious cause of political tension within the alliance. However, to the extent that these countries feel more secure, they will tend to place less value on their alliance with the United States and may, as a consequence, drift towards independent policies not necessarily consistent with U.S. desires and interests.

73. There are still other contradictory political effects that may arise from the development of independent strategic deterrents. If the countries desiring them are forced into expensive development programs by American reluctance to aid in their acquisition of the necessary weapons systems or by American legislation prohibiting the sharing of nuclear secrets, anti-American attitudes may result which will adversely affect

1/ The role of exclusively national goals in the British decision to create an independent nuclear force is discussed in Annex "A" to this Appendix.
In the case of France, an independent nuclear force has been specifically justified on grounds that her aims differ in some areas from those of her allies. French Premier Michael Debre, discussing the French nuclear program before the National Assembly last July stated that modern states are categorized by "those that have the bomb and the rocket and others. Only the former will have the right to speak since the others will be merely satellites. On the other hand, our allies do not always share our ideas, particularly regarding Africa. Our possibilities of acting, and of simply being understood, will depend on many elements but among them will be a modern defense." FBIS, Middle East and West Europe, 25 July 1960, p. R1. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

their relations with the United States. On the other hand, if the United States becomes convinced of the inevitability -- perhaps also of the desirability -- of strategic deterrents in allied hands, whether as a supplement to or substitute for the U.S. strategic deterrent, American assistance programs might contribute to a heightened sense of allied solidarity. Conceivably, too, resistance to the deployment of U.S. bases for strategic operations on allied territory would be lessened if some of the American installations overseas proved useful to allied strategic forces.

OTHER INFLUENCES ON ALLIED SOLIDARITY AND NEUTRAL BENEVOLENCE, 1960-64

74. So far the discussion has been limited to changes in the relations between the U.S. and its allies that result from a deterioration of allied confidence in the American Grand Deterrent. But the threat of U.S. strategic intervention has not been the only form of American military support that has made the alliance valuable to the overseas countries. In Asia, there has been a continuing need for the presence of American tactical forces to cope with limited aggression. While NATO strategy has assumed U.S. strategic intervention in any military conflict above the level of border incidents, the presence of U.S. tactical forces in Europe has been regarded by the other NATO members as a major contribution to Europe's security and has helped to cement the NATO Alliance. The extent to which the U.S. will be supporting allied local defenses with tactical forces of its own by 1964 will therefore be of considerable consequence -- perhaps of decisive consequence in some individual cases -- for the state of allied solidarity in this period. The impact of this factor cannot now be predicted, however, as it is not known what level this form of U.S. military support for its allies will reach in the years ahead.

75. A third form of American military contribution is the economic and military assistance made available to those overseas countries willing to improve their defenses against Sino-Soviet aggression. In the cases of the economically weaker nations of Asia, this U.S. contribution plays an important role in determining attitudes toward the alliance. Several of the NATO members could not support even their present level of military effort were it not for substantial U.S. assistance.

76. This aid may be of such value to individual recipient nations that it may preserve into the 1964-1967 period the allegiance of nations that might otherwise move away from alignment with the Western Bloc. Not only external security, but also internal stability and the continuation of existing regimes may depend on U.S. assistance programs. Caution should be exercised, however, in U.S. reliance on the continued effect of this aid in preserving the orientation of these nations toward the West or their contributions to the U.S. military effort. Where economic aid is most important to bolstering the internal political position of existing governments, these regimes frequently lack widespread public support. Several authoritarian governments of this nature in Europe and Asia are likely to be supplanted by the close of the period in question. Their successors may still find foreign economic and military aid essential, but their disposition to seek it elsewhere (and to forego alliance commitments in the process) may easily be greater. The revolution in Iraq, and the consequent withdrawal of that nation from the Baghdad Pact, occurred despite the programs of British aid to that nation; the case of Egypt is another example in this regard. While it is encouraging that the recent regime changes in Turkey and South Korea have not so far shaken the allegiance

of these countries to the Western alliance, and particularly to the United States, both of these countries have been subjected to recent Communist aggression. The outlook is less encouraging for those countries, such as Libya, who may view the Communist threat with less apprehension and whose military contributions to the alliance are viewed almost exclusively in terms of economic advantage.[1/]

77. Despite these limitations in the ability of U.S. economic aid to solidify the alliance, the need for a relatively high level of military assistance to allied nations is likely to continue through the mid-1960's. Even in the unlikely event that all of the NATO nations were to undertake what the U.S. might consider to be their full share of the collective defense effort, the ability of NATO to meet present defense objectives would still depend on U.S. provision of a substantial amount of modern weapons to many members, and conventional arms to some of the member nations as well.[2/]

78. Despite some recent advances in this area, such as the European programs to produce advanced U.S.-designed fighter aircraft and missiles, the question of U.S. military assistance is likely to place strains on the alliance system in the period immediately ahead. Most of the NATO members are facing obsolescense problems in wide areas of their military equipments and may anticipate U.S. aid in solving them. The U.S., for its own part, has expressed a desire to concentrate its military aid on those modern weapons which it is best suited

1/ In 1960, Prime Minister Kubaar requested an additional $4 million, over the $6 million in aid that Libya has received in the past five years, for a renewal of the U.S. base rights agreement. USAF, SIRAB, No. 123, 24 June 1960, SECRET/NOFORN.
2/ A conclusion reached in the 1959 report of the United States mission to NATO. See The Blue Book, Report on the 1959 Annual Review and the NATO Defense Outlook; January 1960, TOP SECRET.

to supply. Changes in the economic position of the United States, including a gold outflow and balance of payments deficit, are beginning to affect the ability of this country to sustain high levels of economic and military assistance. Future programs to stabilize areas of Africa and South America may impose competing demands on U.S. economic resources. Certainly the willingness of the United States to assist its NATO partners will depend to some extent on the trade practices of the evolving European economic blocs and the degree to which the more prosperous NATO members match their economic progress with increased military effort.

Fear of Nuclear War

79. Other military factors, related only indirectly to the protection afforded allied nations by U.S. strategic power, are likely to affect the cohesion of the alliance in this period. One such factor of mounting importance is a growing public awareness of the devastation likely to be inflicted on any participant in a general nuclear war. This has increased popular fears of military conflict in any form and created particular aversion to the use of nuclear weapons. Where there is a traditionally vocal and articulate pacifist minority, and where public opinion is influential in the shaping of foreign and defense policy, there are indications that sectors of the population might be willing to pay an extremely high price to avoid involvement in war.[1/] For these people the military protection afforded by the presence of nuclear strike forces on their territory may not only lose its attractiveness but may be actively opposed as making involvement of their nation in war

1/ A November 1958 Gallup survey in Great Britain found that, given a choice between 1) involvement in a war in which nuclear weapons were used, and 2) coming to terms with the Soviet Union at any price, those surveyed chose the latter alternative by a 2 to 1 margin. See USIA/ORI, "West European Attitudes in the Wake of the Lebanon and Quemoy Crises," WE-56, January 1959, CONFIDENTIAL.

more likely. While this influence is strengthened by any belief that the effectiveness of such military protection has declined, it is likely to increase regardless of the actual military situation. A growth in neutralist sentiment abroad, and in corresponding pressures on allied governments, is an anticipated by-product of wider public knowledge of nuclear weapons and the probable nature of nuclear war.[1] At the least, one may expect increasing pressure on allied governments to minimize the chance of general nuclear war by making greater efforts to relieve East-West tensions. This pressure may be reflected in a willingness of these governments to make appreciable concessions to the Soviet Union, particularly where their own national interests are not directly involved, or to accept substantial risks in order to achieve disarmament agreements.[2] Other likely effects are an increased allied interest in limiting the area and intensity of local conflicts and even in narrowing the range of alliance interests considered worth the risk of general war to protect.

80. In the face of these pressures, allied governments are likely to seek greater influence and control over U.S. foreign and military policies, and over the uses made of American bases on their territory, in order to promote a cautious or "non-provocative" Western approach to the Communist Bloc. These controls, or even the effort to achieve them, can have adverse military effects from the viewpoint of the United States. As one example,

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1/ See NIE 100-54, "Probable Effects of Increasing Nuclear Capabilities upon the Policies of U.S. Allies," 26 April 1954, SECRET.

2/ Public pressures for disarmament, and even unilateral nuclear disarmament, have increased substantially in the United Kingdom in recent years. The nature and significance of this trend is discussed in Annex "A" to this Appendix.

81. These apprehensions, and a growing public fear of nuclear war, could be aggravated should the U.S., without prior consultation with its allies, initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a limited war. They could have particularly adverse effects on the actions of allied governments should the Soviets precipitate a crisis of such proportions that a general war appeared inescapable.

Fear of Involvement through Presence of U.S. Bases

82. A related source of friction between the United States and some of its allies has stemmed from the presence of U.S. strategic air bases on their territory. While the governments involved have recognized the need for these bases, they have been subjected to increasing public criticism on grounds that they would necessarily involve the host nation in a nuclear war, if hostilities should break out.

83. These fears have been exploited with increasing boldness by the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the U-2 incident, the Soviets extended their threats of nuclear attack even to airbases from which unarmed reconnaissance flights are made in peacetime. While threats of attack on U.S. overseas bases have been a consistent feature of Soviet propaganda for many years, they may be taken with greater seriousness in the future. Such threats are already a factor in the refusal of Denmark and Norway to permit "foreign" military forces on their territory in peacetime. There are indications that similar apprehensions exist, or are thought by national governments to exist, in other nations where the U.S. might wish to place nuclear weapons. In this year's negotiations for rights to Wheelus Field in Libya, Prime Minister Kubaar requested that a joint communique on the talks state that storage of atomic weapons, or the

stationing of "espionage" aircraft, had been precluded. Following the Soviet U-2 threats, the Greek government issued a communique stating that there were no U.S. bases in Greece and emphasizing that each U.S. military overflight or use of Greek airports required individual clearance from the Greek government.[1] On the following day the government of Saudi Arabia reassured its people that Dhahran Airfield was not a U.S. military base, that the U.S. was granted "purely technical facilities" at the airfield, and that no government had been granted permission to use Saudi Arabian territory or airspace for "military action" against any other state.[2]

84. Despite generally optimistic attitudes concerning the actual likelihood of Communist aggression, public apprehensions about the "lightning rod" aspect of U.S. bases appear to be spreading in some countries. Many factors account for this paradox, but perhaps the most prominent is a widening public awareness of the destruction possible in a nuclear war. In several of those countries where there has been relatively little public concern on this issue --- Italy, the Philippines and Spain are examples --- there is also likely to be relatively limited public knowledge of nuclear weapon effects and the nature of nuclear war. In countries with authoritarian governments, such as Spain, the possibility exists that public apprehensions have not found a means of expression against officially sanctioned policy.

85. The importance of this factor, and the chances of increasingly adverse reactions to the presence of U.S. bases

1/ FBIS, DAILY REPORT, July 19, 1960, OUO.
2/ FBIS, DAILY REPORT, July 20, 1960, OUO.

of France,[1] and particularly in the cases of the United Kingdom and Canada, there appears to be apprehension that the weapons or installations involved might be used in such a way as to lead the host nation into war without its consent. This concern is, of course, exploited by Soviet propaganda. It is further aggravated by the fact that host nations might not be able to exercise the prerogatives of national sovereignty over forces on their territory, should they wish to do so, in a crisis situation. The U.S., for its own part, obviously cannot agree to host nation veto powers over such weapons as are considered essential to its own security.

91. This conflict of interest is an element in the refusal of France and Japan to permit nuclear-armed U.S. forces to be deployed on their territories under essentially unilateral control in peacetime.



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1/ French President Charles DeGaulle, speaking on the need for national control of French armed forces, stated recently: "France considers that if atomic weapons are to be stockpiled on its territory these arms must be in its hands, in view of their nature and the consequences which their use could have. Obviously, France cannot allow its destiny, its very life, to be at the discretion of others." FBIS, Daily Report, Middle East & West Europe, 6 Sept 1960, p. R13. OUO.

Effects on Neutral Attitudes

92. The effect of these apprehensions on the attitude of the neutral or uncommitted nations is moderated by the fact that, as a matter of definition, these countries do not permit the deployment of U.S. strike forces on their territory. The question of U.S. strategic protection is also of less relevance to the position taken by neutral nations -- as uncommitted states they have foregone a direct claim on U.S. protection. This does not mean, however, that they would have no interest in U.S. military assistance, should they be attacked, or that they would not regard the Western alliance with greater benevolence if their expectations of effective military support in a crisis were high. The Soviets have attempted to undermine any such expectations by drawing the neutral nations into their own campaigns against U.S. (or U.S.-donated) nuclear strike systems overseas and, by doing so, have made the attitudes of these nations relevant to the military capabilities of the Western alliance. Khrushchev's recent criticisms of Austria, for not protesting Italian acceptance of U.S. IRBM's, is a case in point. Similarly, an important factor in the refusal of the Scandinavian NATO countries to accept nuclear weapons is fear of Soviet reprisal against another neutral, Finland, whose position is of importance to their own security.[1/]

93. Those nations which have chosen neutrality largely to avoid entanglement in war are naturally sensitive to the possible dangers of nuclear weapons and to acts which they may regard as unnecessarily provocative of the Soviet Bloc. This attitude is reflected in the priority given to disarmament by,

1/ The Nuclear Weapons Issue in Scandinavia, Current Weekly Intelligence Summary, 26 May 1960, Part III, pp. 8-10. SECRET.

for example, India, and is indicative of the reaction which the United States might expect from these nations if it should initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a limited war.

Future Trends in Apprehensions

94. The preceding paragraphs have discussed several sources of friction within the Western Alliance that stem, by and large, from public and official fears of nuclear weapons and involvement in nuclear war. With the growth of nuclear capabilities on both sides of the Iron Curtain, it appears likely that these fears will increase in scope and intensity, though the rate of increase will vary considerably from region to region and from country to country. This general trend, however, will not necessarily mean that there will be a significant growth of apprehension in those nations, such as West Germany, which are particularly exposed to Communist aggression and which are well aware that their security rests, in large part, on Western nuclear capabilities. Moreover, it is possible that the development of national nuclear capabilities by some countries might result in more favorable attitudes toward these weapons within those countries. This appears to be the case in France, although trends in British attitudes would suggest the opposite conclusion. At present, in most Middle Eastern, Asian and South American countries there appear to be gradually rising apprehensions concerning the "nuclear menace" which in some instances will continue to have directly adverse effects upon the military capabilities of the alliance.

95. Before leaving this subject, however, it should be said that there are two military trends which will reduce the impact of these fears on the military capabilities of the United States

itself. One of these is the declining importance of overseas air bases to U.S. strategic power that should accompany the phase-out of the B-47 medium bomber force in the mid-1960's. Secondly, the problem of host nation controls should be eased somewhat as allied nations acquire their own nuclear weapons systems and, to at least some extent, gradually replace those U.S. tactical nuclear aircraft and missile systems now deployed in Europe. Such a shift in responsibility should ease the control problem, at the possible cost of U.S. doubts that the missions assigned to these allied forces would actually be performed in wartime.

Other Influences on Allied Attitudes

96. Of the variety of additional considerations affecting the willingness of overseas nations to cooperate militarily with the United States, the following are among the most important.

97. First, the estimates that other nations make of the nature and gravity of the Sino-Soviet threat to their security clearly influence their attitudes toward both the United States and their alliance commitments.[1/] In the past, one of the major difficulties that the U.S. has faced in eliciting military support has been the tendency of many overseas nations to show less anxiety on the subject of Soviet military intentions than has prevailed in this country. Although there have been occasions in the past when crisis situations, precipitated by the Soviets, have increased both allied military efforts and their willingness to cooperate with the United States, it does not necessarily follow that future crises, in the context of

1/ For a detailed area-by-area analysis for recent trends in this respect, see USIA/ORA, Free World Views of the U.S. - U.S.S.R. Power Balance, R-54-60, 29 August 1960. SECRET.

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expanding Soviet and Chinese economic and military power, will enhance allied solidarity. Somewhere along the line of rising anxieties, a point may lie beyond which some of the allies will not dare to continue their collaboration with the U.S. for fear of provoking hostile action by the Communist Bloc. Any decline in their expectation of effective U.S. military support increases the chances of such a negative attitude toward the alliance.

98. Moreover, in the minds of overseas publics, the relative standing of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the Communist system, compared with the standing of the United States and its institutions, bears heavily on their attitudes, wholly apart from the military considerations involved. To the extent that the Soviet bloc becomes attractive as a model for economic development, or as the "wave of the future", active military collaboration with the United States would become more difficult for foreign governments to support. It is likely, therefore, that the attitudes of many non-Communist countries will depend in part on the outcome of the ideological, economic and political aspects of the cold war. In this area the Soviets, by the alternate use of "peace propaganda" and nuclear threats, can play on the conflicting elements that militate against collaboration with the Western alliance.

99. It is obvious, moreover, that any cause of friction between overseas free countries and the United States will tend to place strains on allied solidarity and neutral benevolence. The alliance is most directly affected when these disputes concern military matters, such as disagreements on strategy, weapons systems, or distribution of the military burden. In this area, considerations of national prestige and feelings of what may be thought to be a humiliating

dependency on the United States may complicate the process of decision making. It is difficult to predict, even with regard to individual countries, whether the trend here is toward greater or lesser friction within the alliance. It is possible that the sense of independence which some allies may derive from their increased military power will facilitate the making of military agreements. It is perhaps more likely that this independence will lead these nations to become more demanding or more stubbornly insistent in promoting national, as opposed to alliance, programs.

100. It is less obvious that interallied disputes over economic and political matters place obstacles in the path of military collaboration. While one might expect that disagreements over tariffs, financial assistance or colonial policy would not seriously affect the values placed on the collective defense effort, such disputes tend to strengthen the hands of those in allied countries who are, perhaps for other reasons, unsympathetic or even hostile to military alignment with the United States.

101. Some of the gravest problems facing American alliance policy have arisen from the fact that some of our major allies have belonged to the category of colonial powers. Sympathizing with the movements for the termination of colonial rule, but still wanting to preserve the solidarity of the alliance, the United States has tended to antagonize both parties to the colonial conflict. The colonial power involved may, as in the recent case of Belgium, threaten to reduce its collective defense efforts in retaliation for what it considers U.S. failure to support it.

102. However, as the process of emancipation proceeds and more of the colonial powers come to resign themselves to the liquidation of their empires, this source of conflict between the United States and its allies should diminish in the 1964 to 1967 period. The benefits of this trend, in improving allied solidarity, will, however, be offset by the fact that strategically important areas of the Mediterranean, Asia and Africa will have shifted from the control of U.S. allies to governments which are less able to resist Sino-Soviet pressures and which in many cases are likely to adopt a neutralist position in order to avoid involvement in the great power struggle.

103. Another source of interallied friction, often connected with the colonial issue, are the restrictions placed on some allied military contributions by their preoccupation with interests which they regard as vital, but which have only indirect relevance to the primary issues of the cold war. Disputes such as those between the Netherlands and Indonesia, Pakistan and India, Israel and the Arab States, France and the Algerian rebels, have diverted allied resources and military power from the collective defense effort. The positions taken by the United States in these disputes has driven, and may again drive, one or both parties into opposition to the U.S. and lead to subsequent reductions in, or withdrawals of, military contributions to the alliance. In this area, it is difficult to foresee whether American foreign policy will be more successful than in the past in mediating such conflicts or in gaining the sympathy of its allies by the manner in which it approaches the dispute or contributes to its solution.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE ALLIANCE AND PROSPECTS FOR 1964 TO 1967

104. By 1960, conditions in the world had developed in a way that has permitted the United States to count on significant

military efforts and cooperation by a large number of allies, including the most powerful countries whose territory adjoins the Soviet Bloc, on varying degrees of benevolence from many neutral nations, on facilities to deploy important elements of its strategic force overseas, and on considerable allied contributions to the defense of territory considered of strategic importance to the United States. If it were not for symptoms of possible future deterioration of this situation, and for the inadequacy of the NATO Shield and other local defense forces, the present state of the collective defense system could, in view of the circumstances, be regarded as a considerable achievement.

105. There has, in fact, been widespread recognition throughout the Free World that Communist aggression constitutes the principal threat to the security of independent nations and that the United States is the locus of countervailing power. Even in countries like France and Italy, where strong Communist parties have existed and where many changes of government have occurred since World War II, military ties with the U.S. have been consistently supported. Moreover, where European public opinion has been able to express itself freely, large majorities have supported the alliance policies of their governments. The alliance has retained an underlying cohesion in the face of both rising Bloc military power and increasingly violent Soviet threats against individual countries. In some instances, as in the aftermath of the U-2 incident, Soviet excesses in attempting to exploit an issue to divide the Western nations have served to pull them more closely together. In the far East, Red Chinese brutality toward the Tibetans and aggressive moves against the Indian border caused India to reassess the gravity of the

Communist threat and the security provided by her own neutrality.[1] Even among the new and uncommitted nations of Africa, the tendency is to look first to the U.S. for economic assistance, if not for military protection. It should be added, however, that preservation of the alliance has not prevented the loss of much territory and appreciable human and material resources once available to the collective defense system -- where European colonies have gained independence they have adopted a neutralist position toward the East-West struggle. Had it not been for the tide of colonial emancipation, most of Africa as well as India, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia would today be parts of allied territory.

106. As far as the noncommitted countries are concerned, none has so far voluntarily opted to join the Sino-Soviet Bloc. None except Yugoslavia has a patently Communist government. However, by 1960, the number of countries that claim to be pursuing a policy of neutrality, and that lean more or less strongly towards the Communist Bloc, has grown considerably to include, apart from Yugoslavia, the United Arab Republic as well as Iraq in the Middle East, Indonesia and possibly Laos in Southeast Asia, Guinea and possibly other countries in Africa, and Cuba in the Western Hemisphere itself.

107. Looking towards the period of 1964-1967, those responsible for U.S. military policy have reason to be concerned with two types of trends relating to changes in the Free World:

a. First, with any adverse trends in allied solidarity and neutral benevolence that affect allied contributions and

1/ Even official spokesmen [illegible] acknowledged privately in 1959 that, in the final analysis, it was American military power that would determine the freedom or demise of vulnerable countries of Southeast Asia faced with the potential of Communist aggression. USIA, Free World Views, op. cit., p. 19, SECRET.

neutral noninterference with U.S. military policy and programs.

b. Second, with future U.S. needs for the active military collaboration of overseas allies. Such collaboration includes the provision of bases and facilities for U.S. forces and the maintenance of effective indigenous forces.

108. In this second area, it now appears that changes in the U.S. strategic strike force during the mid-1960's should reduce dependence on overseas bases for support for the strategic mission. B-47 medium bombers, the only strategic aircraft now deployed outside the Western Hemisphere, will decline steadily in number through the 1960-1965 period and are expected to phase out of inventory in 1965 to 1967. No plans known to the authors of this report call for the deployment of U.S. heavy bombers, ICBM's or U.S.-manned land-based strategic missiles outside of the Western Hemisphere.

109. This trend toward a declining reliance on overseas bases must be somewhat qualified. Depending on their actual wartime missions, it may remain militarily desirable to retain "reflex" medium bomber forces on the present SAC bases in Britain and Spain. Even with the phase out of the medium bomber force, these bases could remain useful for staging operations or dispersal of the theater air forces, and, possibly, for poststrike recovery of other aircraft. The importance of the present Canadian SAC bases to strategic air operations cannot be evaluated on the basis of the information available. These facilities have, however, been strengthened as the number of overseas SAC bases has declined. They could play an important peacetime role in support of air alert operations, should the Canadians relax present overflight restrictions. An important element of the 1964-1967 strategic force, the POLARIS FBM missile

submarine, is somewhat of an exception to this trend. It is a strategic offensive system scheduled for overseas deployment in increasing numbers through the 1960's. Deployment of the FBM submarines within range of their targets is not dependent on overseas tender bases, but the availability of such bases would increase the percentage of the force that can be maintained in patrol areas. As the force grows in size, and missile range extensions add to the feasible deployment areas, local logistic support will diminish in importance. These technological advances will also reduce the importance of allied cooperation in the communications and navigational areas of the FBM system.

110. In contrast to this general trend in the strategic mission field, overseas U.S. bases will remain important in a number of other areas. These include the collection of intelligence, provision of both strategic and tactical attack warning, control of the Bloc submarine threat, logistic support of U.S. tactical forces and the rapid transport of these forces to troubled areas. Rather than being reduced by technological innovations, these overseas base requirements may increase as additional areas of the world present military difficulties to the United States. The present extensive and partially successful Bloc campaigns to increase their influence in and to destabilize sections of Africa and Latin America indicate the scope of potential military problems in these areas. Even if the responsibility for maintaining stability in these areas should be formally accepted by regional organizations or by the U.N., it is evident that the United States will still bear the brunt of the military and economic burdens involved.

111. Other trends previously mentioned in this paper indicate, however, that increasingly greater allied contributions to

the alliance will be required. As the U.S. strategic threat loses deterrent value against limited aggression on overseas allies, the vital U.S. interest in denying control over these countries to the Sino-Soviet Bloc will call for greater allied contributions in the area of localized deterrence and defense and for greater flexibility in the rights granted to the United States to deploy its forces in these overseas areas. The changing international economic position of the U.S., the increasing military problems faced by the U.S. in its own defense, and the possibility of extensive economic aid programs to the underdeveloped nations are all likely to restrict the assistance the United States can give its technologically advanced allies in supporting their local defense forces. This possibility emphasizes the importance of increasing the allied collective defense contributions.

112. The chances for successful local defense are particularly vulnerable to adverse shifts in allied solidarity and neutral benevolence. Effective U.S. support for the defense of a particular country may require not only the use of its territory, but the granting of rights by other nations for overflight, staging areas, and even bases from which combat operations are conducted. Defense by local forces may therefore call for solidarity among allied countries themselves, as well as for solidarity with the United States. The French reluctance to provide logistic facilities needed for West German forces, and British opposition to the arming of West German forces with nuclear weapons, are cases in this regard.

113. It was mentioned earlier, in relation to several of the factors that have affected allied solidarity and neutral benevolence in the past, that their development during the next decade cannot be reliably predicted. However, since the emphasis in

preceding sections has been on those trends foreshadowing difficulties for the collective defense system, it should again be mentioned that countervailing influences exist. Experience has shown that allied countries tend to rally to the support of the United States when relations between East and West become critical, particularly when a Soviet-precipitated crisis threatens their area of the world. The creation of NATO itself followed hard on evidence of such threats to Western Europe; its force goals were increased, if not met, under the influence of Soviet aggression in Korea. SEATO was a similar response. If one assumes, therefore, that its growing military and economic power will lead the Sino-Soviet Bloc to take a more aggressive approach in this period, the pull toward allied unity may increase.[1/] Even such confirmed neutrals as India have shown signs of alignment with the West, as evidence of Communist aggressive intentions toward them has become unmistakable. It was mentioned earlier, however, that the rise of Sino-Soviet power, accompanied by more aggressive use of nuclear threats and blackmail, may intimidate some of the free countries and increase their reluctance to cooperate militarily with the United States.

114. The outcome for individual nations will depend largely on their estimates of the alternatives open to them. The alternative of surrendering to the Bloc, or even of joining it voluntarily, would seem to presuppose Communist subversion on the level of an internal coup. While America's allies in Europe would seem to be relatively immune to subversion on this scale, some neutral and even allied nations in Asia might choose the road of affiliation with the Bloc unless given firm confidence in U.S. military protection or otherwise prevented from taking this course of action.

1/ Public opinion polls in the U.K. and France have shown a marked increase in attitudes favoring NATO participation during a period of sharpened East-West tension -- as in late May 1960 -- as compared with periods of apparent detente. See USIA/ORO, Post-Summit Trends in British and French Opinion of the U.S. and USSR, WE-64, June 1960, p. 15.

115. Another alternative, neutrality, may become a more serious possibility for many nations than it has been so far in the post-war period. The rise in Sino-Soviet power, a decline in the deterrent value of the U.S. strategic force, and the development of independent deterrent forces will all tend to strengthen the ranks of those who would wish to remain independent of the East-West conflict. Because the shift to neutrality of any country presently contributing to the collective defense system is likely to make more difficult the defense of its neighbors, such a transition is likely to produce a chain reaction.

116. No matter how strong is the inclination in allied and neutral countries to resist Communist Bloc expansion in this period, it seems unlikely that it will be possible fully to counteract those erosive forces discussed earlier in this paper. This is particularly true of the problems following from the decline in allied confidence in U.S. strategic protection. The allies will realize in time that every approach toward strategic nuclear stalemate raises the level of military action that the Soviets can dare undertake without risking the triggering of U.S. nuclear intervention. While in the areas of Asia that border on Red China, such intervention is considered unlikely anyway, a decline in solidarity may result from the rise in Red Chinese military power.

117. It would be possible, theoretically at least, to offset the adverse effects of nuclear stalemate on the strategic level by a buildup of local forces for deterrence and defense with a view to creating a balance of military power -- and thus a stalemate -- on the nonstrategic level of military confrontation. However, unless the United States is willing to continue to carry a considerable part of the burden of such a buildup of

limited war forces, the increases in allied military efforts and expenditures might play into neutralist hands and arouse opposition to the alliance policy from many quarters. There is also something of a vicious circle here: in order to be able to support overseas local defense efforts, the United States must be permitted to deploy tactical forces on or close to Eurasia; but if allied solidarity declines, this permission might become harder to obtain and, in turn, render more difficult the maintenance of the U.S. military support on which allied solidarity rests. In any case, whatever the trend, the dangers surrounding the Free World nations are so great, even under present conditions, that U.S. military policy and programs should be tailored with a view to maximizing the cohesion of the alliance and the military cooperation of its member nations.

REMEDIAL MEASURES

118. While many political, economic and ideological factors will affect both the future cohesion of the alliance and the attitudes of the uncommitted nations toward it, it is American military posture -- including the judicious choice of military strategies and weapon systems -- that will continue to be a primary influence.

119. Theoretically, the United States might seek better to protect its overseas allies by attaining a clearly decisive counterforce capability against the Soviet strategic arm. In practice, it now appears difficult enough to achieve and maintain a secure retaliatory force. It could also be said that an openly declared U.S. effort to achieve first-strike power could be self-defeating in terms of its effects on the alliance system. Should such efforts lead to an intensification of the arms race, its initiation by the United States might be regarded in some

allied countries as a dangerous step toward war and, for this reason, encourage the flight into neutrality that it was designed to prevent.

120. In this context, allied confidence in U.S. military protection -- the backbone of the alliance system -- can be maintained only if doubts about the effectiveness of the Grand Deterrent are compensated for by expectations concerning other forms of U.S. military support. One form this support might take would be American technical assistance and active cooperation in the development of independent deterrent forces abroad. Several weighty arguments can be raised against such action. It can be held that such independent nuclear strategic forces will be of little military value and may subject the United States to serious new dangers. The Soviet Union might respond to such a move by providing Red China, and possibly some of the European satellites, with similar weapons under nominal local control. (There are, however, strong incentives for the Soviets not to act in this manner, and this has not been their response to the development of nuclear forces by England and France.)

121. Other risks of such assistance are those attendant on any spread of nuclear weapons -- increased danger of a nuclear accident, accidental war, or the less likely possibility of catalytic war. It is also argued that the development of such independent deterrent forces diverts allied attention and resources from the maintenance of conventional arms that may be a more useful contribution to the collective defense. U.S. technical and financial assistance can reduce the need for such a diversion, but may not outweigh nationalist pressures for the development of independent missile and weapon industries or offset the popular concept that strategic nuclear power can be

an effective substitute for conventional ground and air forces. There is also a fear that these weapons may fall into the hands of irresponsible governments, should some now unforeseen change occur in the nations to which we supply them, or should they in turn sell or loan these weapons to third parties.

122. Obviously, the lower the military effectiveness of these independent strategic forces, the less they can compensate for the dangers of abuse. Even so, the risks involved in supporting the efforts of allied nations to achieve them may be a price worth paying, if their establishment should prove psychologically indispensable for the preservation of solidarity with the most resourceful of the overseas free countries. If they believe they need such forces, a belief that may recede on further thought, they are likely to proceed with their development, whether or not assisted by the United States. The result would be to create most of the dangers feared from such a proliferation of nuclear forces, with none but negative effects on the alliance itself and little opportunity for the U.S. to influence the use made, or not made, of these systems.

123. It is unlikely that the spread of independent strategic deterrents will create such divisive strains as to destroy the alliance system itself. The experience of the United States and the United Kingdom argues otherwise. In the case of smaller and less powerful nations, the probable limitations on the size and nature of their deterrent forces are even less likely to make them militarily independent of the alliance.

124. The second principal form by which U.S. military protection of allied countries can be enhanced is through increased support

for local defensive forces. Whether American efforts directed at an increase in such support would have a beneficial effect on the solidarity of the alliance depends on the faith that the allies in question have in local defense as a form of protection against Communist aggression. As things stand today, such faith seems to be firm in South Korea and on Taiwan

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In Europe there is presently no such strong faith.

125. All NATO members, including the United States, are committed to the view that, apart from border incidents, no Soviet military attack on the NATO area can be effectively deterred or defeated except by the threat or use of American strategic intervention. It is possible that by the 1964 to 1967 period, the present almost exclusive reliance on the Grand Deterrent could, without danger to the alliance, be shifted to a greater degree of confidence in collective local defense. The force requirements of any such strategy of local defense in Europe cannot be discussed here. Undoubtedly, such a change would require substantial advances in tactics, tactical weaponry, and perhaps the establishment and equipment of advanced U.S. staging areas sufficient in scope to compensate for Soviet numerical superiority in those forces available and militarily useful for an advance into Europe.

126. Other elements of U.S. military policy can also influence the cohesion of the alliance. One of these concerns the question of host nation controls over those U.S. nuclear weapons deployed overseas. The risks involved in granting control over nuclear weapons, and particularly of granting others a right of veto over their use, are unmistakable. However, their effects in practice may be somewhat exaggerated. Nations on whose territory

these weapons are stockpiled are likely to have access to them in an emergency, whatever is laid down in an agreement. They are likely to feel justified in doing so if the survival of their nation is believed to be at stake. [redacted] If allied pressure for some form of joint control over U.S. nuclear weapons on their territory persists, there is therefore something to be said for peacetime agreements that enhance solidarity, even where legal restrictions present some military risks.

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127. Finally, there is the question of the lengths to which the United States should go in avoiding military activities that are interpreted as unnecessarily provocative by other Free World countries. At least one aspect of this problem will be greatly diminished by the 1964 to 1967 period, as a result of the anticipated reductions in U.S. strategic strike forces deployed on overseas bases. However, should the United States seek to give stronger support to the local defenses of other countries, it may easily discover that the deployment of tactical nuclear forces abroad will be regarded as no less "provocative" than that of strategic weapons, and in fact will require similar installations. It makes sense, however, to proceed on the assumption that increases in military protection will cancel

out any tendency towards increased apprehensions. Such hope would not be warranted with respect to those neutral countries that believed themselves to be in no need of outside military protection. Here, everything will depend on the extent to which the overseas people can be made to understand that the projection of American military power onto, or close to, the Eurasian continent, far from being provocative, is indispensable for the protection of Eurasian free nations and that it is the consequence of a geographical situation in which a ring of weak countries, far removed from North America, is exposed to the risks of aggression from the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Even so, U.S. military policymakers should be aware of the high degree of sensitivity, especially in neutral countries, to anything that may draw Sino-Soviet fire in their direction, as, for instance, overflights by military aircraft or military vessels in their coastal waters. If, in the face of growing Sino-Soviet power, and blackmail threats, the sensitivity of the non-Communist countries of Asia and Africa should increase in coming years, one of the gravest difficulties facing the U.S., in developing a military policy for the protection of the overseas free countries, will be its diminishing freedom of movement and deployment in areas of such strategic significance as North Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the Far East.

128. If military policy cannot be expected to counteract entirely the adverse trend now apparent in allied solidarity and neutral benevolence, it may be able to protect the United States, as well as U.S. vital interests overseas, against the worst effects of this trend. As for the security of the United States which rests on strategic nuclear deterrence, the solution lies in making the U.S. strategic force as independent of overseas

deployment -- particularly of deployment in countries of questionable solidarity -- as technological conditions permit. There is no way of avoiding entirely the allied fears and erosive effects on confidence in U.S. support that will result from the lessening of U.S. dependence on overseas bases for its own security. Apprehensions will be expressed that this independence will generate isolationist inclinations in the United States. On the other hand, increased U.S. support for allied local defense and possibly for independent or regional allied strategic deterrents should go far in convincing the overseas countries of the undiminished U.S. interest in their security and freedom. Moreover, continued American determination to protect them, if necessary, through the threat of strategic nuclear retaliation will not only continue to give them a considerable measure of protection, but should help keep much allied solidarity alive. After all, no achievable degree of strategic nuclear stalemate is likely ever to remove the risks that the threat of U.S. strategic intervention poses to Communist planners contemplating major aggression against the overseas free countries.

ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "A"

BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARD COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

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ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "A"

BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARD COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

THE PROBLEM

1. To explore those prospective developments in British foreign and defense policies that would adversely affect the essential solidity of the Anglo-American alliance and consequently might impair U.S. access to U.K. facilities for the basing or support of American strategic offensive systems.

SCOPE

2. This discussion explores the predominant currents in British opinion, past and present, toward the U.K.'s foreign policy objectives and defense requirements. Particular attention is given to those trends in attitudes that might portend significant changes in British collective defense policies and Anglo-American military collaboration. General trends in public opinion are discussed insofar as they suggest what might be the primary issues of debate in these fields in the foreseeable future. Because public attitudes will both influence and be determined by the stands taken by the two major parties, conceivable developments in Conservative and Labor security policies are examined in detail. In this respect, the future of the British independent nuclear deterrent is considered of particular importance, since its abandonment might result in significant shifts in British attitudes toward nuclear weapons and toward U.S. strategic nuclear systems deployed on or supported from British installations.

INTRODUCTION

3. Traditionally, British foreign and defense policies have been directed toward two main areas of concern: (1) the preservation of a balance of power among the European states as an

essential condition of the security of the British Isles, and (2) the security of British political and economic interests in Asia, Africa, and other overseas territories. In recent years, two developments have affected the pursuit of these traditional objectives. The balance of power struggle, formerly focused on the European Continent, stretched outwards to embrace most of Eurasia and North America, and, as a result of two wars and the rise of two other superpowers, Britain's relative power position in the world dramatically declined. Thus, a third interest emerged to become a keystone of British policy -- the Anglo-American alliance. Only by enlisting American assistance could the U.K. hope to preserve the security of its own home islands and of its overseas interests and dependencies.

4. Also in the postwar period, a shift took place in the geographical orientation of British policy: the U.K. began to regard the security of Western Europe as its area of primary concern, although its interest in the overseas areas remained high, particularly in the maintenance and development of the Commonwealth. A number of factors were responsible: the dissolution of large sectors of its colonial holdings, the replacement of its overseas military commitments and economic interests in many areas by American commitments and dollars, and, particularly, the immediate postwar spectre of Soviet expansion toward the West. With the Continent under the domination of the Soviet Union, the East-West balance of power would be shattered and the security of the U.K. would be most gravely threatened. With this assessment, the U.S. concurred at the time of the Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO and still concurs today. Thus, British and American security interests are deeply intertwined, although both the geographical situation of the U.S. and its position as leader of the Free World give it greater and wider interests and responsibilities than its British ally.

5. The close ties at practically every level of contact between the United Kingdom and the United States constitute without question one of the more significant relationships on the international scene today. The pattern of relations between them has generally been marked by a high degree of identity in thought and action which, in times of crisis, has tended to evoke an impressive congruity of purpose and policy. Ties of language, similar political and legal institutions, a tradition of collaboration against common enemies, and close contacts on the personal and cultural levels have all served to reinforce this sense of community between the two countries. For the United States, the alliance with the United Kingdom is of fundamental importance in view of the U.K.'s contributions to the power of the Free World: its industrial and financial resources, its strategic position off the European continent, its territories and outposts in other parts of the world, its military forces for collective deterrence and defense, and its provision of extensive facilities on its home islands and elsewhere for the deployment and support of U.S. military forces. All of these considerations, in addition to the U.K.'s respected status as a world power -- a status often greater than is measurable by the physical attributes of power -- have given the U.K. a privileged position in the American alliance network.

6. The essence of the Anglo-American alliance is in the basic unity of the two countries on their major objectives.[1/] Nevertheless, the U.S. and U.K. have sometimes differed deeply on

1/ On the level of public opinion, successive polls of British attitudes have indicated a high level of felt mutuality of interests with the United States, with only minor variations over the years. The latest poll, taken in February 1960, shows a slight gain over the average of previous years: out of 1221 respondents, 25% felt that the basic interests of the U.K. were very much in agreement with those of the U.S.; 55% fairly well in agreement; 9% rather different; 2% very different; and 10% no opinion (a net favorable response -- favorable answers less the unfavorable answers -- of 68). USIA/ORA, West European Climate of Opinion on the Eve of the Paris Summit Conference, WE-62, April 1960, p. 26, CONFIDENTIAL.

the methods and approach appropriate to the pursuit of their common goals. On several occasions, their different interests in various geographical areas have led to a near rupture of relations between them or to policies undertaken unilaterally without the other's support. The relative rapidity with which Anglo-American relations have recovered from such occasions suggests that the forces which impel London and Washington together are substantially stronger than those that divide them.

7. Nonetheless, there are indications that some very real differences in outlook could develop between them over certain of the issues confronting the Western alliance, and it is possible that different politico-military approaches to these problems, in combination with existing sources of friction, could lead again to a deterioration in Anglo-American relations. In this study, for purposes of analysis, emphasis will therefore be placed on those British attitudes, official and non-official, that suggest divisive forces in the alliance rather than on those attitudes that sustain the large areas of agreement between the U.S. and U.K. This concentration on the adverse trends should not lead the reader to underestimate the strength and compass of the many forces that enhance the solidarity of the Anglo-American alliance.

DISCUSSION

U.K. CONTRIBUTIONS TO WESTERN COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

8. The United States regards the continued security of the U.K. from Soviet attack or domination as a priority objective of U.S. policy, but not only because of the historical and cultural bonds between them or because of expected British diplomatic support for American international aspirations. Two other considerations are also paramount. First, it is of primary importance

to the long-term security of the United States that the Communist Bloc be denied the territory and resources of the British Isles and of British overseas dependencies. Secondly, the U.K. can make positive, immediate and continuing contributions to U.S. military security in two important ways: (a) by supplementing U.S. military capabilities with its own military power, and (b) by permitting U.S. access to bases and other facilities on its territories. These two types of contributions will be briefly considered here, while the following sections of this paper will be concerned with political forces that might jeopardize these contributions to the alliance and to U.S. military security.

Active U.K. Military Contributions

9. The British military establishment, though gradually declining in overall strength during the past few years and subject to deficiencies in several areas, will remain an important factor in the world military balance in the 1960-1967 period.

[redacted] The military importance of the Army is greater than its size alone would suggest both because of its overseas deployments and because of the substantial number of base facilities available to the U.K. from Gibraltar in the West to Singapore in the East.[2] While these

1/ [redacted]

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Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, OCI No. 3334/60, 7 July 1960, II, p. 12. SECRET.

2/ Despite plans for relinquishing control over present overseas British territories, the U.K. hopes to maintain substantial overseas basing rights. See Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, OCI No. 4443/60, 8 September 1960, III, pp. 2-4. SECRET.

overseas forces contribute to the limited war capabilities of the Western alliance, their levels are not now sufficient to meet the U.K.'s military commitments. [redacted] The Army has borne the brunt of the 1957 decision to reduce the levels of the British armed forces and to create smaller and more mobile nuclear-armed forces of long-term and highly trained regulars: [redacted] Although reductions in the BAOR have not been as great as originally contemplated, its planned qualitative improvements -- for example, the provision of CORPORAL and HONEST JOHN missile units -- are not expected to compensate for its present quantitative deficiencies by NATO standards. At present, it falls short of MC 70 requirements in both combat and service support units and in the modernization of conventional equipment. [redacted]

[redacted]

3/ Ibid, pp. 1-4. SECRET.

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U.S. Access to British Bases

13. From the American viewpoint, a most important British military contribution to the alliance is the availability of the British Isles as a major base area for offensive and defensive operations and for the logistic support of U.S. forces deployed in Western Europe. For the U.S. Air Force, the U.K. provides facilities for strategic and tactical air operations, air refueling, reconnaissance, logistic support and storage, communications, and the programmed BMEWS and MIDAS warning systems. For the U.S. Army, Southampton and Liverpool are supports of Bremerhaven POE, [redacted]

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of the Conservative government are not substantial and are centered mainly on the issue whether priority should be accorded to collective defense efforts or to policies promoting a relaxation of tensions. But the current official line of the Labor Party on foreign and defense policies may suffer modifications under rising pressures in party circles for immediate unilateral nuclear disarmament, greater control over or the removal of American strategic bases, and a cutback of defense expenditures. Such proposals could lead in turn to proposals for Britain's withdrawal from NATO and neutrality in the cold war, if the present leadership of the Labor Party were ousted.

Possible Areas of Conflict on Anglo-American Objectives

36. Despite a substantial degree of concurrence at present between the two British parties on the goals of British foreign policy, it is apparent that the Conservatives' approach is closer to that of the United States. Nevertheless, while the U.S. supports the four major objectives of British foreign policy suggested above,[1/] there is still scope for significant Anglo-American differences over the approaches best suited to their achievement. If differences should become acute and acerbate relations between the U.S. and the U.K., the climate of British opinion on the U.K.'s military contributions to the Atlantic alliance could be adversely affected. The possibilities of such differences will therefore be summarily examined in the following pages.

Containment of Sino-Soviet Expansion

37. Although containment of Communism within its present borders remains a primary goal of British policy, most British analysts differ with their American counterparts with regard to the nature

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and gravity of the Sino-Soviet threat. The Labor Party in particular and the Conservatives, to a lesser extent, hold that there has been a fundamental and significant change in the Soviets' cold war strategy. The dangers of Communist expansion, they believe, are now primarily political, economic and psychological, rather than military: as the recent Sino-Soviet ideological dispute suggests, Khrushchev would be reluctant to jeopardize his country's economic progress and international political gains by aggressive military adventures that might unleash a general war.

38. American observers, on the other hand, have shown a greater concern for the potential dangers of rising Soviet military capabilities, particularly in the missile field, and are deeply suspicious of Khrushchev's occasionally professed desires for peaceful coexistence and nonmilitary competition with the West. Such policies of detente are regarded as essentially tactical shifts in the Soviet Union's basic strategy of territorial aggrandizement. At the least, American leaders are unwilling to bank on the sincerity of Khrushchev's peaceful gestures to the extent of relaxing U.S. efforts to strengthen the West's collective defense posture.

39. The gap between British and American estimates of the threat has narrowed since the 1960 Summit breakup and Khrushchev's missile threats and interference in Cuba and in the Congo. But if it widens again under a new Soviet peace offensive, it could have serious consequences for Anglo-American collective defense planning[1] and could lead to differences over the choice of specific policies in a number of other fields.

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Relxation of Tensions

40. Recognition of Britain's diminished power has encouraged general acceptance of the proposition that the major role in containing the Soviet Bloc must be played by the United States. This belief, coupled with an acute awareness of the U.K.'s inability to protect itself if war is not avoided, has led the British government to place an increasingly heavy emphasis on another and concurrent policy objective: the reduction of East-West tensions while improving the international conditions favorable to peaceful coexistence. The prevailing British estimate of Soviet intentions -- that the Soviets would prefer nonmilitary forms of competition with the West -- leads to the same conclusion: that serious efforts must be made to cash in, whenever possible, on any apparent Soviet desires to resolve outstanding issues. To this end, the Macmillan government, with the support of the Labor opposition, has taken the lead in the Western camp to promote such East-West negotiations at all levels, including the Summit, as might cushion the severity of the cold war and reduce the likelihood of accidental or intentional war. With few illusions that such negotiations could lead to a general settlement, the official approach has been to work toward ad hoc adjustments on specific issues -- trade, European disengagement, disarmament, a nuclear test ban, open conflict situations like Indochina or potential danger spots like Berlin -- whenever opportunities for settlement appeared to open up.[1]

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public conferences or Summit meetings where failure could -- and, in May 1960, did -- result in a sharpening of cold war tensions. In the American view, existing diplomatic channels remain a sufficient, and often a preferable and more effective, instrument for achieving satisfactory settlements. The American approach is therefore somewhat at variance with the general British view that more serious and more positive efforts should be made to provide the Soviets with opportunities to negotiate.[1/] It should be added, however, that many Conservatives remain privately skeptical of the wisdom of these efforts. Macmillan's attempts to bridge the East-West gap have been, in part, a response to general public weariness with the cold war and to the Labor Party's threat to monopolize the "peace" issue. This was particularly the case prior to the 1959 election.

Maintenance of Britain's Security

42. In pursuit of this objective, Britain has placed primary reliance on its collective defense arrangements, particularly NATO and the American alliance, and secondary reliance on the development of its own military forces. British attitudes on defense policy will be the subject of the next section; here it is sufficient to point out that while the U.S. subscribes to the objectives of current British defense policy -- deterrence of war on all levels, particularly strategic nuclear war, and defense against attacks that do occur -- the U.S. and U.K. may differ on the application of that general policy in specific circumstances.

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43. Differing geographical interests will be a particularly potent factor of diverging assessments of defense priorities. The postwar contraction of Britain's overseas interests and commitments, both in its leased bases and colonial possessions, has progressively narrowed the scope of areas in which the U.S. and U.K. share heavy security responsibilities. Since the war the Labor Party and, more lately, the Conservatives have been willing to admit that Britain's stakes in the Far East, Southeast Asia and now the Middle East are declining. One may predict that the U.K., with its limited military resources, will be increasingly reluctant to take such grave risks in defense of overseas areas as the U.S. may feel justified, particularly those areas threatened by Red China.

44. On the other hand, British observers are increasingly concerned that in future years American readiness to come to the assistance of the U.K. and of Western Europe will decline as the utility of European strategic bases for the immediate defense of the North American continent declines, and as Soviet strategic capabilities pose increasingly severe retaliatory sanctions against U.S. strategic intervention in a war initially confined to the European area. As confidence in American strategic protection declines, the incentives for Britain's contracting out of its commitments to NATO and to the U.S. could increase if there appeared to be little hope of redressing an adversely shifting continental balance of power. While a head-in-the-sand British retreat to a neutralist and isolationist policy seems a highly unlikely development -- whether based on independent nuclear capabilities or on unilateral disarmament -- it is a conceivable development if noninvolvement in a nuclear conflict should become the paramount consideration guiding British security policy.

Continued U.K. Prestige and Power

45. The U.K.'s diminished power position since World War II is attributable to a number of developments, including the concurrent rise of the U.S. and USSR as world superpowers, the weapons revolution which left the U.K. particularly vulnerable to a strategic strike, the dissolution of its old imperial system, and its limited financial and industrial potential capable of supporting only a moderate military establishment. Given these conditions, there is wide agreement that the U.K. must rely heavily on American support to preserve its present power position and to achieve its international goals, but necessity has not made a virtue of the fact.

46. In some quarters, the response to the U.K.'s sudden and necessary abandonment of its centuries-old central role on the world stage has been to deny the degree of the U.K.'s dependence on the U.S., or to resent this apparent development. Thus, the almost universal acceptance of the American alliance as a buttress to Britain's power is often accompanied by a seemingly paradoxical urge that the U.K. maximize its ability to act independently of the alliance. This feeling is reinforced by the constant irritations inevitable within an alliance where coordination is attempted on so many aspects of policy, as well as by occasional major differences on foreign policy issues and on estimates of strategic necessities. For a large segment of British opinion, the ability of the U.S. to run the Western show remains on trial, and generalized contrasts are sometimes drawn between the youthful, exuberant idealism of American foreign policy and the experienced, measured, realistic approach of British diplomatists. On occasion, confidence in the United States is badly shaken by such episodes as the Suez crisis, the

handling of the U-2 incident or the Summit failure at Paris.[1] In addition to British uncertainties concerning the skills of American policymakers, there is also apprehension that the U.S. may fail to support the U.K. when one of its vital interests is endangered (as at Suez) or that the U.S. may involve the U.K. in conflicts in which it has little direct interest.

47. To cushion the U.K. against unwelcome developments in U.S. policy, it is often argued that Britain should develop some sources of power independent of the American alliance. Such has been the justification for proposals to tighten Commonwealth bonds or to associate more directly with the Continental countries in economic -- and even political -- arrangements. The maintenance of the British independent nuclear deterrent has also been supported on this ground, and, significantly, one of its foremost official justifications is its value as a lever to enable the U.K. to influence the direction that American policies will take.

48. In addition to these general areas of foreign policy where differences could arise to jeopardize Anglo-American unity, four other specific issues should be mentioned as past or potential sources of friction. First, the British have regarded with some uneasiness the support and encouragement the U.S. has given to the enhancement of West German power and the confidence it has placed in the reliability of the Federal Republic as an ally. As Churchill disapproved of the American "one-track mind"

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approach to Nazi Germany at the close of the war, many Britons now deplore what they feel is a similar U.S. overconcentration on the Soviet threat. American support of West Germany's integration into "Little Europe" has not allayed British fears of future German dominance in Europe or of German adventurism in the years ahead. Secondly, West European integration has become a source of irritation between the U.S. and the U.K. While both countries will suffer commercially from the Common Market's external tariff, the United States is willing to pay that price for the expected advantages of West European political union, even one from which the U.K. excludes itself. Thus, the U.S. has strongly backed integration as a means both of tying Germany to the West and of creating a firm bulwark against the Soviet threat. In contrast, the U.K. has favored participation in a looser and broader association, primarily because of its Commonwealth preferential tariff obligations and because of its reluctance to submit British independent action to supranational controls. Thirdly, the different approaches of the two countries to East-West trade has caused some friction between them. Vitally dependent on its industrial exports, the U.K. has been unwilling to support all the restrictions on trade with the Bloc that the U.S. feels are necessary.

49. Finally, and most important in terms of a serious future Anglo-American rift, is the absence of a common policy toward Communist China and the Formosa Straits. While Britain has sought to preserve its remaining Asian interests, particularly Hong Kong, by recognition of Red China and by a willingness to deal with that country when necessary, many British feel that the American policy of enforced isolation of China, like that of Russia in 1917, breeds despotism within and acquisitiveness

without. It is quite possible that the British government will vote for Red China's admission to the U.N., and both British parties regard the offshore islands as properly within the jurisdiction of mainland China. While the U.K. has not yet tried to force these issues with the United States, a future crisis in the Formosa Straits could lead to sharply differing views on the action to be taken. In the past, such divergent views have not seriously disrupted Anglo-American relations, although occasional clashes have taken place, as, for example, over Indochina in the spring of 1954. In the future, the consequences for the alliance could be far more grave.

British Attitudes Toward Collective and National Defense

50. Future American access to military facilities in the U.K., particularly those that support U.S. strategic systems, will be determined not only by the continued basic compatibility of U.S. and U.K. foreign policies, but also by developing British attitudes on issues relating to the security of the U.K.: in particular, the net advantages and reliability of the American alliance; the risks that U.S. bases pose for Britain's security; the relative strength of British armed forces; and the wisdom, practicality and morality of a defense policy based on nuclear deterrence and an independent British deterrent.

51. In recent years, public discussion of these issues has taken place within the context of debates on developments in British defense policy, in the Parliament, within the parties, in the press and in nonofficial circles. It is within this context that the major lines of British opinion will be explored here, inasmuch as the views that determine the future shape of British defense policy will also have a profound impact on the ability of the U.S. to retain its British bases.

52. The debate on Britain's defense requirements has often been confused. The issues are immensely complex; strategic thinking in the U.K., even on the highest levels, is currently in a state of flux; the information necessary to balanced judgments on such a variety of issues is not readily available, or can be interpreted in different ways; and the choices are all difficult. Moreover, the existence of nuclear weapons with their hitherto inconceivable destructive power has introduced an emotional element into the debate which has sometimes clouded the more rational considerations, particularly in nonofficial circles. Attitudes have also been conditioned by single dramatic events -- like the Bikini test results, Suez, or the recent RB-47 incident -- that act as catalysts for existing but dormant fears which are then transformed into an effective political force. Problems introduced in this manner are not always debated in terms of the other relevant but not so dramatic factors. In short, while heavy reliance on the American alliance and on the U.K.'s independent deterrent remains official British policy, few people in the U.K. can see any certain and valid answer to Britain's security problem in the nuclear age that is anything better than the lesser of many evil choices. But, from the widespread and intense debate that has been developing on defense issues, it is clear that an extraordinarily high percentage of the British public is, to a greater or lesser extent, concerned.

53. The current spectrum of British attitudes on these issues can best be understood and evaluated against the background of what has been called the "nuclear debate" of the postwar years. The development of concepts and public reactions falls roughly into four periods: (1) security under the American nuclear umbrella, 1945 to 1954; (2) the debate on nuclear testing, 1954

to 1956; (3) general approval of the "New Look" in British defense policy, 1957 to 1958; and (4) increasing doubts on the British independent deterrent, 1958 to 1960. A brief survey of these periods, together with an analysis (in the following section) of current attitudes on the specific subject of the U.S. bases, may indicate the trends in British opinion toward reliance on U.S. military power that will determine the future of the U.S. base system in the U.K.

Reliance on U.S. Nuclear Capabilities, 1945 to 1954

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a British thermonuclear capability. Both decisions initially met with substantial public support, for they seemed to promise that Britain could again claim great power status, that it would no longer be totally dependent on the U.S. for deterrence from strategic attack, and that the British bombs would contribute both to the deterrent posture of the Free World and to Britain's influence within the Western councils.[1] The opposition Labor Party, with the notable exception of Aneurin Bevan, concurred in Prime Minister Churchill's H-bomb decision.[2]

The Nuclear Testing Debate, 1954 to 1956

56. Only a few months later, there appeared the first substantial public doubts about nuclear weapons in general and about British nuclear weapons in particular. These apprehensions, which have since multiplied, initially concentrated on the issue of nuclear testing as the result of a wide dissemination of information about the destructiveness of the H-bomb and the dangers of its fall-out.[3] Opposition to the British manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons increased under the impact of the American AEC's report, in February 1955, on the effects of the Bikini H-bomb tests of the previous year, which was widely publicized. The testing issue was also brought dramatically before



the public eye in a major debate in the House of Commons in March on a resolution to halt all further testing until an international conference determined the long-term radiation hazards.

57. Exploited by the left wing of the Labor Party as an election issue in 1955, public sentiment for a test ban continued to grow and reached a climax in June 1956 with the publication of a report by the respected Medical Research Council which expressed fear over the possible long-term genetic effects of Strontium 90. The effect of this report was such that Prime Minister Eden was constrained to announce Britain's willingness to consider negotiations for an international test ban apart from a discussion of general disarmament. By the summer of 1956, public opinion in the U.K. favored such a test ban, with or without general disarmament,[1] although opinion was more evenly divided whether the U.K. should proceed with its own H-bomb tests.[2]

58. By the end of the year, however, perhaps under the impact of Britain's military weakness at Suez, there was a significant shift of opinion against the concept of a separate test ban and against the unilateral postponement of Britain's thermonuclear tests.[3]

General Approval of the New Defense Policy, 1957 to 1958

59. By 1957, the Conservative government, now led by Prime Minister Macmillan, adopted a tougher line toward the Soviet Union and, at the Bermuda Conference with President Eisenhower in the Spring, reversed its previous test ban policy by agreeing

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not to consider negotiating an agreement on nuclear production or testing except within the framework of a satisfactory general disarmament agreement.

60. Moreover, the Defense White Paper,[1] announced in April 1957, marked a significant turning point in the character and objectives of British defense policy.

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62. The Suez operation had brought into question not only the adequacy of Britain's military strength to achieve its vital national goals, but also the value of its overseas deployment. The conviction grew that the political costs of maintaining overseas bases against mounting anti-colonial pressures would be heavy, while the declining importance of British economic and colonial interests in Asia and the Middle East seemed to suggest that a reevaluation of its overseas commitments would be in order. By 1957, the Macmillan government was faced with a choice between increasing the defense effort to meet the commitments and to assure the security of the British Isles as well and, alternatively, concentrating the defense effort to achieve

1/ Defence: Outline of Future Policy, Cmnd. 124, April 1957

2/ [redacted]

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more satisfactory results within a narrower range. In choosing the latter course, the government committed the U.K. to a five-year policy that constituted a radical revision of both the size and character of the whole defense program.

63. The new defense policy, which has been little modified in succeeding years, was based on two major assumptions: in the words of the White Paper, (1) "...that there is at present no means of providing protection for the people of this country against the consequences of an attack with nuclear weapons [so that] ...the overriding consideration in all military planning must be to prevent war rather than to prepare for it;" and (2) that "...in the true interests of defense...the claims of military expenditure should be considered in conjunction with the country's financial and economic strength." Thus, the U.K. chose to place primary reliance for its security on the policy of strategic nuclear deterrence, while limiting the share of its resources -- particularly manpower -- devoted to defense.

64. It followed from the latter consideration that Britain should (a) make reductions in the overall strength of its military forces, then 700,000 men, down to 375,000 by 1962;[1] (b) abolish conscription by 1960; and (c) reduce the number of British forces deployed abroad, on the grounds that Britain could not afford to continue its "disproportionately large contribution" to NATO nor the "substantial demands on British manpower" by garrisons in British colonies and protectorates; meanwhile, Britain would (d) arm its forces with atomic weapons, and (e) create a mobile central reserve force in the British Isles that could be rapidly dispatched to any trouble spot by a strengthened RAF Transport Command or by naval "commando carriers".

1/ [redacted]

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[illegible]. For strategic nuclear deterrence, the British government chose not to rely solely on American capabilities, but rather to speed the development of its own nuclear deterrent power. According to the 1957 plan, the means of delivering the British bomb would remain the British medium-range strategic bombers of the V-class which would later be supplemented by ballistic missiles, supplied initially by the United States,[1] until such time as the U.K. had perfected its own missile capability.

[illegible]. This latter objective of the 1957 White Paper has never been fulfilled. In April 1960, under mounting criticism that the British fixed-site BLUE STREAK intermediate range missile was already obsolete before it was operational, the Defence Ministry finally abandoned its military strategic missile program. It was decided instead that the life of the newer V-bombers would be extended into the late 1960's by the provision of the air-launched ballistic missile, SKY BOLT (GAM-87), to be supplied by the United States.

[illegible]7. The 1957 White Paper on defense was very well received by the British press where it was widely reported. There was virtually unanimous praise for the government's "courageous and realistic" reevaluation of the national defense policy in the light of the country's economic capabilities and the development of nuclear weapons.[2]

[illegible]. By placing primary reliance for Britain's defense on the nuclear deterrent, the Macmillan government forced Labor to modify its stand on the issue of nuclear weapons. In the [illegible]ant House of Commons debates that followed in the spring of 1957, it became apparent that the Labor Party was divided

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between two factions which have been unable to resolve their positions in subsequent years: (1) the more moderate group, which initially supported the government's nuclear deterrence policy but which was still willing to postpone British nuclear tests until the prospects of an international H-bomb disarmament agreement were further explored; and (2) the left-wing and pacifist groups which pressed for an unconditional ban on testing and on the manufacture of the British thermonuclear bomb. Despite a large-scale propaganda effort by the latter group led by Aneurin Bevin, the government remained firm, and on May 15, 1957, the first British H-bomb was successfully tested.

69. Public opinion polls at the time indicated that the government had correctly assessed the mood of British opinion which appeared little affected by the vigorous anti-test campaign of the spring of 1957.[1] A growing consensus developed that nuclear weapons would remain necessary as long as the USSR refused to negotiate a reasonable disarmament plan, and by October 1957 the annual Labor Party Conference had rejected the proposal for a unilateral British nuclear ban, with even Aneurin Bevan reversing his position.[2] Up to 1959, the British public generally went along with the government's new defense policy which has also commanded the active support of the Labor Party's front bench in Parliament.

1/ [redacted]

2/ [redacted]

70. Public attitudes toward a British nuclear capability during this period seemed to vary directly with estimates of Britain's ability to remain a great power and with estimates of the value and reliability of the American alliance. Despite the Suez experience, four-fifths of Britons polled in late 1956 had rejected the proposition that Britain should abandon its claims to "great power" status and should concentrate instead on affairs in the British Isles.[1] For the U.K.'s maintenance of its role of international influence, one of the prime prerequisites seemed to be a nuclear capability.

71. Support for the new defense policy seemed also to stem from severe doubts after the Suez experience as to the dependability of the United States as an ally. Many Britons, including those who had opposed the government's Suez policy, wondered to what extent the U.K. could afford to count on American support in the future, in view of the fact that the U.S. had dared openly to oppose the U.K. when at Suez it had felt that its vital interest were at stake.[2] Despite rekindled British enthusiasm for the alliance during the winter of 1957 to 1958, evidence of Soviet missile achievements provided new reasons to doubt the certainty of American assistance. Increasingly, the British nuclear deterrent began to be supported on

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

the ground that it would provide independent insurance against the Soviet strategic threat in the event that the U.S. should decide not to "commit suicide" for the defense of Europe.

Increasing Doubts About the Independent Deterrent, 1958 to 1960

72. During 1958 and 1959, the British public generally remained convinced of the validity of the new defense policy, as long as the cold war continued and as long as no general disarmament agreement was reached. Nevertheless, several developments during these years indicated growing dissatisfaction and uneasiness, both in the general public and in responsible circles, over the value of the independent deterrent and the risks that it entailed. The resulting debate on Britain's own nuclear capabilities generated ideas and political movements that might well affect British defense policy in the future and, conceivably, the prospects of the American base system in the British Isles.

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

73. One of these developments was the nonparty Campaign for (Unilateral) Nuclear Disarmament whose annual mass demonstration marches -- the first in 1958 from London to the atomic research center at Aldermaston -- have attracted considerable public attention and not a little public sympathy. The proposals of the CND, if taken seriously and carried to their logical conclusion, could have grave consequences for American basing rights in the U.K., for the CND holds that "Britain must...renounce unilaterally the use or production of nuclear weapons, and refuse to allow their use by others in her defense." If ultimately adopted by the government, this program would mean not only the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons systems and their support facilities from British soil, but could easily lead to Britain's

abandonment of its NATO commitments and eventual adoption of a position of neutrality in the cold war: results which most CND supporters have probably not envisioned.

74. The CND cannot, however, be dismissed as a pacifist stunt or even as a temporarily hysterical reaction to the nuclear menace. Its adherents are growing and include a number of respected citizens,[1] and its 1959 Trafalgar Square rally drew out Frank Cousins, leader of Britain's largest trade union, and, as speaker, Robert Willis, chairman of the Trades Union Congress. Moreover, the CND draws on many old strands in the British political tradition -- genuine anti-militarism, Christian pacifism, direct public protest and action for "what is right", the "Little England" concept, nationalism (in the belief that other countries cannot ignore Britain's dramatic moral lead), and anti-Americanism. But, most importantly, it plays on British weariness with the never-ending cold war and on increasing apprehensions over nuclear weapons, the East-West arms race, the destructiveness of modern war, the risks and uncertainties of deterrence policies, and the U.K.'s particular vulnerability to a strategic strike.[2]

75. Although the CND attracted -- and has since gained -- little support in Parliament or in the responsible press,[3] at the

1/ Including J. B. Priestly, A. J. P. Taylor, Victor Gollancz, Philip Toynbee, and Bertrand Russell.
2/ For an analysis of the elements of the CND's appeal, see David Marquand, "England, the Bomb, The Marchers", Commentary, Vol. 29, No. 5 (May 1960), pp. 380-386.
3/ It exerts its pressure mainly through the Labor Party in Parliament, particularly through the Victory for Socialism wing of the Party. Among the Laborite Press, the Daily Herald, the Tribune, and the New Statesman and Nation all supported unilateralism until they abandoned it in favor of the new "nonnuclear club" policy of the Labor Party, announced in June 1959.

popular level its successes have been striking.[1] It is remarkable as the one organization on Britain's otherwise drab political landscape that can inspire mass enthusiasm on a political issue. But it is most significant because its activities have happened to coincide with a noticeable shift of opinion in responsible circles where doubts are growing on the validity of the independent deterrent concept. Thus, the first of the CND's objectives -- the abandonment of Britain's strategic nuclear capability -- has gained respectability, not because it is morally "right" or because it will induce other nations also to "opt out" of the nuclear race, but because it may become politically expedient. Should the government decide that continued maintenance of the independent deterrent is impractical for a country of Britain's size, location and resources, it is probable that the CND would be strengthened in the pursuit of its other objectives which would have more serious implications for the U.K.'s alliance policies and U.S. strategic deployment.

Labor Party Opposition to British Nuclear Capabilities

76. Doubts on the British nuclear deterrent were also strengthened by a second important development in this period: the shattering of the common front that the two major parties had previously presented on the issue of nuclear weapons.

77. In June 1959, the Labor Party adopted its "non-nuclear club" proposal that would have traded Britain's nuclear status for a pledge by other nations to restrict nuclear weapons to the U.S. and USSR alone.

78. Theoretically, the proposal gave British opinion a third option beyond the alternatives of unilateral nuclear disarmament and retention of nuclear weapons pending a general disarmament agreement. Practically, the proposal seemed to fall

1/ In 1958, about 5000 marchers, supported by clergymen, intellectuals, trade union leaders, and some Members of Parliament, protested at Aldermaston. In 1959, the CND's Easter weekend march from Aldermaston to London drew a crowd of about 20,000 listeners with about 15,000 of them having participated in the march and 3000 having marched all the way. The 1960 march showed increased CND strength, with about 30,000 at Aldermaston and a crowd of 40,000 in Trafalgar Square.

between those two existing stools, despite its appeal to those who were searching for a way to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and calling for positive British leadership in the field of disarmament. The nonnuclear club idea failed to elicit more than nominal support at all levels of opinion.[1] Only a handful of papers welcomed the proposal as a new attack on the problem of nuclear weapons and disarmament: the semi-official Laborite Daily Herald, the pro-Labor Daily Mirror, the Socialist New Statesman, and the Liberal News Chronicle. Only the independent-Liberal Manchester Guardian and independent-Conservative Sunday Observer supported the nonnuclear club without reservation as a "reasoned and responsible" policy for preserving the Atlantic alliance while seeking to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and deemphasizing them as symbols of prestige. In Parliament, the more pacifist or unilateralist backbench Labor members felt the new proposal did not go far enough, but on the other hand there were signs that a few Conservative M.P.'s were sympathetic to the concept. While the public reaction might have been tested during the general election in October, 1959, events conspired to generate public indifference to the proposal. A complicated scheme to put across



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to the electorate, it attracted less public interest than expected, largely because of the wave of optimism about East-West relations after Khrushchev's visit to the United States. If the great powers seemed less likely to fight, there seemed to be less reason to worry about the bomb. Of those who took notice of the proposal, some dismissed it as a cynical -- even hypocritical -- preelection maneuver which would have little chance of success if put into effect; France or subsequent nations struggling toward a nuclear capability would not be willing to renounce their achievements.[1] Others felt that the proposal hedged the issue and that the Labor Party should have taken a firm stand either for or against the deterrent -- for retention or for unilateral nuclear disarmament. Many others did not understand the nonnuclear club idea.

79. It was also clear that the nonnuclear club proposal had done little to resolve the fundamental split on defense policy between the Labor Party's moderate leadership and its unilateralist-pacifist wing which was gaining ground, particularly among the trade unions which hold considerable power in Labor circles.[2] Against this wing, Gaitskell and his shadow

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Cabinet defended the U.K.'s retention of the independent deterrent until the nonnuclear club was brought into existence, and he insisted as well on Britain's responsibilities to NATO and to the United States. But Gaitskell was also under attack within the party on other grounds: the party's poor showing in the 1959 election under his leadership, his "intellectual" approach, and his abortive attempt to modify the party's constitutional clause on nationalization policy all had aroused considerable resentment.

80. To counter the rising unilateralist tide and to buttress its position of leadership in the approaching Labor Party Conference, to be held in October 1960, the Gaitskell wing implicitly abandoned the nonnuclear club thesis in a new policy manifesto, issued in June 1960 by the National Executive Committee that was intended to resolve the widening schism on defense policy.[1/] The manifesto admitted that "...a country of our size cannot remain in any real sense of the word an 'independent nuclear power'", and it proposed that "...in future our British contribution to the Western armoury.../should/ be in conventional terms, leaving to the Americans the provision of the Western strategic deterrent."

81. The Gaitskell group therefore opposed in principle the maintenance of the U.K.'s own strategic deterrent, but, unlike the unilateralists, continued to support the concept of a Western strategic deterrent, to be supplied by the United States. The manifesto nevertheless remained equivocal on Britain's appropriate contribution to that deterrent. While it avoided an

1/ Foreign Policy and Defense, NEC/PS/58, issued by the Labour Party Press and Publicity Department, June 22, 1960.

outright attack on the U.S. bases, it criticized patrols of nuclear-armed aircraft and called for the abandonment of the THOR IRBM's deployed in the U.K.

82. Subsequent parliamentary debates have indicated that the Gaitskell group does not favor the immediate abandonment of the British deterrent, but rather envisions a gradual phasing out of British strategic nuclear capabilities as the present V-bomber force becomes obsolete. It is evident the Labor front bench regards with skepticism the government's contention that the promised SKY BOLT ASM can substantially extend the life of the V-bombers as credible and reliable delivery vehicles.[1/]

83. In contrast to the unilateralist position, the defense manifesto emphasized Britain's continued collective defense commitments, particularly to NATO, in other fields than that of the strategic deterrent. At the same time, the document echoed the concern of a number of Laborites (and of some back-bench Conservatives as well) that "...the NATO armies in Europe are perilously dependent on nuclear weapons", at the expense of conventional capabilities.[2/] In proposing full strategic dependence on

1/ SKY BOLT has been criticized on the grounds that it is as yet a hypothetical solution to the problem of the delivery system; that the U.S. might decide to abandon its development, leaving Britain in the lurch; and that interdependence in weapons development with the U.S. undermines the independence of the British armed forces. See the discussion of Labor's stand in the Manchester Guardian Weekly, 14 July 1960.

2/ Continued criticism has been directed in particular against the government's announcement in the 1958 Defense White Paper that even a conventional major Soviet attack would be met with nuclear weapons: "...it must be well understood that, if Russia were to launch a major attack on them /the Western nations/, even with conventional forces only, they would have to hit back with strategic nuclear weapons. In fact, the strategy of NATO is based on the frank recognition that a full-scale Soviet attack could not be repelled without a resort to a massive nuclear bombardment of the sources of power in Russia." Cmnd. 363, February 1958, p. 2, paragraph 12.

American power, the manifesto rejected the alternative of a European independent deterrent on the grounds that it would encourage the dangerous spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries; the spectre of a Germany armed with nuclear weapons was particularly decried.[1]

84. Again, the manifesto failed to bridge the gap between the moderate Labor leadership and the foremost proponents of unilateral nuclear disarmament, notably Frank Cousins and Earl Russell who refused to accept it as a compromise and who continued to gather support for the immediate abandonment of the nuclear deterrent and removal of U.S. bases from the U.K. Then, in September 1960, the substantial confusion with the party on defense was further compounded by the astounding performance of the delegates to the Trades Union Congress, meeting on the Isle of Man. Before the conference were two motions: one concerning the official Labor Party-T.U.C. defense policy and the other in favor of unilateral nuclear disarmament, proposed by Mr. Cousins. The delegates voted to adopt both policies, though the latter by a larger majority, despite the apparent incompatibility of the two proposals. If the Labor Party Conference in early October either repeats this contradictory performance or votes a clear unilateralist mandate, the leaders of the Parliamentary Labor Party will be on the spot.[2] Either they will

1/ The proposal of a European strategic deterrent as a alternative to the British deterrent was presented in Alastair Buchan's widely-circulated book, NATO in the 1960's (Institute for Strategic Studies; Frederick A. Praeger, N. Y., 1960). Gaitskell, himself, was in favor of the NATO deterrent through May of 1960.

2/ In that conference, the unilateralist trade unions did in fact muster enough votes to reject the June Labor-T.U.C. defense manifesto which had emphasized reliance on the American strategic deterrent and on NATO. Instead, the conference passed two unilateralist resolutions advocating Britain's renunciation of the testing, manufacture, stockpiling and basing of all nuclear weapons in the U.K., as well as opposing patrols of nuclear-armed aircraft from British bases, missile bases in the U.K., and any defense policy based on "the threat of the use of strategic or tactical nuclear weapons." However, Parliamentary Labor Party leader Gaitskell, who can expect to command the support of about three-quarters of the Labor M.P.'s, has refused to accept these proposals and has stated his intention always to oppose neutralist policies for the U.K.

have to reject the Conference's dictates and proceed on their own, or they will have to struggle to reinterpret their policies in a pretense that they are following the Conference's motions. In either event, their position will not be enviable, and their ability to present constructive criticism on defense policies will be seriously compromised by their growing isolation from the bulk of Labor's membership.

85. In the meantime, the spokesmen for the Conservative government have remained firm against all attacks on the usefulness, credibility or morality of a defense policy emphasizing the independent nuclear deterrent. Whether the government will continue to remain firm is yet uncertain. Certainly, the decision to abandon the BLUE STREAK military missile program and to stake the maintenance of the British deterrent on the future willingness of the U.S. to supply a yet-undeveloped missile, the SKY BOLT; was not an easy one, and it illustrates the practical difficulties that the British deterrent will increasingly face. The BLUE STREAK decision was, moreover, a severe blow to those Conservatives who feel that only a British-developed delivery vehicle can assure the U.K. of a truly independent strategic force.

86. Defense policy has now entered the political arena and promises to become a major issue between two parties whose political outlook in other fields is surprisingly harmonious and at a time when few other issues can arouse public interest. Public pressures for the abandonment of Britain's nuclear capabilities can be expected to rise, if present trends continue. It may be that the government will feel that such pressures cannot be ignored and, along with the practical difficulties of maintaining the deterrent, will justify its abandonment. On the other hand, for the government to admit that the major emphasis of its five-year defense program was misconceived would

certainly be regarded as a severe political defeat which the Conservatives must hope to avoid. While it is now impossible to predict with certainty which considerations will become the dominant ones structuring Conservative policies, it seems possible that financial, technological and strategic difficulties, as well as public pressures aroused by unilateralist crusaders, will lead the government eventually to abandon the deterrent, whether within its present term of office or shortly after 1964. On the other hand, if the U.K. should succeed in negotiating the dispersal of the V-bomber force on U.S. bases outside the British Isles, the government may regard the future of the British deterrent as more promising. The British abandonment of the deterrent, if it did take place, would, of course, bring into sharp focus the question of the U.S. nuclear strike forces and support systems relying on British installations, as well as the RAF-manned THOR missiles now deployed in the U.K. As long as national strategic nuclear forces remain a major element of the British military establishment, there are fewer grounds on which to criticize the employment of British facilities by similar U.S. forces. If the British forces were abandoned, for whatever reasons, public pressures for rescinding U.S. base rights could be expected markedly to increase.

87. Thus, the future of the British strategic deterrent will be an important determinant of British attitudes toward nuclear weapons of all kinds, and ultimately toward U.S. nuclear weapons systems operating or supported from U.K. facilities. While the strength and direction of opinion on the issues of nuclear deterrence and defense have been traced in the preceding pages, a brief summary of the reasoning behind those convictions may cast some light on the possibility of shifts in the official position under the impact of the nuclear debate.

88. The following arguments represent different strains in the thinking of the proponents and opponents of the deterrent; within each group are many people clearly influenced by several but not all of the arguments employed on either side. The vast majority of those who advocate abandonment of the strategic deterrent, for example, present suggestions of alternative defense strategies, such as reliance on the American deterrent, greater British contributions to the conventional aspect of the overall Western collective defense effort, or the creation of an independent NATO strategic deterrent. Only a few opponents of the British deterrent now conclude that Britain should move all the way to a policy of unilateral conventional as well as nuclear disarmament, removal of the American bases, abandonment of its NATO commitments, and neutrality in the cold war.

89. It should also be noted that opinions on the independent deterrent do not always split neatly along party lines. A few prominent Conservatives, including ex-Defense Minister Antony Head, have declared themselves opposed to the independent deterrent, while a few back-bench Laborites have vigorously defended it.[1]

The Official Position: Arguments for the Retention of Britain's Independent Nuclear Capabilities

90. The British independent deterrent has been justified:

a. As a contribution to the strength of the Western alliance. It is argued that Britain should share fully in the burdens of Western defense, and that its nuclear

1/ See, for example, the remarks of Labor M.P.'s R. T. Paget and Woodrow Wyatt during the debate on abandoning BLUE STREAK. 622 H. C. Debs., No. 101, Cols. 247-256, 291-300. Antony Head's position was set forth in the same debate, ibid, Cols. 256-261.

capabilities are a significant addition to U.S. strategic power and to the Western strategic deterrent.

b. As providing leverage for exerting influence on American policy: to strengthen the U.K.'s hand vis-a-vis the U.S. (1) in resolving interallied differences and in formulating common policies, particularly those policies concerned with the deployment and use of U.S. nuclear weapons;[1/] (2) in countering conceivable future American isolationist tendencies or reluctance to participate in a war confined to Western Europe, under conditions of a U.S.-USSR nuclear standoff; and (3) in gaining access to American nuclear information, or to American strategic delivery systems.

c. For the preservation of the U.K.'s status as a major world power. Without strategic nuclear capabilities in a world in which two other atomic powers are operating, it is felt that the U.K. will no longer retain its great power role, its capacity to sit in on or promote nuclear disarmament negotiations, nor -- with regard to its missile program -- its prospects of gaining additional international prestige through space achievements.

d. As a minimum deterrent against Soviet attack or Soviet missile blackmail. It is feared that both the increasing vulnerability of the continental U.S. to Soviet missile retaliation and the diminishing U.S. strategic dependence on European bases will undermine the reliability of U.S. strategic intervention against limited Soviet aggression in Europe, whether in the form of a major conventional attack or a missile strike confined to one country. The U.K. must therefore provide its own strategic deterrent.

1/ In a public interview in 1958, Prime Minister Macmillan stated that possession of the H-bomb had had a great influence on U.S. policy and "...made them pay greater regard to our point of view." Department of State/Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Britain and the Western Alliance, Intelligence Report No. 8093, 25 August 1959, p. 2. SECRET/NOFORN.

e. As a support for British freedom of action abroad. It is argued that the independent nuclear capability will help the U.K. preserve its relative freedom of action to defend or assert its interests in situations where American and British interests diverge.[1]

f. As an economic means of achieving security. It is argued that an essentially nuclear force would provide the most defense for the least cost ("a bigger bang for the pound"), while the consequent reduced reliance on massive ground forces justifies the politically popular abolition of conscription.[2]

The Position of the Opponents of Continued Retention of an Independent Nuclear Deterrent

91. Some of the arguments against the independent deterrent concern its nuclear aspect, but others relate to the practical difficulties of maintaining an effective British delivery system under developing strategic conditions. Questions are also raised about the value of an independent deterrent capability within the context of a reputedly "interdependent" alliance system, and the adverse effects of the British deterrent effort on NATO's solidarity and military effectiveness are deplored.

1/ While this argument has been less prominent as the limits of British freedom of action are more generally accepted, it is still put forward from time to time. During the recent BLUE STREAK debate in April, Mr. R. T. Paget, a Labor M.P., remarked: "I cannot conceive that I should wish to live in a world in which we can never assert our rights anywhere without first obtaining American support. If we ever have occasion to assert our rights anywhere in the world, I do not want to be entirely naked in front of a Russian threat or Russian blackmail." 622 H. C. Debs. 249, 27 April 1960.

2/ This argument, an important factor in the initial popularity of the 1957 Defense White Paper, no longer appears very persuasive in view of the apparent costs of maintaining the deterrent.

92. The arguments against the independent deterrent, a number of which indicate developing British attitudes toward American strategic forces based in the U.K., may be summarized in the following categories:

a. That a British strategic retaliatory force will be too vulnerable or too expensive to maintain as an effective and credible independent deterrent, because:

(1) The attack warning time available to forces in the British Isles will be minimal or nonexistent;

(2) A political decision to retaliate would be extremely difficult to reach within this time limit;

(3) Britain is too small for the adequate dispersal of a land-based retaliatory force;

(4) Increasing enemy missile accuracy rules out even the costly expedient of hardening;

(5) Budget limitations preclude the development of more than one British strategic delivery system, on which the enemy can concentrate both his attack and his defenses;

(6) And even the currently planned delivery system for the mid-sixties (the advanced V-bombers equipped with the American SKY BOLT, GAM-87) will be too vulnerable, if based in Britain, in view of the prohibitive costs of an extensive airborne alert.

Alternative retaliatory systems or alternative deployments are rejected on other grounds: that land-based POLARIS would be nearly as vulnerable as BLUE STREAK or the V-bombers and THOR's; POLARIS dispersed on surface ships would be too detectable; and a POLARIS submarine program is considered beyond the limits of the British economy. Moreover, it is argued, the joint-control problem that might be raised by the dispersal of the

V-bombers to a global network of American or other bases outside the U.K. would compromise the independent character of the deterrent. Thus, that the destructive potential that a vulnerable and limited British force could be expected to mount in response to an enemy strike would be so small as to be ineffective as a deterrent.

b. That, if the British strategic force is ineffective as a deterrent, it will not strengthen Britain's ability to stand up to the USSR in the absence of American support. If -- it is argued -- the British force cannot provide reliable insurance against Soviet missile blackmail, it will not significantly increase Britain's resolution to act independently of the U.S. in defense of vital British overseas interests, even by conventional means, in the face of Soviet retaliatory threats. Nor can the British deterrent ensure Britain's security if the United States should, for some reason, renege on its commitments to come to Britain's assistance.

In answer to the specific points made by the supporters of the independent deterrent:

c. That the British strategic force is such a minimal contribution to the total strategic posture of the West that it cannot be considered significant or decisive.

d. That British international prestige and influence, both vis-a-vis the U.S. and vis-a-vis other nations, are built on other U.K. assets besides the independent deterrent: its long experience in international affairs, Macmillan's proven ability and world position as a leader and diplomat, the U.K.'s leading role in the Commonwealth, its pivotal position in NATO and other collective defense arrangements, and its economic power. Moreover, it is

argued, it would be dangerous if its possession of nuclear weapons should encourage the U.K. to pursue lines of policy not supported by actual British military capabilities.

e. That the possibilities of Britain's strategic isolation are slim: a major Soviet attack on any NATO country -- or the threat of such an attack -- that does not evoke American support is highly unlikely; if, however, either event should occur without U.S. reaffirmation or fulfillment of its alliance commitments, the U.K. is lost, whether or not it possesses a strategic force.

Two further arguments illustrate the ambivalent attitudes of the opponents of the independent deterrent toward the Soviet military threat; they both discount its gravity and fear its possible consequences for the U.K.:

f. That the Soviet threat has shifted from the military sphere to the political, economic, and psychological battlefields; Britain's resources should therefore be concentrated on efforts to combat the threats in those areas.

g. That Britain's nuclear force, if not effective as a deterrent, makes the U.K. a certain target if a general war occurs. Fears are directed particularly against any fixed-site missile systems deployed in the U.K. -- whether the abandoned BLUE STREAK or the American-supplied THOR squadrons -- and to a lesser extent against land-based strategic bombers -- the V-bomber force, as well as those elements of SAC deployed on British bases. In view of their assumed vulnerability and primary utility as "first-strike" weapons, these systems are regarded less as deterrents than as invitations to attack, and it is supposed that such an attack would turn the U.K. into a "nuclear

incinerator". The logic of this argument, if accepted as a major justification for a decision to abandon the deterrent, would have profound implications for the future deployment of U.S. strategic forces in the U.K., inasmuch as the U.K.'s strike force is only one element of the military forces on British soil that might lead the enemy to regard the U.K. as a worthwhile target in a general war. To eliminate all elements that serve as "lightning rods" to attack, the U.K. would have to demand the removal of U.S. forces and support systems -- particularly any nuclear-armed aircraft and missiles -- and if this approach were carried to its logical conclusion, the U.K. might even scrap substantial amounts of its own nonnuclear defense capabilities, withdraw from NATO, and contract out of the cold war.

h. That a reduction in the number of nuclear powers lessens the risks of war by accident;

i. That Britain's renunciation of its nuclear capabilities will facilitate general nuclear disarmament by encouraging other would-be "Nth nations" also to abandon their efforts to create independent deterrents;

j. And that the policy of the independent deterrent is based on the "exploded fallacy" that "we shall prevent war by preparing for war".[1] As a number of old-school Socialists believe, the independent deterrent represents Britain's involvement in the inevitable progression from balance of power policies to alliances and counteralliances, to a spiraling arms race, to rising tensions, to bluff and counterbluff, and finally to war. The U.K., they argue, must somehow break out of this chain of events and lead other nations to abandon the balance of power principle

1/ Mr. K. Zilliacus, an ex-League of Nations official, in the 1960 defense debate, 618 H. C. Debs. 67, 1 March 1960, col. 1, Col. 1090.

in favor of some form of federative or supranational political system.

k. That the U.K., unable to provide a reliable deterrent of its own, must seek to preserve its security through policies based on the principle of alliance interdependence. To date, it is argued, British defense policy has been a factor of increasing NATO disunity. The British nuclear deterrent has aroused the concern of other NATO governments that the U.K. might follow an independent course of action in the event of a serious challenge to the security of continental Europe. This suspicion has accelerated the trend that has been plaguing SHAPE's efforts to coordinate and integrate NATO forces in recent years -- the increasingly national orientation of the defense policies of NATO members and their reluctance to place their forces under NATO control.

93. Similarly, it is charged, NATO's growing reliance on a nuclear strategy -- in part a consequence of Britain's post-1957 defense policies -- operates as a divisive force in the alliance. Such a strategy will greatly compound the problem of joint decision-making in a crisis by increasing the risks of Europe's nuclear devastation if war should occur and thereby encouraging neutralist or independent action. The possibility that NATO might prove unreliable as a collective defense organization may force other NATO members, besides France, to consider the feasibility of developing their own national strategic deterrents. And the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, whether acquired from the U.S. or through national development programs, will aggravate interalliance suspicions, especially if Germany should obtain even tactical nuclear weapons.

94. Moreover, it is argued, the concept of alliance interdependence -- already nominally official British policy -- implies a division of labor and specialization of functions among NATO members which would maximize NATO's ability to create a graduated system of deterrents, from the strategic-nuclear level down to the level of deterring a limited conventional conflict. In this allocation of roles, it is felt, the U.S. is in the best position to make the strategic-nuclear contribution, while the other NATO countries, including the U.K., should concentrate on conventional forces.

95. A number of critics of official policy are concerned that Britain's concentration on strategic deterrence has reduced the effectiveness of its conventional forces. Not only has this strategy been used to justify the intended reduction of the British army and of the forces committed to the Continent, but it has also encouraged other European NATO states to relax their efforts to meet NATO's ground force objectives. It is argued that the present inadequacy of NATO's Shield force endangers NATO's ability to deal with minor disputes or to "enforce a pause" and buy time for diplomatic intervention or for a decision whether to initiate the use of nuclear weapons.

96. While most opponents of the independent deterrent insist that interdependence means reliance on the U.S. strategic deterrent, others suggest that Britain should join with certain continental NATO members in the development of a NATO or WEU deterrent. Such a force, established separately from the American deterrent, would hopefully achieve many of the objectives that the independent British deterrent was unable to obtain. A credible NATO deterrent could be created, its proponents believe, because its European basis would (1) reduce its vulnerability by

providing greater scope for dispersal and mobility, and (2) allow a pooling of the financial, material, and scientific resources of a number of countries in an effort that is beyond the limits of any single country. And, if achieved, it would be expected (3) to provide insurance against the possibility that the U.S. might decide not to "commit suicide" for the defense of Europe; (4) to give the European countries a larger voice in NATO policies by reducing their dependence on the U.S.; (5) to reverse present trends toward NATO disunity by removing the incentive for national deterrents; (6) to mitigate the "Nth country" problem, thereby facilitating future disarmament efforts. It may be supposed that proponents of the NATO deterrent are among those convinced of the hopelessness of maintaining an effective British deterrent, but anxious to find some means of avoiding complete strategic -- and hence substantial political -- dependence on the U.S. There are serious objections to the concept, especially with regard to the difficulties of decision-making.

British Attitudes Toward U.S. Bases

97. The recent U-2 and RB-47 incidents prompted a wide-ranging discussion which has been valuable in clarifying British attitudes toward the presence of U.S. bases in the British Isles. From the debate in press and Parliament and from recent opinion surveys, it appears that there is widespread sentiment in favor of continued U.S. access to British facilities, but that there is also a strong desire for tighter British surveillance and control over the purposes for which the bases are used.

98. Only from the extreme left and from the small but articulate pacifist groups are there demands for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces of all types from British bases, but these demands are not new. From its inception in 1958, the Campaign

for Nuclear Disarmament had advocated the dismantling of U.S. strategic bases as part of its scheme for ridding the U.K. of the "nuclear menace". This follows from the premise of the CND leaders that the risks of an outbreak of nuclear war -- almost inevitable, they say, with a continuing arms race and with American strategic aircraft and missiles poised for a strike at the USSR or on alert overhead -- are far greater and far more appalling than the risks or consequences of the military domination of the U.K. and Western Europe by Soviet forces. It is better, Philip Toynbee contends, to betray an alliance than to betray the human race.[1/] Bertrand Russell, another CND leader, holds that Britain must break with NATO and abandon the "protection" provided by nuclear weapons: "Britain derives no degree of safety whatever from the American alliance or from nuclear weapons, whether British or American. On the contrary, reliance upon America and nuclear weapons increases the likelihood of the total destruction of the population of Britain."[2/] Whether or not the British government or people like it, he argues, British territory will be used in the future by the Americans for some purpose as obnoxious to the Soviet Union as the U-2 reconnaissance flight. For this minority pacifist group, the RB-47 incident, originating from the Brize Norton SAC base against which the CND had marched in past years, seemed to confirm their fears.

99. In the trade union movement is the heaviest and most politically potent support for rescinding U.S. basing rights in the U.K. Leader of the trade union unilateralists, Frank Cousins, pointed to the U-2 incident as dramatic evidence of the

1/ Philip Toynbee, The Fearful Choice: A Debate on Nuclear Policy (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1958).
2/ From a letter by Lord Russell to the Manchester Guardian, quoted in the New York Times, 22 June 1960.

need to abolish American bases in Britain,[1] and most unions committed to unilateral nuclear disarmament for the U.K. also favor the withdrawal of all "foreign bases".

100. Such sentiments are not, however, shared by the majority of the Parliamentary Labor Party or by its moderate leadership. Even Ernest Shinwell, on the left of Labor's political spectrum, admitted that, while Britain must go on boldly advocating disarmament, it must nevertheless continue to rely on the American strategic deterrent: "I do not believe that the time has yet arrived to say to the United States: 'Take your aircraft and your missiles out of this country,' but I think the time will come when that may happen."[2]

101. It has been Labor policy to support Britain's commitments to NATO and its responsibilities for Western defense. While in the last two years the Labor Party has broken with the government's defense policy on the issue of the independent nuclear deterrent, its leaders in Parliament -- Gaitskell, Brown, Healey, and Wilson -- have placed no less emphasis on the need for a Western strategic deterrent as a condition of Britain's security. Labor's June 1960 manifesto on defense explicitly recognized that, in the absence of a credible British deterrent, reliance would have to be placed on the strategic deterrent supplied by the U.S.

102. The position of the Labor Party on the necessity of American strategic bases and support facilities in the U.K. will, however, remain equivocal until the current intraparty conflict

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2/ 622 H. C. Debates 101, Col. 267. April 27, 1960.

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on defense policy is resolved. To date, it should be emphasized, the party's official platform has not opposed the continuation of the American bases, although it has pressed for increased British surveillance and control over the purposes for which the bases are used, measures advocated over a year ago in its 1959 election platform.[1/] While the 1960 defense manifesto expressed concern over the dangers of patrols of nuclear-armed aircraft, its reaffirmation of Britain's NATO responsibilities and reliance on U.S. deterrent power seemed to imply official Labor support for continued U.S. access to those facilities necessary to the maintenance of the U.S. deterrent.

103. That the Gaitskell group opposes any moves to rescind U.S. base rights was evident in the debates on the RB-47 incident in July, where the discussion was confined to the issue of British surveillance and control. But this official position will undoubtedly be challenged in the future as in the present by left-wing Laborites, and it is doubtful if the leaders of the Parliamentary Labor Party can make any further concessions on defense policy or American base rights without abandoning the party altogether to the unilateralists' viewpoint.

104. The Conservatives, on the other hand, have stood firmly for the necessity and desirability of American strategic bases and support systems in the U.K. Few of them feel that the U.K.'s independent deterrent, if as they hope it can be maintained, can ever be a reliable substitute for American strategic power. Prime Minister Macmillan has nevertheless agreed that American

1/ On June 23, 1959, the Labor Party agreed to advocate "tighter control" over American bases in the U.K., but reaffirmed that the next Labor government would honor Britain's commitments to NATO.

no operation should be carried out in such a way as to effect a casus belli, to be needlessly provocative, or to risk damaging Britain's relations with its other allies by use of their air-space without their knowledge.[1/]

106. Much emphasis in the press was given to the so-called "provocative" character of the flights which was regarded as unjustifiable -- especially in the case of the RB-47 -- in terms of the military advantages that might be reaped by such reconnaissance.[2/] Fears were also expressed that there might be inadequate U.S. political controls over military and intelligence activities.[3/] At the same time, however, the Soviet threats of missile retaliation appeared to be encountering the law of diminishing returns. By mid-summer, the British press was generally discounting the gravity of the Soviet threats on the grounds that they were primarily designed to split the Anglo-American alliance. Instead, the predominant British reaction was in favor of measures to strengthen the alliance through improving liaison on the use of the bases.[4/]

107. The "spy plane" incidents have been useful in clarifying the present state of British opinion on American base rights

1/ British Information Services, Today's British Papers, 18 July 1960, p. 5.
2/ See, e.g., the Observer, 18 July 1960.
3/ The Economist commented: "If there is British uneasiness today about trusting to the apparently unwritten understanding between Mr. Truman and Mr. Attlee in 1951, it is chiefly because the effectiveness of American political control of the intelligence services has come increasingly to be doubted." From the article "Intelligence Should Be Intelligent," The Economist, 16 July 1960, p. 247.
4/ See the Manchester Guardian Weekly, 14 July 1960, p. 1: "A new and fuller agreement...is a step taken to strengthen our alliance...The one thing that could shake the alliance would be the sense that the Americans were not playing fair with their allies. That is what the revised agreement on consultation...should guarantee and be known to guarantee."

use of the bases must be supervised in Britain's interests, and that he will seek closer liaison and continuous and intimate consultation on such American flights as could be regarded as provocative by the Soviet Union. In requesting a review of the original Truman-Attlee bases agreement of 1951, the government was responding to strong public pressures for measures that would insure the U.K. against the possibility that future U-2 and RB-47 incidents might occur from British bases. The government feels that new understandings that will coordinate U.S. operations with British policies will, in fact, strengthen the Anglo-American alliance by allaying public suspicions or apprehensions about U.S. employment of the bases.

105. In the British press, comments upon the plane incidents have generally concentrated on the need for adequate joint controls over American reconnaissance or other "provocative" activities originating from the British bases. It is significant that few dailies or journals have questioned the desirability of retaining the U.S. bases themselves. As the conservative Sunday Times asserts, the bases are part of the joint defense system for the advantage of the whole Western alliance; they are an agency of the deterrent under which we all shelter and whose protection is all the more vital, the less independent power Britain itself has.[1/] But, the Times cautions, the U.K., has the right and duty to insist on certain overall conditions or limitations -- that the program of operations from the bases should be known to the U.K. as party to the joint activities, and should be open to negotiation between the two parties; and that

1/ British Information Services, Today's British Papers, 18 July 1960, p. 5.

in the U.K. When the issue suddenly and dramatically became question of urgent importance, the British public betrayed it uneasiness over the use -- or misuse -- of the bases. Public opinion surveys following the U-2 incident indicated continue approval of the American military presence in the U.K., though significantly less favorable attitudes toward the U.S. air bas specifically than toward the stationing of U.S. armed forces i general.[1] At the same time, however, the polls discovered a marked rise in neutralist public sentiments: the British public willingness to side with the U.S. in the present world situatio dropped to the lowest point yet recorded[2] Moreover, a majority felt that the U.S. was not justified in making the U-2 flights, despite the U.S. argument that they were necessary to prevent surprise attacks.[3]

108. Nevertheless, The Economist's analysis of the public reaction is encouraging:

"This disquiet concerns the workings of the alliance. It does not, except among a familiar minority, call in question either the validity of the alliance or the extent of British obligations under it. The bulk of feeling in the country, and on both front benches in the Commons,...has been plainly that the Atlantic alliance is indispensable and that, within the alliance, British bases ought to be available to the Americans for

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all military purposes...The British point is [only] that such flights...must be carried out within the common obligations of the alliance and for the common advantages of the allies...The Government ought to be aware of, and approve, all the purposes for which British bases are being used, and ought to possess the demonstrable right of final sanction of activities...that have direct political implications and require the use of political judgment.[1]

109. One can expect, therefore, that the United States will continue to have access to the bases for military strike, reconnaissance, and logistic operations. While these operations will require the knowledge and approval of the British government, it is doubtful that this will seriously restrict their scope while the present government remains in office -- another three years, at least, in the absence of some unlikely and unforeseen crisis. When and if the Labor Party regains office, current trends within the party seem to support the pessimistic prediction that the moderate wing may have lost control in the face of powerful unilateralist pressures. If this occurs, the Labor platform will include proposals for the removal of, at a minimum, the most "provocative" of the American forces or installations in the U.K.: almost certainly any nuclear-armed aircraft of the U.S. Air Force and the RAF-manned, American supplied and controlled THOR missiles.[2] Whether under new leadership the party would also advocate the withdrawal of all U.S. base rights, including those rights that the U.S. is now requesting for the support of FBM submarines as well as access to other facilities for naval support and for strategic warning and reconnaissance, is more questionable, unless

1/ July 16, 1960, p. 247.
2/ In 1958, Labor had proposed a suspension of the construction of all missile bases in Britain until Summit talks had explored the possibilities of a wider understanding with the USSR. See Labour's Foreign Policy, 1958, p. 3.

the Labor Party determines to go the full way to neutralism and abandonment of all British commitments to the Western alliance.

110. Current estimates of public attitudes suggest that a Labor program advocating the withdrawal of all U.S. strike and support systems would find little appeal among British voters, unless some grave and major crisis seriously shakes confidence in U.S. strategic support and protection or greatly intensifies fears of unjustifiably rash and "provocative" U.S. actions. It is much more likely that the British people would accept the abandonment of Britain's independent deterrent in the future, should it prove necessary for military, financial and political reasons. But it is also likely that they would favor continued reliance on the American strategic deterrent and contribute those facilities in the U.K. that are necessary to its effectiveness, though preferably not airbases for strategic nuclear strike forces or launching sites for IRBM's.

CONCLUSIONS

111. The United States places high value on its alliance ties with the United Kingdom for a number of reasons, among them: the basic similarity of American and British international objectives and policies, the U.K.'s influence as a world power, its technological, industrial and financial resources, its strategic location off the European Continent and its outposts in other areas, its active military contributions to the Free World's arsenal, and its provision of extensive facilities for the deployment and support of U.S. ground, sea, and air forces.

112. The Anglo-American alliance with the Canadian alliance, the firmest in the American alliance system, rests ultimately on the continued unity of British and American international objectives and on

their continued concurrence on the foreign and defense policies best suited to achieve these ends. As long as the Conservative government remains in office, substantial agreement can be expected to prevail in both these fields, although occasional differences in approach and priority may arise. Particular difficulties may stem from increased British pressure for a greater voice in the West's military and political approach toward the Communist Bloc. While it does not now appear likely that the Labor Party can gain office before 1964 and possibly not for several years thereafter, present trends within the party suggest that many of the foreign and defense policies of a future Labor government would be incompatible with U.S. interests. One such policy might be that of unilateral nuclear disarmament and the removal of U.S. bases from British soil, presently urged by an apparent majority of the party's trade union membership.

113. The most important single factor affecting British attitudes toward the alliance will be the degree of official and public confidence that U.S. military policies and deployments will, on balance, enhance the security of the U.K. against both nuclear devastation and Communist domination. Such an estimate will depend on the future dominant evaluation of the primary threat to U.K. national interests.

114. In this respect it is conceivable but not likely that the evident dangers of Communist aggression could, in the future, be eclipsed by severely intensified British fears of involvement in a general nuclear war. The effects of such a development on British national and collective defense policies would be far-reaching. At present, only a small (but vocal) minority conclude

that the possible dangers of the "nuclear menace" would justify the risks involved in British nuclear disarmament and in a neutralist reorientation of British policies. The vast majority of Britons now reject that conclusion and its implicit assumption that nuclear devastation and neutralism are the only alternatives.

115. It is nevertheless significant that the widespread disposition at present to downgrade the likelihood of general war has not offset the steady increase in public apprehensions about the consequences for the U.K. of such a war. These apprehensions have led to more skeptical opinions on the practicality and desirability of a national or collective nuclear deterrence strategy for the preservation of Britain's security, if such a strategy requires strategic bases on the British Isles.

116. Public apprehensions concerning nuclear war are not likely to affect the Conservative government's present reliance on the threat of strategic retaliation to deter an attack on the U.K., against which -- the government has admitted -- the U.K. could not be defended. However, the practical difficulties and expense of maintaining an adequate and secure British retaliatory force may lead the U.K. to abandon its independent deterrent within a few years and to place total reliance for its strategic protection on the American strike force. Such a move would probably not be accompanied by reductions in British military contributions in other fields to NATO or other collective defense arrangements, and British facilities for the support of U.S. strategic systems would likely remain available. Nevertheless, continued British pressure can be expected for full knowledge and greater control of U.S. military operations from U.K. bases and for joint consultation on the use of nuclear weapons both from British soil and elsewhere.

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ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "A"

JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARD COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

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ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "A"

JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARD COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

PURPOSE

1. To examine current trends in Japanese attitudes toward defense problems, and identify those likely to affect Japan's military collaboration with the United States through the mid-1960's.

SCOPE

2. Japanese public and official attitudes toward the cold war, rearmament, nuclear weapons, and military collaboration with the U.S. are reviewed in the context of Japan's postwar political development and military importance to the United States. The future implications of these attitudes for the U.S.-Japanese military alliance are then examined.

BACKGROUND

3. Following Japan's military defeat in 1945, the country was governed for seven years through the offices of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. A primary objective of this government was to provide for the basic democratization of Japan and to insure that it would never again commit armed aggression. To this end a series of major social, economic and political reforms were instituted by SCAP, including a Constitution that barred war as an instrument of Japanese policy. Militarists were purged from the Japanese political parties; the Emperor reduced to the titular head of government; local autonomy encouraged; labor unions established; and large land holdings broken up. There were also major "trust busting", taxation, voting and educational reforms.

4. To a surprising degree these institutional reforms were accepted by the Japanese people and have interacted with

ideological, social and economic forces to produce permanent social change. This factor, coupled to a widespread Japanese respect for America, and Japan's continued dependence on the U.S. for both defense and trade, made it easy to assume that Japan would endure as both a Western democracy and a U.S. military ally. For this reason the wrath and violence that erupted in Japan over ratification of the U.S.-Japanese security treat last May, the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit, and the downfall of the Kishi government all came as considerable shocks to the United States.

5. These events made it apparent that there was a measure of public discontent with the foreign and military policies pursued by the Japanese government since the nation became independent in 1952. As most Western observers agreed that the new treaty was in fact acceptable to the large majority of the Japanese people, the May 1960 riots were perhaps most significant in the questions they raised about the durability of Japan's new political institutions. It appeared that the concept of a parliamentary democracy was still threatened by such Japanese political traditions as minority intransigence and "direct action."

6. The scope, duration, and intensity of the Spring riots and demonstrations also highlighted several trends in Japanese public opinion on defense matters that had been gaining in strength during the past several years. As these attitudes bear directly on Japan's future role as an ally of the United States they are of considerable importance. It should be remembered that Japan, since the occupation, has become the most prosperous and dynamic of the non-Communist nations of Asia. It is in a unique position and has great potential for contributing to the development of

the newer Asian and even African states. In 1959, its 90 million people produced a GNP of $30 billion and provided an export market for over $1 billion worth of U.S. goods, a new high in both categories. Militarily, Japan is the most important link in the chain of islands which provides logistic facilities and bases indispensable to an economical and effective defensive position in the Western Pacific. These profound changes in Japan's domestic life and international position over the past fifteen years are the background against which the Japanese attitudes and opinions, discussed in the following paragraphs, must be placed.

DISCUSSION

JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

7. In terms of its present military potential, the active contributions that Japan can make to Western collective defense efforts are relatively small.

8. While Japanese ground forces have progressed during the last ten years from what was essentially a police reserve into a relatively well-trained force capable of operations at the division level, this force is considered incapable of sustained defensive operations without heavy U.S. strategic, naval and air support. The Ground Self-Defense Force, created in 1950, to replace the National Police Reserve, was granted an air force in 1954, and its mission expanded from the maintenance of public order to include the repulsion of foreign attack. At present, its strength is estimated at 171,500 men, an increase of about 41,000 over its 1954 strength. Unofficial plans are for a 180,000 man ground force, consisting of twelve infantry and one mechanized division organized on pentomic lines. The GSDF suffers from inadequate maneuver areas and its naval and air forces are considered incapable of providing adequate

troop lift support. These military shortcomings result in large part from the continued absence of any substantial public or official support for large-scale rearmament efforts. For the foreseeable future it is likely that Japan will remain heavily dependent on U.S. advice and assistance in the defense field and that the GSDF will continue to be almost totally dependent on U.S. naval and air support for its effectiveness.[1]

9. Japan's most significant contribution to U.S. military objectives in the Far East is therefore its availability as a base for logistic and combat operations. Without access to present storage, air, and naval base facilities on the Japanese islands, the difficulties of establishing an effective deterrent/defensive posture in the Far East would be greatly compounded. In addition to their support of U.S. forces deployed in Korea, Japanese facilities are of particular importance to operation of U.S. naval forces in the Western Pacific. Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan, is the principal naval base for WESTPAC forces, providing bulk supplies of POL and ammunition in addition to major facilities for ship repair. Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, is a major fleet anchorage and includes the largest POL reserve west of Pearl Harbor. It has been estimated that loss of these two bases alone would require upwards of 50 additional supply ships to maintain the present readiness of the Seventh Fleet. Possible alternatives to the Japanese bases, such as Guam and Okinawa, do not have commensurate facilities. Other U.S. military installations on the Japanese Islands, such as electronic intercept and target-fixing facilities, would be difficult or even impossible to duplicate elsewhere.

1/ See Daily Intelligence Bulletin, No. 2891, 25 July 1960, SECRET.

JAPANESE ATTITUDES ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

The Political Climate

10. The political background for examination of Japanese opinion on security relations with the U.S. can perhaps best be characterized as an uneasy parliamentary democracy. The great majority of public offices in Japan are held by members of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LPD). A minority opposition is furnished by the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), which has won approximately one-third of the total number of seats in the Upper and Lower Houses of the Diet since the war, and a small Japanese Communist Party (JCP).[1/] But this strong plurality of the LPD overestimates its ability to incorporate into legislation public and party opinion on many issues. Several reasons, arising from difficulties encountered in merging traditional Japanese practices with the postwar political institutions, may be given for this disparity. The first is that many Japanese do not yet trust the political parties to be responsive to their desires. At the mass level, there are many adherents to the thesis that politics is synonymous with graft and corruption. Thus the parties often find it difficult to attract and hold popular loyalties and support. Secondly, a straightforward legislative program in Japan is constantly threatened by factionalism within the parties. It is seldom that a party leader can guide through the Diet major bills for more than two years at a time without suffering such bitter opposition that he loses nomination

1/ Of the 467 seats in the Lower House of the Diet, the LPD now controls 286; the JSP, 163; the JCP, 1; and 15 are vacant. The Socialists enjoy their greatest strength at this national level. At the prefectural level they are much weaker, with 482 Socialists in the prefectural assemblies, representing 18.5 percent of the total number. Further drastic declines are shown at the city and district levels where they have 908 Assemblymen or 4.6 percent, and at the rural town level where the Socialists represent only 0.6 percent of the elected officials. Robert A. Scalapino, "Japanese Socialism in Crisis," Foreign Affairs, January 1960. Although the Communists control few offices anywhere, they still are supported by 1 million voters out of 40 million. They are particularly active on issues concerning security policy and often attempt to infiltrate or consolidate with the Socialists in order to be heard. See C.I.W., "Japanese Communist Party," 25 August 1960 (SECRET).

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as his own party's candidate in the next election. Either he does nothing important, or he leads and falls. Finally, there still exists in Japan a basic discomfort with the principles of majoritarianism. Historically, the Japanese are used to long and arduous compromises on important issues, rather than to that acquiescence by the minority to the will of the majority upon which effective parliamentary democracy rests. The tendency of the Socialists and Communists to revert to direct action and protest demonstrations to force their views onto the majority has contributed to this distrust, even among conservatives. Minority rights are not enthusiastically guarded by the majority when the minority resorts to the subversion of basic institutions.

11. An example of these aspects of Japan's political climate was furnished by the political machinations during ratification of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Suspicions were first aroused about the Kishi administration's conduct in negotiating and ratifying the treaty -- and by inference about the treaty itself -- by factions within his own Liberal Democratic Party.[1/] These factional leaders attacked Prime Minister Kishi for more than a year, often to advance their personal interests, though less than 10 percent of the Liberal Democratic Party members in the lower house failed to support him when it actually came to a vote. This provided an opening for the left wing opposition parties and organizations to mount a campaign against the government. These

1/ For example, Kono Ichiro, one of the most powerful conservative factional leaders arraigned against Kishi, contended that a change in leadership was necessary to maintain any relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union after the ratification of a treaty of such duration (ten years). Kono leads a group known as the Shunjukai, some of whom absented themselves from Diet debate and voting through "ill health" in opposition to Kishi. Other "anti-mainstream" factions in the LDP were headed by Matsumara, Miki, and Ikeda. Factionalism on issues other than the security treaty, and other problems, also threaten the unity and even existence of the JSP.

groups, which oppose the conservative administration on almost all issues and are vocal, aggressive, and well-organized, resorted to the violent tactics which brought down the Kishi administration. With the help of a leftist press jealously conscious of its new rights of free expression, they created a widespread impression that their actions were justified by the government's suppression of its legislative opposition. This impression was a major factor in the public's toleration of the subsequent demonstrations and violence.

12. The difficulties attending revision of the security treaty are only the most dramatic of a series of open controversies which have developed over the role of the U.S. in the general area of Japan's national security. Fundamentally, these differences have arisen as a result of another general trend in Japanese politics. This is a tacit but growing desire of many Japanese to see Japan re-emerge eventually as a leading country in Asia and to occupy a position as a "bridge" between Asia and the West. The probable path of such a development has been intensively studied.[1/] To provide larger markets for her burgeoning industry, it is expected that Japan will particularly seek to extend her political and economic contacts with the states of Southeast Asia. For example, Japan has continued to term near-future "normalization" of her relations with Communist China a necessity.[2/] That most

1/ See "The Position of Japan in the Far East and in International Politics 1965-1970," Tempo Report No. 58TMP-41, Technical Military Planning Operation, General Electric Company, Santa Barbara, California, 31 December 1958.

2/ In early August 1960, a Chinese Communist delegation attended the Tokyo Labor Convention and the Sixth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. They were the first Chinese visitors to Japan since Peiping broke all but nominal trade relations in mid-1958 after Japan refused to make political concessions verging on recognition. The group was refused an extension of their two-week visas by the Ikeda administration, which considers their political demands for resumption of trade out of porportion to its value when compared to the $1 billion U.S. trade balanced in Japan's favor. O.N.I.B., 25 July 1960, 11 August 1960 (SECRET).

Japanese would not advocate such a rapproachment without the approval of the U.S. is also symptomatic of her goal of maintaining her Western ties while moving into this more neutralistic position. The present wide debate in Japan on national security issues illustrates the development of this trend. These issues include, but are not limited to: the extent of Japan's involvement in the cold war; the nature and control of U.S. bases in Japan, and the stationing of U.S. troops on Japanese soil; Japanese rearmament; and nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons testing and the establishment of missile bases in Japan.

Japanese Attitudes Toward Present Involvement in the Cold War

13. The attitudes of the Japanese concerning Japan's present involvement in the cold war reflect considerable ambivalence. On the one hand, the practical advantages that accrue to Japan from her present economic and military ties to the U.S. and the West are clearly and obviously appreciated by the conservatives in general; on the other hand, there are many -- including conservatives -- who feel, explicitly or implicitly, that the alliance with the U.S. precludes real independence (dokuritsu)[1/] and freedom of action for Japan. The continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan and the evident U.S. influence on the foreign policy of its government is often interpreted to mean that the U.S. is simply conducting the occupation in a new, more subtle, form. The contention of the leftists and some conservatives that the alliance with the U.S. does not really leave Japan free to develop and pursue an independent, genuinely Japanese, foreign policy, is a charge that evokes considerable popular mass appeal. The slogan dokuritsu is one of the few slogans used by all

1/ The slogan dokuritsu (independence) became popular, interestingly enough, after Japan emerged from the era of American Occupation, and is invariably employed only in relation to Japan's ties with the U.S.

political parties, and is clearly a reflection of renascent nationalist feeling. The call for greater Japanese independence implies that Japan must reduce her ties with the U.S., and from this it is only a short step to the argument that Japanese policy must move in a direction of greater neutrality in the cold war.[1/]

14. Despite indications that the Japanese desire greater independence, and that at least one-third of the electorate supports the Socialists and their policy of neutralism, the fact remains that the cornerstone of present Japanese foreign policy is close cooperation and alliance with the U.S. and the Free World. Nonetheless, it is clear that no Japanese Government can afford to ignore the widespread sentiments which favor neutrality, and it is in recognition of these attitudes that the predominant goal of Japanese conservatives can best be described as that of securing greater freedom of action for Japan within the framework of close Japanese-American relations, rather than in terms of independence per se or neutrality.

Attitudes Towards the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security

15. The alignment of Japan with the Free World is most graphically expressed by its defensive treaty arrangements with the U.S. Since the end of the occupation on April 28, 1952, when the Treaty of Peace restored Japan's sovereignty, the security relationship with the U.S. has been determined by the

1/ Indicative of Japanese orientations toward the cold war are the results of the following question put to Japanese parliamentarians during early 1958: "Would you approve or disapprove of Japan being as neutral as possible in the cold war under present circumstances?"

	Total	Liberal-Democrats	Socialists
Approve	68%	52%	97%
Disapprove	24%	37%	0%
Qualified Answer	5%	6%	3%
No Opinion	3%	5%	0%
	100%	100%	100%

It will be noted that one-half of the Liberal-Democrats join almost all Socialists in approving a policy of as high a degree of neutrality as possible for Japan. See Lloyd A. Free, Six Allies and a Neutral (The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1959), pp. 42-47, 50-52.

Security Treaty signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951. The Security Treaty continued to a substantial degree the rights to bases in Japan that the U.S. had exercised during the occupation. It provided the U.S. with unlimited rights to station in Japan forces for the maintenance of peace in the Far East and the security of Japan, while not binding the U.S. to defend Japan. By 1957, however, Japan had made great progress toward lessening its dependence on the U.S. Its regaining of stature in the family of nations was attested by its election to the Security Council of the United Nations, its growing defense capabilities, and its improving economic vigor. It was at this time that Japan began to press for revision of some of the "one-sided" treaty arrangements.

16. The process of negotiation for this revision continued until the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed by the foreign ministers of both countries on January 20, 1960. The overall aim of the Kishi administration during the bargaining was to achieve a greater degree of control over the use of U.S. bases and to clothe the treaty with more indicia of partnership and equality between the parties. Kishi's purpose was to meet the growing uneasiness in Japan over the provisions of the former treaty and to remove the stigma of coercion that had attached to it; i.e., that the arrangement was one which was prenegotiated by SCAP during the preparations for withdrawal and hence was part of the price Japan paid for the ending of the occupation. The U.S. was, in general, anxious to avoid any serious breakdown in relations with Japan that might occur if the U.S. appeared so truculent as to antagonize a large number of Japanese.

17. The new treaty included a number of significant revisions. The U.S. right to veto arrangements for the entry of a third power into Japan was removed, as was the right of intervention

by U.S. forces into any large-scale internal disturbance in Japan. The U.S. undertook a specific commitment to regard attack upon Japan as one on itself, thus placing Japan in the same position as American's NATO allies. These changes were intended to remove any considered derogation of Japan's equal sovereignty and dignity. The treaty was also changed from one of unlimited duration to one lasting only ten years. Finally, there were incorporated the following changes:

> "Article IV: The parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of the Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened. . .
>
> "Article VI: . . . The U.S. is granted the use by its land, air, and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.
>
> "..The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of U.S. armed forces in Japan shall be governed by separate agreement. . ."

The latter agreement, commonly described as the Japan Status of Forces Agreement, includes many provisions of similar agreements with NATO countries in addition to the following diplomatic note of January 19, 1960:

> "Major changes in the deployment into Japan of U.S. armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V (reply to armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan) shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan." 1/

18. There was also established a special committee to be used as appropriate for the consultations specified above. Called the Security Consultative Committee, the membership includes for Japan: the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Director General of the Defense Agency; and on the U.S. side, the U.S. Ambassador

1/ For the text of the entire treaty package as well as discussion of its meaning and application see Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 86th Congress, 2d Session, June 7, 1960.

to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

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19. Although the wording of the treaty is somewhat open to interpretation, it was understood by the U.S. negotiators to mean that prior consultation through the Security Consultative Committee would be required before the introduction into Japan of nuclear weapons and "large missiles" (i.e., changes in "deployment") and before the initiation of military combat operations from Japan against areas outside Japan,

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Without speculating on the speed or results of such consultation in the event of a U.S. desire to use the Japanese bases for combat operations in the Formosa Straits, Vietnam, or elsewhere in Southeast Asia, their availability is of substantial value. The bases and facilities are first of high logistic importance. For example, it is estimated that the availability at the Yokosuka Naval Base of overhaul and repair facilities permits the maintenance of the Seventh Fleet at a high level of battle-readiness at a saving of hundreds of millions of dollars a year compared to the cost of maintaining these vessels from bases nearer the U.S. Secondly, the very presence of the bases is of psychological import as the perimeter of resistance to Bloc expansion, somewhat in analogy with Berlin. Their existence also implies that the Soviet Union can never totally discount their possible use to a greater degree than the Japanese government would now allow.

20. After the text of the new treaty was made public on January 20, 1960, the Kishi administration began the process of

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1/ United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Congressional Briefing Book,

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its presentation to the Japanese people and to the Diet for ratification. The terms of the treaty evoked a national debate of major proportions. The spectrum of Japanese attitudes towards the treaty ranged from absolute opposition by the Socialists and Communists, who favored immediate neutrality,[1/] to a somewhat reluctant acknowledgement by the majority of the people that it was a necessary requirement for continued Japanese security. The various arguments employed by those who opposed the treaty were not without appeal to many Japanese who, while supporting the government's position, would nonetheless prefer a situation in which U.S. bases and other concomitants of the security treaty were no longer needed. These arguments may be summarized as follows:

a. Close ties with the U.S. preclude Japan from being completely independent.

b. Japan's present relations with the U.S., though intended to defend her against external aggression, actually invite attack. If a major conflict should break out between the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the U.S., Japan would be caught in the middle and subjected to both offensive and defensive actions, while abrogation of the treaty and other ties with the U.S. would reduce this risk of involvement in nuclear war.

c. The countries of Southeast Asia would be much readier to cooperate with Japan if she were no longer closely tied to the U.S.

d. Japan, together with India, would become a powerful "third force" to which other uncommitted nations can rally, and international tension and the risk of another world war

1/ It is only quite recently that the Communists adopted their present, though undoubtedly interim, position urging Japanese espousal of neutrality. During the Korean War, for example, the Communist position was that Japan should reject neutralism on the score that one could not be neutral between the forces of aggression led by the U.S. and those of peace led by the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party passed a resolution on 18 January 1959, proposing the abrogation of the Security Treaty with the U.S., together with abolition of all military bases. It further urged that Japan should establish "honorable relations" with the U.S. and all nations of the world, and that Japan should remain neutral and refuse to join any military alliance.

would be lessened by adding Japan's industrial base and technology to the neutralist camp.

e. Japan would get the best of both worlds by playing an uncommitted role in the cold war, since both sides realize that a breakdown of the Japanese economy might force Japan into the arms of the other side.

21. These arguments exert a sufficiently powerful attraction on the electorate that even the Liberal Democrats feel compelled to take them into account by employing socialist and neutralist slogans.[1/] However, both the Kishi and Ikeda administrations clearly rejected their main thrust, and remained for close though qualified cooperation with the U.S., as has most of the electorate. In the Diet elections of 1958 and 1959, in which foreign policy issues played an unusually significant part, the voters were given an opportunity to decide between two clearly opposing positions -- that of the Socialists who advocated rapprochement with Communist China and the Soviet Union (and whose platform called for a policy of Japanese neutralism in the cold war) and that of the Liberal Democrats who stood for a continuation of the status quo -- that is, alliance with the U.S. and the Free World. The outcome of both the elections was a victory for the Kishi administration.

22. The new treaty was presented to the Japanese Diet for ratification on 5 February 1960. The legislative battle which ensued, the most bitter and protracted in the postwar political

1/ The Japanese Socialist Party has received about one-third of the total vote in national elections since World War II. This strength has induced the Conservatives to adopt for themselves certain elements of the Socialist foreign policy platform. In the past these borrowed policies and slogans have included demands for closer ties between Japan and other Asian countries, and for complete equality in Japan's relations with the U.S. See I.I. Morris, "Foreign Policy in Japan's 1958 Elections," Pacific Affairs, September 1958, pp. 229-235.

history of Japan, terminated with final effective ratification on 19 June 1960. Some of the legislative opposition sprang from a fear of exacerbating tensions in the Far East, particularly with respect to negotiation of certain territorial claims with Russia[1/] and hope for improvement of trade relations with Communist China. If the Bloc had taken offense at the terms of the 1951 U.S.-Japanese treaty, Japan could have explained that it had not been voluntarily undertaken. By negotiating a new treaty, Japan could no longer deny its responsibility for its orientation toward and commitments to the United States. The anti-treaty forces also attacked it on the score that it permitted U.S. forces stationed in Japan to fight in other areas in the Far East, such as Formosa and South Korea, and that this might involve Japan in hostilities between the U.S. and a third power. The Kishi administration attempted to counter this argument by making the most of its success in securing the U.S.'s agreement to "prior consultation," arguing that such consultation would prevent Japan from becoming engaged in hostilities against its

1/ The Japanese have declined to conclude a peace treaty officially ending World War II with the Soviet Union until the USSR recognizes these claims. At one point the Soviet Union had agreed to return part of the claimed islands in return for Japan's signature to the peace treaty, but in November, 1959, withdrew the offer as diplomatic retaliation for the Kishi administration's refusal to seek abrogation of the 1952 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and her opting instead for this revision of it. Japanese public opinion was outraged by this Soviet action, and even extreme non-Communist left-wing elements joined in support of the government's declaration deploring the Soviet action. Paradoxically this probably helped rather than hindered ratification.

will. However, even some supporters of the government appeared to discount the right of prior consultation as such a guarantee.[1/]

23. In guiding the treaty through to Diet ratification, Prime Minister Kishi was subjected to much personal vilification. Although he had allowed more than three months' debate on the treaty, his opposition had used this time largely for emotional appeals to the public. In late May, when Kishi moved to cut discussion and ratify the treaty, the Socialists were still demanding additional time for debate. Immediately before the balloting they resorted to a sitdown strike, a boycott of the Diet, and strong-arm tactics, but a majority of the Lower House approved the treaty on 20 May 1960. Action by the Lower House becomes final if the Upper House remains in session for thirty more days without acting to change it. Hence, when the Diet session, which ordinarily would have terminated on May 26, was extended for fifty days by another majority vote on May 26, the demonstrations which had punctuated opposition to the treaty since early November 1959, reached a climax. Reports indicate that 62,000 took part in Tokyo and 202,000 throughout the country, many of the participants being members of the Socialist and Communist parties, the General Council of Japanese Trade Unions, and the Federation of Student Self-Government Associations. While the demonstrations failed to halt

1/ The Asahi and Yomiuri, two of Japan's largest and most influential newspapers, criticized the revised treaty for not containing a firmer guarantee that the U.S. would not act without Japanese consent on any aspect of the new security agreement requiring consultation between the two countries. The Yomiuri stated: "The phrasing of the joint communique (referring to the Eisenhower-Kishi communique of 19 January 1960) indicates that assurance of prior consultation is not a right to be enjoyed by Japan but something to be granted when America deems it necessary. The implications are obvious . . ." Yomiuri, January 20, 1960.

the final effective ratification of the treaty on 19 June 1960, they did succeed in forcing Kishi to promise his resignation and request the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit, the timing of which made many believe it was designed to bolster Kishi's own prestige. The strong minority opposition, aided by the Liberal Democratic party factionalism, thus made ratification a Pyrrhic victory for Kishi personally. The election of Ikeda to replace Kishi has done little to heal this factionalism, and herein may lie the seeds for the future downfall of another conservative administration. 1/

24. The process of securing ratification for the treaty has brought home the fact that, while the treaty has the support of the majority of the Liberal Democrats and most important business groups, their support was by no means unqualified. Further, the general public's acceptance of the Liberal Democrats' stress on Japan's need for close cooperation with the United States and protection against Communist attack does not necessarily imply popular enthusiasm for these positions on the part of the Japanese people. The indications are that, for the present at least, most Japanese look upon the question of close ties with America as necessary in view of Japan's weak military and economic position, and that the security treaty, although not desirable in and of itself, is something which, in the circumstances, cannot be helped. This attitude reflects a pragmatic rather than an ideological approach to the ties with the U.S. From the Japanese point of view, the relationship has risks and drawbacks, but at

1/ Kono and the Shunjukai were not included in the new cabinet announced by Ikeda in early July, 1960. Kono presently favors the creation of a new conservative party in Japan as a result. See Tokyo newspaper Kyodo, in English, 12 August 1960.

the same time it is looked upon as one in which the advantages outweigh those to be gained from pursuing the alternative advocated by the Socialists.

25. The violent success of the public demonstrations brought out the fact that a militantly organized minority can impose its will against the wishes of the majority. While Ikeda has pledged himself repeatedly to the same policies as Kishi, and to the implementation of the new treaty as the foundation of his domestic and diplomatic policies, the possibility of jeopardization of the U.S. military position in Japan by demonstrations or strikes against the bases must not be overlooked. The Socialist and Communist parties and the Sohyo Labor Organization have adopted resolutions to oppose the implementation of the treaty whenever possible. However, the excesses of these groups will more likely have the opposite effect. A recent public opinion poll shows that the Socialists have reached a new low in popular estimation.[1/] The several prefectural elections since Ikeda's election by his party have resulted in wide margin wins for Liberal Democrats, especially in the rural areas, despite an intense effort by the Socialists to expand their influence.[2/]

1/ The poll, just concluded by Asahi, a large Tokyo newspaper, showed the Ikeda administration enjoys greater popular support than any other government since 1951. The public presently favors the Liberal Democratic Party 3 to 1 over the Socialists, who were at their lowest ebb in the Party's history. Of particular interest is the shift away from the Socialists in youth and highly educated groups:

	LPD	JSD
Age 20-29	33%	26%
Highly Educated	37%	27%

J-2 Intelligence Bulletin, 12 August 1960 (SECRET, limited distribution).

2/ ONIB, 29 July 1960 (SECRET).

Annex "B" to
Appendix "A" to
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The violent minority has also weakened public opposition to the use of the Self-Defense Forces to quell serious riots, though this would still be an unpopular move. There have been investigations and arrests of leaders of the anti-pact rallies by local police boards.[1] Finally, as a result of the public relations efforts by each of the U.S. bases, combined with the economic and social benefits of employment at the bases, it became more difficult for the 3.7 million workers of Sohyo to leave their jobs, however willing they were to pass resolutions at union conventions.

Attitudes Toward Rearmament

26. Japanese popular reactions to the rearmament issue are not easy to define. Polls and other surveys[2] indicate a gradual, albeit reluctant, acceptance by the Japanese people of the need for some sort of national defense force. Beyond this no consensus is discernable. As a domestic political issue the entire question has become one of the most controversial in Japan. The Socialists oppose rearmament strenuously and make it a major issue in their election campaigns. The Liberal Democrats support limited rearmament, but the enthusiasm of their support has wavered in the past. The future strength of a national defense force may well have received a boost from the recent June riots. While political considerations may continue to militate against the use of the military to quell internal disturbances, the Ikeda administration

1/ The police investigations also established that the mobbing of U.S. Presidential Press Secretary James Hagerty at Haneda Airport on 10 June 1960 was planned and directed by members of the JCP and the extremist Zengakuren student organization. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, 28 July 1960 (official use only).

2/ [illegible] and Lloyd A. Free, Six Allies and a Neutral, op. cit.

had pledged itself to prevent such occurrences and is expected to move ahead quietly with contingency plans to cope with possible new outbreaks of serious violence.[1] The primary reasons cited against rearmament may be summarized as follows:

a. Article IX of the 1947 Constitution,[2] the so-called anti-war clause, calls for Japan to become a completely demilitarized state;

b. The economic and financial resources of Japan cannot stand the burden which rearmament would entail without reducing the standard of living and thus adversely affecting or even destroying its democratic freedoms and institutions.

c. Small scale rearmament would not contribute to the security of Japan since it would be militarily insignificant in an era of nuclear weapons and ICBM's.

d. Large-scale rearmament, as well as U.S. bases and U.S. forces on Japanese soil, invites attack from the Soviet Union and Communist China.

27. The supporters of some kind of rearmament, particularly the Kishi government and the conservatives in general, have argued that if Japan is to exercise any world influence it can do so

1/ ONIB, 9 August 1960 (SECRET).
2/ It reads as follows: "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or the use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

only by having its own military forces -- that is, something more formidable than the present National Self-Defense Force.[1] The conservatives contend that world Communism is a definite threat to Japanese independence and that the pacifist and neutralist argument of strength through weakness is not impressive in the light of the cold war. The Kishi government favored an amendment to the Japanese Constitution to clarify the right of rearmament and would have passed such an amendment if it could have assured itself of a two-thirds majority in both Houses of the Diet.[2] In practical political terms, however, the Liberal Democrats, although spearheading the drive for constitutional revision, made no mention of it in their platform in the May 1959 general elections because they feared that it was a politically disadvantageous issue. Even among conservatives there is ambivalence at the grass roots level on this issue and, at least on

1/ [redacted]

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2/ This appears unlikely for the present. The left-wing and staunchly anti-revisionist segment of the Lower House can apparently count on at least 166 votes, six more than are necessary to defeat a bill or amendment. At a minimum, the conservatives must increase their support in the House by at least this margin before revision becomes feasible. In the May 1959 elections the Socialist Party captured 166 seats, an increase of six over the February 1955 elections. Socialist gains have, in general, been due to their use of slogans opposing constitutional revision, rearmament, nuclear testing, and the Security Treaty with the U.S. In view of the solidarity of the existing alignment of forces opposed to this particular issue, it is almost certain that only future general elections resulting in an extraordinary victory for the pro-revisionist forces could bring about constitutional revision.

the emotional level, the appeal of the Socialists on this particular question is not without some attraction to many conservative Japanese voters.

28. One final factor of relevance to Japanese attitudes toward rearmament is the economic factor. There is widespread belief, shared by all parties, that the costs of rearmament on a meaningful scale would place an intolerable strain on the Japanese economy.[1] This position is taken by a number of conservatives who are inclined to favor rearmament on other grounds, and was reflected in the negative attitude of the Kishi administration to United States urging that Japan assume a larger share of its defense burden. The political attractiveness of this argument is not lost to the Japanese who see in it a lever to obtain the maximum amount of financial assistance from the United States.

Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Weapons Testing, and the Establishment of Missile Bases in Japan

29. The subject of nuclear weapons has been hotly debated in the Diet, with the Socialists and Communists bitterly attacking any proposal to introduce either nuclear weapons or guided missiles into Japan as a violation of the Constitution. In 1958 the Japanese Government decided that the possession of offensive nuclear weapons would be unconstitutional, but on the question of whether or not defensive nuclear weapons also ran counter to the Constitution, it remained noncommittal. In assessing Japanese

1/ [redacted]

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popular attitudes toward the nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons testing, it must be borne in mind that Japan's experiences at Hiroshima and Nagasaki have understandably generated an extraordinary degree of emotional sensitivity on this point.[1/] The Japanese suffer from what some have termed "radioactive neurosis," expressed by extreme hostility to any further nuclear weapons testing, and particularly to testing in the Pacific which, in the past, has contaminated Japanese fish catches. The antinuclear movement in Japan has been able, with the fishing issue, to provide itself with an economic basis for its emotional appeal for the cessation of nuclear testing and the abolition of all nuclear weapons.

30. After the "Lucky Dragon" incident, the Japanese Diet urged that further nuclear weapons testing by all parties be cancelled. The Soviet Union appeared to accede to this demand seven months later and thereby scored a substantial propaganda victory in Japan, one reinforced by the United States' rejection of the proposal. The fact that the U.S.'s offer to suspend testing came six months after the Soviet offer apparently contributed to the relatively meager impression it made on the general public. The Soviet resumption of testing undoubtedly neutralized some of the favorable responses generated by the original announcement of a test ban, but Soviet propaganda and psychological warfare was

1/ Japanese-American relations were seriously affected by the 1954 "Lucky Dragon" incident in which the Japanese tuna boat was caught in radioactive fallout near Bikini atoll, and a crew member subsequently died. There was another near crisis in 1959 when the oceanographic survey ship "Takuyo Maru" passed through heavy radiation to the west of the U.S. Central Pacific testing grounds and crewmen only avoided the injuries of the "Lucky Dragon" crew by prompt decontamination procedures.

able to mitigate much of the unfavorable response by shifting the onus for the resumption of testing to the U.S.[1]

31. Closely related to the widespread Japanese opposition to nuclear weapons testing, is the fear held by many Japanese that the U.S. intends to stockpile nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. The pressure of public opinion on this issue[2] forced both Kishi and Ikeda to issue numerable assurances that the U.S. will not be permitted either to stockpile nuclear weapons in Japan or to establish missile bases on Japanese soil. Given the temper of the general public on this issue, it is highly unlikely that any Liberal Democrat would jeopardize his political career by publicly recognizing that the denial of nuclear weapons to U.S. forces in Japan may seriously degrade the very purpose for which they are there. It appears almost certain that Japan will not permit either the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan or to the use of U.S. bases to launch combat operations involving conventional weapons against targets elsewhere in the Far East.[3]

1/ It will be recollected that the Soviet announcement calling for the cessation of nuclear weapons testing was timed in the hope of forcing the U.S. to cancel its long scheduled Hardtack test series, and in the knowledge that if the U.S. refused to do so, the Soviet Union would be in a position to employ such refusal to resume its own testing of nuclear weapons.

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32. During the past year the issue of nuclear weapons has been relatively quiescent, probably because there have been no recent nuclear tests in the Pacific; however, public revulsion against nuclear weapons continues unabated, with left-wing elements[1] raising the issue again in connection with the national debate on the revised security treaty. By the terms of the revision the Kishi administration made the subject of prior consultation any innovations which would introduce nuclear weapons or strategic missiles on Japanese soil. If the U.S. approached the Japanese Government for permission to do so, the U.S. would raise an issue which would not only be vigorously opposed by the Liberal Democratic administration but which would also generate considerable opposition from the general public. In a poll of Japanese parliamentarians[2] in early 1958, more than eight out of ten opposed the "...establishment of long-range missile bases here in Japan," with 77 percent of the Liberal Democrats agreeing with the negative view.[3]

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1/ The Sixth World Convention Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs on 2 August 1960 adopted several resolutions militantly opposing both the development and deployment of nuclear weapons and the revised security treaty. The sponsor of the convention, the Japanese Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, while the author of considerable propaganda appearing in public news media, is publicly opposed by the conservative administration.

2/ Conducted under the auspices of the Institute for International Social Research by The Central Research Services, Inc., Tokyo, in 1958. Approximately 100 parliamentarians, proportioned between the Upper and Lower Houses in accordance with their total respective memberships and in proper proportions in terms of political parties, were interviewed.

3/ See Lloyd A. Free, Six Allies and a Neutral, op. cit., p. 50.

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34. The general public seems to have accepted with aplomb the Kishi administration's announcement that it intends to acquire for the Self-Defense Force surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles. HAWK missile bases have been built by the U.S. on Okinawa, and MACE sites are being introduced on the Ryukyuan Islands, although local legislatures have opposed them because of the land they require and the offensive capabilities of the MACE (range 650 to 1000 miles).[3] Socialists have continued to descry these activities as leading inevitably to the establishment of larger missile bases, the introduction of nuclear weapons and as subjecting Japan to an ever greater danger of becoming a target for nuclear weapons.

1/ Signing of the new U.S. - Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security; OASD (ISA); Memo 1-12, 380/60 (SECRET, limited official use only).

2/ Following Khrushchev's threats to strike at U-2 bases, 8000 Japanese paraded before the USN Air Station at Atsugi on 10 July 1960 protesting the presence of U-2 aircraft. By 18 July all three U-2's were returned by ship to the U.S.

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Press and radio promptly lauded the U.S. for the withdrawal, maintaining this was in the spirit of the true meaning of prior consultation. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, 12 July 1960.

3/ DIB, 13 May 1960 (SECRET).

CONCLUSIONS

35. For the next several years, Japan's common interests with the United States and the advantages she derives from the U.S. Alliance will probably be sufficiently great to preclude any real break from this tie. At the same time, however, Japan can be expected to seek those opportunities which will decrease her dependency on the U.S. This effort will continue to be strengthened by strong Japanese desires for an international detente, Japanese fears of possible nuclear war, and Japanese hopes that accommodation between East and West would permit Japan to reappear on the international scene as a spokesman for Asia and as an Asian power.

36. The Japanese are likely to remain strongly opposed to increasing their participation in the military aspects of the Japanese-American alliance. While continuing to seek the benefits of U.S. military protection, Japan will probably resist U.S. pressure that she assume greater responsibilities and a larger share of the defense burden. However, with the revised Security Treaty now ratified, it seems reasonable to believe that the present U.S. military position in Japan might be maintained for several years, inasmuch as present trends in Japanese politics would seem to auger a continuance of conservative rule.

37. Japan's future military collaboration with the United States cannot, however, be regarded with complacency. There are several developments that could adversely affect this collaboration. These would include Chinese Communist acquisition of nuclear weapons or the occurrence of even a limited nuclear war in the Asian area. While such developments might, in theory, be expected to stiffen Japanese efforts to resist aggression, the opposite reaction is foreshadowed by the longstanding Japanese aversion to nuclear weapons and by the recent weakening of confidence in the ability of the U.S. to protect Japan in time of war. At a minimum

there is likely to be continued friction over the presence of U.S. military bases in Japan and efforts by the Japanese government to satisfy public opinion by appearing to exercise greater control over U.S. use of those bases.

38. The importance of Japanese military collaboration is underlined by the fact that many of the facilities that the United States would require for wartime operations -- particularly those relevant to the augmentation or evacuation of U.S. forces in Korea -- have been returned in recent years to the control of the Japanese government. Moreover, existing U.S. bases and installations will remain dependent on indigenous labor and suppliers. For these reasons, the U.S. must remain alert to Japanese reactions to changes in the world situation that would alter this present support. Should there develop an economic crisis in Japan which the U.S. seemed unwilling or unable to alleviate, or should the Sino-Soviet Bloc appear to have gained a decisive military position over the United States, the benefits of close ties with the U.S. may appear less attractive to the Japanese than those which they might hope to derive from either neutralism or closer relations with the Bloc.

39. While the vast majority of the Japanese people reject Communism as an ideology, Japan may still be susceptible to a Soviet diplomatic offensive. The Soviets are in a relatively powerful bargaining position vis-a-vis Japan, due to their continued occupation of island territories which have been considered by the Japanese as a traditionally integral part of Japan. The Soviets may offer to recognize Japanese territorial claims to these islands in exchange for the closing of U.S. bases in Japan or an American evacuation of Okinawa. This offer could be accompanied with favorable trade concessions to Japan in the

ANNEX "C" TO APPENDIX "A"

ASPECTS OF PROSPECTIVE U.S. OVERSEAS
BASE REQUIREMENTS, 1964-1967

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BASE REQUIREMENTS, 1964-1967

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ANNEX "C" TO APPENDIX "A"

ASPECTS OF PROSPECTIVE U.S. OVERSEAS BASE REQUIREMENTS, 1964-1967

PURPOSE

1. To outline the relationship of overseas bases to U.S. military capabilities and, with particular reference to strategic offensive weapons, estimate the utility of such bases in the 1964 to 1967 time frame.

SCOPE

2. The present U.S. overseas base system is described in summary form to indicate the purposes for which the United States uses military facilities provided by other nations of the Free World.

3. Future U.S. overseas base requirements are then discussed in the context of the anticipated 1964-1967 strategic strike force and the characteristics of individual weapons systems.

4. The prospective military threats to the U.S. overseas base system -- analyzed in WSEG Report No. 48 and a preceding section of WSEG Report No. 50 (Appendix "E" to Enclosure "A") -- are recognized here but not reviewed in detail.

CONCLUSIONS

5. The ability to deploy forces and to conduct military operations on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc is and will continue to be a major strategic asset of the United States. Exploitation of this asset, through the U.S. overseas base system, will remain dependent on the active cooperation of U.S. allies.

6. The present U.S. overseas base system is both complex and extensive. U.S. forces are now stationed at 160 main bases on foreign soil. The total of all Service requirements for overseas

bases, including many minor facilities and contingency needs, comprises some 2,500 items in some 100 countries or locations throughout the Free World. The primary functions of these bases are to support the strategic offensive mission and to assist in the defense of CONUS, the NATO area, and strategically important areas of the Far East.

7. U.S. base requirements vary with military, technological and political developments that include improvements in both U.S. weaponry and in the military capability of allies. For the past two years, however, the effect of these improvements has been more than offset by new base requirements generated by changes in the nature of the military threat or in the means available to deal with it. There has been a marked increase in the number of countries in which the U.S. requires military facilities.

8. The present U.S. overseas base system is insufficient in scope to support military operations in many countries exposed to Communist aggression, particularly in those countries that lie on the southern periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Base requirements for limited war operations are likely to increase with expansion of Sino-Soviet influence outside the Eurasian continent, particularly should the U.S. and USSR reach and recognize a "stalemate" on the strategic level.

9. One of the controlling factors in the disposition and employment of these forces will continue to be that of logistic support and the related use of overseas staging and supply bases. Prospective improvements in the technology of military transport do not promise a significant degree of independence from such facilities.

10. The protective measures that may become necessary for the effective use of U.S. overseas forces in the 1964-1967 period are

likely to increase base requirements. This is particularly true of such measures as the wider dispersal of theater strike aircraft or their replacement by either STOL vehicles or hardened and dispersed tactical missiles.

11. Whether or not such a stalemate occurs, a wide range of U.S. military and political objectives can be met only by the presence of U.S. forces in strategic areas of the Free World. Technological advances may permit some consolidation or reduction in these forces, but the effect of their presence cannot be duplicated from remote locations.

12. There are and will continue to be serious doubts about the utility of overseas-based nuclear strike systems in a general war that begins with a well-coordinated Soviet missile and aircraft attack. Despite their vulnerability, however, these systems and bases contribute to deterrence of a general war by complicating Soviet coordination problems and increasing the number of countries that the Soviets would have to attack in a first strike.

13. The expected composition of the 1964 to 1967 strategic offensive force augurs a sharp decline in those weapons systems now considered suitable for overseas deployment, and a corresponding decline in SAC overseas base requirements. Existing SAC bases could, however, remain useful for CASF operations or the dispersal of theater forces.

14. Deployment of the POLARIS (FBM) system within range of its targets is not dependent on use of overseas facilities, but their availability would increase the utilization of this system. The importance of overseas logistic, communications and navigational support to the FBM system will diminish during the 1964 to 1967 period.

15. Overseas facilities for the collection of all forms of intelligence on bloc activities are related to the strategic mission and will remain of critical importance in this time period. Although it may become possible to gather certain types of intelligence from remote locations, several of the new intelligence and warning systems can be most effectively employed from overseas sites.

16. New overseas base requirements will also be generated by the introduction of military space systems, and the extension of U.S. missile testing facilities.

DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION

17. The ability to deploy forces and to conduct other military operations on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc is a major strategic asset of the United States. Exploitation of this asset, through the collaboration of allies and the U.S. overseas base system, has enabled this country to compensate, at least in part, for the distances that separate us from our military allies and for the Sino-Soviet bloc's advantages of military secrecy and interior lines of communication.

18. U.S. overseas base requirements[1/] stem from the nature of this country's political objectives, the military threats to those objectives, and the level and character of the resources made available to meet those threats. Such resources include U.S. military strategy, forces and weapons systems of diverse

1/ The term "overseas bases" is used here to include all U.S. force deployments, military bases, installations and facilities outside the continental United States.

and changeable characteristics, and facilities made available by other nations of the Free World as part of a collective defense effort.

19. As a consequence of these factors, judgments and commitments the United States now maintains active offensive, defensive or major support forces at some 160 main base complexes on overseas territory. The three Services have a combined total of 2500 requirements for the retention or establishment of overseas bases in some 100 countries, territories or locations throughout the Free World.[1] Many of these requirements are for minor technical or logistic facilities, or are mobilization requirements to be met only under wartime or other emergency conditions. Their approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, reflects a judgment that each is of net advantage to U.S. security and, specifically, could be expected to assist in the conduct of war under current strategic concepts.[2]

than offset by new requirements generated by changes in the nature of the military threat or in the means available to deal with it.

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22. In the course of the 1960 USBRO review, for example, there were deletions of 400 U.S. overseas base requirements but additions of more than 600 new ones. Major deletions included 19 air bases in France and Germany and an appreciable number of aircraft support facilities in France and the United Kingdom.

1/ United States Base Requirements Overseas (USBRO), JCS 570/512, 12 July 1960, TOP SECRET. This list of Service base requirements is reviewed annually by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and distributed as a basis for inter-service and inter-Department programming and guidance.

2/ In accordance with JCS and NSC policy directives.

Requirements for 18,000 troop housing spaces in France, West Germany, Italy and Korea were also dropped after some consolidation of facilities and a reevaluation of requirements. Among the significant new requirements, however, were those for 24 Special Weapons Storage Sites in West Germany, contingency requirements for staging areas and logistic support facilities in eight countries of Southeast Asia and requirements for specialized intelligence collection facilities in 38 other countries.

23. There has also been a perceptible broadening in the geographic areas considered of military interest to the United States, and a consequent increase in the number of governments from which we desire military collaboration in some specific form. In 1959, USBRO requirements were approved for logistic facilities in nine countries not previously listed. Fourteen countries and eight territories or colonial possessions were added to the USBRO list for the first time in 1960 to meet new requirements for communications, space tracking and recovery, and intelligence collection facilities. In view of current political developments it is of interest that five of these "new" countries are in Central and South America.

24. These facts have been mentioned to indicate the element of fluidity in the overseas base system -- new base needs are being generated by military and technological developments as older requirements are discarded. A prospective decline in one type of requirement does not therefore diminish the present and potential military value of overseas bases, and the collaboration of Free World countries, to the United States.

25. Present U.S. overseas bases and force deployments can be divided into those primarily associated with (1) the strategic offensive mission, (2) the air and sea defense of North America and its lines of communication to Europe, (3) the defense of the NATO area, and (4) the defense of strategically important areas of the Far East.[1]

26. This classification is adopted here, although it is recognized that the theater defense forces may be deployed to areas outside those of primary interest, and that elements of these forces have a strategic offensive capability.[2] It should also be said that many U.S. overseas bases support two or more of the above functions. Facilities for communications, logistic support and the collection of military intelligence are of this multi-purpose type.

OVERSEAS BASES AND THE STRATEGIC MISSION 1960

27. The B-47 (STRATOJET) medium bomber has been the strategic offensive system most closely associated with the U.S. overseas bases. Its range limitations made forward bases essential to attack on Soviet targets. Bases spread along the bloc periphery also provided the protection of dispersal and the tactical advantage of being able to penetrate Soviet air defenses from different directions.

28. In recent years, however, an increased availability of tankers, a buildup in the B-52 (STRATOFORTRESS)/KC-135 force, and the evident vulnerability of overseas airbases to missile

1/ This is the classification used in the Lang Committee report.
2/ These include attack carrier and tactical air forces with nuclear capability and those aerodynamic missile systems (such as TM 76 A/B) whose range approximates that of tactical aircraft. They are grouped here with the theater defense forces on the understanding that their general war missions are directly related to theater defense.

attack have led to a gradual decline in the number of medium bombers deployed outside the U.S. in peacetime. Both political pressures and new technological requirements have also reduced the number of bases utilized by SAC abroad.

29. SAC has released 11 of its U.K. bases within the past three years, and the U.S. recently agreed to relinquish the three SAC bases in Morocco by 1963. Four of the U.K. bases were turned over to U.S. tactical squadrons withdrawn from France in the aftermath of a dispute over nuclear weapons stockpiles. The seven other U.K. bases were considered as no longer meeting SAC requirements and were returned to U.K. forces.

30. B-47 bombers are currently deployed at ten air bases on foreign soil; these include four bases in the United Kingdom, three in Spain and three in Morocco. Aircraft are rotated to these bases on an average 21-day cycle with the deployed forces maintained in a "reflex" ground alert posture that keeps an average of six B-47's on 15-minute alert at each base. Medium bomber forces are also rotated from CONUS to two bases in Alaska and one in Guam. SAC's present command structure assigns all strategic aircraft to the three numbered Air Forces in the United States (the Second, Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces). The overseas SAC commands (the Sixteenth AF at Torrejon, Spain, the Seventh Air Division at South Ruislip, England, and the Third Air Division at Andersen AFB, Guam) are charged with base maintenance and the supervision of those SAC aircraft operating in their area.

31. It is understood that those B-47 forces deployed outside the U.S. in "reflex" or maneuver operations are scheduled to launch immediate strikes in the event of a general war.

Appreciable portions of the medium force may be subsequently deployed overseas should SAC bases remain available for follow-on operations.

32. A wing of B-52 heavy bombers is deployed with its tanker force to Ramey AFB in Puerto Rico. According to the Lang Committee report this is the only airbase outside CONUS in use, or programmed for use, for the peacetime deployment of B-52's. In the event of a general war, all heavy bombers are to conduct operations from the Western Hemisphere. Air Force policy is to place minimum reliance on prestrike staging bases for such operations, using in-flight refueling whenever practical.

33. SAC plans to use nine tanker facilities outside the U.S. for wartime support of the heavy and medium bomber forces. Six of these bases are in Canada and one each in Greenland, Bermuda, and the Azores. In addition to their general war missions, the Canadian bases could also be used for support of a "forward" air alert should the Canadian government agree to this form of overflight with nuclear weapons.

34. SAC has additional requirements for bases to be used only in the context of a general war. A majority of these bases are now used by other sections of the USAF; they include four bases in the U.K., two in Japan and one each in Turkey and on Okinawa. Post-strike recovery is contemplated at airfields in other countries, such as Pakistan, to which there are presently no U.S. base rights and where no peacetime deployment is planned.

35. In the absence of data on their wartime roles, the utility of these SAC overseas bases would appear to have been severely compromised by Soviet MRBM and IRBM developments. As Albert

Wohlstetter commented two years ago, these bases "are subject to an attack delivering more bombs with larger yields and greater accuracies and with less warning than bases at intercontinental ranges. Whether they are under American command, or completely within the control of our allies, or under joint control, they present the severest problems for the preservation of a deterrent force."[1/] Possible exceptions to this conclusion would be if the deployed bombers were used in a pre-emptive strike, or in counter-force missions against a very poorly coordinated Soviet attack.

36. The presence of these bases may, however, contribute to a form of political deterrence by forcing the Soviets to attack a larger number of countries should they opt for general war. SAC overseas bases also increase the force requirements and coordination problems of a Soviet first strike, although neither of these difficulties would appear to present the Soviets with insuperable problems.[2/]

OVERSEAS BASES AND THE DEFENSE OF CONUS

37. The second major function of U.S. overseas bases and force deployments is defense of the continental United States itself. While all U.S. and many allied military forces contribute in a general or ultimate sense to this task, it is the primary and immediate role of those facilities associated with strategic and tactical warning and the active defense of the sea and air approaches to this continent.

Strategic Warning

38. Strategic warning is generally defined as a notification that enemy hostilities may be imminent, without reference to the

1/ "The Delicate Balance of Terror," RAND P-1472, 6 November 1958, p. 32. CONFIDENTIAL.

2/ Possible Soviet methods of combining attacks on the U.S. and overseas SAC bases are discussed in Albert Wohlstetter, "Another Look at the Importance of Overseas Bases," Air Force and Space Digest, Vol. 43, No. 5 (May, 1960) p. 73f.

time element involved. As such, strategic warning is inseparable from general intelligence of bloc activities, and the military and civilian installations that collect such information.

39. Because of the security classifications involved, no survey of pertinent U.S. intelligence activities or facilities has been made for this report. Nor has an attempt been made to assess the likelihood of strategic warning in the military environment of the mid-1960's. It is recognized, however, that strategic warning of a Soviet attack could permit the augmentation of theater forces and the achievement of alert and dispersal postures that might significantly affect U.S. military capabilities in the initial phase of a general war.[1/]

40. It is the opinion of authorities in this field that strategic warning, if available at all, is likely to come from those U.S. and allied intelligence collection posts on the general periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. These posts are distributed along the Western, Southern and Eastern Bloc boundaries. Many of these installations and activities are made possible only by the presence of other U.S. military units in the locations involved.

41. The nature of these intelligence activities requires that many of them be conducted from overseas territory and, in some cases, from locations dictated by the technologies involved.

1/ The effects of strategic warning on the capability of overseas-based U.S. tactical air power are discussed in Enclosure "C", Part II of WSEG Report No. 48. TOP SECRET.

Electronic intercept (ELINT) sites, for example, must be located as close to the "target" areas as possible; critical installations of this type are maintained in [a number of other countries allied to the U.S. Conduct of these operations from U.S. ships and aircraft would not be possible in many cases, and would provide only partial or intermittent coverage in others.

Tactical Warning

42. Tactical warning -- notice that the enemy has initiated hostilities -- may come in principle from U.S. overseas bases, from allied nations on whom the attack is first launched, or from the detonation of nuclear warheads on U.S. soil. Primary reliance for warning of air and missile attack on CONUS, however, is now placed on networks of air, land and sea based radars in the Western Hemisphere. A large portion of these facilities are on foreign soil.

43. For warning of the air-breathing threat, these facilities include three radar lines across the northern segment of the North American continent. Included in this network are approximately 100 aircraft control and warning installations on Canadian soil. Requirements for more than 70 additional (gap filler) facilities in Canada were approved in 1960.

44. Land, sea and air extensions of this system run from Alaska to the Aleutians and Midway Island in the Pacific, and from Baffin Island to Newfoundland and the Azores in the Atlantic. Programmed additions will run from Baffin Island to the United Kingdom in a chain linking Greenland, Iceland and the Faeroes Islands.

45. To provide this country with tactical warning of missile attack, the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS)

is under construction at sites in Alaska, Greenland and the United Kingdom. The contribution of the U.K. radar site is to provide coverage against 15-degree trajectories launched from the westernmost portion of the Soviet Union against the eastern United States.

Active Defense: Aircraft and Missiles

46. Active defense of CONUS against air attack is provided by manned interceptors in addition to area and point defense surface-to-air missiles. The majority of these weapons are located in the United States. There is no operational system for active defense against ballistic missiles. Tentative plans for the NIKE-ZEUS antimissile system, however, call for three local defense centers and five fire units on Canadian soil.

Active Defense: Sea and Air LOC's

47. Two tiers of U.S. air and naval bases extend across the North Atlantic Ocean to Europe and North Africa, forming an integral part of our lines of communication to Europe and making possible the defense of these arteries in time of war. Localized AEW and ASW operations conducted from these bases may also play an important part in the defense of CONUS against missile-firing submarines. Additional uses of these bases include the logistic support of carrier groups and other naval forces in wartime.

48. Key links in these North Atlantic base chains are Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland and the U.K. in the north, and Bermuda and the Azores in the central area. Naval and air facilities in Cuba and on islands of the West Indies Federation provide coverage of the Carribean area and approaches to the Panama Canal.

49. A similar range of military operations for the maintenance and defense of LOC's in the Northern, Central and Eastern Pacific is made possible by a chain of multi-purpose bases on U.S. or

U.S. controlled territory. Bases at Adak and Kodiak, Alaska, provide communications, logistic and intelligence support for operations in the North Pacific and Bering Sea areas. Pearl Harbor is the major naval base for forces operating in the Central Pacific. Midway Island provides a staging base for aircraft in transit to Japan and Guam a medium naval base, air station and bulk storage site for forces operating in the Western Pacific. It is the westernmost major base complex under firm U.S. control.

OVERSEAS BASES FOR THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

50. By far the major portion of U.S. overseas force deployments are those associated with deterrence of attack on the NATO area and the defense of that area should deterrence fail. The comparatively large peacetime deployments to Europe reflect both the seriousness of the Communist threat to that area and a judgment that its loss to the bloc would constitute a most serious threat to the security of the United States.

51. A measure of this judgment is that of 14 active U.S. army divisions, five are stationed in West Germany for the defense of central Europe. An additional 4000 men (not committed to NATO) are stationed in West Berlin. These forces utilize some 15 base areas in West Germany and are supported by an extensive logistic complex that runs across France from the Bordeaux-La Pallice port area to Kaiserlauten, Germany.

52. The Lang Report states that a majority of the USAF's overseas tactical strength is deployed to Europe and comprises 39 tactical squadrons[1]

1/ From Table I, Enclosure "A", Part II, of WSEG Report No. 48, TOP SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA.

53. These USAFE units have been assigned a large number of automatic strike targets in the event of a general war. The great majority of these are counterforce targets -- such as airfields and military control centers -- that pose a direct and immediate threat to the theater forces and our NATO allies.[1/]

54. A few staging bases and long-range airfields are included on these target lists, but only a small number of the USAFE automatic targets are also scheduled for attack by SAC forces. Except for the rotational squadrons the USAFE areas of target responsibility are primarily in the satellite countries.[2/]

55. Naval forces for the defense of the Southern NATO area are centered in the Sixth Fleet, deployed in the Mediterranean. The Navy's policy has been to keep two CVA's in the Mediterranean, and one of these is usually in the Eastern Mediterranean, at all times.[3/]

1/ Targeting data for both land and carrier-based tactical air are taken from Vol. V, Part II of WSEG Report No. 48, TOP SECRET.
2/ Ibid.
3/ Three CVA's, one with an all-attack A/C loading, are currently deployed to the Mediterranean in what is regarded as a temporary strengthening of U.S. strike power in the area. This increased deployment has almost doubled the number of naval attack aircraft in the Mediterranean; it has also increased the use made of naval air bases in Spain and Italy. VFR and other aircraft displaced from the all-attack carrier have been stationed at Rota, Spain, and Sigonella, Italy, to provide coverage when the CVA is in their operating area.

Aircraft from these carriers are assigned primary responsibility for about 55 counterforce targets, about half of them in the southwestern USSR and the remainder in the satellite countries. The Sixth Fleet also has secondary responsibility for targets assigned to those U.S. tactical air squadrons in Italy and Turkey.

56. The Sixth Fleet receives the majority of its peacetime provisions from CONUS by way of replenishment ships. The bulk of its peacetime requirements for fuel and lubricants, however, is supplied from commercial sources in Naples. Here, and in the Far East, the number of supply ships normally assigned to the deployed fleets is not sufficient to free them from dependence on overseas supply stores. This applies particularly to the high tonnage requirements of POL and ammunition, and no drastic reduction of this use of overseas facilities is in prospect.

57. In addition to its bulk POL and ammunition storage at bases in Spain and Italy, the Navy has, or plans to have, wartime supplies of these and other critical materials prestocked at about 25 other locations in the Mediterranean area. These include sites in the Balaeric Islands, Greece, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey.

58. Primary communications support for both fleet and air units operating in the Mediterranean is provided by a complex of land-based facilities near Port Lyautey, Morocco. An installation at Asmara, Eriteria (Ethiopia), provides communications coverage of the Eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and West Indian Ocean. Reliance on these land-based communication facilities will be reduced by the availability of communication ships in the 1963 to 1967 period.

OVERSEAS BASES FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE FAR EAST

59. The pattern of U.S. military deployments in the Pacific is influenced by the great distances involved and the relatively limited number of base facilities available. These conditions, coupled to the fact that our allies in this area are less capable of defending themselves than are those in Europe, have resulted in heavy utilization of a relatively small number of base complexes.

60. Major Army deployments in the Far East include two divisions of the Eighth Army and a missile command in Korea and an infantry division split between Okinawa and Hawaii. Support for the forces in Korea is provided from 22 installations in that country, and from bases in Japan and on Okinawa. The Marine Corps has one division deployed to Okinawa, less one regiment which is in Hawaii, and one aircraft wing in Japan, less one aircraft group also in Hawaii. The Hawaii-based units are organized into the First Marine Brigade.

61. According to the Lang Committee Report the Air Force now operates some 40 tactical and tactical support squadrons in the Far East, utilizing six bases in Japan, two each in Korea and Okinawa and one in the Philippines. There are wartime requirements for two bases each in Korea and Taiwan that are now occupied by host nation forces. Important air transit facilities for both peace and wartime requirements are on the island bases of Guam, Wake, Eniwetok, Midway and Johnston Islands.

62. The approximate present deployment of nuclear-capable tactical air forces in the Pacific theater comprises 48 B-57B's and 150 F-100D's tactical missile groups (TM-61C) 75 F-100D's and 25 F-100D's These PACAF forces

1/ From Table II, Enclosure "A", Part II of WSEG Report No. 48. TOP SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA.

are assigned several hundred Russian, Chinese Communist and North Korean targets of a type not requiring surveillance prior to attack.

63. Eight of the Navy's 14 in-commission attack carriers are generally assigned to the Pacific Fleet, with from 2-3 of these CVA's deployed in the Western Pacific with the Seventh Fleet. The Navy's policy has been to keep at least one of these CVA's in the vicinity of the Philippines and another in the area of Southern Japan. Logistic support for these naval forces is provided by a mix of mobile support and shore-based stocks, but the distances involved and the limited number of support ships available have resulted in considerable dependence on the major naval base complexes in Japan, the Philippines, Okinawa and on Guam. Of these the Japanese bases have been described as the hub of logistic capability in WESTPAC.[1/] Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan, is the principle naval base for forces operating in the Western Pacific; Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, is a major fleet anchorage and includes the largest POL reserve west of Pearl Harbor. It has been estimated that loss of these two bases alone would require a very substantial increase in mobile support ships to maintain the present readiness of the Seventh Fleet.

64. Our allies in Asia are less likely than are those in Europe to achieve offensive capabilities that would permit a reduction or withdrawal of U.S. forces. U.S. land-based nuclear strike forces in the Far East are already concentrated on what would appear to be a dangerously limited number of island air bases. The vulnerability of these bases and the requirements for greater dispersal would increase markedly should the Chinese Communists acquire a nuclear capability.

1/ The functions and individual importance of U.S. naval bases in the Pacific and Mediterranean are discussed in Enclosure "G", Vol. IV, WSEG Report No. 48. TOP SECRET.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE OVERSEAS BASE SYSTEM

Limited War

65. Between those U.S. bases in the Far East and those in Turkey lies a wide segment of the bloc's periphery on which the United States has relatively few military installations and no major base complexes. The dearth of facilities to support U.S. military operations in this area of the world is made more serious by the fact that the free nations of South and Southeast Asia are highly exposed to Communist overt and covert aggression and are able to maintain only relatively low levels of indigenous military strength.

66. This shortcoming of the present U.S. overseas base system has been recognized in NSC Lang Committee and in WSEG Report No. 48. It is reflected in the large number of U.S. military requirements for bases in Cambodia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Laos, North Borneo, Rhodesia, and Vietnam to which there are presently no base rights.[1] Political difficulties in making the necessary base and rights agreements have been a major obstacle to fulfillment of these requirements.

67. Political restrictions on the use of certain U.S. overseas base facilities have also led to undesirable concentrations or deployments of U.S. nuclear strike weapons. Refusal of the French to permit U.S. nuclear stockpiles on their territory has resulted in a concentration of tactical aircraft in Germany and the U.K. The Japanese ban on nuclear weapons has led the U.S. to place an undesirable reliance on use of air facilities in South Korea. Both these examples indicate the military importance of political cohesion within the Western Alliance.

1/ These requirements include air movement facilities, bulk storage, communications sites, ports and anchorages, staging areas and extensive logistic support facilities that would be needed for operations in these areas or, in a limited number of cases, for U.S. operations in a general war. See listings under the countries named in the 1960 USBRC, JCS 570/512, TOP SECRET.

General War

68. Considerable doubt has been raised about the utility of the U.S. overseas base system -- and particularly about the wartime availability of those U.S. nuclear strike forces deployed overseas -- in the context of a general war that begins with a well coordinated Soviet missile strike. A recent WSEG study of tactical air forces in a general war situation concluded that both U.S. land and carrier-based strike aircraft have a present capability to launch a very substantial number of weapons against military targets in the event of a U.S. initiative attack, but added that:[1]

"The USAF and PACAF bases represent highly vulnerable complexes which can be destroyed by medium range ballistic missile attacks from within the Sino-Soviet Bloc and which are well within the estimated range of Soviet capabilities in the 1960 to 1963 time period. Deployment of these missiles within the USSR only would allow coverage of present overseas tactical bases except Taiwan and the Philippines.

"It is improbable that these forces will receive tactical warning of a Soviet missile attack sufficient to enable any aircraft to be launched before impact of the first missile in the theater.

"Under certain conditions of strategic alert the USAFE and PACAF forces may be able to launch about 30 percent of the force if the enemy's missile coordination of a worldwide attack is poor (such that the forces receive 5 minutes of used warning and the enemy attack is spread over 20 minutes)

1/ These are among the conclusions reached in Part II of WSEG Report No. 48, 1 August 1960, TOP SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA. The term "used warning" here refers to warning received, and acted upon by the launching of strike aircraft.

and our response to the initial phases of such an attack is virtually instantaneous. A significant decrease of the survivability of the force can be expected with a well co-ordinated enemy attack or with our present communication delays.

"In the event of a daytime surprise missile attack with no strategic warning, it is considered improbable that more than a small fraction of the aircraft force (less than 10 percent of the total force) could be launched even if the enemy's missile arrivals are spread over a 20-minute period.

"In the event of an enemy attack in general war, the ability of the deployed carrier forces to survive long enough to launch all their aircraft is critically dependent upon receipt of strategic warning."

69. These problems are compounded by the difficulties likely to beset U.S. military command and control arrangements in the initial phase of a general war. Assuming even that a timely national decision could be made to release the overseas strike forces, there may be considerable doubt that execution orders could reach them before these forces fell under attack. This problem stems from the disruption of command and communication systems that may occur as an intentional or "bonus" product of a Soviet first strike.[1/]

70. Another type of limitation on the use of overseas bases and strike forces in a general war is that of host nation reactions to the crisis that might precede such a conflict. Should the Soviets offer sanctuary to these nations, in return for their neutrality, U.S. forces deployed or dependent

1/ These command and control problems are discussed in Enclosure "C" of WSEG Report No. 50, TOP SECRET, and in WSEG Staff Study No. 78, TOP SECRET.

on the territories involved may be incapacitated regardless of U.S. intentions in the matter. The likelihood of this contingency arising will depend on the cohesion of the Western alliance and the rigidity of its military arrangements at the time, as well as the time element involved. A prolonged crisis situation, for example, might allow host nations to neutralize U.S. strike forces before the United States had decided to either launch or withdraw them. Such actions would of course put the U.S. on notice that these weapons systems might not be available and, perhaps, permit other arrangements for coverage of their wartime targets. At the very least, however, the possibility of such contingencies emphasizes the importance of a high degree of cohesion within the Western alliance, and retention of both deployment and target flexibility for those nuclear strike systems which the U.S. deploys overseas.

71. Without entering into a discussion of these problems, it appears that they can be but partially alleviated by such protective measures as the provision of bomb alarm systems, more secure and redundant communications, the introduction of higher performance (faster reacting) tactical aircraft and missile systems and providing theater strike forces with the protection of hardening, greater dispersal or mobility. Proximity to the potential enemy, and the use of territory not under U.S. control, will continue to qualify the general war utility of overseas-based strike systems in this period.

72. These doubts do not invalidate one form of contribution made by overseas bases and strike systems to the deterrence of general war. Regardless of their vulnerability, their very existence complicates Soviet coordination problems and increases the number of countries and areas to be covered in a Soviet

first strike. Nor does their general war vulnerability reduce the importance of U.S. overseas bases and strike forces for the great majority of missions -- ranging from psychological bolstering of the alliance to use in less-than-general war -- to which they now contribute. Many of these tasks promise to remain important to U.S. security in the mid-1960's and may increase in importance should a genuine "nuclear stalemate" occur at the strategic level.

73. Whether or not such a stalemate occurs, or is thought to occur, there will remain U.S. military and political objectives that can be met only by the presence of U.S. forces at or near troubled and threatened overseas areas. While improvements in military technology and the capabilities of allies may permit some reduction in U.S. overseas deployments during this period, the psychological effects of their presence in strategically important areas of Europe and the Far East cannot be duplicated from remote locations.

74. One of the controlling factors in the disposition and employment of these forces will continue to be that of logistic support and the related use of overseas staging and supply bases. Prospective developments in military technology, such as the introduction of long-range military jet transports or the wider use of nuclear ship power, do not promise independence from these facilities. Instead, the protective measures that may become necessary for the effective use of these forces are likely to increase U.S. overseas base requirements. This is particularly true of such measures as the wider dispersal of theater tactical aircraft, or their replacement by either STOL systems or hardened and dispersed tactical missiles.

OVERSEAS BASES AND THE STRATEGIC MISSION 1964 to 1967

75. Changes in weapons systems and related areas of military technology may alter U.S. requirements for overseas bases in the 1964 to 1967 period. Changes in the types and numbers of weapons available to our potential enemies may, as suggested above, seriously compromise the value of overseas-based strike systems in a general war environment. Improvements in our own weaponry may permit certain military operations to be conducted from increasingly remote locations. New weapons and associated military techniques may also require location close to the bloc to be effective.

76. It is difficult to predict the 1964 to 1967 composition of the U.S. strategic strike force, as unforeseen political, economic and technological factors may alter both the characteristics of this force and the level of resources devoted to this part of the defense effort. Characteristics of the principal strategic offensive systems likely to be available in the 1964 to 1967 period are, however, given in earlier Enclosures to this Report, and nominal force levels have been predicted on the basis of anticipated funding and Service programs. The estimated 1960 to 1967 composition of the strategic strike force is given in Table I for those weapons now considered suitable for overseas deployment.

Strategic Aircraft

77. These estimates augur a sharp reduction in the medium bomber and tanker force during the period of interest. The B-47 force is expected to decline 50 percent from its present level by the beginning of FY 1964 and to phase out entirely in FY 1965-66. As the B-47 is the only strategic bomber deployed or scheduled for peacetime deployment outside

of FBM submarines is relatively small. As the force grows in size, and missile range extensions increase the feasible deployment areas, overseas logistic support is likely to diminish in importance. Anticipated developments in the communications field, including global VLF coverage from transmitters on U.S. territory and the development of shipborne HARE receivers, will further reduce system requirements for overseas facilities in the mid-sixties.

90. The cooperation of allied nations, however, is likely to remain of advantage to this system in the 1964 to 1967 period, particularly should the Soviets attempt to locate, shadow, harass and/or clandestinely destroy deployed FBM submarines in peacetime.[1/] Possible countermeasures to such a Soviet effort include the submarines' taking shelter in shallow or sheltered waters, [redacted] While it is not expected that FBM submarines will ordinarily patrol in the waters of allied nations, the use of their islands, bays, and other natural shelters could be of considerable importance for the evasion of detection and attack. U.S. and allied surface ships could also be used to locate and harass Soviet ASW units.

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91. Conversely, FBM submarines may be prohibited from operating in certain areas, such as the Red or Arabian seas, for political reasons. Such denial is most likely to apply to FBM tenders (as readily recognizable elements of a nuclear weapons system).

1/ This prospect is assessed in Enclosure "E" to WSEG Report No. 50, SECRET, on which the above discussion of the FBM system is based.

Soviet access to or control over additional land areas near FBM deployment sectors would facilitate their ASW efforts.

Intelligence and Warning

92. Closely related to the strategic mission is the problem of gaining intelligence of Sino-Soviet weapons and activities. The need for all forms of information on Communist Bloc activities has increased markedly during the cold war and no slackening of this trend is expected. Instead, the increasing seriousness of the military threat to CONUS and the expense of possible defensive measures are likely to generate more stringent requirements for both timely intelligence and greater detail.

93. The great bulk of the information now obtainable, particularly that type of information associated with strategic warning, comes from installations and intelligence activities overseas. Improvements in technology have resulted in some consolidation of these activities, and should provide additional and/or more detailed information from more remote locations in the mid-sixties, but are not expected to reduce the value of intelligence operations on the Bloc periphery.

94. Several of the newer intelligence and warning systems discussed in earlier Enclosures to this Report would depend on overseas facilities for their effectiveness. One of these techniques envisages the use of airborne infrared sensors to detect missile launchings within the Soviet Union. Two methods of operation for such aircraft were suggested -- "Arctic patrol" missions along the northern periphery of the Bloc and "loiter type" missions over allied territory on the Bloc's borders. Both such tactics would require the use of overseas airbases. Another such technique is the suggested use of over-the-horizon radar systems to detect both missile launchings and nuclear explosions within

the Bloc area. A variety of these systems etc.) are under development but have range characteristics that make overseas basing desirable, or even necessary, to their effective use. One suggested ICBM-warning system, for example, envisages radar sets of this type in

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95. Other attack warning systems that may become necessary in the early and mid-1960's involve use of overseas sites. An example would be the use of BMEWS-type line-of-sight radars to provide coverage against Soviet "long-way-around" (16,000 n.mi.) missiles that are launched along southern trajectories. Suggested sites for such a "Southern Fence" are either close to probable launch areas on the southern periphery of the Bloc or in the southern portion of the Western Hemisphere.

96. Without assessing these systems, or the desirability of using multiple modes of detection and observation, it appears that several of the intelligence and warning systems now under development can be most effectively employed from overseas sites, or could be employed earlier in their development cycle if such sites are available. The utility of overseas based intelligence systems is not necessarily limited to a peacetime environment. One of the most difficult general war problems is considered to be that of gaining timely and accurate knowledge of both the performance of our own weapons and the location of those that remain available to the enemy. It is possible that overseas-based systems or vehicles would be of utility in such post-strike reconnaissance, particularly if they are not collocated with deployed nuclear strike systems or other U.S. forces overseas.

Space Operations

97. Indirectly related to the strategic mission area are those military requirements for overseas bases to support space operations

in command, communications, R&D, testing and tracking functions. Major additions to U.S. base requirements in this area are likely to include extension of the Atlantic missile range possibly through sites in the African and Indian Ocean areas, and a landing site and other support facilities in South America for the DYNASOAR test program. Several of the earth satellite systems now under development, [redacted] envisage ground readout stations and other support facilities on overseas territory.

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