Project 84

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 20, 1961

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Assignment of Projects within the Department of Defense

In accordance with your memorandum of March 8, 1961, subject as above, the enclosed study of Project 84, due March 20, 1961, is forwarded for your consideration.

I am forwarding a copy of this study to the Special Projects Officer.

Arthur Sylvester

DOD 020 #84

#312

14 Aug 61

SD-314

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

20 March 1961

I. THE PROBLEM

To prepare instructions on statements to the press and the public by DOD civilian and military representatives. Compare our policies with those of the British, French and Canadians.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

See APPENDIX "A"

III. DISCUSSION

See APPENDIX "B"

IV. CONCLUSIONS

See APPENDIX "C"

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that the Secretary of Defense establish an Inspector General's Office, comparable to that in the Military Departments to insure that his policies are known, understood, implemented and enforced.

APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTIONS & REGULATIONS

1. The Secretary of Defense policy on public statements was issued to all the commands and the Military Departments on February 3, and February 27. These clear, unmistakeable instructions have not needed interpretation to any element of the Department of Defense; they have not been questioned as to specific meaning; they need to be enforced. (Enclosure 1).

2. There are many other DoD and Service instructions and regulations in existence governing public statements. Enclosure 2 details them.

3. The basic rules and regulations known to all, stipulate that it is forbidden to divulge classified information to unauthorized personnel. When these regulations are violated there are well known investigation procedures. These are detailed in DoD Directive 5145.2, enclosure 3.

DoD Public Affairs Guidance #16 -

"The Secretary: Yes. I have stated to the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to the Service Secretaries, and to the Joint Chiefs my philosophy in management, and it is this: that (a) during the development of policies relating to the Defense Department, I expect full and open discussion within the Department by all the leaders of the Department, military and civilian, without regard to whether their views conform to those of others in the Department, including my own; (b) that once a decision has been reached and a policy established representing the decision of the President, or other appropriate authorities, that all members of the Department, civilian and military, will be expected to support that decision, publicly and otherwise; (c) that when I say that they are expected to support it publicly, I do not mean that they should not express their opinions, particularly their disagreements, relating to policies, if queried by appropriate agencies of Congress; (d) there are additional provisions provided for in the Reorganization Act which permit the Service Secretaries, the three Service Secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs, to report to appropriate Congressional agencies their disagreement with specific policies of the Defense Department, if, in their opinion, those policies do not permit them to carry out their responsibilities. I think that perhaps covers the question."

DoD Public Affairs Guidance #18 -

"McNamara: Well, it's in line, Martin, with a very simple and strongly held belief of mine that it's inappropriate for any member of the Defense Department to speak on the subject of foreign policy. That's a

field that should be reserved to the President, the Secretary of State and other officials in the State Department.

Question: That goes for you then?

McNamara: That applies to me as well as it does to all of the Presidential appointees, all of the military officers, and all of the high civilian officials in the Department.

Question: Then no military man, as far as you're concerned, is going to be permitted to say anything that would affect in any way our foreign policy relations with other countries.

McNamara: That is correct.

Question: Reason?

McNamara: Because a military officer speaking on a matter of foreign policy is speaking about a field that lies outside his responsibility and yet as a representative of this government -- an official representative -- his words are taken as the policy of the government. This is quite inappropriate."

* * * *

"Question: Well, suppose, Mr. Secretary, that some of the military men think that the decisions that you make are wrong or even dangerous to our security. How is that handled? Are you going to permit them to voice publicly their opposition to your position?

McNamara: After the President has taken a position, has established a policy, or after appropriate officials in the Defense Department have established a policy, I expect that no member of the Department, either civilian or military, will discuss that policy other than in a way to support it before the public. I can't conceive of a military organization or a Defense Department organization functioning effectively in any other way.

Question: Well, if he does, what do you do? Ask him to hand in his suit?

McNamara: I think that would be appropriate. I should qualify this statement, however, on two points -- three points, rather. First, prior to the decision, prior to the time the President or other consitiutional authorities have established a policy, it's not only appropriate but I wish and will require that every individual, civilian or military, express his point of view with respect to the matter at hand, and give his opinion without fear of whether that opinion may or may not be acceptable to his superiors.

Further, the Congress has the right to request of any of us our personal opinions when we appear before them, and I will expect that the military and civilian officials of the Department, appearing before Congress, will respond to Congress' inquiry.

Question: No detriment to their position?

McNamara: Exactly. Beyond that the Reorganization Act of 1958 specifically provides that the three Service Secretaries -- the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy -- and the Joint Chiefs will report to Congress any situation in which they find themselves unable to carry out their responsibilities because of policies or decisions imposed upon them from above."

ENCLOSURE 2
TO APPENDIX A

BASIC REGULATIONS

DOD and Military Departments -

DoD, Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps Regulations prohibit the divulgence of classified information to those unauthorized to receive same.

DoD Regulations and Service Instructions governing public statements are as follows:

DoD Directives

5122.2	Responsibilities of the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) - Functions of the Office of Security Review
5122.5	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
5200.1	Safeguarding Official Information in the Interests of the Defense of the U. S.
5200.6	Policy Governing the Custody, Use and Preservation of Department of Defense Official Information Which Requires Protection in the Public Interest
5210.39	Security Classification Guide for Proximity Fuses & Components
5230.2	Activation, Training & Movement/Units
5230.3	Information Releases by Manufacturers
5230.4	Release of Info. on Atomic Energy, Guided Missiles and New Weapons
5230.5	Information Releases by Colleges and Universities Holding Defense Contracts
5230.9	Clearance of DoD Public Information
5230.10	Phased Release Program for Aircraft Gas Turbine Engines for Commercial Operation
5230.12	Release to Public/Info. on Guided Missiles, Mil. Aircraft, Assoc. Power Plants Components, and/or Accessories
5400.1	Dissemination of Information to Reserve Components and Public

5410.1	Release of Information Concerning Mil. Personnel Involved in Accidents
5410.8	Furnishing Lists of Civilian Employees' Names, Salaries, Official Titles and Stations
5410.10	Coordination and Clearance of Announcements of Personnel Reductions, Closures of Installations and Reductions of Contract Operations Within the United States
5430.1	Participation of Military Personnel in Commercially Sponsored Radio-Television Broadcasts not of a Public Service Nature
5525.1	Status of Forces Policies and Information
6040.2	Release of Information from Medical Records
C-2110.3	Release of Information Concerning the Mutual Defense Assistance Program to Foreign Governments
C-5230.1	Official Statements Regarding Nuclear Weapons
C-5230.2	Public Discussion of Air and Ground Bases Overseas
C-5230.3	Public Statements on Foreign and Military Policy and on Certain Weapons
C-5230.6	Policies and Procedures for Regulating Access to Critical Category Atomic Weapons Stockpile and Production Info.
S-5400.1	Policy on Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare
S-5400.2	Policy on Atomic Energy, Guided Missiles and New Weapons

Service Regulations

Army Regulation No. 380-5 - Safeguarding Defense Information

Op NAV Instruction 5510.1B - Department of the Navy Security Manual for Classified Information

Air Force Regulation 205-1 - Safeguarding Military Information

Marine Corps - Governed by Department of Navy Security Manual for Classified Information

DoD Directive 5230.9, August 17, 1957 - "Clearance of DoD Public Information" prescribes:

"Defense information originated by the Department of Defense or any of its agencies for official release to the public through news media by military or civilian personnel of the DoD, such as official speeches, press releases, and photographic material, shall be submitted to the Secretary of Defense through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) or other designees for review and clearance; speeches not less than five days before delivery date, other material as early as practicable."

ENCLOSURE 3
TO APPENDIX A

INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES

DoD Directive 5145.2 prescribes investigation procedures as follows:

"C. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) shall make a preliminary analysis to confirm the classification of information disclosures reported by DoD personnel pursuant to subparagraph B. 2., above, and of information disclosures noted during the review of material published in the United States, conducted pursuant to reference (c). In any case in which classification of the information is confirmed, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) shall refer the case promptly to the General Counsel, or otherwise as he may direct, for appropriate action."

APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

COMPARISON OF AMERICAN POLICIES WITH BRITISH, FRENCH AND CANADIANS

American

The Bill of Rights almost two centuries ago laid down as a first necessity of freedom the freedom of the press. The theory of our Founding Fathers was that an enlightened electorate depends upon a well informed public.

Freedom to publish is, of course, no good without freedom of access. Consequently, the press have ever since been trying to force governmental officials to conduct all operations in a "gold fish bowl." This is obviously impossible. Government officials cannot be free to arrive at carefully considered decisions if they have to divulge all of their discussions. Also premature disclosure of certain programs could cause untold problems.

In recognition of this, the Executive branch of government has traditionally classified certain types of sensitive information and invoked the right of Executive Privilege under the "Separation of Powers" concept.

Periodically classified official or privileged information has been leaked to the press for a variety of reasons. Efforts to trace the sources of these leaks have met with little success.

One of the principal reasons these efforts are unsuccessful is requirement to prove "treasonable intent" under the Espionage Act to secure conviction.

The American Newspaper Guild has historically stood for the unqualified principle of "newman's privilege" to keep confidential his news sources. This stand was reaffirmed in July 1959, at the Twenty-Sixth Annual Convention in New York City. Several years ago New York reporter Marie Torre went to jail rather than reveal her news source.

British

Informed observers advise that the British do not possess the passion for public utterances. "My dear fellow, we just don't make speeches," describes their attitude. Public officials, both diplomatic and military, as a general rule will respond to a public query that "It is not in the interest of Her Majesty's Government to discuss the matter." On the other hand, the British are very adept at "backgrounding," particularly where they desire to "float" society on the world scene which advances British interests.

In contrast with the American system of the guaranteed free press and particularly the protection of a "source" in legal proceedings, the British possess an "Official ~~Secret~~ Act." This law enables the Government to prosecute the publisher for classified material which he disseminates. The American system does not permit this procedure, except under terms of the Espionage Act wherein "treasonable intent" must be proven. Very seldom has this been ~~involved,~~ even in time of war.

French

Informed observers advise that the Minister of Information, Cabinet Minister, attends meeting on matters of public interest and issues a brief statement following the session.

DeGaulle does not give out very much information. DeGaulle talks with an individual without any of his deputies present. He does have one man in his Secretariat in charge of press relations. However, the French do not provide a press room or gallery for the newsmen. Frequently stories which do appear in the French papers are only good for one edition. As they are written so far off base, according to one experienced observer, the French read them and are so used to them not being accurate they don't look for later stories.

The politico-military public debates over Algeria are so well-known that they need no detailing here.

The French are also adept at "backgrounding" correspondents to advance national interests.

Canadian

Informed observers advise that until Prime Minister Diefenbaker took office, there were no written instructions to Canadian military officials on public statements. However, by tradition they have avoided entering into political controversy or expressing opinions on foreign policy.

Prime Minister Diefenbaker has caused directives to be issued to the services to refrain from speaking on matters of governmental policy, foreign and domestic. Officers believing that they have been speaking of matters solely military and within their competence, have received reprimands because the Prime Minister's interpretation is different from their own. At the moment the Canadian military are not talking.

It is believed that Canadian officials are also skillful at "backgrounding" correspondents to advance national objectives.

APPENDIX "C"

CONCLUSIONS

It is concluded that

a. The Secretary of Defense has clearly enunciated and promulgated his policies as to public posture statements.

b. The principal problem in the days ahead is to achieve enforcement and inspection of implementation of his policies.

c. The American policies in this respect differ with those of the British, French and Canadians for a variety of reasons -- tradition, form of government, national aims -- among other things.

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Copy 24 of 30 copies
each of 8 pages

Mr. A. Barbeau
26 April 1961

PROJECT OUTLINE

BALLISTIC MISSILE PROJECT

~~THIS DOCUMENT AS A WHOLE IS CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL. INDIVIDUAL PORTIONS AND ATTACHMENTS HERETO CARRY THEIR APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION.~~

Log No. C-61-277

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PROJECT OUTLINE

BALLISTIC MISSILE PROJECT

INTRODUCTION

1. The following is an outline of the program for carrying out the JCS Directive, "Evaluation of Operational Effectiveness of Ballistic Missiles," (U), JCS 2012/185.

2. The program is intended to provide for a continuing evaluation of development and operational test data on major missile systems. The systems to be considered initially are ATLAS, TITAN, MINUTEMAN, SKYBOLT, and POLARIS. The following factors, among others, will be considered: accuracy, reliability, range, response to command and control and reaction time.

OBJECTIVES

3. The objectives of the WSEG project are:

a. To provide technical evaluations of the developmental and operational test data for each missile system;

b. To proceed toward the development of specific criteria, procedures, and definitions; i.e., (methodology) with the objective of establishing a common basis, insofar as is feasible, upon which the overall evaluations may be accomplished.

4. The project will not be concerned with:

a. Factors related to base survivability and penetration of enemy defenses;

b. Force size requirements.

[redacted]

[redacted]

PROPOSED PROGRAM

GENERAL

5. The program presently envisioned for carrying out the Directive consists in taking successive steps starting with the most general results and then proceeding into the more detailed aspects of overall missile performance.

6. The intent is to provide useful information and indicate the major areas of uncertainties and limitations at the earliest possible time. The issuance of a preliminary report in time to be of use in the preparation of SIOP 63 appears to be particularly desirable. The emphasis in this case would be placed on the ATLAS and the POLARIS systems. The other systems which are programmed to be operational in the time period of SIOP 63 will, however, also be examined. The longer range objectives are to develop a methodology and apply it to assess the expected performance of all assigned missiles.

STUDIES

7. The following paragraphs outline the areas to be investigated in the course of the project. The preliminary report will, however, be primarily concerned with the analysis of the newly operational system programs. The complete evaluation program is seen as involving four major tasks:

a. The description of the missile systems, including the operational environment, for each system to be evaluated;

b. The review of development programs and procedures;

c. The study of programs intended to establish confidence in the capability of the weapon systems; in particular, the study of test and training exercises and the analysis of available test data;

d. The study of generalized procedures for establishing best values for expected system performance and the confidence to be placed in them.

8. The indicated tasks can be considered to involve an analysis and a synthesis phase. The analyses consist primarily of investigations of individual missile systems and the specific programs and procedures currently being followed in each case. The synthesis phase will be primarily concerned with procedures, definitions and measures that are generally applicable to all systems. In this part of the study, the special features of the individual systems are considered as specific variations of a common basic process.

9. In view of the different development status of the missile systems to be studied, a clear distinction will be made in all phases of the study between the Technical and the Operational programs. The separation is also justified on the basis that different types of problems are encountered in technical and operational development. For systems sufficiently advanced, however, the overall evaluations are to include the effects of factors of both types and their interactions.

10. The following entries indicate the areas of investigation to be included in the study:

A. Review and Analysis of Existing Programs and Procedures for Each System

A.1 Description of System Process

- System Concept
- Overall Performance Goals
  - Operational Readiness
  - Timeliness of Launch and Delivery
  - Reliability in Launch, Flight and Delivery
  - Capability to Detect and Allow for Failures (Prelaunch and Powered Flight)
  - Accuracy

- Technical Functions for Weapon Delivery - Functions of Major Subsystems
  - Base System
  - Communication System
  - Ground Control and Support Systems (Fire Control - Targeting - Launch Control)
  - Missileborne Systems
- Operational Functions for Weapons Delivery
  - Training
  - Operations
  - Maintenance and Replacement

A.2 Review of Technical Development Procedures and Programs - Status of Each System

- Engineering Research and Development
- Engineering Test Program
- Production and Construction
- Product Improvement Programs and Procedures
- Integrated System Tests

A.3 Review of Operational Development Procedures and Programs - Status of Each System

- Training Programs
- Operational Environment
- Operational Field Tests
- Maintenance Programs
- Logistics

A.4 Review of Test, Evaluation and Improvement Programs

- Technical Evaluations
  - Laboratory Component and Subsystem Tests
  - Subsystem Tests (Sleds, Centrifuge, Captive Firings, etc.)
  - RD Firings
    - Description of RD Environment
  - Test Data Analysis
  - Product Improvement

- Operational Evaluations
  - Training Exercises
  - Operational and Training Firings
    - Description of Operational Environment
  - Programs for Improving Operating Procedures

A.5 Description of Test Instrumentation

- Contractor "In House" Testings
- Subsystem Testing Facilities
- Missile Test Ranges AMR, PMR, etc.
- On-Site Test Programs

A.6 Analysis of Available Data

- In All Test Facilities
- Reliability in Countdown, Launch and Flight
- Timeliness Countdown and Launch
- Accuracy in Delivery
- Performances in RD Environments
- Performances in Operational Environments

B. Synthesis - Methodology

B.1 Generalized Functional Description of Ballistic Missile Delivery Process

- Common Functions and Subsystems
- Special Features of Mobile Systems
- Measures of Performances
- Functional Requirements in Order to Meet Specific Performances

B.2 Programs for Establishing Confidence in the Capabilities of Systems - Common or Recommended Procedures

- Technical and Operational Programs
- Test and Evaluation
- Systems Improvement Programs

B.3 Methodology for Assessing Performance

- Engineering Design Prediction - Techniques for Reliability, Accuracy and Reaction Time
- Statistical Techniques
- Overall System Performances
- Synthesis of Subsystem and Component Reliabilities

B.4 Application of Methodologies to Evaluation of Programmed Missile Systems

- Technical Development Phases
- Operational Systems

SUPPORT

11. The intention is to make the greatest possible use of the efforts of ODDR&E, Service agencies, and contractors which are involved in the development and/or evaluation of the missile systems. It is planned to establish close contacts with ODDR&E, the Service agencies concerned with the staffs at AMR, PMR, and White Sands missile ranges, Vandenberg and subsequent operational bases, as well as with the principal contractors and research laboratories involved in development and/or evaluation of the weapon systems. In addition, it is planned to consult with other groups concerned with the methodology of assessing overall system reliabilities.

12. It is expected that the bulk of the data reduction and a good deal of analysis will be available and provided by the Services and contractors. Additionally, it might be possible to request special data processing formats without causing delays or otherwise affecting the programs. In any case, data processing could be contracted out if large amounts are required by WSEG.

13. With regard to test data, the intention is to reserve the WSEG staff for analysis and to minimize the in-house data processing activities.

[redacted]

REPORTING

14. In view of the fact that the systems to be studied are for the most part still under development, definitive reports on any or all systems cannot be provided in the near future. The program must be a continuing effort. Nevertheless, it is believed that useful outputs can be provided when significant changes occur.

15. It is estimated that a preliminary report could be issued September 15, 1961, in time to be used in the preparation of SIOP 63. This Report would be devoted primarily to the ATLAS and POLARIS systems. It would include:

a. Summary of the status of each missile system,

b. Best estimates for performance factors based on the completed tests,

c. Major areas of uncertainties for each system,

d. Discussion of methodology,

e. Plans for follow-on phases.

A first phase report presenting a more fully developed methodology, together with its application to those systems for which sufficient test data are available, as pointed out previously, should be completed by April 1962. The reports will in all cases clearly indicate the distinctions between technical and operational performances.