OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE

From The

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

OF

DEFENSE

And The

MILITARY SERVICES

To The

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE

AND

REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Documents O-106 thru O-161

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
Production and Logistics

#375

0-10.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
Memo 44C1/59
11 June 1991

RESPONDS TO I-055

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Assistant Secretary of Defense memo of June 5, 1991

Encl: (1) Response to items 8, 10, and 11

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in final response to the request for additional information forwarded by reference (a).

P.W. Drennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to: OASD (P&L)

0-107

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
Memo 44C1/60
12 June 1991

RESPONDS TO 10 JUNE REQUEST

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Request for additional information dated 10 June 1991

Encl: (1) Response to items 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 17

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in partial response to the request for additional information forwarded by reference (a).

P.K. Drennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to: OASD (P&L)

Pat Walker
3D780

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0103

June 12, 1991

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

O-108

HEARING

Mr. Jim Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N. W.
Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. Courter:

During your hearing on June 7, 1991, you asked for the Army's position on transferring Forts McCoy, Pickett, A.P. Hill, Indiantown Gap, and Buchanan to the Army National Guard. I would like to elaborate upon my letter to you of June 5, 1991 explaining why the Army sees no military or economic advantage in pursuing this initiative at this time.

The Army has the authority to make changes in administrative control or garrison configurations as needed outside of the P.L. 101-510 Base Realignment and Closure Commission framework. While we agree that the principle of National Guard control may have some merit in limited circumstances, it is clearly prudent to await the final results of the study of Reserve Component (RC) training strategies and management of training areas before making any changes in administrative control. That study will give us a firm basis for our final decision on which installations would be good candidates. We expect to begin the final phase of that study in August 1991; detailed examination of unit requirements will not be completed until Spring 1992.

The Total Army Analysis process, which will define the content of the RC force structure in greater detail, will give us an indication of potential excess capacity in this category. If excess capacity is apparent, we would seek to minimize turbulence to the installations while studying them for inclusion in the 1993 Defense Base Closure Commission process.

Forts McCoy, Pickett, A.P. Hill, and Indiantown Gap all support both active and reserve training. Data on the active/reserve component use mix for these installations are attached.

Fort Buchanan, a sub-installation of Fort McPherson, primarily supports the administration of the Army presence on Puerto Rico. As a command and control type of installation, it has no training area, and few ranges. While no study has been done on command and control posts, it is unlikely that administrative installations can be operated more cheaply by the Reserve Component.

It is misleading to assume that significant savings are possible by transferring major training area installations to the reserve components. Precise staffing levels cannot be determined without extensive site visits and workload analysis, in part because the current garrisons are already small and operating with minimal staff.

Both Forts Dix and Chaffee have Active Component tenants which do not support Reserve Component training or the installations' training mission. The Army proposed realigning those functions, and in the case of Fort Dix, proposed disposal of a substantial portion of the cantonment area not needed by the Reserve Component. These realignments and reductions, not a change in management structure, are what result in operations and maintenance savings.

It also should be noted that an earlier study of the issue of administrative control, completed in 1986, found that Congressional ceilings on Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) and Guard military technician spaces were a significant constraint if responsibility were passed to either the National Guard or the U. S. Army Reserve. These ceilings still exist today, and the Department of Defense is planning reductions because of budget constraints.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, the transfer of these additional installations is premature pending completion of our above-referenced study and would not necessarily be more cost effective. Once the reserve force structure is determined and our study is complete, the Army can and will exercise the authority it already has to make changes in administrative control and garrison config-urations to make changes that make sense. I urge you to accept the Army's current recommendations for this category.

I will provide a copy of this letter to Mr. Colin McMillan, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production & Logistics).

Sincerely,

Susan Livingstone

Susan Livingstone
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics & Environment)

Attachment

INSTALLATION USAGE

	AC	USAR	ARNG
Fort McCoy	17 %	56 %	27%
Fort Pickett	33%	24%	43%
Fort A.P. Hill	19%	24%	67%
Fort Indiantown Gap	15%	36%	49%
Fort Buchanan *	34%	52%	14%

* best avail est

TABS

TRAINING DATA

1. The data below was collected from the various installations using an ad-hoc form. No two installations replied in exactly the same way. There is no standardized method of data collection. All data was requested for fiscal year 1990. In some cases, there may be a reference to earlier years or a comment as to why 1990 data might be considered significantly different from the norm.

2. Active Component Use

a. Fort Pickett, VA

	USA	USN	USMC	USAF
Total Unit Visits	107	18	40	5
Estimated Mean Length of Visit (days)	14	18	14	14
Estimated Mean Unit Size (# of personnel)	144	144	144	144
Man Days Training	215,712	46,656	80,640	16,100

Total Active Component Training Man Days 359,102

b. Fort A P Hill, VA

(1) USA - 22,944 man days training from 187 unit visits. Typical unit visit probably slightly greater than two weeks. Primary training site for the 3rd Infantry Division (Old Guard), Transportation Officer Basic Course, Quartermaster Officer Basic Course, and JAG Basic Course.

(2) Other services - 24,208 man days training from 202 unit visits. Used primarily by USMC, but also by USN SEALS, and special operations forces.

c. Fort Indiantown Gap, PA - 38,988 man days training, primarily from 10 company size units in the geographical area and a field training exercise by the 513th MI Brigade from Ft. Monmouth.

d. Fort Mc Coy, WI

(1) 1990 data not readily available. The 1988/89 numbers are below historical averages, primarily because of budgetary problems. Prior to those years, the Army would train 6,000 to 8,000 and the Marines, 4,000 to 5,000.

(2) 1989

(a) approximately 4,000 USA
(b) 3,764 USMC

(3) 1988

(a) approx. 4,000 USA
(b) approx. 3,000 USMC

3. Inactive Duty Training (i.e. weekend training)

a. Fort Pickett, VA - 43,376 soldiers from 324 units

b. Fort A P Hill, VA - 106,885 soldiers training visits from 1097 unit visits. A "visit" is typically a full days training for a soldier or unit. A MUTA 4 weekend would be considered two soldier or unit visits. By this definition, most soldiers and units would be counted multiple times.

c. Fort Indiantown Gap, PA - 98,000 soldiers from 350 units

d. Fort Mc Coy, WI - 73,661 soldiers from 847 units. The ROTC units have been subtracted from the IDT section. The USAF figure is for the active component, USAF Reserve, and Air National Guard.

4. Annual Training

a. Fort Pickett, VA - 23,578 soldiers from 163 units

b. Fort A P Hill, VA - 20,156 soldiers from 78 units

c. Fort Indiantown Gap, PA - 13,040 soldiers from 80 units

d. Fort Mc Coy, WI - 47,297 soldiers from 323 units.

5. ROTC Training

a. Fort Pickett, VA - 1,638 cadets from 11 schools train monthly

b. Fort A P Hill, VA - Cadets (number unknown) from 13 schools use five times monthly. On 63 occasions, cadets received training. There were 3,824 cadet days (It appears that cadets trained multiple times.)

c. Fort Indiantown Gap, PA - 9,883 cadets from 17 schools train six times per year

d. Fort Mc Coy, WI - 3,792 cadets from 7 schools train twice monthly.

6. Army Reserve Readiness Training Centers (ARRTC)

a. Fort Pickett, VA

(1) Active Guard and Reserve - none

(2) Active Component - none

(3) Drilling Reservists - 181

(4) Civilian - 10

b. Fort A P Hill, VA - NA

c. Fort Indiantown Gap, PA

(1) Active Guard and Reserve - 2,552

(2) Active Component - 1,598

(3) Drilling Reservists - none

(4) Civilian - 279

d. Fort Mc Coy, WI

(1) Active Guard and Reserve - 5,755

(2) Active Component - 200

(3) Drilling Reservists - none indicated

(4) Civilian - 1,747

7. FORSCOM Petroleum Training Module

a. Fort Pickett, VA - 954 Personnel Trained

b. Fort A P Hill, VA - None

c. Fort Indiantown Gap, PA - None

d. Fort Mc Coy, WI - None

8. Equipment Concentration Sites

a. Fort Pickett, VA

(1) Number of Support Units - 182

(2) Mean Number of Vehicles per Unit - 25

(3) Total Number of Vehicles (1 * 2) - 4,550

(4) Number/Type Other End Items - Roughly 30 different end items, similar to those reported by other installations, but no numbers to indicate quantity are available.

b. Fort A P Hill, VA - NA

c. Fort Indiantown Gap, PA

(1) Number of Support Units - 117

(2) Mean Number of Vehicles per Unit - 17

(3) Total Number of Vehicles (1 * 2) - 1,989

(4) Number/Type Other End Items -

(a) 1,427 Communications Equipment
(b) 302 Heavy Engineer Equipment
(c) 404 Weapons
(d) 399 Tents, Screens, etc

d. Fort Mc Coy, WI

(1) Number of Support Units - 372

(2) Mean Number of Vehicles per Unit - 4.6

(3) Total Number of Vehicles (1 * 2) - 1,728

(4) Number/Type Other End Items

(a) 924 Communications Equipment
(b) 1,525 Heavy Engineer Equipment
(c) 4,954 Weapons
(d) 85,653 Tents, Screens, Cold Weather Gear, etc

9. Mobilization Equipment and Training Site (MATES)

a. Fort Pickett, VA - Not available

b. Fort A P Hill, VA - Not available

c. Fort Indiantown Gap, PA - Not available

d. Fort Mc Coy, WI - Wisconsin ARNG MATES

(1) Number of Support Units - 8 Bn, 7 Sep Company

(2) Mean Number of Vehicles per Unit - 37.5

(3) Total Number of Vehicles (1 * 2) - 562

(4) Number/Type Other End Items -

(a) 391 Communications Equipment
(b) 113 Heavy Engineer Equipment
(c) 411 Weapons
(d) 274 Tents, Screens, etc

10. USAR Forces School

a. Fort Pickett, VA - NA

b. Fort A P Hill, VA - NA

c. Fort Indiantown Gap, PA - 7,016 soldiers attended 51 different courses.

d. Fort Mc Coy, WI - 6,003 soldiers attended an unknown number of different courses.

11. Civilian Police Agency Support

a. Fort Pickett, VA - estimates 16,100 man days training provided to FBI, CIA, federal correction officers, special operations, and state police. No significant military support provided.

b. Fort A P Hill, VA - estimates 1,083 personnel trained from police, FBI, CIA, INS, Secret Service, and US Park Police. No indication of length of training, whether or not these persons trained on more than one visit, or whether or not any troop support was provided.

c. Fort Indiantown Gap, PA - estimates 5,500 man days training provided to police and FBI. No significant military support provided (10 to 15 troops/month)

d. Fort Mc Coy, WI - None specified

12. Other Civilian Support

a. Fort Pickett, VA

(1) Boy Scouts - 80 Boy Scouts, bi-annually, no significant military support provided.

(2) Civil Air Patrol - 300 cadets, annual, no significant military support provided.

b. Fort A P Hill, VA - 9,251 Boy Scouts from 70 troop visits. One troop uses the installation for regular meetings. Most of the troop visits represent one time visits per year. Data appears to indicate an average of 6 troops use the installation each month.

c. Fort Indiantown Gap, PA

(1) Boy Scouts - 1,172 Boy Scouts (probably includes multiple visits), two/three times per month, less than 10 soldiers providing support

(2) Other - estimate of 2,300 personnel visiting the installation (probably includes multiple visits), including PA Wing CAP, WWII Historical Society, PARNG Vet Reunion, Handicapped Olympics, etc.

d. Fort Mc Coy, WI - 2,588 Boy Scouts from 216 troops, with five troops per weekend.

12. Other Potentially Useful Information Provided by the Installation

a. Fort Pickett, VA

(1) Best MOUT site in CONUS

(2) Central location

(3) Excellent ranges

(4) Excellent engineer bridge site

(5) Total support of civilian community

(6) Outstanding potential for Regional Training Site

(7) Four nap of earth (NOE) routes

(8) Low level background light for NVG training

(9) TSFO

b. Fort A P Hill, VA

(1) CECOM operates a Laser Test Range and Nignt Vision Laboratory

(2) Largest military training area between Fort Bragg, NC and Fort Drum, NY. Installation has 40 ranges, 40 indirect firing points and 13 demolition sites covering 30,000 acres. There are 30 training areas and 38 training facilities separate from the range complex encompassing an additional 44,000 acres. Good maneuver areas and extensive road network

(3) Research, Development and Engineering Center, Ft Belvoir conducts testing and evaluation on mines and explosives.

(4) A 5,000 foot assualt strip for C-130 aircraft; a drop zone and an aerial gunnery complex.

(6) USN maintains a SEAL camp year round.

(7) Supports firing of all infantry division weapons and weapons systems to include the A-7 and A-10 ground support aircraft.

c. Fort Indiantown Gap, PA

(1) Air Force operates an air-to-ground range and is used by Air Force high performance aircraft. 2,339 sorties flown in FY 90.

(2) Muir Army Airfield - Over 100 aircraft permanently stationed. Over 80,000 air movements a year, mostly associated with the Eastern Army Aviation Training Site (EAATS). EAATS is a mini-Fort Rucker which conducts pilot and crew-member training for RC personnel throughout the year.

d. Fort Mc Coy, WI

(1) 49,700 acres of maneuver training area and 8,000 acres of impact area.

(2) The 41 direct fire ranges provide training and qualification opportunities for gunners of all direct fire systems in the Army inventory. The 42 surveyed artillery firing points locating in the north post provide artillery units with the opportunity to perform all ARTEP tasks in a realistic yet safe training environment.

(3) Other training facilities include drill fields, prisoner of war compounds, wheeled and tracked vehicle driving courses, gas chambers, vehicle recovery sites, litter obstacle course, deliberate equipment decon site, conditioning course, confidence course, bayonet training court, bayonet assault course, hand to hand combat court, 32 foot rappel tower, 55 foot rappel tower, rope bridge site, infantry battle drill course, drop zones, float bridge sites, dry span bridge site and dirt assault strip.

(4) Possesses large amounts of MILES equipment.

(5) McCoy Army Airfield used by Air Force and Air National Guard and will accommodate up to a C130 aircraft.

TRAINING EVENTS POSSIBLE

	BRIGADE	BATTALION	COMPANY	PLATOON	CREW
ATTACK	AP Hill	AP Hill Pickett	AP Hill Pickett Mc Coy	AP Hill Pickett Ind Gap * Mc Coy	AP Hill Pickett Ind Gap * Mc Coy
DEFEND	AP Hill	AP Hill Pickett Mc Coy	AP Hill Pickett Mc Coy	AP Hill Pickett Ind Gap * Mc Coy	AP Hill Pickett Ind Gap * Mc Coy
MVMENT TO CONTACT	AP Hill	AP Hill Pickett *	AP Hill Pickett Mc Coy	AP Hill Pickett Ind Gap * Mc Coy	AP Hill Pickett Ind Gap * Mc Coy
TANK GUNNERY					AP Hill Pickett Ind Gap * Mc Coy

*** Limited Training**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0103

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

June 12, 1991

O-109

Mr. Jim Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N. W.
Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. Courter:

This letter responds to your June 7, 1991 request for the Army's position on the proposed closure of England Air Force Base, Louisiana.

The Army understands the Air Force need to close England Air Force Base. During the Army's deliberations, the Air Staff ensured that all the support requirements of the Joint Readiness Training Center, if stationed at Fort Polk, Louisiana, could be met in light of the recommendation to close England Air Force Base.

In the original stationing studies for the Joint Readiness Training Center, England Air Force Base was identified as the primary air support site, with Chennault Field as an alternate. However, analysis has shown Barksdale Air Force Base and Chennault Field can be used to meet our requirements. Should the Secretary of Defense's recommendations to close England Air Force Base and station the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk be accepted, please be assured that all airfield requirements for the JRTC can be fully met.

The Army would not have gone forward with the recommendation to permanently station the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk if good alternative airfield support bases were not available in an acceptable area. The center provides unique training opportunities for both the Army and the Air Force.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this issue. I will provide a copy of this letter to Mr. Colin McMillan, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production & Logistics).

Sincerely,

Susan Livingstone
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics & Environment)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0103

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

June 12, 1991

Mr. Jim Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N. W.
Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20006

Sir. I regret the delay. We only received your letter June 11.

Dear Mr. Courter:

This is in response to your letter of May 29, 1991, requesting an explanation of differences in installation rankings used by the 1988 Commission, and those developed by the Army to support its current recommendations.

The differences are a result of several factors. In developing the current recommendations, the Army used attributes which were more comprehensive and which relied upon updated and validated data sources. We used new models, not in existence in 1988, that calculated facility requirements more accurately. The specific attributes and data were also the subject of extensive audits and validation.

The 1988 rankings helped the Commission identify excess capacity. The 1990/91 rankings provide a starting point for the Army when assessing alternatives to tailor the Army's base structure to a smaller force structure. Individual comparisons between an installation's rank then, and now, are misleading, since the purposes and circumstances are much different. Improvements in data and methodology make such comparisons inappropriate.

The importance of the installation rankings must not be overestimated. The arrays were not used to determine which bases to close or realign. Instead, they gave the Army a baseline for comparing and evaluating its installations.

The Army's rankings have withstood scrutiny by the Army's senior leaders, the Army Audit Agency and the General Accounting Office. We conducted sensitivity analyses to ensure that no attribute's weight would distort or bias the final rankings.

I am confident that the current rankings provide a good means to assess military value and compare and evaluate basing options.

I will provide a copy of this letter to Mr. Colin McMillan, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production & Logistics).

Sincerely,

Susan Livingstone
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics & Environment)

The circumstances have changed dramatically since the 1988 Commission's rankings. They were projecting a 781,000 end state for the active Army force by the mid-1990s. Our current force structure plan projects 530,000.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
Memo 44C1/61
13 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Request for additional information dated 10 June 1991

Encl: (1) Response to items 4, 6, 7, and 16

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in partial response to the request for additional information forwarded by reference (a).

P.W. Drennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to: OASD (P&L)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330

1 8 JUN 1991

Mr James Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N.W. Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006-1604

Dear Mr Courter:

This is in response to your 24 May 1991 letter requesting specific information on Williams and Eaker Air Force Bases.

GENERAL QUESTIONS (Williams AFB)

Question 1: The presentation asserted that: In evaluating Williams AFB the Air Force rated the airspace low because they were unaware of the recently established MOA 4. This airspace, it was asserted, would significantly improve the base's rating.

Answer: The recently established MOA was considered while rating the base during the base closure evaluation process. Even though this airspace does provide the base with additional capability not previously available on a consistent basis, the magnitude of civil aviation operations continues to impact base operations. Future base operations should be impacted at a greater degree as the number of civil operations is predicted to increase by more than 40% during the next several years.

Question 2: It was also stated that the ATC Program Training Document clearly identifies Williams AFB as the best pilot training base. In responding to this point please include a copy of the referenced document.

Answer: The term "best" pilot training base is not used in referenced document. It appears to be someone's conclusion that Williams AFB is the "best" pilot training base without considering facts such as long term capabilities and airspace. A copy of the requested document is attached. The information contained in this document is consistent with that used by the Air Force in analyzing the subcategory of Flying/Training.

GENERAL QUESTION (Eaker AFB)

Question 3: In the Eaker AFB presentation it was stated that the Air Force analysis was biased by subelement one of criteria one. Specifically, bases with declining force structure received a negative bias by downgrading for its force structure which is not a valid measure of the base's value.

Answer: The grading of Subelement 1, Criteria 1, was done specifically by weapon system in order not to bias a base because its aircraft were being retired. The question

highlights whether the base's assigned weapon system will remain in the inventory as an integral part of the Force Structure Plan or be phased out.

Eaker AFB has B-52G aircraft assigned. These aircraft are being phased out of the inventory, therefore a grade of "R" was assigned. Similarly, Plattsburgh AFB's FB-111A aircraft are being phased out and have also received a grade of "R". In contrast, Carswell AFB--also recommended for closure--with B-52H aircraft assigned, which are not being phased out, received a rating of "G". Subelement 1 of Criteria 1 is only one of over 80 subelements used to analyze the base and did not provide negative bias but did highlight a base that might have excess capacity as a potential base closure or as a potential receiving location.

Hopefully this response will be of use in your deliberations.

Sincerely,

EUGENE E. HABIGER, Maj Gen, USAF
Director
Directorate of Programs

1 Atch
Program Flying Training Document

0-13

DACS-DM(TABS)

14 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Phonecon with Base Closure Commission Staffer Roydell Anderson

1. Called for information on the number of acres being retained at Fort Dix. Stated that one of the Commissioners had asked during today's hearing.

2. I explained that our initial estimate was that DOD would retain 28,080 acres. That could fluctuate depending upon USAF/USAR/ National Guard requirements, as well as State of New Jersey outgrant requests. Two-thirds of the cantonment area will be excessed; the ranges, training areas, and critical facilites (@ 3 million SF) will be retained.

3. Total Time: 10 min.

Maureen Wylie
Project Manager

Pole

O-114

THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

14 June 1991

REQUEST FOR BRIEF.

REPLY ZIP CODE:
20318-5000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS)

Subject: Base Closure Commission Request for Testimony

1. The Base Closure Commission requested CINCSOC and two of his staff (Col Paul Morgan and Col Palmer Rowe) testify on potential closure of MacDill at 0800, 17 June 1991. Chairman Courter wanted the entire Commission to hear the same classified briefing that he heard when he was at MacDill. The testimony will not be above the TOP SECRET level.

2. CINCSOC is not available on 17 June. The Commission agreed that BG Edward Brya, the SOCOM J-3, would attend in his place.

3. Additional attendees will be Col Leon Wilson from SOCOM and Col Jeffrey Fletcher and Ms Marilynn Wilson from the Joint Staff.

4. Questions can be directed to my POC: Ms Marilynn Wilson, J-5 Policy, extension 32745.

C. Jerome Jones

C. JEROME JONES
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Director,
Strategy and Policy, J-5

O-115

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
Mem 441D/62
14 Jun 91

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Multiple telecons between BCRC Mr. Patrick/OP-441C CDR Kendall

Encl: (1) Information regarding financing for Section 801 housing project for NAVSTA Staten Island

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in response to your request of reference (a).

P. W. Drennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to: OASD (P&L)

Staten Island Section 801 Housing Project

- Financing of this project is arranged through the sale of commercial bonds.

- Total financing required is **$126 million**, which is being marketed in two bond sales

  Series I bonds - $34 million - to institutional investors

  Series II bonds- $92 million - for public sale

- The $60 million Letter of Credit issued by the Bank of New York (BNY) "backs up" the Series II bond sale, and is sufficient to insure the construction portion of the project. BNY has also agreed to purchase the entire Series II bond offering at a fixed percentage rate, and remains a fallback position for the developer in the event that the public offering requires paying a higher rate than that with BNY.

- The Series I bond sale is backed by the value of the land upon which the project is being developed.

ENCLOSURE (1)

O-116

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION)

14 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DOUG HANSEN ASD(P&L)

Principal Deputy

The attached questions were received from the BCRC staff on 11 June. The attached answers will be provided to the BCRC staff.

Genie McBurnett

Genie McBurnett

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR THE BCRC

1. Why did the Navy choose to go with four warfare centers distributed among the SYSCOMS vs a more centralized management with one Director of Navy Laboratories?

The first task in the consolidation effort was to bring like functions together under one organization and to form the warfare centers. We studied two options for the chain of command for the warfare centers. One was the structure that is currently proposed and the second was the formation of a central management organization. Because of the size of the consolidated structure, such an organization would, by default, become a Systems Command-like organization. Such an organization would require a sizable support staff to deal with contracting, funding and legal issues. The major advantages of such an organization are the independence of the activities and the synergy that would exist across all of the RDT&E and engineering support activities. Despite the attractiveness of these advantages, we felt that they were outweighed by the requirement to establish a new, large management headquarters which adds a management layer and the difficulty such an organizational structure would create for the integration between the managers of our programs and life-cycle support and the personnel who provide them with technical support. The SYSCOMs provide the life-cycle support to the fleet and the Centers provide technical support to the fleet. The vertical nature of the chain of command for the SYSCOMs and the Centers will make the integration of these two functions difficult. To provide the needed cross-warfare center coordination and synergy, we have established the Navy Laboratory/Center Commanders Group. This group is composed of the Commanders and Technical Directors of each of the warfare centers and the corporate laboratory. Their charter is to prevent duplication across center boundaries, integrate investment and business plans, and provide an open forum to air and resolve problems. This is a coordinating group with no directive authority. We have also provided for the oversight of the laboratory and centers. This oversight is accomplished through the Navy Laboratory/Center Oversight Council. The three core members of this Council are the ASN(RD&A), the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. There are a number of members at large which include the SYSCOM Commanders, the Chief of Naval Research, the ASN's, General Council and the Office of the CNO. This body does have directive authority and is chartered to preclude mission and investment duplication, establish the strategic corporate vision and resolve issues. In addition, we have provided for the husbanding of our Science and Technology investment under the Chief of Naval Research.

While there are advantages for both approaches, we feel that weight of the evidence falls clearly with the warfare centers reporting to the Systems Commands.

2. Although you have not developed specific plans for implementing a scaled down version of the consolidation plan, you have stated that you intend to implement as much of the plan as possible within the constraints of the law. Specifically, what parts of the plan could you implement if the Base Closure Commission were to remove these facilities from the list of closures/realignments? Cite examples of the inefficiencies that would be introduced.

The RDT&E, Engineering and Fleet Support Activities Consolidation Plan is a wholly integrated plan. The activities that would be removed from the plan are at the heart of the goal of establishing full spectrum centers. Additionally, the Navy must still accommodate a decrease in budget in excess of 20 percent as well as a 20 percent reduction in the acquisition workforce over the next five years. By being prohibited from fully implementing the consolidation plan, we will be forced to operate facilities that are smaller and less efficient with increased overhead. We are keenly aware that every dollar we spend to maintain an inefficient shore infrastructure is a dollar that we cannot spend to buy and maintain our operating forces.

Specific examples of inefficiencies are:

- Restrictions on NUSC New London and NSWC White Oak will impact the planned improvements and efficiency increases in Surface ASW Systems and Submarine Warfare Systems.

- Restrictions on DTRC Annapolis will impact planned improvements and efficiency increases in Ship Systems and Submarine Quieting.

- Restricting NESEA St Inigoes and NADC Warminster will prevent almost all of the efficiencies to be gained in the Aircraft Division of the Naval Air Warfare Center.

3. Why did the Navy include its ISE, T&E and industrial functions in its consolidation plan and not just the R&D centers?

Under the current organization we have the R&D centers under the Director of Navy Laboratories and the In-service engineering centers under the Systems Commands. These centers have overlapping missions and compete for work. The R&D centers have retained programs from beginning through fleet support and a number of the engineering centers have pursued R&D projects. We have a situation where our the Navy's RDT&E and Engineering infrastructure is competing internally. In

more prosperous times, this competition is not necessarily a bad thing. However, in the current era of declining resources we can no longer afford this divergence. The warfare centers will be full spectrum organizations. They will pursue work in their leadership areas from basic research, through development to fleet support. This provides for centrally managed workload assignments and for long-term investment and capability development. With the span of control provided to the Warfare Center Commander, he will exercise a corporate view to overall management of this research, development, and engineering enterprise. The Navy believes that one of the most important benefits of the full spectrum character of its warfare center concept is the synergy that results from having scientists and engineers employed in a technical product area "from its birth to its grave". Fleet inputs, as well as the results of developmental test and evaluation, are readily available to those designing the product; and personnel can move through the development cycle with the product, fostering technology transition at every stage. This level of synergy would not exist in a competitive environment.

4. How much of the 20% mandatory reduction would be realized over the next five years through attrition and limited consolidation not requiring Commission approval?

By implementing the full consolidation plan, we anticipate realizing approximately one quarter of the mandated personnel reduction. More important is that we will achieve this reduction by eliminating functions, most of which are overhead functions. If we were prohibited from implementing the full consolidation, we would realize less than one quarter of the mandated reductions. We would still have to eliminate the positions, but the overhead functions will remain. So there will be fewer people to perform the same functions.

There are a variety of factors affecting the actual number of personnel that would be eliminated under any modified plan. Without rigorously developing that alternate plan, we don't want to speculate on the numbers.

5. By warfare center, how many (1) management, (2) clerical/administrative, and (3) scientific and engineering positions will be (1) eliminated and (2) transferred under the consolidation plan?

The following are the approximate numbers of positions eliminated and transferred by category. The sum of these categories may not equal the total number of personnel moving because there are personnel in other categories such as graphics personnel and mechanics that are transferring.

	ELIMINATED	TRANSFERRED
NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER		
Management	30	140
Clerical/Admin	320	96
Science/Engineering	66	874
NAVAL UNDERSEA WARFARE CENTER		
Management	13	51
Clerical/Admin	90	39
Science/Engineering	35	431
NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER		
Management	123	158
Clerical/Admin	385	120
Science/Engineering	277	1371
NAVAL COMMAND, CONTROL AND OCEAN SURVEILLANCE CENTER		
Management	11	118
Clerical/Admin	159	83
Science/Engineering	59	1692

6. Will this consolidation plan result in people with seniority "bumping" other people out of their positions? How serious will this be? What is being done to limit the impact?

Should a reduction in force be necessary, it would be carried out in accordance with governing rules and regulations which do provide bumping. The severity of these actions is dependent on several factors, one of which is the attrition experienced up to the effective date of the drawdown. To reduce impact, early out authority would be requested and extensive outplacement efforts would be undertaken.

7. A 5/23/88 DODIG report, "DOD Aircraft Engine Test Facilities," found that the Arnold Engineering Development Center consumed about 33% more labor hours (costing $.9 million) than the Naval Air Propulsion Center. NAPC's professional and paraprofessional skill mix resulted in lower operating costs than AEDC. However, under the consolidation plan, high altitude, large engine testing is being transferred to AEDC. Was the Navy aware of this information? Why transfer a function to a less efficient facility?

The Navy was fully aware of the results of the DODIG report and is in full agreement with it. The main objective of the realignment of air breathing engine testing capability was to minimize the total cost to DOD over a long period of time. Therefore, we considered not only the operating costs to the aircraft programs but also to the cost of maintaining and

upgrading the testing facilities over a long period. Under the guidance of DDR&E and the Joint Commanders Group (T&E) JCG(T&E)) of the Joint Logistics Commanders, a tri-service study was conducted to review the consolidation of aeropropulsion facilities. Given the projected workload and the facility and technical specialties at the two major DOD test Centers, a study recommendation and subsequent JCG(T&E) decision was made to assign lead responsibility for large engine testing to the Air Force.

8. Regarding NESEA St. Inigoes move to Portsmouth, NESEA reportedly now occupies 474,00 sq. ft. on base and 80,000 sq ft off base in leased facilities. Under the consolidation plan, input to the COBRA was for 59,000 sq. ft. of MILCON for a maintenance shop at Portsmouth. Please correct these figures or otherwise reconcile the differences.

The number input to the COBRA model for MILCON are correct. Less space is required at Portsmouth due to manpower reductions from consolidation, reduced workload and more efficient utilization of space. The following table summarizes the space that will be provided for NESEA transfer.

Type of Space	SQ Footage
New Construction (Communication Suites - 29,000) (Laboratory - 20,000)	49,000
Rehabilitation of Existing Space	10,000
Utilize existing Space at Portsmouth	40,000
Resite Programmed MILCON *	121,000
Leased Space (including Private/Public Venture)	163,000

* There are 4 programmed MILCONs previously intended for St. Inigoes in FY91 through FY94. These are current mission requirements that are to be relocated to Portsmouth. The MILCONs are not additional requirements due to consolidation.

9. How will moving from St. inigoes affect your ability to accomplish the mission considering your current close proximity to Pax River?

Consolidation in the Norfolk area will have no negative mission impact. The Naval Air Station , Norfolk and the Naval AIr Station, Oceana are available to accommodate airfield related mission projects. We have also looked into a small

landing field (Fentress Field) located away from air traffic congestion which could be used for special applications, if necessary.

10. There are documented communications-electronics testing problems in the Portsmouth area brought about by the very congested conditions of the frequency spectrum and the high density population in the Portsmouth area. The rural geography surrounding NESEA includes a natural ridge in the landscape which acts as a barrier between NESEA and the closest metropolitan center. Did the Navy consider this problem when it drew up its plans to move from St. Inigoes to Portsmouth? What has the Navy done to satisfy itself that the Portsmouth area will nonetheless be an acceptable site for this type of work?

We are confident that all mission related functions can be performed in the Norfolk/Portsmouth area without any loss of effectiveness. A complete analysis was conducted (both TEMPEST survey and EMI analysis) at the proposed site for the NCCOSC East Coast ISE Directorate. Frequency approval were applied for and received. The site is actually in a non-industrial area of Chesapeake, VA known as the St. Juliens Creek Annex of the Norfolk Naval Shipyard.

11. Did the Navy ever consider relocating San Diego to Vallejo? If not, why not, considering that Vallejo is a less expensive area to conduct such operations and sufficient facilities exist with the rehabilitation of facilities at Mare Island Naval Shipyard?

The Navy did consider relocating NESEC, San Diego to Vallejo. However, the analysis showed that the preferred site is the Pt. Loma site in San Diego for the following reasons:

- Greater personnel efficiencies result from consolidation with the NCCOSC headquarters and RDT&E functions at Pt. Loma. One basic support staff will service the headquarters and both Directorates.

- Vallejo is separated from the major West Coast fleet concentration.

- Significantly more personnel and equipment would have to be moved from San diego to Vallejo than vice versa.

- Facilities will become available at Pt. Loma due to personnel efficiencies and the transfer of functions from NOSC San Diego.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

6-117

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
Ser 441D/1U597845
14 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Memo for the Base Closure Commission dtd June 12 1991

Encl: (1) Cost Impacts of Delaying T-45 Introduction

1. Enclosure (1) is provided in amplification to the information contained in the response to item 5 of reference (a).

P.W. Drennon /for
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to (without enclosures): OSD (P&L)

COST IMPACTS OF DELAYING T-45 INTRODUCTION

1. The following are estimated costs provided by NAVAIR relative to introducing the T-45 Training System at NAS Meridian and NAS Chase Field:

NAS Meridian

Site Activation FY-92/93	$23,000,000

NAS Chase Field

Site Activation FY-93/94	$23,000,000
Installation of Additional Trainer	$ 2,500,000

Site activation includes the following contract work: installation of the aircraft flight simulators; installation of fiber optic cabling and other cabling which interconnects the various nodes of the T-45 Training System throughout NAS Kingsville; coordinating initial parts delivery, warehousing, and installation and training for the repair parts computerized inventory system; coordinating procurement and delivery of contractor provided Ground Support Equipment; establishing the aircraft maintenance system and standup of maintenance personnel; installation and training for the computer aided instruction system, training information system, and pilot tracking and flight scheduling system;

2. NAVAIR estimates that there will be a two year delay in IOC of the T-45 if NAS Kingsville is closed. This delay would prevent the Navy from realizing the annual aircraft operating savings which are anticipated from the T-45. The following is a comparison of the hourly operating costs of the T-45, T-2 and the TA-4:

T-45	$539
T-2	$861
TA-4	$1,205

The training syllabus for a strike pilot is 175 hours in the T-45 and 190 hours in the T-2/TA-4 (90hr/100hr). Using these parameters it would cost $94,325 to train a pilot in the T-45 and $197,990 to train a pilot in the T-2/TA-4. This is a savings of $103,665 per pilot or $41,466,000 per year for a PTR of 400. This savings, at full implementation, will be delayed 2 years if NAS Kingsville is closed. The additional cost to the Navy for the delay will be nearly $100 million.

3. Kingsville was designated as the master site for updating the above computer systems and MACAIR, who will maintain the system software, has already established their headquarters at Kingsville. There would be a contract cost to relocate MACAIR personnel and offset losses on residences, possibly as much as $2 million.

The installation and testing of the training systems are almost complete at NAS Kingsville. NAVAIR estimates that the cost to

diassemble, reassemble, and bring the equipment back to full operating condition could cost between $20 million and $35 million and tak e over 18 months to complete.

The following is an estimate summary of non-construction costs:

Extra Aircraft Operating Costs	$ 82M
MACAIR Personnel Relocation Costs	$ 2M
Relocation of Training Equipment	$ 35M
	$119M

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

0-113

IN REPLY REFER TO
Memo 441D/65
14 Jun 91

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Telecon btwn BCRC Mr. Patrick/OP-441D CDR Ching of 13 Jun 1991

Encl: (1) Information regarding ship berthing considerations and requirements for various ship classes

1. Enclosure (1) is provided in response to your request of reference (a).

P. W. Drennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to: OASD (P&L)

O-119

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

Memo 443/64
14 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: AMENDMENTS TO COBRA ANALYSIS FOR RECRUIT TRAINING CENTERS (RTC) SAN DIEGO AND ORLANDO

Encl: (1) Revisions to COBRA Analyses for RTC San Diego and RTC Orlando

1. The enclosure provides amended COBRA analyses which more accurately reflect full the costs associated with closing each RTC. The additional recurring costs shown for RTCs San Diego and Orlando capture the costs of moving personnel from the RTCs to the NTCs where they will undergo their Service A School training prior to assignment to the Fleet or Fleet Support Units.

2. These costs derive from the current relationship between each RTC and its adjacent NTC. To the maximum degree possible, we ensure that recruits undergo basic training at the RTC collocated with the NTC where they will undergo their A School follow-on training. This policy reduces delay and disruption for the recruits, increases efficiency of both the RTC and NTC, and avoids the costs and delays associated with moving personnel to NTCs located at long distances from the RTC where basic training occurs. In addition, a certain percentage of the recruits entering without a career field designation will attend A School at the NTC collocated with the RTC where they receive recruit training. The closing of one of the RTCs will leave us with two RTCs feeding three NTCs and will thereby increase personnel moving costs, regardless of which RTC is closed.

3. The enclosed COBRA analyses assume that closure of either RTC San Diego or Orlando will result in RTC Great Lakes, which has the largest capacity, absorbing the closed RTC's entire workload. These analyses reflect the additional costs of moving recruits for A School Training at either NTC San Diego or NTC Orlando from RTC Great Lakes if either one of these RTCs is closed. The results of the enclosed analyses reinforce our previously stated contention that closure of a RTC by itself does not make sense for economic as well as mission-related reasons. Closure only makes sense from both economic and mission-related perspectives if an entire NTC/RTC complex is closed. We have not provided an analysis for RTC Great Lakes since the Commission has removed it from consideration. The results of a COBRA analysis for it would, however, be consistent with the results obtained for RTCs Orlando and San Diego.

P. W. DRENNON
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore

0-120

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

Memo 443/63
14 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: COBRA REVISIONS FOR NAVSTA NEW YORK

Encl: (1) Revised COBRA Analyses for NAVSTA New York

1. Additional review has revealed some shortcomings in the previously submitted COBRA analyses. We are concerned that inclusion the Section 801 housing costs resulted in a skewed comparison of NAVSTA New York relative to the Gulf Coast homeports for the following reasons:

a. The 801 housing annual costs of $19,740,000 included in the previous analyses reflects the costs of housing the personnel from the ships not yet homeported at NAVSTA New York.

b. The COBRA analyses for NAVSTAs Mobile and Pascagoula did <u>not</u> include any comparable costs (family housing, leases, or BAQ/VHA) for housing personnel of the ships planned for homeporting at these ports.

Accordingly, we have enclosed two new analyses. The analysis identified as STANY 04.COB corrects some errors that are independent of the 801 housing issue, which require correction and which have relatively minor impacts on the model's outcome. The analysis identified as STANY 05.COB deletes the Section 801 costs. As you can see, the deletion of these recurring costs has a major impact on the steady state savings, reducing them from $47.3M annually to $27.5M annually.

P. W. DRENNON
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

O - 15

JUN 17 1991

The Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006-1604

Dear Mr Courter:

In response to the Base Closure Commission identification of potential additional or substitute Air Force installations for closure consideration, I tasked my Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) to re-examine the viability of the Loring AFB closure recommendation. In the course of this review, the BCEG examined the issues surfaced by your Commissioners and staff as well as the information developed by the Maine Congressional delegation and the Save Loring Committee. The review was undertaken with the participation of the Strategic Air Command and included data collected from base level. As a result of that analysis, I have found no significant deviation from either the Force Structure Plan or the DoD criteria, and still strongly recommend that Loring AFB be closed and that Plattsburgh AFB remain open.

In a related issue, I want to address the importance of closing the entire package of bases that we had recommended. The number of bases we recommended for closure was based on the Force Structure Plan, along with simple mathematics. The Force Structure Plan is as accurate a statement of the aircraft and missiles required to accomplish our mission as we can make. It is inextricably tied to our declining budget. To prevent certain bases from closure based on speculation regarding changes to our planned force structure or to defer tough closure decisions to subsequent Commissions would be a costly mistake. Simply put, if we don't close the bases, we will have no choice but to further reduce Air Force programs, force structure and manpower in order to pay the bill to keep unnecessary bases open.

Finally, I am not aware of any new data which would justify the closure of Goodfellow AFB, or any change to my original recommendation for the partial closure of MacDill AFB.

I know your task is a tremendously difficult one. I commend the Commission on the progress you have made thus far. The Air Force will continue to be as responsive as possible to assist you in this serious undertaking.

Sincerely

Donald B Rice

Donald B. Rice

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

O-122 DIM

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
Memo 441C/66
17 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Multiple telecons between BCRC (Mr. Patrick) and OP-441C (CDR Kendall)

Encl: (1) Strategic Homeport Information

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in response to your request of reference (a).

P.W. Drennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to: OASD (P&L)

STRATEGIC HOMEPORT INFORMATION

1. What is the need for ships based at Everett to use training ranges in Southern California waters, and the cost differential that may result compared to basing those same ships in Southern California?

We estimate that Everett based ships will train in Southern California (SOCAL) waters on an average of twice a year for battlegroup workups, refresher training, etc. Impacts are negligible with respect to costs because PACFLT ships operate at sea 27 days per quarter. Transit times for ships in Everett will be factored into the total at-sea exercise and training package. Everett ships will conduct single ship and multi-ship training while in transit. The same training for SOCAL bases ships is accomplished during cruises in the SOCAL area. If transit time alone was used as a determining factor, the difference in cost would be approximately $2.5 million per year more for all the Everett ships to train in the SOCAL area. Although specific training ranges are in SOCAL operations areas, this delta cost can be misleading since no at-sea period can be viewed in isolation of the total package of training that will be conducted while transiting (i.e., lookout, OOD, ASW, RAS training, PASEX, ENCOUNTEREX, etc). The delta between the personnel tempo of Everett and Long Beach sailors is negligible because ships will be out of homeport 27 days a quarter regardless of homeport.

2. The following information concerning the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure projects which have been awarded at Staten Island is provided:

($ millions)

Proj #	Description	OSD Submit Amount	Curr Program Amount	Obligated (6/17/91)	Expended (6/17/91)
111R	PW Facility	5.85	5.15	3.717	1.340
107R	BEQ	9.2	7.6	7.27	1.607
115R	NEX Facility	2.6	2.6	2.456	0.690
116R	Phys Fitness	3.7	2.6	2.436	0.164
Total		21.35	17.95	15.879	3.801

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

O-123 DIR

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
Memo 441D/67
19 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Telecon btwn BCRC Mr. Patrick/OP-441D CDR Ching of 17 Jun 1991

Encl: (1) Information regarding costs to repair substandard piers at Naval Station Long Beach

1. Enclosure (1) is provided in response to your request of reference (a).

P. W. Drennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to: OASD (P&L)

The Naval Facilities Assets Data Base identifies the condition of a number of piers at Naval Station Long Beach as substandard. How much would it cost to bring these piers up to adequate standards?

The staff, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, has identified one Military Construction project (estimated at $3.5 million) and nine special projects (totaling $13.1 million) which would be required to bring the piers at Long Beach up to adequate standards.

ENCLOSURE (1)

F A C I L I T I E S R E Q U I R E M E N T S P L A N S U M M A R Y

ACTIVITY UIC. N-60028 ACTIVITY NAME. NAVSTA TREASURE ISLAND CA 06/19/91

FD CERTIFICATION DATE

CCN	CATEGORY CODE DESCRIPTION	UM	BASIC FACILITY REQUIREMENT	ASSETS ADEQUATE SUBSTNRD INADEQTE OTHER	ASSETS S I O	EXISTING QUANTITY SURPLUS+ DEFICIENT-		PROPOSED QUANTITY SURPLUS+ DEFICIENT-	
11-20	HLCPTR LDG PAD	SY	1100	1112	A	12	+	12	+
122-20	SM/CFT FUEL STA	GM	70			70	-		
123-10	FILLING STATION	OL	2	2	A				
124-40	SM/CFT R/FUEL S	GA	227500	220332	S	227500	-	7168	-
124-50	VEH R/FUEL ST	GA	455000	355572	S	455000	-	99428	-
137-40	PORT CONTRL OFF	SF	10500	3578	A	6922	-		
				6177	S				
141-60	PHOTO BUILDING	SF	3770	3105	A	665	-	665	-
143-30	FLT MOT PIC EXC	SF	1950	1956	S	6	+	6	+
						1950	-		
143-45	ARMORY	SF	1200	1107	A	93	-	93	-
143-77	OPERTNL STRG	SF	9086	79	A	35463	+	19119	+
				25246	S	9007	-		
				19224	I				
151-20	GP BERTH PIER	FB		1560	A	3510	+		
				1950	I				
151-40	FUELING PIER	FB	600	3130	I	2530	+		
						600	-		
151-50	REPAIR PIER	FB	2277			2277	-	717	-
151-80	DEPERMING PIER	FB	310			310	-		
155-20	SMALL CRFT BRTH	FB	4293	1580	I	4293	-		
159-64	WTRFR OPER BLDG	SF	3492			3492	-	8	-
159-66	LNDG CRFT RAMP	EA	1	1	A				
171-15	RESV TRAIN BLDG	SF	2146	2146	A				
171-20	APPL INSTR BLDG	SF	29384	10446	A	14938	+	8850	-
				13696	S	18938	-		
				20180	I				
171-77	TRNG MATRL STRG	SF	1144			1144	-	1144	-
211-05	MAINT HNGR-OH S	SF		2080	A	2080	+	800	-
213-58	BOAT SHOP	SF	8104			8104	-	8104	-
217-10	ELEC COM MTN SH	SF		8027	S	8027	+	8027	+
219-10	PW SHOP	SF		4615	S	4615	+	4615	+
229-50	PRINTING PLANT	SF		13000	S	13000	+		
310-13	CHEM/TOXOGY LAB	SF		18790	S	18790	+		
310-27	ENVIRONMENL LAB	SF		2880	S	2880	+		
421-35	READY MAGAZINE	SF		256	A	256	+	256	+
441-10	GEN WHSE/BULK	SF	81267	100872	S	19605	+	19605	+
						81267	-		
441-30	HAZ FLAM STHSE	SF	4620			4620	-	4620	-
441-35	GEN STRG SHED	SF	11134			11134	-	11134	-
441-72	SERVMARTS	SF	11834	8300	S	11834	-	3534	-
610-10	ADMIN OFF	SF	80100	158338	A	178014	+	93168	+
				99247	S				
				529	I				
610-40	LEGAL SERV FAC	SF	29854	23913	A	5941	-	5941	-

F A C I L I T I E S P L A N N I N G D O C U M E N T

TIME: 11:47:49 DATE: 06/19/91
ACTIVITY UIC....N60028 NAME....NAVSTA TREASURE ISLAND CA

CATEGORY CODE...15120 DESCRIPTION...GENL PURP/BERTHING PIER
RQMTS DATE.. 31 JUL 87 PARTIAL FRP DATE.. 30 JUL 87 EFD CERT DATE..

BASIC FAC RQMT	UM	FACILITY ASSETS DATA ADEQUATE	SUBSTNRD	INADEQUATE	OTHER	QUANTITY DEFICIENT	QUANTITY SURPLUS
	SY	10832		7094			17926
	(FR)	1560		1950			3510
	DW						

FACILITY FAC NO	DETAIL U	EE	C	ADEQUATE	SUBSTNRD	INADEQTE	DEF CODES	SATISFACTION OF DEF/SURP ACTION	ID	D	SCOPE	NT
P14TI	N	87	T			800	F30	DEMOL	P-503	-	800	
P15TI	N	87	T			800	F30	DEMOL	P-503	-	800	
PIER22	N	87	T			350	F30	DEMOL	RC183	-	350	
PIER1	N		P	1560								

TOTAL PROPOSED ADEQUATE ASSETS =

NOTES FOR CATEGORY CODE.. 15120
STD NOTES: FRP APPROVAL PENDING WASHINGTON-LEVEL REVIEW

GEN NOTES:
FPD ACTION NOTES:

END DATA FOR CATEGORY CODE 15120

Dom

O-124

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS

June 19, 1991

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006-1604

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Commission's final list of additional options for closure or realignment, if recommended by the Commission, would represent a significant departure from the Secretary's recommendations. Of particular concern is the potential military impact of deviations from proposals that were closely coordinated between the Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the case of the Corps of Engineers, I know you can appreciate the Secretary's reasons for preferring to work directly with Congress.

While the Commission must review these additional options in order to exercise its independent judgment, I would note the Department already analyzed many of these options before making its recommendations. While these analyses have been previously provided to you as part of our overall documentation, I thought that the Commission might find summaries of the Department's analyses useful for consideration in your final deliberations.

Finally, I want to stress once again the importance the Department places on closing unneeded bases. As the Secretary said at his base closure press conference in April, "You get a hollow force when you scrimp on any of the unglamorous things and pay, instead, for things you don't need, like too many military bases. If we keep all of the bases open and have a smaller force, we will end up wasting resources to keep bases alive, instead of spending money to maintain a quality force."

Sincerely,

Colin McMillan

Colin McMillan

Enclosures

As the Commission enters the last few days of its deliberations and needs additional information please don't hesitate to call us. C. M.

SUBJECT: Sacramento Army Depot, "Sacramento Plan" Modifications

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVES:

1. Close Sacramento Army Depot. The Depot would transfer all workload to the Sacramento Air Logistics Center except an amount equivalent to 255 personnel who would transfer to Tobyhanna Army Depot. This transfer is necessary because the capacity of the Air Logistics Center is not sufficient to absorb all the Sacramento Army Depot workload.

2. All Sacramento Army Depot work would transfer to the Sacramento Air Logistics Center except for 236 authorizations for Electro-Optical work which would go to Anniston Army Depot.

DISCUSSION:

The Department urges approval of the DoD plan for moving workload from the Sacramento Army Depot for the following reasons:

- Cost savings. The DoD plan will result in significantly more savings than either alternative 1 or 2. When compared to the $55 million annual steady state savings for the DoD plan, alternative 1 would reduce DoD savings by $12 million per year, and alternative 2 would reduce DoD savings by $18 million per year. If other factors were considered in the calculations of savings, such as lower indirect and overhead costs at Tobyhanna Army Depot, the DoD plan would show even greater savings when compared to alternatives 1 or 2.

- Flexibility. The DoD plan is an integral part of a comprehensive effort to strengthen all depot maintenance activities. To make changes to the DoD plan would substantially effect the workload changes proposed in several other commodity areas. The Defense Depot Maintenance Council reviews the distribution of workload on a continuing basis. If the Base Closure Commission were to dictate workload distribution, it would make it difficult for DoD to obtain future potential savings by using our flexibility to move workloads.

- Utilization. The DoD plan provides more effective use of depot capacity. Alternatives 1 and 2 leave Tobyhanna Army Depot underutilized.

- Competition. The DoD plan recognizes that even greater savings can be achieved through competing "above core" workload requirements with industry and other DoD depots. The alternatives would not allow competition of the affected workload, precluding the realization of these savings.

The Defense Depot Maintenance Council extensively reviewed the original "Sacramento Plan" and rejected it as not cost effective. The alternatives should be similarly rejected by the Commission.

SUBJECT: Forts McCoy, Indiantown Gap, Pickett, A. P. Hill, and Buchanan.

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE:

Forts McCoy, Indiantown Gap, Pickett, A. P. Hill, and Buchanan would be transferred to the Reserve Component as possible additions to the Department's recommendations; elimination of the active duty presence and transfer to the Reserve Component of Fort Dix, NJ and Fort Chaffee, AR. All of these bases except for Fort Buchanan, PR, were evaluated by the Army within the Major Training Installation category.

DISCUSSION:

The Department of Defense already has the authority to make changes in administrative control or garrison configuration of its installations outside of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (P.L. 101-510) framework. While we agree that the principle of National Guard control may have some merit in limited circumstances, it is clearly prudent to await the final results of the study of Reserve Component (RC) training strategies and management of training areas before making any changes in administrative control.

Forts McCoy, Pickett, A.P. Hill, and Indiantown Gap all support both active and reserve training. Fort Buchanan, a sub-installation of Fort McPherson, primarily supports the administration of the Army's presence on Puerto Rico. As a command and control type installation, it has no training area, and few ranges.

It is misleading to assume that significant savings are possible by transferring major training area installations to the reserve components. Transferring funding responsibility from the active component to the guard or reserve component does not, in itself, create savings. Most savings occur through effective use of personnel resources which cannot be determined without site visits and workload analysis. The garrisons in question are currently small and operate with a minimal staff. Therefore the ability to further economize is questionable.

It should be noted that an earlier study of the issue of administrative control, completed in 1986, found that Congressional ceilings on Active Guard and Reserve, and Guard military technician spaces would be a significant constraint if responsibility were passed to either the National Guard or the U. S. Army Reserve.

In conclusion, the Department opposes the transfer of these installations pending completion of the above-referenced study. Additionally, the proposed transfer may not necessarily be more cost-effective. Once the reserve training study is complete around the Spring of 1992, the Army can and will exercise the authority it already has to make changes in administrative control and garrison configurations between active duty and reserve forces, if appropriate.

SUBJECT: Forts Hamilton and Totten, New York

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE:

Transfer the operational control of Forts Hamilton and Totten in New York from the Army to the Navy.

DISCUSSION:

There are no proven operational or economic advantages to be gained by such a transfer at this time.

The missions of this complex are area-oriented and are not being eliminated. The Army is required to support the current missions for the foreseeable future. If an agreement could be reached between the Navy and the Army over the geographic support to all DoD operations in the New York city area, consolidations between Army and Navy installations and operations could occur. In the absence of such an agreement and without the time to do the necessary analysis and negotiation, it is not prudent to close, realign or transfer operational control of either installation at this time.

The Department of Defense already has the authority to make changes in administrative control of its installations outside of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (P.L. 101-510) framework, should circumstances warrant.

SUBJECT: U. S. Army Corps of Engineers Reorganization

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE:

Include the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers reorganization study in the Commission's recommendations.

DISCUSSION:

The Department recommends elimination of the Corps from further consideration by the Commission.

Although the Secretary of Defense supports the need to reorganize the Army Corps of Engineers, he did not include it in the DoD recommendations to the Commission. At the request of leaders of the House Public Works and Transportation Committee, Secretary Cheney agreed to submit separate legislation in consideration of the civil works committee's jurisdictional authorities. On May 24, 1991, the Defense Department forwarded the legislative proposal and the Corps of Engineers Reorganization Study to Congress, and urged the expeditious enactment of the legislative proposal.

SUBJECT: Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE:

Close Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA

DISCUSSION:

NSY Long Beach should not be considered a substitute for NSY Philadelphia, even though both are non-nuclear shipyards. Excess drydock capacity exists on the east coast while it does not on the west coast. NSY Long Beach has already been downsized and restructured to properly balance its workload and workforce to operate effectively and efficiently. Based on the New Threat Upgrade (NTU) modernization of conventional surface ships, Long Beach's final cost per ship modernization to the customer (the fleet) is about 15% less than Philadelphia.

NSY Long Beach is the third largest shipyard (private or public) on the west coast and is the only public shipyard on the west coast that bids on surface ship repair. Without this shipyard, the public/private competition program would cease to exist on the west coast. NSY Long Beach was placed in service 42 years ago and is the Navy's youngest shipyard. Additionally, it is only 115 miles north of San Diego and is therefore close to the major fleet concentration. This is important because San Diego, unlike Norfolk, does not have a major collocated shipyard. In all, NSY Long Beach is in close proximity to the vast majority (70%) of the Pacific surface fleet.

NSY Long Beach is designated as the contingency drydock for emergency docking of nuclear aircraft carriers on the west coast in the event that Drydock Number 6 at NSY Puget Sound, WA is not available. NSY Long Beach provides the only large drydock for conducting routine maintenance work on all large ships in Southern California. In total, its three drydocks provide 52% of the drydock capacity (both public and private) in the region. This situation is in contrast to that on the east coast where three shipyards capable of docking aircraft carriers and large ships are located in close proximity to fleet concentrations (i.e., Norfolk, Newport News, and Philadelphia). If NSY Long Beach is closed, all aircraft carriers, large amphibious and replenishment ships would be forced to leave Southern California for drydocking. The nearest alternative drydocks are at Puget Sound (1300 NM) and Pearl Harbor, HI (2600 NM). These yards would have insufficient capacity to handle NSY Long Beach's current workload. The resulting crew relocation and family separation would cause a major degradation in quality of life for the crews of these ships. By having NSY Long Beach near San Diego few, if any, families have to relocate during major repairs or overhauls.

SUBJECT: Kingsville Naval Air Station, TX

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE:

Close Kingsville Naval Air Station, TX.

DISCUSSION:

Closure of NAS Kingsville is a less attractive alternative than closure of NAS Chase Field because:

- Infrastructure to support T-45 aircraft is in place at NAS Kingsville, (i.e., trainers, aircraft maintenance facilities, and jet engine test cell). Moving the T-45 aircraft function to NAS Chase will cost an estimated $25.5 million.

- NAS Kingville has dual runways (two parallel runways bisected by two parallel crosswind runways) allowing more flexibility in conducting training operations than at NAS Chase which has two parallel runways and a single crosswind runway.

- NAS Kingsville has newer facilities in better state of repair than NAS Chase. This results in lower maintenance costs and more efficient operations.

- Closure of NAS Kingsville would cause a two year delay in T-45 Initial Operating Capability.

SUBJECT: Meridian Naval Air Station, MS

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE:

Close Meridian Naval Air Station, MS.

DISCUSSION:

Closure of NAS Meridian is a less attractive alternative to NAS Chase Field because:

- NAS Meridian could not be utilized as an Outlying Field (OLF) as it is too far away from other training fields. NAS Chase is close enough to Kingsville to be used as an OLF and would provide flexibility during T-45 transition and surge.

- Reconstitution of the force can be more readily accomplished at NAS Chase than NAS Meridian. NAS Meridian is near enough to major air hubs that airlines would find the air space attractive. If NAS Meridian is closed, the Navy would probably lose the airspace with little chance of recovery. NAS Chase is remote from airline hubs, with little competition for its airspace.

- Return on investment years for NAS Meridian closure is approximately five times longer than that for closure of either NAS Chase or NAS Kingsville.

- NAS Meridian has the most modern design of any NAS; NAS Chase dates from the WWII era. Being newer, NAS Meridian is easier to maintain. The runways at NAS Meridian are built to newer criteria. They are staggered and offset to allow an increased tempo of operations accommodating simultaneous landings or take-offs and more aircraft in the pattern at the same time. Additionally, the operations area at NAS Meridian is remote from the administrative and training area. This arrangement is more efficient because there is less noise impact on classroom training.

SUBJECT: Staten Island Naval Station, NY

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE:

Close Staten Island Naval Station, NY

DISCUSSION:

The Department is opposed to the closure of Staten Island Naval Station.

The Secretary of the Navy's Base Structure Committee rated Naval Station New York (Staten Island) high in overall military value. NAVSTA New York received high ratings in both the mission and land/facilities assessment categories. Staten Island's new and excellent facilities are state of the art in terms of their ability to support homeported ships. Staten Island, as a homeport, is 78% complete. The Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMA) is in a newly constructed facility, with up-to-date equipment. The SIMA will provide modern ship intermediate-level maintenance work more efficiently than those at existing older facilities. The SIMA at Staten Island also provides intermediate level maintenance support for ammunition ships at the Naval Weapons Station at Earle, NJ.

Ship homeport assignments for Staten Island have been carefully developed to ensure that crew sizes and corresponding family housing requirements will be adequately satisfied by Navy-sponsored housing in the immediate area.

The geographic location of Staten Island, in an area with a large Naval Reserve population, makes retention of this facility desirable. The assignment of ships to Staten Island to support reserve training is in full support of the Navy's Total Force concept. The demographics are good and will allow for sufficient manning of these ships; a vital factor of the Navy's reconstitution intentions in time of emergency.

Staten Island has specifically designed modern facilities for new class ships such as the deep draft, power intensive CG-47 class AEGIS cruisers. The facilities at Staten Island have a low level of maintenance and repair requirements due to their newness. Other homeports, with some facility and support improvements, could accommodate the ships currently planned for Staten Island. The added costs of upgrading and maintaining older facilities at existing bases (costs not now included in the Defense budget) must be weighed against the lower cost of maintaining this new base.

SUBJECT: Treasure Island Naval Station, CA

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVES:

1. Realign Treasure Island Naval Station, CA, eliminating excess berthing capacity but retaining all necessary administrative, training, housing, and personnel support functions for the San Francisco Bay Area naval complex.

2. Realign Treasure Island to retain only the housing.

DISCUSSION:

The Naval Station is not a "stand alone" activity. The bulk of its functions support the entire San Francisco Bay Area Navy complex or are related to the support provided to tenant activities, family housing residents of Treasure Island, and transient personnel. Additionally, the berthing capacity of Treasure Island, while small, provides flexibility in accommodating Bay Area operations.

The new brig and medical/dental clinic, the large Coast Guard presence, the port services/operations function, the Naval Technical Training Center, a new state of the art fire fighting school that meets local clean air standards, and the large numbers of units of family housing are all indicative of Treasure Islands importance to the San Francisco Bay Area Navy complex. A significant number of activities supporting the Bay area would require relocation and construction at other locations in the Bay area in the event of a large realignment as described in alternative 2.

It makes no sense to recreate this complex of tenants elsewhere in the area, especially if the housing at Treasure Island and the Technical Training Center were to remain in place.

SUBJECT: San Diego Naval Training Center, CA

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE:

Realign/close San Diego Naval Training Center, CA.

DISCUSSION:

The Department is opposed to the closure of NTC San Diego. It is not the most cost effective option:

	Cost	ROI Years
NTC Orlando	397M	11 Years
NTC San Diego	549M	100 Years

Closure of NTC San Diego is also not operationally sound. Retaining NTC San Diego due to its collocation with fleet units enhances the Navy's informal program to keep personnel sea-shore duty rotations in the same geographical area. This results in a savings of nearly $13 million per year in Permanent Change of Station (PCS) and Temporary Attached Duty (TAD) expenditures as follows:

- Over 2,000 staff billets (93 officer and 1,919 enlisted) support NTC San Diego. An estimated 50% of these billets are filled by PCS transfers from San Diego area commands. This results in a PCS savings of $6 million per year.

- The Service School Command (SSC) San Diego is the major west coast single site training facility, offering 102 advanced occupational courses with a duration to more than 12 days ("C" schools), and 21 team training and technical courses of 12 day or less in duration ("F" schools). These schools support fleet units located along the west coast, in Hawaii and the western Pacific. Estimated FY-97 inputs for SSC San Diego "C" and "F" schools are 6,930 and 4,700 respectively. Relocation of these schools to Great Lakes would increase TAD expenditures by $6.8 million per year in travel expenses alone.

Collocation of the Recruit Training Command (RTC) San Diego with the fleet allows interaction with fleet commands. Regular fleet visits serve to ensure that newly trained recruits meet fleet requirements. Fleet personnel visit the RTC weekly. On average, recruit companies are able to participate in at least two open discussions with fleet personnel and share fleet experiences.

Unlike Orlando, relocation of the type of technical training conducted at SSC San Diego would disrupt training pipelines for nearly 8,500 students. This would reduce fleet readiness in essential technical skill ratings. Internal Communications, Engineman, Electricians Mate, and Machinists Mate occupational skill training would be out of service for three months to one year. Radioman occupational schools would be out of service for at least one year to re-engineer and re-install associated training devices and lab equipment.

SUBJECT: Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD), San Diego, CA

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVES:

1. Close and sell MCRD San Diego and relocate the mission and personnel to Marine Corps Base (MCB), Camp Pendleton, CA. The MCRD would continue as a stand-alone entity within Camp Pendleton, but share common areas of support.

2. Close and sell MCRD San Diego and relocate the mission and personnel to MCRD Parris Island, SC. This would combine the two commands as the sole Marine Corps command/location for recruit training.

DISCUSSION:

The Marine Corps is opposed to the closure of MCRD San Diego.

MCRD San Diego trains 55% of all Marine recruits. Relocation of the MCRD to either location would virtually eliminate surge capacity essential to rapidly expand recruit throughput for mobilization during time of national emergency.

The personnel loading and training mission cannot be absorbed at Camp Pendleton without largely replicating San Diego's infrastructure. Facilities would also have to be constructed at Parris Island and facility deficiencies at both locations would have to be corrected.

Both locations have significant impediments to accommodating the MCRD mission and personnel. MCRD Parris Island is essentially all wetlands, which limits development under section 404 of The Clean Water Act and the President's policy of no net loss of wetlands. MCB Camp Pendleton is constrained by a limited water supply from already stressed aquifers and by the competition for land use in support of current training missions.

It is unlikely that the cost of either relocation could be offset through real property sales. Approximately 40% of MCRD San Diego is filled tidal lands to which the State claims ownership. Also, the large common boundary with San Diego's civilian airport (Lindbergh Field) makes a large public discount allowance transfer for airport expansion almost a certainty. Further, disposition of the property is limited by the National Historic Preservation Act, under which 25 of the MCRD's buildings and approximately 25% of land are listed in the National Register of Historic Places.

SUBJECT: Goodfellow Air Force Base, San Angelo, TX

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVES:

1. Close Goodfellow AFB as an alternative to closing Lowry AFB, CO.

2. Close Goodfellow AFB in addition to Lowry AFB, CO.

DISCUSSION:

The Department is opposed to the closure of Goodfellow AFB. The closure of Lowry AFB is a better option from a capacity, military value and cost standpoint.

Goodfellow AFB is one of the Air Force's six Technical Training Centers. Others are Chanute AFB, IL (1988 Base Closure Commission decision to close in FY93), Keelser AFB, MS; Lackland AFB, TX; Sheppard AFB, TX; and Lowry AFB, CO. The primary mission of Goodfellow AFB is to provide general and cryptologic intelligence training for the Air Force, other DoD agencies, and allied forces. Goodfellow also supports El Dorado AFS, located 35 miles away, whose primary mission is to provide submarine and intercontinental ballistic missile attack warning. El Dorado AFS's mission is not projected to decrease and no other military installation is readily located to provide the necessary support.

The Air Force projects that $116 in MILCON would be required to conduct Goodfellow AFB courses elsewhere, while the net cost of implementing the closure of Lowry is expected to be only $48M.

With Air Force enlisted accession dropping from 40,000 to 30,000 per year, the Air Force projects approximately 20% excess capacity in its Technical Training Centers (TTC) after Chanute AFB is closed in FY93. Lowry AFB contributes 17% of TTC facility capacity, Goodfellow AFB contributes only 6%. Closing Lowry AFB saves 11% more manpower ($5.7M annually) and annual Real Property Maintenance (RPM) savings are $5.5M more through closing Lowry AFB. Closing both bases would take more than the identified excess capacity, would require additional construction, and would jeopardize essential surge capacity.

Excess facilities at the other Technical Training Centers are more readily adapted to courses from Lowry AFB than Goodfellow AFB, due the classified and sensitive nature of most Goodfellow AFB courses and the resultant security requirements. Goodfellow therefore has a higher military value than Lowry.

SUBJECT: MacDill Air Force Base, FL

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE:

Close MacDill AFB and relocate CENTCOM and SOCOM.

DISCUSSION:

The Secretary of Defense recommended the partial closure of MacDill AFB. The flying mission and Joint Communications Support Element would realign to other bases. CENTCOM and SOCOM would remain in-place. The Air Force estimates partial closure of MacDill AFB to cost $29M and complete closure, including realignment of CENTCOM and SOCOM, would cost $220M.

The Air Force Base Closure Executive Group investigated the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) facilities at Andrews AFB, MD as a potential receiver location for realigning missions; however, the group concluded the space could better be utilized by DoD to reduce dependency on National Capital Region leased space. The Defense Authorization Act for 1991 (Section 2803) establishes restrictions on the amount of leased space that DoD can occupy during 1991-1993. In addition, the Department is opposed to moving additional missions into the Washington area.

Finally, the AFSC HQ building has 347,371 sq ft; CENTCOM and SOCOM currently occupy 442,164 sq ft at MacDill (CENTCOM 190,522 sq ft, SOCOM 251,642 sq ft).

SUBJECT: Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVES:

1. Close Plattsburgh AFB as a substitute for another base in the strategic category.

2. Close Plattsburgh AFB in addition to Loring AFB, ME.

DISCUSSION:

The Department is opposed to the closure of Plattsburgh AFB.

HQ SAC basing requirements substantiate the need for a northeastern tanker base. SAC can not operationally afford to close both Plattsburgh AFB and Loring AFB.

A northeast base is required for Tanker Task Force and MAC European/CENTCOM support missions. The task force operates six to eight rotational KC-135 aircraft supporting European bound aircraft deployments. The task force can not operate effectively from any base further west than Plattsburgh AFB and there would be a day-to-day Emergency War Order alert shortfall of 6-9 tankers should both bases close, even considering Air Reserve Component tanker beddown. Also, Tanker Task Force infrastructure is already in-place and operations are currently being conducted from Plattsburgh AFB.

Plattsburgh AFB has approximately 60% more aircraft parking space than Loring AFB and annual operating costs are $9 million less. Also, historical weather data shows less severe weather at Plattsburgh AFB. For these, and other reasons, Plattsburgh AFB ranks higher in military value than Loring AFB.

The most convincing argument for not closing both Plattsburgh and Loring AFBs was presented to the Commission in a classified session on June 6, 1991.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
Memo 441D/68
20 Jun 91

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Telecon btwn BCRC Mr. Patrick/OP-441D CDR Ching of 18 Jun 1991

Encl: (1) Information regarding Pier Echo at Naval Station Long Beach
(2) Information regarding the "Case for Chase"

1. Enclosure (1) is provided in response to your request of reference (a).

2. Enclosure (2) was provided as background information to Congressman Ortiz at his request and is, therefore, provided for your information as well.

P. W. Drennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to: OASD (P&L)

Pier ECHO at Long Beach does not appear in the NAVFAC data base extract used as a baseline for the Category 1A (Naval Stations) pier length calculations. This pier, with 2.9KFB, was formerly a part of the Naval Shipyard, Long Beach. Information received from CINCPACFLT staff in response to a query indicates that Pier ECHO was turned over to the Naval Station in February 1990. The data base update apparently occurred after the Base Closure extract was made. CINCPACFLT staff also advises that Pier ECHO is being used for general purpose berthing; LHAs are tied up along the west wall and AORs are tied up along the south wall. The berthing assets at NAVSTA Long Beach should be increased by 2.9KFB to a total of 13.8KFB. The increased capacity reflected by this correction is offset by a corresponding increase in the amount of reduction associated with the Navy's proposed closure of Naval Station Long Beach, resulting in no change to the previously calculated net berthing excess.

17 JUNE 1991

PURPOSE

o To provide clarification of points raised in "The Case for Chase".

BACKGROUND

o "The Case for Chase" was developed by the local community to justify retention of NAS Chase Field suggesting that another strike pilot training base be considered.

o The presentation contained some inaccuracies and over stated some points.

DISCUSSION

o The 1988 Base Closure Evaluation criteria contained a maximum possible 475 points. The point spread between the highest and lowest strike pilot training base was 9 points. This is a deviation of less than 2% from the highest rating to the lowest and is statistically insignificant. The evaluation was not designed to rank the bases but to identify their relative strengths and weaknesses.

o The Base Closure Evaluation Criteria, when reviewed by the Base Structure Committee, were determined to be biased in favor of retaining bases and the results of the evaluation were therefore used as only one element upon which the BSC based their overall assessment of a base in reaching the Navy base closure recommendation.

o A comparison of the average strike pilot graduation rate (1985-1989) per aircraft assigned to each strike pilot training base provides the following PTR productivity results:

	Aircraft Assigned	Average Annual Pilot Graduation	Average Pilot Graduation Per Aircraft
Chase Field	125	156	1.25
Kingsville	122	157	1.29
Meridian	109	134	1.23

There is an insignificant difference in productivity per aircraft assigned between bases.

o "The Case for Chase" quotes a 12 April 1990 Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) letter which states that NAS Meridian suffered from severe airspace limitations. This position was changed in a subsequent CNATRA letter stating that runways were the limiting factor for training.

o "Chase/Kingsville can produce 428 PTR with no MILCON expense." Statement ignores that it will cost at least $15.4 million to construct facilities for the T-45 at NAS Chase Field.

o "Chase/Kingsville can produce 500 PTR with the T-45." It does not contain the complete CNATRA analysis:

Maximum PTR Chase Field/Kingsville - 527

PTR Capability without NAS Chase Field

	PTR
NAS MERIDIAN	239
NAS KINGSVILLE	274
	513

PTR Capability with OLF Chase Field

NAS MERIDIAN	239
NAS KINGSVILLE	373
	612

o When the ability to accommodate major pilot training surge or reconstitution are considered, the combination of two Texas bases can accommodate a maximum PTR of 527, with the T-45. A Kingsville/Meridian combination with OLF Chase Field could produce a PTR of 612 with the T-45.

o "The Case for Chase" Facility Comparison presentation presents some inaccuracies based on the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Facility Data Base:

- NAS Chase Field has only 181,056 SF of hangar bay area vice the 205,424 SF shown in the comparison.
- NAS Meridian has 299,863 SY of apron space vice the 288,263 SY shown in the comparison.
- The source data for training space comparison can not be determined but the following is a comparison from the NAVFAC data base of operational trainer building area:

NAS KINGSVILLE	53,556 SF
NAS MERIDIAN	33,534 SF
NAS CHASE FIELD	25,550 SF

o When the ability to accommodate training simulators is considered, Chase Field has the smallest existing trainer area as illustrated above.

o When considering cost and manpower factors, all strike pilot training bases use the El Centro Strike Detachment. Use of El Centro by all three bases has increased since 1988.

o AICUZ and encroachment incompatibilities at Kingsville and Meridian are felt to have been overstated. Neither AICUZ nor

encroachment are viewed as major problems at Meridian either in the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) or the existing Base Master Plan. Meridian has 58 residences and 3 churches in noise zones which are incompatible by Navy standards. The relatively low number of noise complaints which have been received at Meridian "indicates relatively few noise conflicts with area residents" (Meridian Master Plan). AICUZ analysis for Kingsville in the DEIS was based on the T-2/TA-4 aircraft combination. The operating noise for the T-45 is significantly lower thereby reducing the AICUZ footprint illustrated in the DEIS.

o The potential safety hazard of mid-air accidents at Kingsville was over-emphasized in "The Case for Chase" While the Navy acknowledges that staggered thresholds would enhance safety, the Kingsville Wing Commander has been quoted in OPNAV correspondence to the Base Closure and Realignment Commission that staggered thresholds are not a safety hazard until the PTR exceeds 250 to 300 at Kingsville.

o The potential civilian reuse of excess facilities at any of the strike pilot training bases has not yet been investigated. The potential for excess facilities exists at each of the bases, even if it were used as an OLF. Beeville has expressed interest in potential reuse of facilities in "The Case for Chase".

RECOMMENDATION

o None, for information only.

O-125

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
Memo 44C1/69
20 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission letter of June 19, 1991

Encl: (1) Response to items 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 14

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in partial response to the request for additional information forwarded by reference (a).

P.W. Brennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to: OASD (P&L)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

0-177

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
Memo 44C1/72
21 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission letter of June 19, 1991

Encl: (1) Response to items 1, 3, 4, 7, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in final response to the request for additional information forwarded by reference (a).

P.W. Brennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to: OASD (P&L)

O-128

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

11000
Memo 441D/73
21 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) CNO ltr 11000 Ser 441D/1U597826 dtd 4 June 1991
(b) CNO ltr 11000 Ser 441D/1U597845 dtd 14 June 1991

Encl: (1) Updated COBRA data for closure of NAS Kingsville which incorporates costs resulting from associated delay in introducing T-45
(2) Updated COBRA data for closure of NAS Meridian which incorporates costs resulting from associated delay in introducing T-45
(3) Updated COBRA data for closure of NAS Chase Field

1. Reference (a) provided, among other things, detailed COBRA cost analyses for the closures of NAS Kingsville and NAS Meridian in accordance with your requests. Reference (b) responded to your subsequent request for information regarding delays associated with the hypothetical closure of the T-45 introduction site --- NAS Kingsville.

2. This correspondence is provided to modify estimated costs, provided by reference (b), associated with prospective delays in implementation of T-45 should NAS Kingsville or NAS Meridian be closed and to update the reference (a) COBRA models for NAS Kingsville, NAS Meridian and NAS Chase Field by incorporating those costs.

3. The cost of delaying T-45 introduction at Kingsville is expected to impact approximately 60% rather than 100% of the annual 400 PTR. Thus, 240 pilots per year rather than 400 pilots per year would be trained using more costly T-2/TA-4 aircraft for each of two years of delay. At the previously documented cost differential of $103,665 per pilot, the 480 pilots impacted during the two-year delay would amount to an additional cost of approximately $50 million. This cost plus an additional $32 million for equipment relocation is reflected in the updated COBRA for NAS Kingsville provided by enclosure (1).

4. The costs of delaying T-45 introduction at Meridian will impact the remaining 40% of the annual 400 PTR for one year versus two years since Meridian"s MILCON project is at an earlier stage than Kingsville's. It is, however, at least one year advanced over the time involved if Meridian were closed and a new project were initiated at Chase Field. This cost approximates $16.6 million and is reflected in the updated COBRA for NAS Meridian provided by enclosure (2).

5. Enclosure (3) provides an updated COBRA for NAS Chase which reflects the deletion of a MILCON cost avoidance for T-45 facilities inappropriately included in previously submitted versions and the deletion of the MILCON for the runway extension at NAS Kingsville proposed in earlier closure scenarios.

P. W. Brennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to: OASD (P&L)

D-127

21 JUNE 91

Mr. Jim Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006-1604

Dear Mr. Courter:

We would like to call an issue to your attention regarding the April 1991 Department of the Army report to the Commission. Page E-21 of that report states that the recommendation is to "retain approximately 3,000 acres of training area...for use by the reserve components."

The figure of 3,000 acres is incorrect. It has come to our attention that the correct figure is approximately 4,600 acres. The boundaries and all other facts are stated correctly in the report. The attached map illustrates the Fort Devens Military Reservation which is the area to be retained for use by the Army Reserve Components.

Sincerely,

Susan Livingstone
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics & Environment)

Enclosure

TABS POC: BOB DASKI, X32556/7/8



Long Swamp
Plow Shop Pond
Devencre
FORT DEVENS MILITARY RESERVATION
Shirley
Tophet Swamp
Turner Pond
Water tank
SHIRLEY AIRPORT
Fort Pond
Robbins Pond
Mirror Lake
Cutler Army Hospital
Little Spectacle Pond
Spectacle Pond
Cranberry Pond
Bowers Brook
Harvard
Lookout tower
Radio tower
Still River
5 NM
180°
Bare Hill Pond
Ponakin Mill
Nashua River
North Village
Lancaster
Great Brook
South Lancaster
Water tank
Five Corners
Brockway Corners
St. Johns Cemetery
Clinton Hospital
Bolton
West Pond
Little Pond
Mossy
569
562
524
637
476
576

O-130

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

PRODUCTION AND
LOGISTICS

June 21, 1991

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed for your review and consideration is recent correspondence from the Comptroller of the Department of Defense regarding alternative Commission base closures or realignments.

Sincerely,

Colin McMillan

Enclosures

COMPTROLLER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

June 20, 1991

Honorable James Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Recent statements at your hearings would suggest that the Commission is considering additional proposals to close and consolidate several major activities of the newly formed Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). We urge you to defer this premature proposal so that we can complete a number of studies which I believe will provide a framework for any resultant realignment proposals for the Commission's consideration when it reconvenes in 1993.

DFAS, which has been in operation less than 5 months, comprises about 10,000 employees at six major centers (Cleveland, Columbus, Denver, Indianapolis, Kansas City, and Washington). These centers pay all active, reserve, and retired military and process major contract payments. The goal of DFAS is not only to streamline its current operations, but more importantly, to standardize and consolidate other financial functions such as civilian pay, travel reimbursements, and general accounting that are being performed in non-standard, decentralized fashion by some 40,000 people outside of DFAS. Standardization of these functions in addition to DFAS operations is the goal of this recent consolidation endeavor.

Study groups are currently working to determine the detailed steps necessary to transition to standard systems and consolidated operations for each of these functions. Concurrently, we have efforts underway to determine the optimum basing strategy for future operations. However, it is simply much too soon to forecast the results of these initiatives and realignments in the interim could severely compromise our consolidation objectives.

Since we have just begun this effort involving very complex and critical functions, the Department deliberately excluded the six DFAS centers from the current closure and realignment package. To the extent that the standardization initiatives yield base operations efficiencies, proposals will be forwarded in our next realignment package.

Cordially,

Sean O'Keefe
Comptroller

O-131

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS

June 24, 1991

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I've enclosed, per your staff's request, the official minutes of the June 12, 1991, meeting of the Federal Advisory Commission on the Consolidation and Conversion of Defense Research and Development Laboratories.

The Laboratories Commission met again on June 19 and 20. Unfortunately, the minutes of this meeting are not available as the Laboratories Commission has established procedures to approve minutes of its meetings at each subsequent meeting.

I am advised, however, that the Commission held further discussions regarding the Secretary's recommended laboratory closures and realignments that are before your Base Closure Commission, but took no action or votes regarding those recommendations.

Sincerely,

Colin McMillan

Colin McMillan

Enclosure

FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON THE CONSOLIDATION AND CONVERSION OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT LABORATORIES

MEETING OF JUNE 12, 1991

COMMISSION ATTENDEES:

Mr. Charles Adolph	Chairman
Mr. Solomon J. Buchsbaum	Member
Mr. Frank Verderame	Member
Mr. Robert Hillyer	Member
Mr. O'Dean P. Judd	Member
Mr. James C. McGroddy	Member
Mr. William McCorkle	Member
Mr. Earle Messere	Member
COL. Richard Paul	Member
Mr. Vic Reis	Member
Mr. James Decker	Member
Mr. H. Steven Kimmel	Executive Director
Mr. Michael Heeb	Executive Secretary

INVITED GUESTS:

Mr. Gurden Drake	OSD/General Counsel
COL. Larry Hourcle'	OSD/General Counsel
Mr. George Singley	DASA (RD&A)
RADM Bill Miller	Chief Naval Research
Dr. Robert Selden	Chief Scientist, USAF
Mr. Doug Hansen	Director, Base Closure Unit, ASD (P&L)
Mr. Dave Berteau	PDASD (P&L)
Mr. Ray Siewert	Act DDDR&E (R&AT)

Mr. Adolph opened the Commission meeting with a review of his meeting with the Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BCRC) on June 7, 1991. Mr. Buchsbaum asked if the Laboratory Commission would have an opportunity to brief the BCRC. Mr. Adolph explained that the proper mechanism for the Laboratory Commission to comment on BCRC activities is to submit recommendations to the Secretary of Defense who would in-turn pass his recommendations to the BCRC, if so desired.

Mr. Heeb addressed administrative issues and reviewed the minutes of the last meeting.

Mr. Doug Hansen, Director of the Base Closure Unit in ASD (P&L), presented a review of the BCRC criteria for base closure. He pointed out that:

- The final selection criteria were the most visible portion of the base closure process.
- The Force Structure Plan included issues for labs, training, R&D, and mandated reductions.
- Base closure is a three legged process. It links forces, criteria, and process, and leads to the overall plans.
- The process of determining which laboratories were to be consolidated or closed was different than the process used for other military installations, but was consistent with the BCRC criteria.

Mr. Hansen explained that military value is a key component of the selection criteria, that this is not just a cost cutting exercise but involves a study of the total force structure required by DoD, and that It is almost impossible to quantify military value in dollars.

Mr. Buchsbaum noted that the criteria used for base closures should not be the same as that used for laboratory consolidation.

Mr. Verderame questioned that if the acquisition process is being cut by 20% and Congressional staffers say R&D budget is up by 2% why is there such a hurry to include labs on base closure/consolidation? Mr. Adolph explained that the acquisition workforce must be drawn down by 20%. Mr. Siewert explained that the 92-97 budget has slightly less than 0 real growth for 6.1,6.2, and 6.3 funds but shows negative growth with SDI included.

Mr. Gurden Drake, office of General Counsel, OSD, explained the role of the commission from a legal view point. He explained that the commission is to provide its recommendations only to the Secretary of Defense who will forward his recommendations to Congress. The commission has no authority to directly advise the BCRC. The commission can advise the Secretary of Defense of the problem and the Secretary of Defense can direct the commission (if he wants to) to advise the BCRC. The commissioners asked if Mr. Drake could provide the commission with a letter explaining the legal authority of the Laboratory Commission. Mr. Drake agreed to provide one at the next meeting of the commission. COL. Hourcle' explained the BCRC thresholds for inclusion on the list.

Dr. Selden, Chief Scientist for the Air Force, provided a briefing on the Air Force's laboratory reorganization process from a strategic perspective. He also covered a brief overview of history of previous laboratory studies over the last 30 years.

Dr. Selden explained that Air Force labs play key roles by providing focus and linkage to applicable technology activities within academia, the Government, and industry. Service labs also provide technology translation by linking the customer (operational user) with the technology base.

Dr. Selden explained that the Air Force restructured its labs to align with its four products, which are: air vehicles and their conventional armarment; space

systems; command control and communications; and people-centered products. Thus, there are now four laboratories attached to the four AFSC product divisions.

Mr. Buchsbaum asked how the Air Force implemented their plan without going through the BCRC. Dr. Selden stated that the Air Force realignment started about 18 months ago, and that proposed relocations were under the BCRC threshold.

Dr. Selden next discussed five charateristics that transcend all good laboratories (DoD, DOE, university or industry). They are: (1) sense of purpose; (2) ambiance of importance (includes linkage with customers); (3) smart management practices (personnel, procurement, etc.); (4) good facilities and equipment; and (5) enough size to have clout and permit flexibility. He also said that an understood (implied) attribute that should be at the front of the list is good people. Finally, Dr. Selden briefly discussed pros and cons of GOCO's, and indicated that the laboratory demonstration project could provide many improvements in the "management practices" area for Government-owned, Government-operated laboratories.

When asked what one thing he would do to improve the laboratories, Dr. Selden said he would change the personnel policies, rules, etc to allow greater flexibility in hiring, classification, etc.

Mr. George Singley presented a briefing on the Army laboratory system and answered specific questions relative to the Army's process of developing their laboratory reorganization and plans.

Mr. McGroddy asked "what were the three biggest problems that were needed to be solved?" Mr. Singley responded that the Army needs to: (1) execute LAB-21; (2) do a better job of creating a dual path career opportunity for Scientists and Engineers; and (3) streamline the technology processes.

A general discussion on laboratory consolidation and its impact followed. Focus was on the technical capability of laboratories. Mr. Singley explained that the Army corporate laboratory will have two centers, one at Adelphi with about 1200 people and the other at Aberdeen with 1150 people. He then answered many specific and detailed questions from the members. He ended his presentation by answering Mr. Messere's question of what would be the single recommendation he would make to the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Singley said he would recommend that the Army be allowed to implement the Lab Demo program (take the best characteristics of the GOCOs), and implement the LAB-21 program.

RADM Bill Miller, Chief of Naval Research, presented a briefing on the Navy's laboratory restructuring plans.

He explained that all Navy labs are essentially industrially funded. He supports the Laboratory Demonstration program and would like to see all RDT&E labs in

the program. He stated that the whole Navy focus changed last fall due to Congressional action on defense resources. He pointed out that the business base will decrease by 21% over the next 5 years, and that this is in addition to the mandated 20% cut. Laboratory consolidation is essential if the Navy is to protect and maintain a core of laboratory facilities within Navy. He then discussed the funding impact in detail.

RADM Miller explained that final consolidation was driven by mandated constraints (20% reduction), and mentioned a declining business base, work force reduction, and the need for improved quality and efficiency.

Mr. Dave Berteau, PDASD (P&L), presented a briefing on how the Services' laboratory consolidation plans were reviewed by OSD. He also explained some of the details of the BCRC process.

Prior to going into an Executive Session, the commission agreed that the goal for the next meeting was to consider specific recommendations that might go forward to the Secretary of Defense. In Executive Session the commission decided, by a vote of six to two, to take no action, at this time, that would impact the BCRC-'91. Immediately following the vote the meeting was adjourned.

Michael Heeb 6/20/91

Michael Heeb
Executive Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0103

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

May 3, 1991

0-132

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS

SUBJECT: Interaction with Base Closure Commission

Per your memo of April 19, 1991, the following contacts have been made with the Base Closure Commission:

1 May FONECON between Mr. Steve Kleinman and LTC Paul Goodwin reference 10 May Hearing tasking letter.

2 May FONECON between Mr. Rod Bricksin and Mr. Paul Johnson reference heads up on requirement frm SEN McCollum (5th District) to provide COBRA model.

2 May FONECON between Mr. Steve Kleinman and LTC Paul Goodwin reference 10 May Hearing.

Paul W. Johnson
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations and Housing)
OASA(I,L&E)

0-133

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS

May 17, 1991

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006-1604

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The General Accounting Office (GAO) has completed its analysis of the Department of Defense's base closure and realignment recommendations and selection process.

The GAO recognizes the need to close unneeded bases. The Department's initial review of the GAO's report and findings confirms that the Services' selection processes were comprehensive and fairly compared all bases. We find nothing in the GAO's report that would cause us to recommend reconsideration of any of the Department's recommendations to the Commission of April 12, 1991.

We look forward to continued cooperation with the Commission as you review the GAO report.

Sincerely,

Colin McMillen

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0-135

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS

June 13, 1991

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I've enclosed for your information a letter from Mr. Pete Adolph to Congressman Murtha regarding Mr. Adolph's recent testimony before your Commission.

Sincerely,

Colin McMillan

Colin McMillan

Enclosure

DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

June 13, 1991

Honorable John P. Murtha
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman Murtha:

To follow up on our conversations of June 12, this is to confirm that my testimony before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission expressed the views of the Department of Defense and my professional views, which I believed was clear at that time. Confusion may have arisen in the minds of some in that, by delegation from the Secretary of Defense, I am performing the duties of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and among the duties that I am performing in that capacity is the duty of the Chairman of the Federal Advisory Commission on the Consolidation and Conversion of Defense Research and Development Laboratories. At the time of the BCRC hearing on June 7, the Laboratories Commission had not reached any substantive conclusions relative to the laboratories.

Sincerely,

Charles E. Adolph

Charles E. Adolph
By Direction of the Secretary of Defense

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0103

June 24, 1991

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

O-136

Mr. Jim Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N. W.
Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. Courter:

During your hearing on June 14, 1991, you asked for the Army's position on transferring operational control of Forts Hamilton and Totten to the Navy.

The Army previously considered this proposal during its study and rejected it. The missions of Forts Hamilton and Totten are area oriented and are not anticipated to be eliminated. Currently, the Army is required to support the current missions for the foreseeable future. If an agreement can be reached between the Navy and the Army over the geographic support to all DoD operations in the New York city area, consolidations between Army and Navy installations and operations could occur. In the absence of such an agreement and without the time to do the necessary analysis and negotiation, it is not prudent to close, realign or transfer operational control of either installation at this time. Furthermore, there are no proven operational or economic advantages to be gained by such a transfer at this time.

It is important to note that the Department of Defense has the authority to make changes in administrative control of its installations <u>outside</u> of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (P.L. 101-510) framework. If, after additional study and consultation with the Navy, this realignment has merit, the Army will exercise the authority it already has to make changes in the administrative control that make sense.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this issue. If your staff can furnish their analyses of this proposal, I will be happy to comment in greater detail.

I will provide a copy of this letter to Mr. Colin McMillan, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production & Logistics).

Sincerely,

Susan Livingstone

Susan Livingstone
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics & Environment)

3D780 Pat Wacke

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0103

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

June 14, 1991

O-137

Mr. Jim Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N. W.
Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. Courter:

This letter responds to your June 12, 1991 question on the support provided to Fort Stewart, Georgia by Moody Air Force Base, Georgia.

The proposed closure of Moody Air Force Base has no adverse impact on Fort Stewart. Our Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans reviewed this and other Air Force proposals for operational constraints prior to announcement. The Army currently receives minor tactical air support for training from Moody Air Force Base. Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, which also maintains tactical air assets, is within the same approximate distance to Fort Stewart as Moody and could provide support. There are also sufficient Naval air forces in the area to more than meet the requirements of the 24th Infantry Division.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this issue. I will provide a copy of this letter to Mr. Colin McMillan, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production & Logistics).

Sincerely,

Susan Livingstone
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics & Environment)

I believe Commissioner Callaway raised this question as well.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0103

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

June 14, 1991

O-133

Mr. James A. Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 "K" Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006-1604

Dear Mr. Courter:

This is in response to your letter of May 13, requesting a list of leased space exceeding 10,000 square feet occupied by Army functions. The enclosed printout lists the main data elements for all leased spaces. The enclosed disk lists all data in MS-DOS format.

Sincerely,

Susan Livingstone

Susan Livingstone
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics, and Environment)

2 Enclosures w/o Attachment

Copy Furnished:

Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Production and Logistics)

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS

June 19, 1991

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006-1604

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Commission's final list of additional options for closure or realignment, if recommended by the Commission, would represent a significant departure from the Secretary's recommendations. Of particular concern is the potential military impact of deviations from proposals that were closely coordinated between the Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the case of the Corps of Engineers, I know you can appreciate the Secretary's reasons for preferring to work directly with Congress.

While the Commission must review these additional options in order to exercise its independent judgment, I would note the Department already analyzed many of these options before making its recommendations. While these analyses have been previously provided to you as part of our overall documentation, I thought that the Commission might find summaries of the Department's analyses useful for consideration in your final deliberations.

Finally, I want to stress once again the importance the Department places on closing unneeded bases. As the Secretary said at his base closure press conference in April, "You get a hollow force when you scrimp on any of the unglamorous things and pay, instead, for things you don't need, like too many military bases. If we keep all of the bases open and have a smaller force, we will end up wasting resources to keep bases alive, instead of spending money to maintain a quality force."

Sincerely,

Colin McMillan

Colin McMillan

Enclosures

As the Commission enters the last few days of its deliberations and needs additional information please don't hesitate to call us. C. M.

SUBJECT: Sacramento Army Depot, "Sacramento Plan" Modifications

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVES:

1. Close Sacramento Army Depot. The Depot would transfer all workload to the Sacramento Air Logistics Center except an amount equivalent to 255 personnel who would transfer to Tobyhanna Army Depot. This transfer is necessary because the capacity of the Air Logistics Center is not sufficient to absorb all the Sacramento Army Depot workload.

2. All Sacramento Army Depot work would transfer to the Sacramento Air Logistics Center except for 236 authorizations for Electro-Optical work which would go to Anniston Army Depot.

DISCUSSION:

The Department urges approval of the DoD plan for moving workload from the Sacramento Army Depot for the following reasons:

- Cost savings. The DoD plan will result in significantly more savings than either alternative 1 or 2. When compared to the $55 million annual steady state savings for the DoD plan, alternative 1 would reduce DoD savings by $12 million per year, and alternative 2 would reduce DoD savings by $18 million per year. If other factors were considered in the calculations of savings, such as lower indirect and overhead costs at Tobyhanna Army Depot, the DoD plan would show even greater savings when compared to alternatives 1 or 2.

- Flexibility. The DoD plan is an integral part of a comprehensive effort to strengthen all depot maintenance activities. To make changes to the DoD plan would substantially effect the workload changes proposed in several other commodity areas. The Defense Depot Maintenance Council reviews the distribution of workload on a continuing basis. If the Base Closure Commission were to dictate workload distribution, it would make it difficult for DoD to obtain future potential savings by using our flexibility to move workloads.

- Utilization. The DoD plan provides more effective use of depot capacity. Alternatives 1 and 2 leave Tobyhanna Army Depot underutilized.

- Competition. The DoD plan recognizes that even greater savings can be achieved through competing "above core" workload requirements with industry and other DoD depots. The alternatives would not allow competition of the affected workload, precluding the realization of these savings.

The Defense Depot Maintenance Council extensively reviewed the original "Sacramento Plan" and rejected it as not cost effective. The alternatives should be similarly rejected by the Commission.

SUBJECT: Forts McCoy, Indiantown Gap, Pickett, A. P. Hill, and Buchanan.

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE:

Forts McCoy, Indiantown Gap, Pickett, A. P. Hill, and Buchanan would be transferred to the Reserve Component as possible additions to the Department's recommendations; elimination of the active duty presence and transfer to the Reserve Component of Fort Dix, NJ and Fort Chaffee, AR. All of these bases except for Fort Buchanan, PR, were evaluated by the Army within the Major Training Installation category.

DISCUSSION:

The Department of Defense already has the authority to make changes in administrative control or garrison configuration of its installations outside of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (P.L. 101-510) framework. While we agree that the principle of National Guard control may have some merit in limited circumstances, it is clearly prudent to await the final results of the study of Reserve Component (RC) training strategies and management of training areas before making any changes in administrative control.

Forts McCoy, Pickett, A.P. Hill, and Indiantown Gap all support both active and reserve training. Fort Buchanan, a sub-installation of Fort McPherson, primarily supports the administration of the Army's presence on Puerto Rico. As a command and control type installation, it has no training area, and few ranges.

It is misleading to assume that significant savings are possible by transferring major training area installations to the reserve components. Transferring funding responsibility from the active component to the guard or reserve component does not, in itself, create savings. Most savings occur through effective use of personnel resources which cannot be determined without site visits and workload analysis. The garrisons in question are currently small and operate with a minimal staff. Therefore the ability to further economize is questionable.

It should be noted that an earlier study of the issue of administrative control, completed in 1986, found that Congressional ceilings on Active Guard and Reserve, and Guard military technician spaces would be a significant constraint if responsibility were passed to either the National Guard or the U. S. Army Reserve.

In conclusion, the Department opposes the transfer of these installations pending completion of the above-referenced study. Additionally, the proposed transfer may not necessarily be more cost-effective. Once the reserve training study is complete around the Spring of 1992, the Army can and will exercise the authority it already has to make changes in administrative control and garrison configurations between active duty and reserve forces, if appropriate.

SUBJECT: Forts Hamilton and Totten, New York

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE:

Transfer the operational control of Forts Hamilton and Totten in New York from the Army to the Navy.

DISCUSSION:

There are no proven operational or economic advantages to be gained by such a transfer at this time.

The missions of this complex are area-oriented and are not being eliminated. The Army is required to support the current missions for the foreseeable future. If an agreement could be reached between the Navy and the Army over the geographic support to all DoD operations in the New York city area, consolidations between Army and Navy installations and operations could occur. In the absence of such an agreement and without the time to do the necessary analysis and negotiation, it is not prudent to close, realign or transfer operational control of either installation at this time.

The Department of Defense already has the authority to make changes in administrative control of its installations outside of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (P.L. 101-510) framework, should circumstances warrant.

SUBJECT: U. S. Army Corps of Engineers Reorganization

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE:

Include the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers reorganization study in the Commission's recommendations.

DISCUSSION:

The Department recommends elimination of the Corps from further consideration by the Commission.

Although the Secretary of Defense supports the need to reorganize the Army Corps of Engineers, he did not include it in the DoD recommendations to the Commission. At the request of leaders of the House Public Works and Transportation Committee, Secretary Cheney agreed to submit separate legislation in consideration of the civil works committee's jurisdictional authorities. On May 24, 1991, the Defense Department forwarded the legislative proposal and the Corps of Engineers Reorganization Study to Congress, and urged the expeditious enactment of the legislative proposal.

SUBJECT: Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE:

Close Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA

DISCUSSION:

NSY Long Beach should not be considered a substitute for NSY Philadelphia, even though both are non-nuclear shipyards. Excess drydock capacity exists on the east coast while it does not on the west coast. NSY Long Beach has already been downsized and restructured to properly balance its workload and workforce to operate effectively and efficiently. Based on the New Threat Upgrade (NTU) modernization of conventional surface ships, Long Beach's final cost per ship modernization to the customer (the fleet) is about 15% less than Philadelphia.

NSY Long Beach is the third largest shipyard (private or public) on the west coast and is the only public shipyard on the west coast that bids on surface ship repair. Without this shipyard, the public/private competition program would cease to exist on the west coast. NSY Long Beach was placed in service 42 years ago and is the Navy's youngest shipyard. Additionally, it is only 115 miles north of San Diego and is therefore close to the major fleet concentration. This is important because San Diego, unlike Norfolk, does not have a major collocated shipyard. In all, NSY Long Beach is in close proximity to the vast majority (70%) of the Pacific surface fleet.

NSY Long Beach is designated as the contingency drydock for emergency docking of nuclear aircraft carriers on the west coast in the event that Drydock Number 6 at NSY Puget Sound, WA is not available. NSY Long Beach provides the only large drydock for conducting routine maintenance work on all large ships in Southern California. In total, its three drydocks provide 52% of the drydock capacity (both public and private) in the region. This situation is in contrast to that on the east coast where three shipyards capable of docking aircraft carriers and large ships are located in close proximity to fleet concentrations (i.e., Norfolk, Newport News, and Philadelphia). If NSY Long Beach is closed, all aircraft carriers, large amphibious and replenishment ships would be forced to leave Southern California for drydocking. The nearest alternative drydocks are at Puget Sound (1300 NM) and Pearl Harbor, HI (2600 NM). These yards would have insufficient capacity to handle NSY Long Beach's current workload. The resulting crew relocation and family separation would cause a major degradation in quality of life for the crews of these ships. By having NSY Long Beach near San Diego few, if any, families have to relocate during major repairs or overhauls.

SUBJECT: Kingsville Naval Air Station, TX

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE:

Close Kingsville Naval Air Station, TX.

DISCUSSION:

Closure of NAS Kingsville is a less attractive alternative than closure of NAS Chase Field because:

- Infrastructure to support T-45 aircraft is in place at NAS Kingsville, (i.e., trainers, aircraft maintenance facilities, and jet engine test cell). Moving the T-45 aircraft function to NAS Chase will cost an estimated $25.5 million.
- NAS Kingville has dual runways (two parallel runways bisected by two parallel crosswind runways) allowing more flexibility in conducting training operations than at NAS Chase which has two parallel runways and a single crosswind runway.
- NAS Kingsville has newer facilities in better state of repair than NAS Chase. This results in lower maintenance costs and more efficient operations.
- Closure of NAS Kingsville would cause a two year delay in T-45 Initial Operating Capability.

SUBJECT: Meridian Naval Air Station, MS

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE:

Close Meridian Naval Air Station, MS.

DISCUSSION:

Closure of NAS Meridian is a less attractive alternative to NAS Chase Field because:

- NAS Meridian could not be utilized as an Outlying Field (OLF) as it is too far away from other training fields. NAS Chase is close enough to Kingsville to be used as an OLF and would provide flexibility during T-45 transition and surge.

- Reconstitution of the force can be more readily accomplished at NAS Chase than NAS Meridian. NAS Meridian is near enough to major air hubs that airlines would find the air space attractive. If NAS Meridian is closed, the Navy would probably lose the airspace with little chance of recovery. NAS Chase is remote from airline hubs, with little competition for its airspace.

- Return on investment years for NAS Meridian closure is approximately five times longer than that for closure of either NAS Chase or NAS Kingsville.

- NAS Meridian has the most modern design of any NAS; NAS Chase dates from the WWII era. Being newer, NAS Meridian is easier to maintain. The runways at NAS Meridian are built to newer criteria. They are staggered and offset to allow an increased tempo of operations accommodating simultaneous landings or take-offs and more aircraft in the pattern at the same time. Additionally, the operations area at NAS Meridian is remote from the administrative and training area. This arrangement is more efficient because there is less noise impact on classroom training.

SUBJECT: Staten Island Naval Station, NY

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE:

Close Staten Island Naval Station, NY

DISCUSSION:

The Department is opposed to the closure of Staten Island Naval Station.

The Secretary of the Navy's Base Structure Committee rated Naval Station New York (Staten Island) high in overall military value. NAVSTA New York received high ratings in both the mission and land/facilities assessment categories. Staten Island's new and excellent facilities are state of the art in terms of their ability to support homeported ships. Staten Island, as a homeport, is 78% complete. The Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMA) is in a newly constructed facility, with up-to-date equipment. The SIMA will provide modern ship intermediate-level maintenance work more efficiently than those at existing older facilities. The SIMA at Staten Island also provides intermediate level maintenance support for ammunition ships at the Naval Weapons Station at Earle, NJ.

Ship homeport assignments for Staten Island have been carefully developed to ensure that crew sizes and corresponding family housing requirements will be adequately satisfied by Navy-sponsored housing in the immediate area.

The geographic location of Staten Island, in an area with a large Naval Reserve population, makes retention of this facility desirable. The assignment of ships to Staten Island to support reserve training is in full support of the Navy's Total Force concept. The demographics are good and will allow for sufficient manning of these ships; a vital factor of the Navy's reconstitution intentions in time of emergency.

Staten Island has specifically designed modern facilities for new class ships such as the deep draft, power intensive CG-47 class AEGIS cruisers. The facilities at Staten Island have a low level of maintenance and repair requirements due to their newness. Other homeports, with some facility and support improvements, could accommodate the ships currently planned for Staten Island. The added costs of upgrading and maintaining older facilities at existing bases (costs not now included in the Defense budget) must be weighed against the lower cost of maintaining this new base.

SUBJECT: Treasure Island Naval Station, CA

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVES:

1. Realign Treasure Island Naval Station, CA, eliminating excess berthing capacity but retaining all necessary administrative, training, housing, and personnel support functions for the San Francisco Bay Area naval complex.

2. Realign Treasure Island to retain only the housing.

DISCUSSION:

The Naval Station is not a "stand alone" activity. The bulk of its functions support the entire San Francisco Bay Area Navy complex or are related to the support provided to tenant activities, family housing residents of Treasure Island, and transient personnel. Additionally, the berthing capacity of Treasure Island, while small, provides flexibility in accommodating Bay Area operations.

The new brig and medical/dental clinic, the large Coast Guard presence, the port services/operations function, the Naval Technical Training Center, a new state of the art fire fighting school that meets local clean air standards, and the large numbers of units of family housing are all indicative of Treasure Islands importance to the San Francisco Bay Area Navy complex. A significant number of activities supporting the Bay area would require relocation and construction at other locations in the Bay area in the event of a large realignment as described in alternative 2.

It makes no sense to recreate this complex of tenants elsewhere in the area, especially if the housing at Treasure Island and the Technical Training Center were to remain in place.

SUBJECT: San Diego Naval Training Center, CA

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE:

Realign/close San Diego Naval Training Center, CA.

DISCUSSION:

The Department is opposed to the closure of NTC San Diego. It is not the most cost effective option:

	Cost	ROI Years
NTC Orlando	397M	11 Years
NTC San Diego	549M	100 Years

Closure of NTC San Diego is also not operationally sound. Retaining NTC San Diego due to its collocation with fleet units enhances the Navy's informal program to keep personnel sea-shore duty rotations in the same geographical area. This results in a savings of nearly $13 million per year in Permanent Change of Station (PCS) and Temporary Attached Duty (TAD) expenditures as follows:

- Over 2,000 staff billets (93 officer and 1,919 enlisted) support NTC San Diego. An estimated 50% of these billets are filled by PCS transfers from San Diego area commands. This results in a PCS savings of $6 million per year.

- The Service School Command (SSC) San Diego is the major west coast single site training facility, offering 102 advanced occupational courses with a duration to more than 12 days ("C" schools), and 21 team training and technical courses of 12 day or less in duration ("F" schools). These schools support fleet units located along the west coast, in Hawaii and the western Pacific. Estimated FY-97 inputs for SSC San Diego "C" and "F" schools are 6,930 and 4,700 respectively. Relocation of these schools to Great Lakes would increase TAD expenditures by $6.8 million per year in travel expenses alone.

Collocation of the Recruit Training Command (RTC) San Diego with the fleet allows interaction with fleet commands. Regular fleet visits serve to ensure that newly trained recruits meet fleet requirements. Fleet personnel visit the RTC weekly. On average, recruit companies are able to participate in at least two open discussions with fleet personnel and share fleet experiences.

Unlike Orlando, relocation of the type of technical training conducted at SSC San Diego would disrupt training pipelines for nearly 8,500 students. This would reduce fleet readiness in essential technical skill ratings. Internal Communications, Engineman, Electricians Mate, and Machinists Mate occupational skill training would be out of service for three months to one year. Radioman occupational schools would be out of service for at least one year to re-engineer and re-install associated training devices and lab equipment.

SUBJECT: Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD), San Diego, CA

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVES:

1. Close and sell MCRD San Diego and relocate the mission and personnel to Marine Corps Base (MCB), Camp Pendleton, CA. The MCRD would continue as a stand-alone entity within Camp Pendleton, but share common areas of support.

2. Close and sell MCRD San Diego and relocate the mission and personnel to MCRD Parris Island, SC. This would combine the two commands as the sole Marine Corps command/location for recruit training.

DISCUSSION:

The Marine Corps is opposed to the closure of MCRD San Diego.

MCRD San Diego trains 55% of all Marine recruits. Relocation of the MCRD to either location would virtually eliminate surge capacity essential to rapidly expand recruit throughput for mobilization during time of national emergency.

The personnel loading and training mission cannot be absorbed at Camp Pendleton without largely replicating San Diego's infrastructure. Facilities would also have to be constructed at Parris Island and facility deficiencies at both locations would have to be corrected.

Both locations have significant impediments to accommodating the MCRD mission and personnel. MCRD Parris Island is essentially all wetlands, which limits development under section 404 of The Clean Water Act and the President's policy of no net loss of wetlands. MCB Camp Pendleton is constrained by a limited water supply from already stressed aquifers and by the competition for land use in support of current training missions.

It is unlikely that the cost of either relocation could be offset through real property sales. Approximately 40% of MCRD San Diego is filled tidal lands to which the State claims ownership. Also, the large common boundary with San Diego's civilian airport (Lindbergh Field) makes a large public discount allowance transfer for airport expansion almost a certainty. Further, disposition of the property is limited by the National Historic Preservation Act, under which 25 of the MCRD's buildings and approximately 25% of land are listed in the National Register of Historic Places.

SUBJECT: Goodfellow Air Force Base, San Angelo, TX

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVES:

1. Close Goodfellow AFB as an alternative to closing Lowry AFB, CO.

2. Close Goodfellow AFB in addition to Lowry AFB, CO.

DISCUSSION:

The Department is opposed to the closure of Goodfellow AFB. The closure of Lowry AFB is a better option from a capacity, military value and cost standpoint.

Goodfellow AFB is one of the Air Force's six Technical Training Centers. Others are Chanute AFB, IL (1988 Base Closure Commission decision to close in FY93), Keelser AFB, MS; Lackland AFB, TX; Sheppard AFB, TX; and Lowry AFB, CO. The primary mission of Goodfellow AFB is to provide general and cryptologic intelligence training for the Air Force, other DoD agencies, and allied forces. Goodfellow also supports El Dorado AFS, located 35 miles away, whose primary mission is to provide submarine and intercontinental ballistic missile attack warning. El Dorado AFS's mission is not projected to decrease and no other military installation is readily located to provide the necessary support.

The Air Force projects that $116 in MILCON would be required to conduct Goodfellow AFB courses elsewhere, while the net cost of implementing the closure of Lowry is expected to be only $48M.

With Air Force enlisted accession dropping from 40,000 to 30,000 per year, the Air Force projects approximately 20% excess capacity in its Technical Training Centers (TTC) after Chanute AFB is closed in FY93. Lowry AFB contributes 17% of TTC facility capacity, Goodfellow AFB contributes only 6%. Closing Lowry AFB saves 11% more manpower ($5.7M annually) and annual Real Property Maintenance (RPM) savings are $5.5M more through closing Lowry AFB. Closing both bases would take more than the identified excess capacity, would require additional construction, and would jeopardize essential surge capacity.

Excess facilities at the other Technical Training Centers are more readily adapted to courses from Lowry AFB than Goodfellow AFB, due the classified and sensitive nature of most Goodfellow AFB courses and the resultant security requirements. Goodfellow therefore has a higher military value than Lowry.

SUBJECT: Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY

DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVES:

1. Close Plattsburgh AFB as a substitute for another base in the strategic category.

2. Close Plattsburgh AFB in addition to Loring AFB, ME.

DISCUSSION:

The Department is opposed to the closure of Plattsburgh AFB.

HQ SAC basing requirements substantiate the need for a northeastern tanker base. SAC can not operationally afford to close both Plattsburgh AFB and Loring AFB.

A northeast base is required for Tanker Task Force and MAC European/CENTCOM support missions. The task force operates six to eight rotational KC-135 aircraft supporting European bound aircraft deployments. The task force can not operate effectively from any base further west than Plattsburgh AFB and there would be a day-to-day Emergency War Order alert shortfall of 6-9 tankers should both bases close, even considering Air Reserve Component tanker beddown. Also, Tanker Task Force infrastructure is already in-place and operations are currently being conducted from Plattsburgh AFB.

Plattsburgh AFB has approximately 60% more aircraft parking space than Loring AFB and annual operating costs are $9 million less. Also, historical weather data shows less severe weather at Plattsburgh AFB. For these, and other reasons, Plattsburgh AFB ranks higher in military value than Loring AFB.

The most convincing argument for not closing both Plattsburgh and Loring AFBs was presented to the Commission in a classified session on June 6, 1991.

THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON D.C. 20318

CM-945-91
20 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Base Closure Commission Optional Base Closures

1. My staff, the unified and specified commands, and the Services have reviewed the latest additional list of bases being considered by the Base Closure Commission. A few of the proposals are of particular concern from an operational perspective.

a. MacDill AFB, FL. The Air Force recommendation, which you approved and sent to the commission, was to close the airfield but keep facilities and support for the CINCs. The commission's option of complete closure of MacDill would force us to relocate the headquarters of two unified commands and preclude options to move other headquarters to MacDill in the future. Also, the movement of major headquarters would be disruptive to continuity of operations.

b. Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA. Closure would seriously degrade drydock capability for all large ships in the Southern California area. Alternatives in Hawaii and Washington simply could not provide the services found at Long Beach.

c. Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, CA. Closure would virtually eliminate capacity for rapid expansion of recruit training during mobilization. Alternatives at Camp Pendleton and Parris Island could not duplicate the capacity of the San Diego facility.

d. Plattsburgh AFB, NY. Closure would adversely affect our ability to provide refueling for SIOP missions.

2. I believe it is important for us to express these concerns to the Base Closure Commission before it makes any final decision. I am ready to support you in whatever method you believe would be most effective to communicate these concerns.

COLIN L. POWELL
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON D C 20318

CM-945-91
20 June 1991

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COLIN L. POWELL
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

19 JUN 1991

Mr. Jim Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006-1604

Dear Mr. Courter:

This is in response to your letter of May 24 to Mrs. Livingstone requesting additional data on Army base closure and realignment candidates. Attached is a listing of all available data requested in your letter. We are unable to provide data for average operation and maintenance projects by contract.

Sincerely,

for ALBERT J. GENETTI, JR.
Colonel, GS
Director, Total Army Basing
Study

Enclosure

Copy Furnished:

Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Production and Logistics)

Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics, and
Environment)

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS

June 20, 1991

D-171

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed for your review and consideration are recent correspondence from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Comptroller of the Department of Defense regarding alternative Commission base closures or realignments.

Sincerely,

Colin McMillan

Colin McMillan

Enclosures

THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON D.C. 20318

CM-945-91
20 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Base Closure Commission Optional Base Closures

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COLIN L. POWELL
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

393-49 104

COMPTROLLER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

June 20, 1991

Honorable James Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Recent statements at your hearings would suggest that the Commission is considering additional proposals to close and consolidate several major activities of the newly formed Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). We urge you to defer this premature proposal so that we can complete a number of studies which I believe will provide a framework for any resultant realignment proposals for the Commission's consideration when it reconvenes in 1993.

DFAS, which has been in operation less than 5 months, comprises about 10,000 employees at six major centers (Cleveland, Columbus, Denver, Indianapolis, Kansas City, and Washington). These centers pay all active, reserve, and retired military and process major contract payments. The goal of DFAS is not only to streamline its current operations, but more importantly, to standardize and consolidate other financial functions such as civilian pay, travel reimbursements, and general accounting that are being performed in non-standard, decentralized fashion by some 40,000 people outside of DFAS. Standardization of these functions in addition to DFAS operations is the goal of this recent consolidation endeavor.

Study groups are currently working to determine the detailed steps necessary to transition to standard systems and consolidated operations for each of these functions. Concurrently, we have efforts underway to determine the optimum basing strategy for future operations. However, it is simply much too soon to forecast the results of these initiatives and realignments in the interim could severely compromise our consolidation objectives.

Since we have just begun this effort involving very complex and critical functions, the Department deliberately excluded the six DFAS centers from the current closure and realignment package. To the extent that the standardization initiatives yield base operations efficiencies, proposals will be forwarded in our next realignment package.

Cordially,

Sean O'Keefe
Comptroller

→ (I)

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

21 JUN 1991

The Honorable Jim Courter, Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street NW, Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Commission is considering for possible closure facilities for which the Department of Defense has an operational need. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has advised me that the following facilities under Commission discussion are of particular concern for the reasons indicated:

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The Secretary of Defense recommended to the Commission on April 11, 1991as follows:

> "MacDill AFB, Florida, is recommended for realignment and partial closure. Realign the 56th Tactical Training Wing's F-16s from MacDill AFB, to Luke AFB, Arizona. The Joint Communications Support Element will move to Charleston AFB, South Carolina. The airfield at MacDill AFB will close, those facilities that support flying operations will be disposed of and the remainder of MacDill AFB will become an administrative base."

The continuation of MacDill as an administrative base as the Secretary proposed would permit the Department to continue to maintain the headquarters of two unified commands at the base and preserve the option to move other headquarters to that base in the future. Complete closure would require movement of the two headquarters and disrupt the continuity of their operations.

Long Beach Naval Shipyard, California. The Secretary of Defense's recommendations to the Commission did not recommend closure or realignment of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, except for receipt by the Shipyard of ship support functions and a parcel of land to be transferred from the Long Beach Naval Station. Closure of the Shipyard would seriously degrade drydock capability for all large ships in the Southern California area. Alternatives in Hawaii and Washington simply could not provide the services found at Long Beach.

Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, California. The Secretary of Defense's recommendations to the Commission did not recommend closure or realignment of the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego. Closure of the Recruit Depot would virtually eliminate capacity for rapid expansion of recruit training during mobilization. Alternatives at Camp Pendleton and Parris Island could not duplicate the capacity of the San Diego Facility.

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York. The Secretary of Defense's recommendations to the Commission did not recommend closure or realignment of Plattsburgh Air Force Base. Closure would adversely affect the Department's ability to provide refueling for aircraft in the execution of the Single Integrated Operational Plan.

We urge the Commission to adopt the Secretary of Defense's recommendations as transmitted to the Commission on April 11.

Sincerely,

D J Atwood

39426

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

PRODUCTION AND
LOGISTICS

June 21, 1991

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed for your review and consideration is recent correspondence from the Comptroller of the Department of Defense regarding alternative Commission base closures or realignments.

Sincerely,

Colin McMillan

Enclosures

COMPTROLLER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

June 20, 1991

Honorable James Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Recent statements at your hearings would suggest that the Commission is considering additional proposals to close and consolidate several major activities of the newly formed Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). We urge you to defer this premature proposal so that we can complete a number of studies which I believe will provide a framework for any resultant realignment proposals for the Commission's consideration when it reconvenes in 1993.

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Study groups are currently working to determine the detailed steps necessary to transition to standard systems and consolidated operations for each of these functions. Concurrently, we have efforts underway to determine the optimum basing strategy for future operations. However, it is simply much too soon to forecast the results of these initiatives and realignments in the interim could severely compromise our consolidation objectives.

Since we have just begun this effort involving very complex and critical functions, the Department deliberately excluded the six DFAS centers from the current closure and realignment package. To the extent that the standardization initiatives yield base operations efficiencies, proposals will be forwarded in our next realignment package.

Cordially,

Sean O'Keefe
Comptroller

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20360-5000

24 JUN 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission letter of June 19, 1991

Encl: (1) Response to items 3, 4, and 5

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in partial response to the request for additional information forwarded by reference (a).

JACQUELINE E. SCHAFER

Copy to: OASD (P&L)

ADDITIONAL INFO REQUIRED FROM THE NAVY 19 JUNE 1991

Question 3: How does the Navy evaluate the Lindbergh Airfield encroachment problem to NTC San Diego and MCRD San Diego over the next 10 to 20 years? How about the noise pollution problem, now? There is no significant space for expansion for the NTC future use. What is the prospect that NTC will have to eventually move due to the encroachment of a growing city?

Response: MCRD San Diego is immediately adjacent to the Airport and has been the primary installation affected by the Airport's growth in physical size and level of operations. Specifics are:

(1) Encroachment - Until 1991, proponents of expanding Lindbergh Field to meet the City's long-term civil aviation demand placed serious pressure on MCRD. This pressure has been greatly reduced as the result of the City and general public's acceptance of the findings provided through a series of exhaustive studies on airport relocation and expansion potential of Lindbergh Field. While a number of alternatives were considered, the studies uniformly concluded that the inherent geographic limitations on Lindbergh Field preclude meeting the needs for an all weather jumbo jet airport. San Diego is proceeding with negotiations for a bi-national airport with Mexico. The President of Mexico has given his approval for formal study and negotiations on the proposal are proceeding favorably.

(2) Airport Role - Lindbergh Field's role will change to that of a regional commuter facility when the new bi-national airport becomes operational. Similar to other older airports in core urban areas, there will continue to be a demand for convenient short haul air transportation. Such use is compatible with Lindbergh Field's size and layout, which greatly diminishes demand for additional land and noise impacts on both MCRD and NTC.

(3) Noise - The problem has progressively improved based upon the continued introduction of Stage III (quiet) aircraft into the civil fleet and the imposition of daily curfew from 2300 to 0630. An ongoing FAA study of operations is expected to make numerous recommendations for further reducing noise impacts on MCRD and NTC. The impact of aircraft noise is further mitigated by our modern educational facilities, which are completely sound attenuated.

(4) Capacity - Although both MCRD and NTC are constrained geographically, their current through-put could readily be doubled under mobilization conditions. We have previously met this challenge for WWII, Korea and Vietnam. Additionally, as has been discussed previously, the opportunity to train 26% of the Fleet which are collocated in San Diego affords us a tremendous cost and quality of life benefit.

(5) Inevitability - With resolution of the City's airport capacity problem in sight, it is unlikely that either MCRD or NTC San Diego would be forced to relocate from encroachment. The areas surrounding the two facilities are established neighborhoods with little prospect for further growth or major redevelopment. The recent Base Closure Commission's hearing in San Diego underscored the strong community support for retention of both installations. Mayor Maureen O'Connor stated at that time "We've solved your problem. We're going to move the airport and you're going to have plenty of room.... I can assure you, commissioners, it may feel that [MCRD and NTC are being encroached]. But believe me, we are moving quite nicely forward to moving the airport. It will happen, I'm a native San Diegan. I feel as passionately about this issue as everybody behind me and guarantee you, we solved our problems in San Diego and if you want more land for the military, you shall receive it."

Question 4: Please explain further the restriction on training space consideration noted in the '88 study to relocate MCRD to Pendleton. What training would be impacted? How is the addition of this expanded training being addressed in projects or contracts?

Response: The 1988 commission coincided with the completion of a Marine Corps-wide 2-year study of Land and Training Area Requirements (LATAR). As documented therein, the modernization of the Marine Corps has provided a force that shoots further, moves faster, and provides more lethal firepower than ever before. This enhanced capability requires commensurate improvements in ranges and maneuver areas to train realistically. MCB Camp Pendleton is implementing the LATAR standards and recommendations and is in the process of completing a base-wide master plan for reorganizing training areas to take maximum advantage of limited space. Relocation of MCRD San Diego to the Base would remove land from training areas and detract from the Base's primary military value in hosting combined arms training for Fleet Marine Forces. Some of the specific training that would be impacted includes the Landing Craft Air Cushioned program, the expansion of the School of Infantry, and the moving tank target range.

A related issue is that water supplies for the base are limited, with the Base's aquifers being drawn on at essentially maximum safe yield. The introduction of the additional personnel loading would necessitate that water to support them be reallocated from other training and support mission functions.

Question 5: If the MCRD were relocated out of its present location would the land automatically go to the airport without DOD being reimbursed of any relocation costs? Under what authority does this take place?

Response: It would be fair to assume that the vast majority of MCRD San Diego would be transferred to other governmental entities through one or more of the low/no-cost public discount programs and/or through settling claims concerning MCRD's filled tide lands. The airport, however, would be only one of the potential recipients.

Approximately 40% of the MCRD occupies filled tidal lands (lands below the high tideline in 1919), in which the State of California claims an interest. The State has actively pursued claims of this nature whenever the concerned property was proposed for disposal, the most recent example being the State's claims against a nearby Navy joint venture project.

Lindbergh Field, even as a short haul commuter oriented facility, will have sufficient land requirements to make an excellent case for transfer under the authority of 50 U.S.C. 1622(g) -- which is the specific authority for Federal property to be transferred, without reimbursement, to local governmental entities for airport purposes. Airport purposes include parking lots, roadways and support services. Further, the provisions of 40 U.S.C. 485(h) states that priority for the transfer of military property is given to airport use following consideration for use by other military and federal agencies.

The area above the 1919 high tideline encompasses the arcade area, consisting of 25 structures and surrounding 110 acres, is listed in the National Register of Historic Places. Anticipated local competition for public purposes for this area through public discount allowance programs for parks, recreation, education and similar entitled public uses would probably leave little of the MCRD for actual sale for commercial reuse.

One significant factor that must be considered is City of San Diego's entitlement (zoning) authority, and that based on the MCRD's location adjacent to the airport, the City would have ample justification to zone the property solely for airport and recreation purposes. Such zoning would in essence guarantee the ultimate transfer of the lands for those purposes with or without a public discount allowance program.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
Ser 441D1/1U59785
25 Jun 91

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Encl: (1) Representative Molinari letter dated 18 June 18, 1991
(2) Answers Regarding Excess Capacity

1. Enclosure (1) requested information with regard to excess berthing capcacity and enclosure (2) was sent on June 25 in response. Both enclosures are provided for information and use in the event that similar questions arise during the Commission's deliberations.

P.W. Brennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to (without enclosures): OSD (P&L)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

11000
Memo 443D/ 74
25 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: REVISED COBRA MODEL FOR NAVAL ELECTRONICS SYSTEMS ENGINEERING ACTIVITY (NESEA), ST. INIGOES

Encl: (1) Revised COBRA for NESEA

1. Enclosure (1) revises Screen Six of the original COBRA model for NESEA St. Inigoes which had incorrectly reflected MRP and OBOS costs in thousands of dollars where the model required input in dollars. This correction increases steady state savings from $2.4 million to $4.8 million and reduces the years to break even from ten to six and the ROI years from six to two.

P.W. Brennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to: OASD (P&L)
ASN (RDA)

PD DAD

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

25 June 1991

The Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006-1604

Dear Mr. Chairman:

While I appreciate that your Commission must exercise independent judgement in reviewing our base closure and realignment recommendations, I am concerned that deviations from our recommendations would degrade military readiness, adversely affect the quality of life of Navy families, and cost more.

During our comprehensive base structure analysis, much attention was focused on the relative military value of each installation to support the projected smaller force structure, while still preserving adequate surge capacity for possible contingencies and reconstitution. Answers to the in depth inquiries of your staff provided clearer documentation and support of our previous conclusions. As a result, I remain totally confident that the recommendations submitted to the Commission are sound, completely consistent with the force structure plan, and in the best total interest of the National defense.

Our recommendations also are balanced with the declining budget. Thus, deletion of recommended closures would hollow the remaining force by driving offset reductions in other Navy programs. Conversely, we must not prematurely reduce our infrastructure, given the extended period over which force reductions will occur. Consequently, we believe that the substitutions being considered by the Commission would sub-optimize the military value intrensic in the integral set of recommendations we sent to the Commission. For example,

- Closure of Naval Shipyard (NSY) Long Beach, as a substitute for or in addition to NSY Philadelphia, would deprive the Navy of needed drydock capability for large ships on the West Coast, necessitating diversion of work to more distant shipyards, with attendant cost increases and major disruptions to the stability of families. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently expressed his concern over the operational implications of closing NSY Long Beach.

- Closure of Naval Air Station Kingsville or Meridian, instead of Chase Field, is unattractive because it would eliminate surge training capability, cost more, and delay achieving initial operating capability of the T-45 aircraft.

115
1U008576

• Closure of Naval Station (NAVSTA) New York at Staten Island would be a tragic loss of ample family housing and new state of the art facilities, ideally located for co-support of ships homeported at Staten Island and nearby Earle, and the large concentration of Reserve personnel residing in the Greater New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Area.

• Realignment to downsize NAVSTA Treasure Island does not make sense due to the support role it plays for the entire San Fransisco Bay Area Naval Complex.

• Closure of the Naval Training Center at San Diego in lieu of Orlando initially would cost more, ultimately save less, compromise the high military value of collocating a major training complex with a major Fleet concentration, and disrupt the training pipline for thousands of West Coast personnel. Severing collocation would also adversely affect the quality of life of sailors and their families. Closing just the Recruit Training Center by itself, as others have suggested, would provide no savings.

• Closure of Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego, as also highlighted by General Powell, would virtually eliminate surge capacity for rapid recruit training during mobilization.

Finally, I would like to emphasize the importance of the Navy's comprehnsive plan for consolidating laboratories and engineering, fleet support and RDT&E installations to the overall integrity of a smaller force structure and shore infrastructure. We are prepared to provide whatever additional briefings may be needed to explain the complexities of the plan.

Having agonized over these same alternatives myself, I know how difficult the decisions of the Commission will be. Having reviewed the issues in depth myself, I encourage you to forward our recommendations to the President without change.

In any event, we stand ready to assist the Commission however possible.

Sincerely,

H. Lawrence Garrett, III
Secretary of the Navy

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0103

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

June 25, 1991

Mr. Jim Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N. W.
Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. Courter:

Your letter of June 18, 1991 questions the Army's recommendations for Forts Dix and Chaffee in light of our desire to await the results of the ongoing reserve training strategy and installation management study. The Army's recommendations are consistent with our decision to await completion of the study before further evaluating the other major training areas.

As I noted in my June 12, 1991 letter, both Forts Dix and Chaffee have active tenants which do not support Reserve Component (RC) training or the installations' training mission. The planning and analysis done in support of the realignment of the Joint Readiness Training Center from Fort Chaffee and the implementation of the P. L. 100-526 recommendations for Fort Dix gave us a detailed picture of the capabilities of the installations and the units supported. The Army's proposals place Forts Dix and Chaffee on a similar footing with the other major training areas which, except for Fort Irwin, principally support the RC.

The issue of administrative control is immaterial at this time. Should the Army's proposal be accepted, our implementation planning process will dovetail with the study to find the best garrison control arrangements. We estimate that little or no manpower savings would be realized from the transfer of Forts A.P. Hill, Indiantown Gap, McCoy and Pickett to the RC. These installations are already minimally staffed. Detailed workload analyses are required for further validation.

I want to emphasize again that the Army has the authority to make changes in administrative control or garrison configuration outside of the P.L. 101-510 framework and will exercise that authority at the appropriate time.

I will provide a copy of this letter to Mr. Colin McMillan, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production & Logistics).

Sincerely,

Susan Livingstone

Susan Livingstone
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics & Environment)

The bottom line is that our BRAC 91 recommendations for Forts Dix and Chaffee close out the active component (AC) use of those installations. Portions of Fort Dix and all of Fort Chaffee would remain available for reserve component (RC) use.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20360-5000

25 JUN 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission letter of June 19, 1991

Encl: (1) Response to item 20

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in partial response to the request for additional information forwarded by reference (a).

JACQUELINE E. SCHAFER

Copy to: OASD (P&L)

20. Why did the BSC drop the following projects from the OP-05 MILCON requirements for the NAS Whidbey relocation to Lemoore:

- 140K SF maintenance hangar space in support of EA6B squadrons and FRS
- 50K SF of admin space support of EA6B squadrons and FRS
- 120K SF of storage support for relocating squadrons (warehouse)
- 4200 BBL of POL storage
- 45K SF of increased medical facility to handle increased medical load.

Response: The BSC's review of Lemoore's requirements acknowledged that it had a large excess capacity at present and that during the Vietnam era it had regularly housed 20-24 squadrons. These two facts resulted in a reduction of the hangar requirements by 140,000 sf. The BSC further recognized that this reduction could cause some crowding, but felt that the major budgetary reductions programmed for the outyears called for some scaling back.

Similar considerations entered in the BSC's decision to delete OP-05's requirement for 42,000 BL of POL capacity. They reasoned that all of the airplanes would be using the same type of fuel and that, even with varying rates of consumption, Lemoore would be able to function satisfactorily within its existing POL storage capacity, particularly since past history had shown this to be the case. Any anticipated shortfalls could be addressed by accelerating fuel delivery schedules.

The reduction in the requirement for additional medical facilities resulted from the fact that the naval hospital at Lemoore is highly underutilized. The BSC felt that 5,000 SF for expanded outpatient clinic services should satisfactorily accommodate the increased requirement at Lemoore.

The major reductions in both administrative space and storage reflected the opportunities for consolidations and economies of scale and the underutilized capacity at Lemoore. The BSC's decision to delete these requirements recognized that when capacity is underutilized over a period of time, personnel and organizations tend to expand to fit the available capacity and that significant opportunities existed for realigning requirements back to a more realistic level. This again was based upon the fact that during the Vietnam era Lemoore had supported a much larger number of squadrons than the current loading.

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS

June 26, 1991

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Chairman:

You asked for additional clarification of the Department's recommendation to close Forts Dix and Chaffee, while retaining facilities and training areas at both forts for use by the Reserve Components.

The critical issue, by far, is the recommendation to remove the active component missions from the two forts.

The permanent move of the Joint Readiness Training Center from Fort Chaffee to Fort Polk, and the realignment of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from Fort Polk to Fort Hood are critical to the Army's base restructuring plans. These interrelated actions reflect the reality of the smaller Army of the future. The Army has excess capacity in its fighting installations. By moving the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) to fill the void at Fort Hood, and changing Fort Polk from a fighting installation to a major training area, the Army reduces that excess capacity. After exhaustive studies begun in 1987, Fort Polk was found to be the best possible location for the Joint Readiness Training Center. Fort Chaffee does not have the facilities necessary to support the required number of rotations per year to fully train its light fighters. Furthermore, the training areas at Fort Polk better support the intensity of training required by the Center. If the Center is forced to remain at Fort Chaffee, the required facilities investment will be greater than that required to support the Army's recommendation.

With regard to Fort Dix, the 1988 recommendation realigned all of the active duty training functions out of the installation, but left a variety of active duty tenants in place, along with a large number of facilities in "mothball status."

The presence of these tenants, along with the excess facilities, forced the Army to maintain a garrison far larger than that needed to support a "semi-active" installation. The Army's recommendation recognizes that because of the smaller Army of the future, the mothballed facilities will no longer be required for mobilization. The active tenants can be served more cost effectively at other locations where space is now available. Reserve Component training requirements can be fully supported by retaining some facilities, the ranges and training areas, and a minimally sized garrison.

In short, Secretary Cheney has recommended changing the missions of Forts Dix and Chaffee to be more in line with those of Forts A.P. Hill, Indiantown Gap, Buchanan, Pickett and McCoy. I urge you to support the recommended moves of the Joint Readiness Training Center, the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the removal of active component tenants from Fort Dix.

Sincerely,

Colin McMillan

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS

O-150

June 26, 1991

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Chairman Courter:

Thank you for your letter of June 18, 1991, to Secretary Cheney concerning the Department's position on live chemical agent training.

The May 30, 1991, response you received from the Army reflects the Department's position on live agent training. The Department's decision to close Fort McClellan is the most efficient and effective use of our resources, while preserving the Department's flexibility in facing an uncertain future. Realistic live agent training is valuable, but is not essential. Currently, less than 5 percent of DoD's military personnel have an opportunity to train at the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility. Having the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility in caretaker status allows us to reconstitute this training capability, if required.

The Department of Defense will continue to provide other types of chemical defense training to the total force, for the foreseeable future. This training will also continue to be extended to other government agencies and foreign countries.

Finally, the entire package of recommendations including the decision to cease live agent training was supported by the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Sincerely,

Colin McMillan

Colin McMillan

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS

June 26, 1991

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Chairman:

You asked for additional information supporting the Army's plan to renovate Building One at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana.

Building One is the second largest administrative facility in DoD's inventory. Its 1.6 million square feet can support 5,000 people. There is simply no other facility available which could serve as a suitable alternative to continued operation of Building One at this time.

I recently forwarded to you the DoD Comptroller's reasons for not pursuing realignment of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service at this time. The enclosed Army Corps of Engineers' economic analysis confirms that renovation appears the most cost effective option.

Renovating Building One appears to be the optimal use of the Department's physical assets and its limited resources.

The DoD Comptroller concurs in this assessment.

Sincerely,

Colin McMillan

Enclosure

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-2600

RECEIVED

1991 JUN 21 PM 5:13

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

19 JUN 1991

DAEN-ZCP-A

21 JUN 1991

Paul W. Johnson
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations and Housing)
OASA (I, L&E)

MEMORANDUM THRU ~~ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (I, L&E)~~

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT: Economic Analysis for Building One

1. The Fiscal Year 1992 Army Military Construction budget contains the project for the Administration Building, Building One, at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. The Fiscal Year 1992 budget requests Total Authorization of $125,000,000 and Authorization of Appropriations of $25,000,000.

2. An executive summary of the economic analysis that supports this request is provided as requested. This analysis was prepared assuming a 1991 start and the conclusion remains valid for a 1992 start as requested. Major renovation was selected as the lowest cost alternative of the four feasible alternatives shown below.

OPTION	NET PRESENT VALUE
-Renovation	$154 million
-Third Party	$220 million
-New Construction	$240 million
-Leases	$576 million

FOR THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS:

Encl

PETER J. OFFRINGA
Major General, USA
Assistant Chief of Engineers

000239

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CF: COA
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

An Economic Analysis of Alternative Methods
of Providing 1,584,000 SF of Administrative Space
to Accommodate 5,000 Employees at Fort Benjamin Harrison.

A. OBJECTIVE: Provide adequate work space for 5000 personnel currently located at Fort Benjamin Harrison who require proper administration type work space in Building 1.

B. ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED:

1. Alternative 1 - Renovation. This plan would include removing asbestos, providing a raised floor system in administrative areas of Building 1 and modernizing the building.

2. Alternative 2 - New Construction. This plan would involve constructing an entirely new administration type facility for 5,000 employees.

3. Alternative 3 - Third Party. This plan would involve constructing a new building on post and financing the project through a third party. The Federal Government would make annual base payments over the period of analysis rather than pay construction costs initially as in the case of the MCA project.

4. Alternative 4 - Lease Off-Post. This plan would involve leasing existing office space off-post for 5,000 tenants located in Building 1.

5. Alternative 5 - Status Quo. This plan was not evaluated because the plan does not meet the objective of providing adequate administrative space and special use areas for 5000 personnel. Building 1 requires asbestos removal along with modernization of the existing building to fix the components of the building such as electrical system, roofing, insulation, and windows, which are either at or near replacement stage or are needed to increase energy savings.

C. METHODOLOGY. Each alternative was studied to determine the appropriate costs associated with each option. The costs were estimated for each alternative and compared over a 26-year period of analysis. Annual project costs were discounted at an 8.0 percent rate to calculate net present value (NPV) and equivalent uniform annual cost (EUAC) for each alternative.

D. RESULTS. Alternatives are ranked by net present value:

Alternative name	Net Present Value	Equivalent Uniform Annual Cost
1 Renovation	$154,810	$14,321
2 Third Party Project	$219,902	$20,343
3 New Construction	$239,904	$22,193
4 Lease Off-post	$575,901	$51,264

These results indicate the cost effectiveness of the alternative 1, renovation. In addition to the results above, several sensitivity analyses were performed to test the strength of the NPV and EUAC results. The results above proved insensitive to changes in the large cost items in this analysis. Based on the NPV results of this economic analysis, it is concluded that the least costly method of meeting the requirement to provide administrative work space for 5,000 employees at Fort Benjamin Harrison is by renovating Building 1. Recommend that this project be funded.

E. ASSUMPTIONS.

1. It is assumed that Building 1 will be demolished if new construction, third party financing of a new project or leasing alternatives were implemented.

2. It is assumed that if a new building were constructed it would be located adjacent to Building 1, allowing for use of existing parking.

3. It is assumed that adequate office space could be leased off-post. Multiple locations for the office space leased is likely.

4. Inflation for leasing (Alternative 4) is higher than inflation rates used for other cost items. Inflation rates are based on OCE Economic Briefs.

5. It is assumed that Building 1 will continued to be fully utilized (1,584,531 SF). All alternatives consider 1,584,531 SF as the necessary square footage required to meet the objective.

F. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS.

Large and volatile cost items in the analysis were allowed to change in order to see the effects of those changes on the NPV and EUAC results. If a small change in a certain cost or assumption results in the recommended alternative (renovation) being more expensive (a higher NPV than other alternatives), then the NPV results are sensitive to changes in those items. The following table summarize the results and conclusions of the sensitivity analyses performed:

Cost Item Changed	Alternative	Percent Change required to make Renovation not the least cost option
Cost to Renovate	Renovation	+ 104 percent
Construction Cost	New Construction	- 49 percent
Annual Payments	Third Party Constr.	- 50 percent
Annual Lease	Lease Off Post	- 79 percent

The degree of change required to reverse the NPV rankings is significant for all cost items tested. These results show that even if large errors in cost estimating occurred in preparation of this analysis, the renovation option is still likely to be the most cost effective alternative.

Dan Hill/CEMP-P

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS

June 26, 1991

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1628 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The enclosed letters were received from senior leaders within the Department of Defense intelligence communities. They are indicative of how far reaching the effects of closing Goodfellow Air Force Base would be. The directors express serious concern over the possibility of Goodfellow being included in your closure recommendations to the President.

As their letters indicate, Goodfellow AFB represents far more than an Air Force training center. Goodfellow is the premier multi-service joint intelligence training facility within the Department of Defense.

I urge you to support the Department's recommendations which did not include the closure of Goodfellow AFB in Texas.

Sincerely,

Colin McMillan

Colin McMillan

Enclosure

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3040

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

June 24, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS)

SUBJECT: Goodfellow AFB Closure

Colin

I have watched with considerable interest the base closure and realignment actions of both the Department of Defense and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Of particular concern is the addition of Goodfellow AFB as a possible closure site.

We consider Goodfellow AFB more than just an Air Force resource, since 70 percent of the training conducted there is, in fact, DoD Executive Agent training; approximately 50 percent of the students are from the other three Services attending Air Force-run courses. Beginning in 1985, we embarked on a two-fold effort to consolidate all Air Force intelligence training and upgrade the systems used to train intelligence specialists of all Services. All told, we have invested over $200 million in Goodfellow.

This consolidation and modernization of intelligence training was done with the full support of Congress. The multi-Service training environment supports the spirit of Goldwater-Nichols legislation for increased "jointness", and it gives us a tremendous asset to help implement the Secretary of Defense Plan for the Restructuring of Defense Intelligence, which includes many consolidation initiatives. Goodfellow includes specially constructed facilities to house the highly-sensitive equipment needed for our training mission; it would be extremely expensive to replicate these buildings and relocate the technical systems.

We support the retention of Goodfellow as a multi-Service intelligence training base.

Duane P. Andrews

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340

U-45/RDT

26 JUN 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS)

SUBJECT: Goodfellow AFB Closure

1. As the Department of Defense manager charged with ensuring the adequacy of general intelligence training, I would like to advise against any proposal that closes Goodfellow Technical Training Center, San Angelo, Texas. Such an action would have a very negative, disruptive and long-term impact on the entire DoD Intelligence Community. Goodfellow is a true joint Service training institution that teaches Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as Air Force personnel. Overall, 50 percent of Goodfellow's student throughput is not Air Force.

2. Goodfellow is the only DoD site for advanced imagery training, attended by both civilian and military analysts from all Services and national intelli-gence organizations. This training is considered critical in preparing intelligence personnel for joint assignments at the national and U&S Command level. The high technology, high classification, operations-like environment built over the past decade would probably not be replicated for many years. Thus, the relocation of these facilities would disrupt the training pipelines of the entire DoD Intelligence Community.

3. Finally, the Goodfellow facility is unique because of the co-location of cryptologic and general intelligence training which provides an opportunity for an integrated approach to the presentation of all-source intelligence. This type of training is essential in a joint environment. The Defense Intelligence Community can ill-afford to see Goodfellow closed.

Harry E. Soyster

HARRY E. SOYSTER
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Director

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

25 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS

SUBJECT: Closure of Goodfellow Air Force Base (U) - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

1. I understand that Goodfellow Air Force Base in Texas has been added to the supplemental list of military facilities to be considered by your Commission for possible closure. My purpose in writing you is to emphasize the critical role that Goodfellow cryptologic training plays in our overall national intelligence programs, the difficulty in moving this capability, and the damage that would accrue to national collection efforts were this capability to be lost or seriously degraded.

2. The 3480th Technical Training Wing, located at Goodfellow, trains over 6000 multi-service cryptologic personnel a year in cryptologic linguist skills for all major languages, intelligence analysis and reporting, cryptologic maintenance, and electronic intelligence. This training is delivered through the SENTINEL BRIGHT system, a $200M, computer-driven training system that is presently configured for over 700 terminals and eight mainframe computers, providing the primary training device for all linguistic and analysis/reporting training. Goodfellow presently has over 323,800 square feet of SCIF space, and large numbers of prime collection equipment (CFS/CSU, PARSEC, DCS ULLMAN) used for equipment maintenance.

3. The training pipeline for most sophisticated cryptologic skills is as long as two years. Goodfellow is a critical part of this pipeline, and the disruption of this training flow would have an extremely adverse impact on NSA's capability to fulfill its cryptologic mission. Additionally, the need to recreate these facilities elsewhere and move large, expensive computer systems would generate additional costs that would probably be difficult to support under the current funding environment.

4. I stand ready to provide your Commission any supporting data that will assist you in making a well-informed decision to the ultimate benefit of the cryptologic community and the DoD.

Very Respectfully,

W. O. Studeman

W. O. STUDEMAN
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS

June 26, 1991

The Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20300-1000

Dear Mr Courter:

The purpose of this letter is to request that in your recommendations on base closures and realignments, you indorse DoD's flexibility to reallocate real property or facilities pursuant to the 1990 Base Closure and Realignment Act, section 2905(b)(2)(D). We are particularly interested in potentially transferring military family housing (MFH) between military departments. Your upcoming closure recommendations could generate excess MFH that would help offset validated MFH shortages, alleviate quality of life problems, and save DoD dollars. Additionally, the Air Force may require long term access to the runway at Moffett Field.

The Air Force considers it essential to have continued access to a runway capable of supporting the air transportation needs of critical national security satellites. Currently, NAS Moffett accommodates air transport of oversized satellites, via specially modified C-5A aircraft, from manufacturing/assembly facilities at the collocated Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation to the launch bases. Transport of oversized satellites is accomplished through the use of a uniquely designed Space Cargo Transportation System (SCTS) that maintains critical environmental conditions for the satellite during transport. The large size and slow speed (5 mph maximum) of the SCTS make it impossible to transport over public highways without obtaining special permits and attracting considerable attention. The Air Force is exploring alternatives to NAS Moffett, including the potential use of the San Jose Airport or NAS Alameda. However, both of these options may likely result in significant operational drawbacks and additional expense even if feasible. Consequently, it is essential that if the reuse of NAS Moffett does not include an active runway, an option be maintained of operating the runway at NAS Moffett in lieu of deactivation.

We hope you will support these potential requirements in your recommendations on base closures and realignments.

Sincerely,

Colin McMillan

Colin McMillan

D-134

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
Ser 441D1/1U597854
26 JUN 91

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission letter of June 26, 1991

Encl: (1) MILCON Cost Breakdowns for NAVSTAs Long Beach, Philadelphia, and Puget Sound
(2) Carrier Major Repair, Overhaul, and Refueling Schedule
(3) COBRA Breakdown for NAS Whidbey Island

1. The following answers are provided in response to reference (a).

a. Question 1: In an attachment to his letter to Chairman Courter dated 22 May, 1991, Admiral Loftus stated that the land and facilities at Long Beach were rated yellow because "access to the port will be threatened by a container ship facility planned for the future." We understand that the ship channel will remain open and dredged to sufficient depth and width. In what regard, then, is access threatened? If it is based on any quantified assessment of the expected degradation of access, please provide that assessment.

Response: The planned container ship facility is a joint Army Corps of Engineers, Port Authority of Los Angeles and Port Authority of Long Beach project which will be built on landfill seaward of the existing mole at Long Beach. The project will not appreciabley affect the ability of the ship channel to physically accommodate Navy shiping but will, as planned, create an increase in ship traffic density in the approaches to the inner harbor at Long Beach. This added congestion can not be quantified and is based upon operational judgement that the approach to Long Beach will become commensurately more difficult with added shipping traffic. In addition, the commercial land traffic, both vehicular and train, immediately outside the Naval Station will increase significantly with attendant congestion and safety impacts. In general, Plan 2020 will create potentially significant encroachment, both from the land and water sides of the Naval Station.

b. Question 2: Please provide a breakdown of the percentage of reserves who currently drill onboard reserve ships who live outside the 100 mile radius that the Navy considers the standard radius for a reserve pool.

Response: There are currently 3800 Reservists drilling aboard NRF ships. Of this number, approximately 200 people, or 5.25%, commute more than 100 miles to drill aboard their assigned ship.

c. Question 3: Opponents of Naval Station New York have stated to commission staff that homeporting ships at Staten Island is less efficient and therefore more costly because it forgoes economies of scale available at larger naval bases like Norfolk. Has the Navy ever quantified this difference in cost? If so, please provide this data. If not, can it be quantified?

Response: Our research has not revealed any indication that such an analysis has been performed within Navy. Intuitively, a naval station with relatively fewer ships homeported (e.g., New York) could be assumed to have a higher "cost per ship hull" than a station with a larger number of homeported ships such as Norfolk. The difficulty in quantifying such costs with any accuracy, however, is that costs associated with direct ship homeporting support are not easily captured within the Navy budgeting system at either the naval station or ship levels, particularly at larger facilities that perform a myriad other functions and missions.

Such an undertaking would require significant resources depending on a number of factors including the level of detail and accuracy desired and the scope of the study. In effect, new accounting methods would be required to record the capitalization costs of piers, support infrastructure, security, etc. attributable to the presence of a ship that is not always in port.

In previous communications with the General Accounting Office, the Navy did estimate that the operation of the new strategic homeport sites would require base operating costs of approximately $ 35 - $ 50 million per year. While it appears that there may be economies of scale available at larger naval bases, potential cost savings is only one of many criteria by which Navy infrastructure has been planned, developed, and studied during base closure analysis. The military value criteria as described in VADM Loftus' letter of May 24, 1991 for NAVSTA New York form the basis for the Navy's decision to retain that naval station, not the issue of cost efficiency.

d. Question 4: Please provide cost breakdowns by type of project and location for the MILCON cost avoidance from the recommended closure of NAVSTA Long Beach and for the MILCON costs that result from the recommended closure of NAVSTAs Philadelphia,

and Puget Sound.

Response: See enclosure (1).

e. Question 5: Please provide schedule and shipyard for planned carrier major repairs, overhauls, and refuelings through 2005.

Response: See enclosure (2)

f. Question 6: Please provide completion dates for the NTU work listed on the Philadelphia-Long Beach comparison chart previously provided.

Response:

Ship	Dates	Shipyard
USS Biddle	86 Jul 15 - 87 Aug 02	Philadelphia
USS England	86 Oct 06 - 87 Nov 20	Long Beach
USS Dale	87 Jan 12 - 88 Jun 11	Philadelphia
USS Leahy	87 Jul 27 - 88 Jul 22	Long Beach
USS Scott	87 Jun 15 - 88 Aug 15	Philadelphia
USS Jouett	88 Apr 18 - 89 Aug 26	Long Beach
USS Kidd	88 Aug 16 - 89 Sep 14	Philadelphia
USS Horne	88 Oct 31 - 90 Jan 12	Long Beach
USS Callaghan	89 Sep 18 - 90 Oct 25	Long Beach

g. Question 7: The Navy has stated its intention to discontinue the carrier SLEP program. Congress had provided funds for a SLEP of the KENNEDY at PSNY (first year funding). If Congress is successful in requiring the Navy to perform this SLEP, where and when would the overhaul be performed?

Response: If the Congress is successful in funding the accomplishment of the KENNEDY SLEP at Philadelphia, it will be done there. The Navy's current plan had the KENNEDY's complex overhaul as a "to be determined" availability. The accomplishment of the KENNEDY's next major industrial availability does not preclude placing PSNY on the closure list and closing by 1996.

h. Question 8: Representatives of the Philadelphia community have stated that, if the closure/preservation proceeds, they may seek the ability to use the shipyard property for alternate purposes which would provide greater immediate economic benefit. A similar action related to Hunter's Point will soon eliminate the Navy's ability to use the drydock there for

emergent work. How does this potential action affect the closure recommendation?

Response: Much of the property remaining after the closure will not be available for private use, NAVSESS, the propeller and foundry shops, as well as the Navy Inactive Ship's Maintenance Facility will remain open. This extensive Navy commitment to the continued use of these facilities will preclude significant alternative use.

i. Question 9: The attached chart displaying large drydock requirements FY90-FY2000 was presented to the BSC. Subtracting the two large drydocks in Philadelphia shows a deficit for most of the period. Compare this data with others provided to the Commission that display excess drydock capacity.

Response: The NAVSEA presentation given to the BCC reflected a very conservative approach to assessing drydocking capacity.

NAVSEA's Data

-- The population included ships which could be done in other docks in addition to the large ships requiring CV/CVN docks.

-- Reflected a requirement to hold over 608 dockdays a year in reserve to meet emergent requirements.

-- Used 304 days as the maximum available dockdays per year in accordance with DoD capacity measurement considerations.

-- Includes ship docking requirements which can be docked together as a separate requirement (these were also ships which could be done in other docks but for efficiency were multiple docks.)

Other Data Shown to BCRC

-- Assessed the requirement for large docks separately from usage.

-- Discounted one empty dock on each coast for emergent repairs as our experience indicated that this was excessive.

-- Validated against actual drydock schedule.

-- Accepted the loss of flexibility if Philadelphia is closed, but kept the docks available in the event the facilities might be required.

Note: Philadelphia's drydock #3, although relatively large (about 1000 feet), was not considered as it was too small to dock a carrier.

j. Question 10: With regard to Recruit Training Command San Diego, how many staff personnel are there and how many of them reside in government quarters, i.e., officer family quarters, enlisted family quarters, officer bachelor quarters, and enlisted bachelor quarters?

Response provided by ASN I&E via separate correspondence.

k. Question 11: Please show a detailed breakdown of the COBRA displays that show $ 40 million in annual personnel savings associated with the closure of NAS Whidbey Island.

Response: Since the original COBRA analysis was developed for NAS Whidbey Island, the personnel numbers have undergone additional review by CNO (OP-05). Enclosure (3) provides updated numbers for NAS Whidbey Island and identifies the number of personnel planned for migration or elimination within each command now located at the Naval Air Station.

l. Question 12: Please provide the Commission answers to the questions in Congressman McCollum's letter to Secretary Schafer of 24 June. Some of these questions have previously been asked by the Commission but a good many others have not.

Response provided by ASN I&E via separate correspondence.

P.W. Drennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to (without enclosures): OSD (P&L)

0-155

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0103

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

26 June 1991

Mr. Jim Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N. W.
Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. Courter:

As the Commission continues its review of the Department of Defense's recommendation to close the Sacramento Army Depot and to distribute the communication workload as outlined in our 12 April 1991 report, I take this opportunity to reaffirm the exhaustive DoD analyses which concluded that it was not cost effective to keep the workload in the Sacramento area.

The base closure and realignment process is difficult, and we fully understand the desire to minimize turbulence and job loss in the affected communities. However, for every job <u>not</u> eliminated in the Department of Defense's Sacramento proposal, economics will require the Army to eliminate one and one half jobs elsewhere, most likely in Tobyhanna, an area much less capable of providing comparable alternative work in the civilian sector.

In addition, the notion that it will take 2 to 5 years to train people to receive Sacramento's workload is not supported by the facts. Workloads routinely shift both internally and externally at every depot. Training personnel to stay current with improved or new repair techniques is normal management practice throughout the depot system. Given appropriate training and management, the highly qualified workers who decide to move from the Sacramento area and the equally qualified workers already performing technically similar work at the receiving sites, like Tobyhanna, can easily be accommodated during the 2 to 5 years that it will take to transition the workload. This is quite different than saying that it will take 2 to 5 years to train the employees at receiving sites to perform the workload.

Prompted by community leaders in Sacramento and at my direction, the Army Audit Agency studied the cost differentials between Tobyhanna Army Depot and those of Sacramento. Their analysis shows that the cost to produce communication electronic repair work in Sacramento is 52 percent higher than the same amount of work in Tobyhanna.

After lengthy and detailed analysis, I wish to assure you that our depot maintenance strategic plan, of which the ground communication electronic workload is a part, is the optimal approach for the Services. We simply cannot afford any of the alternatives under consideration by the Commission.

Sincerely,

Susan Livingstone
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics & Environment)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

26 JUN 1990

O-156

Mr. Jim Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N. W.
Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. Courter:

This letter is in response to your letter to Mrs. Livingstone requesting information about the Electronic Technology and Device Laboratory at Fort Monmouth New Jersey.

The answers to your questions were prepared by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology and are attached next under.

If there are any further questions, we look forward to working with your staff to get them resolved quickly.

Sincerely,

John B. Nerger
Acting Director, Total
Army Basing Study

QUESTIONS FROM LETTER TO MS. LIVINGSTONE

1. What is current authorization and composition of ETDL?

ETDL wiring diagram is shown at attachment 1. The fiscal year 1990 and 1991 civilian authorizations for ETDL are 277 and 283 spaces respectively (Note: LAB 21 and DMR baseline data is October 1989).

2. What elements are proposed to relocate to Adelphi and what elements remain at Ft. Monmouth?

All ETDL functions, with the exception of 54 spaces associated with development and production efforts related to batteries, power sources and Pulse Power Center, will move to CMRL, Adelphi, MD. These 54 spaces will be transferred to CECOM.

3. ETDL currently has executive agency proponency for DOD programs. Where will the responsibility reside after the proposed realignment?

These will reside in CMRL, Adelphi, MD.

4. Does the residual ETDL capability go to CECOM or LABCOM?

The residual ETDL functions will transfer to CECOM.

5. Provide a final statement on the personnel eliminations and savings.

Personnel eliminations and savings associated with LAB 21 and COBRA analysis are shown at attachment 2.

6. How does the Army propose to retain mission capability with the personnel turbulence (relocations and attritions)?

The government now has the authority to pay bonuses, relocation costs, etc. that are comparable with industry. We recognize that the number who move will be dependent upon local economies at the time it occurs and we plan to conduct a massive effort to entice the people to move; we have approximately six years to manage the ETDL realignment in a smart way. The continuing downsizing of the Defense Industry will further ease this challenge.

ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY & DEVICES LABORATORY



LAB 21 SPACES ELIMINATED

	MIGRATION DIAGRAM					COBRA
	TOTAL		MIL		CIV	DELTA	CIV
CMRL	978	=	13 +		965	(+19 - 210)*	774
MRDC	203	=	84 +		119		119
	1181	=	97 +		1084		893
COE	(IN PLACE REDUCTION)						76
							969

* 1.COBRA INCL 19 SPACES SAVED FOR AIRMICS NOT SHOWN ON THE MIGRATION DIAGRAM
2. COBRA TOOK THE MOST CONSERVATIVE SAVINGS ASSUMING THE CMRL INSTALLATION SUPPORT ACTIVITY WOULD RETAIN 210 SPACES THAT MAY BE CONTRACTED OUT

CMRL REALIGNMENTS -- ADELPHI LABORATORY CENTER, MD

MISSILE RDEC
HUNTSVILLE, AL

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	76	1,657	1,733
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	30	30
AFTER	76	1,687	1,763

TACOM RDEC, DETROIT, MI
PROPULSION (21 SPACES)
TO NASA-LEWIS, OH

NASA (AVSCOM ONLY)
LEWIS, OH

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	0	41	41
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	1	20	21
AFTER	1	61	62

CENTER FOR NIGHT VISION AND ELECTRO-OPTICS, FT BELVOIR, VA

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	29	446	475
TRANS OUT	12	100	112
ELIM	1	0	1
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	16	346	362

ADELPHI LABORATORY CENTER
ADELPHI, MD

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	38	1,294	1,332
TRANS OUT	11	119*	130
ELIM	9	467	476
TRANS IN	14	447	461
AFTER	32	1,155	1,187

ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES LABORATORY, WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE, NM

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	3	190	193
TRANS OUT	1	46	47
ELIM	0	81	81
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	2	63	65

ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY AND DEVICES LABORATORY
FT MONMOUTH, NJ

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	1	277	278
TRANS OUT	1	211	212
ELIM	0	12	12
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	54**	54

HARRY DIAMOND LABS & INSTALLATION SPT ACT - WOODBRIDGE RES FACILITY
WOODBRIDGE, VA

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	0	90	90
TRANS OUT	0	90	90
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

ARMAMENT RDEC
PICATINNY ARSENAL, NJ

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	79	3,845	3,924
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	30	30
AFTER	79	3,875	3,954

DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY
ADELPHI, MD

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	0	0	0
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	29	29
AFTER	0	29	29

* Includes TPM (30 spaces) to Alexandria, VA
** Includes 39 spaces to be transferred to CECOM, Ft. Monmouth, NJ

NOTE: RDEC - Research, Development and Engineering Center

16 APR 91 0815

CMRL REALIGNMENTS --ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MD

NASA (AVSCOM ONLY), LANGLEY AFB, VA

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	1	42	43
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	20	20
AFTER	1	62	63

MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY, WATERTOWN, MASS

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	8	536	544
TRANS OUT	6	205	211
ELIM	2	331	333
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MD
Ballistic Research Lab, Human Engineering Lab, Vulnerability/Lethality Assessment Mgmt Office, Chemical RDEC*

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	50	983	1,033
TRANS OUT	2	15	17
ELIM	1	47	48
TRANS IN	15	279	294
AFTER	62	1,200	1,262

BELVOIR RDEC, FT BELVOIR, VA

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	46	890	936
TRANS OUT	4	40	44
ELIM	0	7	7
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	42	843	885

ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE ALEXANDRIA, VA

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	16	311	327
TRANS OUT	3	54	57
ELIM	0	20	20
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	13	237	250

NATICK RDEC NATICK, MASS

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	82	902	984
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	15	15
AFTER	82	917	999

* CRDEC shown only for transfer of 50 civilian & 2 military spaces to CMRL

NOTE: RDEC - Research, Development & Engineering Center

15 APR 91 1300

MEDICAL LAB21/RELIANCE REALIGNMENTS

PAGE 1 OF 2

INSTITUTE OF SURGICAL RESEARCH
FT. SAM HOUSTON, TX

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	153	74	227
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	29	8	37
AFTER	182	82	264

MIL/29, CIV/8
TRAUMA
RESEARCH

LETTERMAN ARMY INSTITUE OF RESEARCH
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CA

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	113	107	220
TRANS OUT	57	54	111
ELIM	56	53	109
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

MIL/17, CIV/16
BLOOD
RESEARCH

NAVAL MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
BETHESDA, MD

	MIL	CIV	TOT
COLLOCATE	17	16	33

COLLOCATE
65 NAVY
BILLETS
INFECTIOUS
DISEASE RES.

WALTER REED ARMY INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH
WASHINGTON, DC

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	355	383	738
TRANS OUT	2	5	7
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	353	378	731
COLLOCATE	32	33	65

COLLOCATE
MIL/11, CIV/30
LASER
BIOEFFECTS

COLLOCATE
MIL/2, CIV/5
MICROWAVE
BIOEFFECTS

NAVAL AEROSPACE MEDICAL RESEARCH LABORATORY
PENSACOLA, FL

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	40	54	94
TRANS OUT	2	15	17
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	38	39	67

COLLOCATE
MIL/2, CIV/15
MICROWAVE BIOEFFECTS

USAF SCHOOL OF AEROSPACE MEDICINE
BROOKS AFB, TX

	MIL	CIV	TOT
COLLOCATE	15	50	65

COLLOCATE
4 CIV USAF AUTH
HEAT PHYSIOLOGY

US ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE
NATICK, MA

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	76	92	168
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	76	92	168
COLLOCATE	0	4	4

MEDICAL LAB21/RELIANCE REALIGNMENTS

PAGE 2 OF 2

BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT LABORATORY FT. DETRICK, MD

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	26	93	119
TRANS OUT	9	38	47
ELIM	17	55	72
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

ARMY AEROMEDICAL RESEARCH LABORATORY FT. RUCKER, AL

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	70	68	138
TRANS OUT	1	2	3
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	69	66	135

INSTITUTE OF DENTAL RESEARCH WASHINGTON, DC

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	57	19	76
TRANS OUT	46	8	54
ELIM	11	11	22
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

CIV/8 MEDICAL MATERIEL →

COLLOCATE MIL/9, CIV/30 ENVIRN/OCCUP. TOXICOLOGY →

COLLOCATE MIL/1, CIV/2 BIODYNAMICS →

COLLOCATE MIL/46, CIV/8 COMBAT DENTISTRY →

US ARMY MEDICAL MATERIEL DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY FT. DETRICK, MD

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	20	34	54
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	8	8
AFTER	20	42	62

ARMSTRONG AEROSPACE MEDICAL LABORATORY WRIGHT-PATTERSON, AFB, OH

	MIL	CIV	TOT
COLLOCATE	42	74	116

COLLOCATE MIL/32, CIV/42 BIODYNAMICS ↑

NAVAL BIODYNAMICS LABORATORY NEW ORLEANS, LA

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	37	47	84
TRANS OUT	32	42	74
ELIM	6	4	10
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

NAVAL DENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE GREAT LAKES NAVAL BASE, IL

	MIL	CIV	TOT
COLLOCATE	46	8	54

TO: MR DAVE YENTZER 26 June 1991
FM: TABS

0-157

SUBJECT: ETDL

1. Reference your fax dated 24 Jun 91.

2. Attached are the answers you requested. They were also faxed to you yesterday.

3. The last page of attachment is the "bullet chart" that was requested after Mr Singley briefed the Chairman.

LTC Larouche

QUESTIONS FROM NOTE TO LTC LaROUCHE

1. Short statement on purpose of CMRL Adelphi & CMRL APG.

The LAB 21 initiative presented in the BRAC 91 submission was designed to improve the quality, productivity, and efficiency of Army research and development organizations, while increasing their ability to attract and retain high quality scientists and engineers.

Our organizational design for the laboratories was driven by our modernization vision, strategy and action plan as documented in the Army Technology Base Master Plan (ATBMP). Extensive analyses of numerous alternatives were conducted using a uniform set of evaluations factors and attributes. The LAB 21 factors used were consistent with and complementary to those used for the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure analyses, and represent those considerations which are critical to increased productivity and quality of products and services.

One of the key elements of the LAB 21 is the creation of a world class "flagship" laboratory called the Combat Materiel Research Laboratory (CMRL). If approved, the CMRL would be headquartered at Adelphi, MD, home for the following Directorates: Signatures, Sensors and Signal (S3) Processing; Battlefield Environmental Effects; Electronics and Power Sources; and Directed Energy. Lethality, Materials, Life Sciences, and Simulation/Modeling/Assessment Directorates of CMRL would be located at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, where extensive test and range capabilities already exist.

One objective is to significantly improve the quality and efficiency of our Corporate Laboratory system yet move as few people as possible (minimized personnel cost and turbulence) and require the least amount of costly construction. The solution was the two sites of Adelphi and Aberdeen Proving Ground. The bulk of the personnel were already at one of these two sites and the facility costs were the lowest for that combination. But, primarily there were significant technological advantages. It allowed for the clustering of electronic related technologies at one site. This meant that the Army would have the ability to collocate technologies and focus on the ability to see and provide command and control in a battlefield environment. It brought together the research of small electronic devices along with their power sources for the purpose of developing new sensors that relied upon optics, acoustics, and radar. With the incorporation of the battlefield environment effects technologies, it added the necessary elements for incorporating the atmospheric effects into the design of sensors.

At Aberdeen Proving Ground, it enabled the Army to bring together materials with lethality and survivability to address the "materials" aspects of surviving on the battlefield along with the assessment of vulnerabilities. The primary difference between the two sites is that Adelphi focuses on electronic elements and Aberdeen focuses primarily on materials related technologies. The other Aberdeen elements were left in place to minimize costs and to provide the advanced computing and human effects related elements for all the other technologies for both sites. The sites are less than one and a half hours drive apart.

2. Short statement on ETDL residual mission at Ft. Monmouth - CECOM.
   a. Will it become part of CECOM?
   b. What "branches" and "functions" remain?

Fifty-four ETDL spaces do not move to CMRL, Adelphi, MD. These spaces are associated with development and production efforts related to batteries, power sources and Pulse Power Center. They will be transferred to CECOM, Ft. Monmouth, NJ.

3. ETDL authorization and wiring diagram.
   a. What branches and functions move?

ETDL wiring diagram is shown at attachment 1. The fiscal year 1990 and 1991 civilian authorizations for ETDL are 277 and 283 spaces respectively (Note: LAB 21 and DMR baseline data is October 1989). All functions not associated with development and production efforts for batteries and power sources will move to CMRL, Adelphi, MD.

4. COBRA explanation vs. LABCOM briefs.
   a. Vitali shows 788 personnel savings.
   b. COBRA shows 969 personnel savings.
   c. Migration chart shows $48.5M personnel savings. Why is average salary so high?

Mr. Vitali's chart showed 774 CMRL civilian space savings, consistent with the COBRA analysis. Personnel eliminations and savings associated with LAB 21 and COBRA analysis are shown at attachment 2. The salary rate of $48.5M is based on actual experience in Army laboratories. The figure which includes salary and benefits includes scientists and engineers who are paid more than administrative and clerical workers.

5. ETDL has DOD executive agency for electronics mission like flat panel display & frequency control timing, plus others - Who will do that in future - CECOM or CMRL?

These will reside in CMRL, Adelphi, MD.

6. Comment on laser work moved to Ft. Belvoir in 85? Only 10% of people moved - how does Army expect to maintain readiness if 10% move?

The concern seems to be that only 10% will move. We do not think that that will be the case. The government now has the authority to pay bonuses, relocation costs, etc. that are comparable with industry. We recognize that the number who move will be dependent upon local economies at the time it occurs and we plan to conduct a massive effort to entice the people to move; we have approximately six years to manage the ETDL realignment in a smart way. The continuing downsizing of the Defense Industry will further ease this challenge.

7. Comment on Corporate Labs are moving to systems approach (true?) and Army is moving to materiel - dichotomy?

The Army proposes to streamline and improve its current corporate laboratory system: the geographically dispersed LABCOM. Our corporate laboratory must be aligned with those key technologies most important to the Army of the 21st century, as documented in the vision and strategy of the Army Technology Base Master Plan. The Army is undergoing this consolidation to take a systems approach to the technology development and integration essential to the Army advanced systems and concepts of the future. That is one of the fundamental tenets for consolidating related technologies. This consolidation will enhance the flexibility, synergism and application of the critical mass of resources.

8. Why is it more expensive to leave ETDL Ft. Monmouth?

All CMRL options which left ETDL at Ft. Monmouth were more expensive for the total CMRL cost. To leave ETDL at Ft. Monmouth would be suboptimizing. We must collocate ETDL with the other Adelphi, MD elements in order to achieve a true Sensors, Signal Porcessing and Signatures Directorate and program.

ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY & DEVICES LABORATORY

DIRECTOR
- Deputy Director
- Deputy for Development & Ops.
- Acquisition Program Manager

- Senior Research Scientist for Physical Sciences

- Plans & Programs Office
- Resource Management Office
- R&D Acquisition Office

Electronic Devices Research Division
- Emerging Technologies Office
- Electronic Materials Branch
- Solid State Electronics Branch
- Frequency Control & Timing Branch
- Integrated Device Technology Branch

Microwave & Signal Processing Devices Division
- Microwave/Lightwave Branch
- Analog Signal Processing Devices Branch
- Microwave/Millimeter Wave Tubes Branch
- Pulse Power Technology Branch

Microelectronics/Display Division
- Circuits & Subsystems Design Branch
- Integrated Circuits Branch
- Microelectronic Subsystems Development Branch
- Display Devices & Technology Branch

Power Sources Division
- Chemical Research Branch
- Battery Development/ Engineering Development Branch
- Power Sources Systems Branch

Reliability, Logistics & Standardization Division
- Standardization & Parts Control Branch
- Rel., Test & Quality Assurance Branch
- Operations Engineering Branch
- System Support Team

LAB 21 SPACES ELIMINATED

	MIGRATION DIAGRAM					COBRA
	TOTAL		MIL		CIV	DELTA	CIV
CMRL	978	=	13 +		965	(+19 - 210)*	774
MRDC	203	=	84 +		119		119
	1181	=	97 +		1084		893
COE	(IN PLACE REDUCTION)						76
							969

* 1.COBRA INCL 19 SPACES SAVED FOR AIRMICS NOT SHOWN ON THE MIGRATION DIAGRAM
2. COBRA TOOK THE MOST CONSERVATIVE SAVINGS ASSUMING THE CMRL INSTALLATION SUPPORT ACTIVITY WOULD RETAIN 210 SPACES THAT MAY BE CONTRACTED OUT

CMRL REALIGNMENTS -- ADELPHI LABORATORY CENTER, MD

CENTER FOR NIGHT VISION AND ELECTRO-OPTICS, FT BELVOIR, VA

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	29	446	475
TRANS OUT	12	100	112
ELIM	1	0	1
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	16	346	362

ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES LABORATORY, WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE, NM

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	3	190	193
TRANS OUT	1	46	47
ELIM	0	81	81
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	2	63	65

ARMAMENT RDEC PICATINNY ARSENAL, NJ

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	79	3,845	3,924
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	30	30
AFTER	79	3,875	3,954

MISSILE RDEC HUNTSVILLE, AL

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	76	1,657	1,733
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	30	30
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ADELPHI LABORATORY CENTER ADELPHI, MD

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	38	1,294	1,332
TRANS OUT	11	119*	130
ELIM	9	467	476
TRANS IN	14	447	461
AFTER	32	1,155	1,187

HARRY DIAMOND LABS & INSTALLATION SPT ACT - WOODBRIDGE RES FACILITY WOODBRIDGE, VA

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	0	90	90
TRANS OUT	0	90	90
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

TACOM RDEC, DETROIT, MI PROPULSION (21 SPACES) TO NASA-LEWIS, OH

NASA (AVSCOM ONLY) LEWIS, OH

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	0	41	41
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	1	20	21
AFTER	1	61	62

ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY AND DEVICES LABORATORY FT MONMOUTH, NJ

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	1	277	278
TRANS OUT	1	211	212
ELIM	0	12	12
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	54**	54

DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY ADELPHI, MD

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	0	0	0
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	29	29
AFTER	0	29	29

* Includes TPM (30 spaces) to Alexandria, VA

** Includes 39 spaces to be transferred to CECOM, Ft. Monmouth, NJ

NOTE: RDEC - Research, Development and Engineering Center

16 APR 91 0815

CMRL REALIGNMENTS --ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MD

NASA (AVSCOM ONLY), LANGLEY AFB, VA

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	1	42	43
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	20	20
AFTER	1	62	63

MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY, WATERTOWN, MASS

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	8	536	544
TRANS OUT	6	205	211
ELIM	2	331	333
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MD
Ballistic Research Lab, Human Engineering Lab, Vulnerability/Lethality Assessment Mgmt Office, Chemical RDEC*

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	50	983	1,033
TRANS OUT	2	15	17
ELIM	1	47	48
TRANS IN	15	279	294
AFTER	62	1,200	1,262

BELVOIR RDEC, FT BELVOIR, VA

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	46	890	936
TRANS OUT	4	40	44
ELIM	0	7	7
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	42	843	885

ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE ALEXANDRIA, VA

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	16	311	327
TRANS OUT	3	54	57
ELIM	0	20	20
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	13	237	250

NATICK RDEC NATICK, MASS

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	82	902	984
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	15	15
AFTER	82	917	999

* CRDEC shown only for transfer of 50 civilian & 2 military spaces to CMRL.

NOTE: RDEC - Research, Development & Engineering Center

15 APR 91 1300

MEDICAL LAB21/RELIANCE REALIGNMENTS

PAGE 1 OF 2

INSTITUTE OF SURGICAL RESEARCH
FT. SAM HOUSTON, TX

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	153	74	227
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	29	8	37
AFTER	182	82	264

MIL/29, CIV/8
TRAUMA
RESEARCH

LETTERMAN ARMY INSTITUE OF RESEARCH
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CA

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	113	107	220
TRANS OUT	57	54	111
ELIM	56	53	109
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

MIL/17, CIV/16
BLOOD
RESEARCH

NAVAL MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
BETHESDA, MD

	MIL	CIV	TOT
COLLOCATE	17	16	33

COLLOCATE
65 NAVY
BILLETS
INFECTIOUS
DISEASE RES.

WALTER REED ARMY INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH
WASHINGTON, DC

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	355	383	738
TRANS OUT	2	5	7
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	353	378	731
COLLOCATE	32	33	65

COLLOCATE
MIL/11, CIV/30
LASER
BIOEFFECTS

NAVAL AEROSPACE MEDICAL RESEARCH LABORATORY
PENSACOLA, FL

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	40	54	94
TRANS OUT	2	15	17
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	38	39	67

COLLOCATE
MIL/2, CIV/15
MICROWAVE BIOEFFECTS

USAF SCHOOL OF AEROSPACE MEDICINE
BROOKS AFB, TX

	MIL	CIV	TOT
COLLOCATE	15	50	65

COLLOCATE
MIL/2, CIV/5
MICROWAVE
BIOEFFECTS

COLLOCATE
4 CIV USAF AUTH
HEAT PHYSIOLOGY

US ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE
NATICK, MA

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	76	92	168
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	76	92	168
COLLOCATE	0	4	4

MEDICAL LAB21/RELIANCE REALIGNMENTS

PAGE 2 OF 2

BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT LABORATORY FT. DETRICK, MD

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	26	93	119
TRANS OUT	9	38	47
ELIM	17	55	72
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

ARMY AEROMEDICAL RESEARCH LABORATORY FT. RUCKER, AL

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	70	68	138
TRANS OUT	1	2	3
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	69	66	135

INSTITUTE OF DENTAL RESEARCH WASHINGTON, DC

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	57	19	76
TRANS OUT	46	8	54
ELIM	11	11	22
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

CIV/8 MEDICAL MATERIEL →

COLLOCATE MIL/9, CIV/30 ENVIRN/OCCUP. TOXICOLOGY →

COLLOCATE MIL/1, CIV/2 BIODYNAMICS →

COLLOCATE MIL/46, CIV/8 COMBAT DENTISTRY →

US ARMY MEDICAL MATERIEL DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY FT. DETRICK, MD

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	20	34	54
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	8	8
AFTER	20	42	62

ARMSTRONG AEROSPACE MEDICAL LABORATORY WRIGHT-PATTERSON, AFB, OH

	MIL	CIV	TOT
COLLOCATE	42	74	116

COLLOCATE MIL/32, CIV/42 BIODYNAMICS ↑

NAVAL BIODYNAMICS LABORATORY NEW ORLEANS, LA

	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	37	47	84
TRANS OUT	32	42	74
ELIM	6	4	10
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

NAVAL DENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE GREAT LAKES NAVAL BASE, IL

	MIL	CIV	TOT
COLLOCATE	46	8	54

ETDL AT CMRL ADELPHI

- COLLOCATION OF ESSENTIAL RESEARCH DISCIPLINES FOR:
  - SEEING AND RECOGNIZING THE ENEMY (MICRO-ELECTRONICS, BATTERIES, SIGNAL PROCESSING & ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON SENSORS)
  - DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPON SYSTEMS (ELECTRONIC SOLID STATE SWITCHING, ELECTRICAL POWER STORAGE & CONTROL, LASERS , & HIGH POWER MICROWAVE DEVICES)
  - HARDENING ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS OF THE FUTURE TO RADIATION PHENOMENA
  - SIGNAL PROCESSORS, INTELLIGENCE FUSION SYSTEMS & COMPUTERS FOR AIRLAND BATTLE MANAGEMENT
- MORE EFFICIENT, STATE-OF-THE-ART LABORATORIES FOR THE AREAS MENTIONED ABOVE
- REDUCED MANAGEMENT LAYERING & OVERHEAD

0-158

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
Memo 441D1/75
26 June 1991

MEMORANDUM

From: RADM P.W. Drennon

To: Mr. A. Yellin

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Encl: (1) Historical Strike Pilot Training Statistics

1. As requested during our phone conversation of earlier this week, enclosure (1) provides a historical summary of strike pilot training rates.

P.W. Drennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to (without enclosure): OSD (P&L)

NAVAL AIR TRAINING COMMAND PRODUCTION

	STRIKE PILOTS			TOTAL PILOT ALL TYPES
	NAVY	MARINE	TOTAL	
1970	692	369	1061	2450
1971	665	259	924	1809
1972	531	176	707	1853
1973	433	223	656	1650
1974	401	192	593	1447
1975	332	139	471	1337
1976	324	137	461	1350
1977	346	149	495	1196
1978	276	99	375	934
1979	208	76	284	871
1980	320	178	498	1471
1981	314	185	499	1482
1982	312	207	519	1515
1983	327	182	509	1424
1984	306	155	461	1370
1985	304	120	424	1343
1986	355	105	460	1437
1987	376	103	479	1480
1988	315	105	420	1452
1989	341	109	450	1528
1990	315	152	467	1474
1991	*251	*154	*405	*1347
1992	*205	*150	*355	*1334
1993	*265	*152	*377	*1355
1994	*265	*149	*414	*1386
1995	*265	*146	*411	*1382
1996	*265	*129	*394	*1356
1997	*265	*123	*388	*1358

* INDICATES PROJECTION

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

C-159

IN REPLY REFER TO

11000
Memo 443D/
27 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: REVISED COBRA MODEL FOR NAVAL STATION LONG BEACH

Encl: (1) Revised COBRA for NAVSTA Long Beach

1. Conversations with your staff indicates they may not have received enclosure (1) which revises personnel numbers in the original COBRA model for NAVSTA Long Beach. Due to a mathematical error, the original model incorrectly included non-appropriated instrumentality personnel. Since these personnel are off-budget they should not have been included in COBRA calculations. This correction decreases one-time costs from $31.1 million to $30.9 million and steady state savings from $99.4 million to $73.2 million. These changes have no impact on the number of years to break even or achieve return on investment and both remain zero.

Copy to: OASD (P&L)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D C 20350-1000

0-160

27 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission questions for Service Secretaries and Secretary Garrett

Encl: (1) DD Form 2136 sheets (Insert for the Record)

As requested by reference (a), enclosure (1) responds to questions from the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

H. Lawrence Garrett, III
Secretary of the Navy

INSERT FOR THE RECORD					
HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SERVICES 1

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: After this round of closures and realignments, will sufficient capacity exist to expand and sustain training during future conflicts?
Answer: Yes. Although our overall maximum capacity to train new recruits and conduct specialized skill training will be reduced, current projections can be met. There also exists the capability to mobilize the Recruit Training Commands (RTCs) and the Service Schools Commands (SSCs) to meet unexpected accessions and fleet training requirements.

Current accession projections indicate the highest recruit training requirement through FY-97 is 76.6K. The "peacetime" capacity of RTC Great Lakes is 51.5K (given FY-92 MILCON for galley renovation) and of RTC San Diego is 30.4K, a total of 81.9K recruits. The mobilization capacities for RTC Great Lakes and RTC San Diego are 97.9K and 81.2K respectively.

Present and future specialized skill training requirements can be accommodated, but this is predicated upon completing MILCON to relocate instructional and bachelor quarters facilities from Orlando. With the MILCON projects complete, Great Lakes and San Diego SSCs can also mobilize to meet increased requirements by double and triple shifting the school house.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1		DATE PREPARED
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144		3 MAY 91

COORDINATION

OFFICE	45N(16E)	OPA						
NAME	R H RICE EA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/19/91	6/19						

DD FORM 1 NOV 77 2136

INSERT FOR THE RECORD

HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SERVICES 2

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: What will be the impact if no land sale proceeds are realized as part of the closure and realignment process? What was the basis for calculating your land-value estimates and how were these estimates used in making your return-on-investment calculations?

Answer: The Department of the Navy did not consider proceeds from land sales when calculating return-on-investment for its base closure and realignment candidates except in the case of Marine Corps Air Station at Tustin, California, which presented unique opportunities because of its location and its potential for commercial development. Our land value estimates were calculated based on a number of factors, including that adjacent finished building lots have sold for over $1 million per acre. Recognizing that developing finished lots at MCAS Tustin would entail expensive demolition costs, along with the installation of new roads and utilities, and so on, we estimated $449.6 million in land sale proceeds for its 1,249 acres. Return-on-investment calculations were made using the standardized COBRA model. Within the model, the sale of the land was treated as a $449.6 million savings in the last year of execution. If no land sale proceeds are realized from the closure of MCAS Tustin, the closure will not provide a reasonable return-on-investment.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1							
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144						DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91	
COORDINATION								
OFFICE	4SW(166)							
NAME	R.H. RICE EA							
DATE	6/14/91	6/19						

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INSERT FOR THE RECORD					
HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SERVICES 3

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: What will be the impact on the force structure if no bases are closed?

Answer: In FY 90, $6.2 billion (FY 91 dollars) was spent to operate and maintain our bases. DoD is projecting a 25 percent reduction in funding over the FYDP, or a reduction of about $1.6 billion in base operating accounts. In order to operate at this level of funding, requirements and inventory must be reduced. With projected force level reductions, bases that are no longer required must be closed. If bases are not closed the procurement and fleet operation accounts will have to be "robbed" to operate and maintain our bases. This will adversely affect our ability to support the projected force structure. If base maintenance and operations were not funded, the quality of life for our personnel will be degraded, adversely affecting retention and productivity.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1							
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144							DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91
COORDINATION								
OFFICE	43W(1+8)	OPA						
NAME	R.H. Rice EA	[illegible]						
DATE	5/14/91	5/19						

DD FORM 1 NOV 77 2136 S/N 0102-LF-002-1360

INSERT FOR THE RECORD

HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SERVICES 4

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: The Base Closure and Realignment Act allows bases in Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and other territories and possessions to be included in this review. Did you treat all bases in these areas on equal footing with other bases?

Answer: We included bases on Guam in our review, notwithstanding their forward location, because of the potential for consolidation with the Air Force. NAVSTA Roosevelt Roads was excluded from the review because of its unique training mission.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1						DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91	
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144							
COORDINATION								
OFFICE	ASN(I&E)	OPA						
NAME	R.H. Rick EA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/14						

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INSERT FOR THE RECORD					
HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SERVICES 5

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: Do you anticipate additional closures or realignments in your Service's base structure in rounds 1993 and 1995?

Answer: Yes, we anticipate force structure and workload changes currently outside of the 6 year window of the 1991 round which may permit additional closures.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1	DATE PREPARED
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144	3 MAY 91

COORDINATION

OFFICE	ASN(I&E)	OPA						
NAME	ZH. Rice EA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/11/91	6/11						

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INSERT FOR THE RECORD					
HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SERVICES 6

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: Did you consider relocating your Service's assets to sister service installations?

Answer: Yes, but few installations had appropriate maritime services-related facilities; none that matched.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1	DATE PREPARED
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144	3 MAY 91

COORDINATION

OFFICE	ASN(I&E)	OPA						
NAME	R.H. Rice EA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/14						

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HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SERVICES 7

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: Describe how the three categories of criteria: military value (criteria 1-4), return on investment (criterion 5) and impacts (criteria 6-8) were used in your respective processes. Describe the degree of emphasis placed on each of these categories.

Answer: The Department of the Navy used the final criteria in performing the comprehensive review of the Navy shore establishment in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for FY-91. Priority consideration was given to the military value criteria (criteria 1-4).

During Phase I, the BSC evaluated all installations in each category with excess capacity against the OSD final criteria 1-4 (military value), using operators input, presentations to the BSC, and other requested information. During Phase II, after identifying exclusions from further review, the remaining installations were subjected to an initial analysis of options and costs which led to final candidates for closure or realignment. Also during Phase II, after applying criteria 6-8 and checking business-decision validity by evaluating the return on investment (criterion 5) for each final candidate, final recommendations were made.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1	
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144	DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91

COORDINATION

OFFICE	ASN(I&E)	OPA						
NAME	R.H. RICE EA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/14						

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HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER	BCRC	
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.		INSERT NO.		SERVICES 8	

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: Were there any cases where the military value of bases rated evenly and, therefore, the impact criteria became decisive in recommending a base for closure or realignment? Were any environmental impacts significant enough to recommend a base for closure or realignment?

Answer: No. None of the environmental impacts were significant enough to override the recommendations from Phase I. Phase II impacts, which include environmental as well as economic and community support were reviewed only for those bases which screened for possible closure/realignment after having been evaluated based on its military value (Phase I). Environmental impacts were not used to identify candidates.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1							
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144						DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91	
COORDINATION								
OFFICE	ASN(I&E)	OPA						
NAME	RH. RICE EA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/14						

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HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SERVICES 9

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: Were any local economic impacts significant enough to recommend or not recommend a base for closure or realignment.

Answer: No. Although economic impacts associated with possible base closure were considered, none of the impacts were significant enough to override the military value assessments from Phase I.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1	
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144	DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91

COORDINATION

OFFICE	ASW(I&E)	OPA						
NAME	R.H. RICE FA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/19						

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INSERT FOR THE RECORD								
HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC			
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.	SERVICES 10				

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: Were any bases specifically included or excluded from your recommended closure and realignment list as a result of Operation Shield or Desert Storm? If yes, which ones and why?

Answer: No bases were included or excluded in our review as a result of Operation Desert Shield or Desert Storm.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1							
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144						DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91	
COORDINATION								
OFFICE	4SW(NE)	UPA						
NAME	RH Rice BA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/4/91	6/14						

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HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SERVICES 11

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: Please provide the Commission with a list of your proposed under-threshold closures or realignments for fiscal years '91, '92, and '93.

Answer: The under-threshold closure/realignment candidates are being reviewed through separate procedures which have not yet resulted in any final decisions.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1							
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144							DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91
COORDINATION								
OFFICE	ASN (MR)	OPA						
NAME	R.H. RICE EA							
DATE	6/14/91	6/14						

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HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SERVICES 12

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: Explain why employment was the only economic factor calculated and used for characterizing the local economic impact of criterion 6?

Answer: ASD (P&L) policy guidance of 13 February 1991 prescribed: "Economic impact on communities will be measured by the direct and indirect effect on employment at closing and realigning bases, as well as at receiving locations." Additionally, the Office of Economic Adjustment developed computerized spreadsheets to quantify the employment rates based on the formulae and rationale used in 1988, with the addition of appropriate multipliers to measure indirect economic impacts.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1	
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144	DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91

COORDINATION

OFFICE	ASN (I&E)	CDA						
NAME	RH Rice BA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/14						

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HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SERVICES 13

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: What was the significance of identifying whether or not a base recommended for closure or realignment was on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List (NPL)? Was the fact a base was on or not on the NPL a factor in your process for evaluating environmental impacts?

Answer: ASD (P&L) policy guidance of 13 February 1991 prescribed that a summary statement and status be provided for seven key environmental attributes at each installation affected by the closure/realignment action, including receiving installations. Among the key attributes was Hazardous Materials/Wastes which included identifying whether or not the base was on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List (NPL). The fact that a base was on or not on the NPL was not a significant factor in our evaluation.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1	
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144	DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91

COORDINATION

OFFICE	4SW(PE)	OPA						
NAME	R.H. Rice CA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/19						

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HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SECNAV 1

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: Are there any of the nuclear-capable shipyards also able to support conventional ships? If yes, why did you exclude them from your analysis?

Answer: With the exception of Portsmouth (which works primarily on nuclear submarines), the nuclear-capable shipyards also support certain classes of conventional ships. All naval shipyards were included in our analysis. However, the nuclear-capable yards were excluded because the capacity analysis clearly showed that the nuclear workload in the late 1990s will require all nuclear-capable shipyards. This workload includes SSN-688 and CGN refuelings.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1	
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144	DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91

COORDINATION

OFFICE	45N(16A)	NA						
NAME	R.H. RICE EA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/14						

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INSERT FOR THE RECORD						
USE / DATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC	
NG DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SECNAV 2	

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: Do you anticipate that any of the 17 bases you have recommended for realignment this year will be prime candidates for closure in 1993 and 1995, as appears to have happened in the case of Sand Point Naval Station?

Answer: No. If they could have been closure candidates we would have recommended their closure.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1						DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91	
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144							
COORDINATION								
OFFICE	ASN(I&E)	OPA						
NAME	E.H. Rice EA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/1/91	[illegible]						

INSERT FOR THE RECORD

SE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE	OTHER		
ATE		SENATE		SENATE	BCRC		
G DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SECNAV 3		

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: Why are you adding units and personnel to NAS Lemoore when housing in this high-cost area is already seriously deficient?

Answer: NAS Lemoore is our newest jet base. There is significant excess hangar and apron space available at NAS Lemoore and it is located in an area which will be free of encroachment for many years. Studies conducted to evaluate the impact of introducing the A-12 aircraft at NAS Lemoore indicated that local family housing and schools were capable of accommodating all of the Medium Attack squadrons stationed at NAS Whidbey Island.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1							
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144						DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91	
COORDINATION								
OFFICE	ASN (I&E)							
NAME	RH Rice							
DATE	6/14/91							

INSERT FOR THE RECORD					
HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SECNAV 4

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: Why didn't the severe employment impact of closing Whidbey Island (58.3%) seem to have any influence over the recommendation to close the base?

Answer: Employment impacts were considered, as were other criteria (environment, community infrastructure, military value, force structure, etc.). While the analysis did, in fact, indicate severe employment impacts, other factors were weighed and the conclusion was made to recommend closure.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1	
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144	DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91

COORDINATION

OFFICE	ASN (I&E)	OPA						
NAME	R.H. Rice EA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/14						

DD FORM 1 NOV 77 2136

INSERT FOR THE RECORD

HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SECNAV 5

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: In your justification for closing NTC Orlando, the Navy stated it needs "slightly over two Recruit Training Centers." The closure of NTC Orlando would bring you down to only two centers. How would the Navy then be able to absorb what appears to be an extra demand for training?

Answer: Given current capability, on average the Navy will need slightly more than two RTCs. However, planned FY-92 MILCON for a galley renovation at Great Lakes will expand its capability. Projected recruit training requirements can then be met with RTC Great Lakes, by far our largest RTC, and one other RTC.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1							DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144							
COORDINATION								
OFFICE	ASN(I&E)	OPA						
NAME	RH Rice GA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/19						

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HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE		HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE		HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.		LINE NO.		INSERT NO.		SECNAV 6

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: Define the phrase "high cost" used in the justifications for the recommended closure of Long Beach and Philadelphia Naval Stations. Does this refer to the high cost of living for service members or the high operational costs?

Answer: The phrase "high cost" refers to the cost to the service member. (Screen 4 of COBRA analysis depicts the relative VHA/per diem costs for each site - ex. the San Diego VHA/per diem rate is lower than Long Beach, while the Philadelphia rate is higher than Norfolk, but lower than Staten Island).

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1							
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144						DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91	
COORDINATION								
OFFICE	ASN(I&E)	[illegible]						
NAME	R.H. RICE EA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/14						

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HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SECNAV 7

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: Specifically, how does the closure of overseas naval bases affect your recommendations for closing and realigning CONUS bases?

Answer: Overseas actions were considered in identifying CONUS closures. The closure of naval bases overseas had minimal impact on the closure and realignment recommendations for CONUS bases. The vast majority of the Navy's force structure is homeported in CONUS with overseas sites used primarily for deployment support.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1	
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144	DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91

COORDINATION

OFFICE	ASN(I&E)	OPA						
NAME	R H RICE EA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/14						

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HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC		
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.	SECNAV 8			

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: What are the costs associated with retaining the outlying field (OLF) at Chase Field? Could greater savings be achieved by moving the OLF elsewhere?

Answer: As an outlying field, Chase Field will be operated with 122 military and 42 civilians. It is estimated that operating Chase Field as an outlying field with ground control precision approach capability will cost approximately $3 million per year. Retention of Chase Field as an OLF is predicated on providing instrument training that is, ground controlled precision approach (GCA) capability. OLF Goliad, located fifteen miles north of Chase Field, does not have a GCA facility and will continue to be used to support Fleet Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP).

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1	DATE PREPARED
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144	3 MAY 91

COORDINATION

OFFICE	ASN(I&E)	ODA						
NAME	RH RICE EA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/14						

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HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER	BCRC	
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.		INSERT NO.		SECNAV 9	

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: What is the basis for claiming that "air operations are expected to be continued by other aviation businesses...to mitigate the economic impact" of closing Moffett Field?

Answer: Discussions with NASA-Ames Research Center during the closure study indicated that they were prepared to assume operation of Moffett Field if the Navy ceased operations at the Field. Letters from the mayors of Sunnyvale, Mountain View, and San Jose indicate that they are interested in developing a civilian reuse of Moffett Field if the Navy ceases operations there.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1	
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144	DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91

COORDINATION

OFFICE	ASN(I&E)	OPA						
NAME	RHRICE E.4	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/19						

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HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC		
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.	SECNAV 10			

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: Why does the Sand Point Regional brig along with some associated land remain?

Answer: It is too costly to reconstruct ($12.8M). There is no reason to move it.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1							
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144						DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91	
COORDINATION								
OFFICE	ASN(I&E)	OPA						
NAME	RH Rice EA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/14						

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HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SECNAV 11

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: What is the basis for claiming that closing Sand Point will not affect the community at either Sand Point or the Receiving base?

Answer: No impacts are expected since the resulting actions will create a net gain to the Seattle MSA. Actions are as follows:

Lose	-980
Gain	+1,458
Net	+478

Impacts to the Seattle MSA would be an increase in employment opportunity of 0.1%.

Additionally, many personnel are expected to remain in their present residential locations and commute to the new Naval Station Puget Sound at Everett, which is located in the same MSA. Many of these people already live north of the city, which would facilitate this type of commuting pattern. Since the detached family housing sited at Brier, Paine Field, Fort Lawton, and Pier 91, not at Sand Point, will be retained by the Navy, few impacts are expected to the local school system as the housing will continue to be occupied by military families.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1	
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144	DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91

COORDINATION

OFFICE	RW(I+E)	OPA						
NAME	RH RICE EA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/19						

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HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SECNAV 12

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: You expressed concern that coastal-development encroachment will make closure actions irretrievable. Did this concern lead you in any way to hold bases that aren't essential to support our force structure as it is presently projected?

Answer: No bases were held back for coastal development reasons.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1		DATE PREPARED
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144		3 MAY 91

COORDINATION

OFFICE	ASN(I&E)	OPA						
NAME	RHRICE EA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/14						

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HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SECNAV 13

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: Your justifications did not identify the payback period required by criteria #5 and OSD guidance. Can you provide this information to the Commission?

Answer: Yes, contained in Detailed Analysis already provided to Commission.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144
DATE PREPARED	3 MAY 91

COORDINATION

OFFICE	ASN(I&E)	OPA						
NAME	RHRice EA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/4/91	6/14						

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	HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE		HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE		HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE		TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.		INSERT NO.			SECNAV 14

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: What percentage of the fleet will be nuclear vs. non-nuclear by FY 95?

Answer: Of the total number of ships (surface and subsurface) in FY-95, 28.3 percent will be nuclear.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1								
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144							DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91	
COORDINATION									
OFFICE	ASW (I&E)	WPA							
NAME	RH Rice EA	[illegible]							
DATE	6/14/91	6/14							

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HOUSE / SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER BCRC
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		SECNAV 15

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Question: Why were the strategic homeports removed from consideration?

Answer: They were not removed. They were evaluated as if they were complete so they could be fairly evaluated against other naval stations and the decision be based upon their individual merits.

OFFICE	OPNAV-44C1	
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION	CDR J.L. BULLOCK, EXT 695-5144	DATE PREPARED 3 MAY 91

COORDINATION

OFFICE	ASN(I&E)	OPA						
NAME	R A RICE EA	[illegible]						
DATE	6/14/91	6/14						

DD FORM 1 NOV 77 2136

O-161

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20360-5000

27 JUN 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission letter of June 26, 1991

Encl: (1) Responses Provided to Congressman McCollum

1. The following answers are provided in response to reference (a).

a. Question 10: With regard to Recruit Training Command San Diego, how many staff personnel are there and how many of them reside in government quarters, i.e., officer family quarters, enlisted family quarters, officer bachelor quarters, and enlisted bachelor quarters?

Response: Total Staff numbers are: 27 officer; 422 enlisted; and 11 civilians. Residence locations are: 74 enlisted in family qtrs; 4 officers in family quarters; 61 enlisted in BEQs; 0 officers in BOQs.

Note: This information was passed to Captain Jerry Vernon on 25 June 1991.

b. Question 12: Please provide the Commission answers to the questions in Congressman McCollum's letter to Secretary Schafer of 24 June. Some of these questions have been previously asked by the Commission, but a good many others have not.

Response: Enclosure (1) is the requested information.

Jacqueline E. Schafer
JACQUELINE E. SCHAFER

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20360-5000

26 JUN 1991

The Honorable Bill McCollum
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. McCollum:

Thank you for your letter of 24 June 1991 concerning the recommended closure of the Naval Training Center Orlando, Florida. I am providing a partial response to the questions and requests for information. To complete the responses to questions 1, 2, and 4 require detailed information not held here in Washington. Various field activities have been asked to provide the necessary data. As I am sure you will understand, the complete responses to these three questions will be delayed. In the interim, I am providing complete responses to the other thirteen questions.

Thank you for your continued interest in this issue.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline E. Schafer

JACQUELINE E. SCHAFER

Enclosure

1. During FY90, what was the total number of graduates from "A" schools at NTC San Diego and how many of these went on directly to "C" schools in San Diego or elsewhere? Of these, how many went to "C" schools at NTC San Diego and how many went to "C" schools located in the San Diego area at other commands?

Approximately 4,500 sailors graduated from "A" schools at NTC San Diego during FY90. Data necessary to answer follow-on questions pertaining to subsequent "C" school training is not readily available. Estimate 2-3 weeks to recover data and summarize appropriately. Enclosure (1) provided to highlight what "C" schools frequently follow successful "A" school training. Highlighted locations indicate San Diego area.

CNETRANOTE 1514
14 SEP 1990

FOLLOW-ON "C" SCHOOLS FOR INITIAL SKILL RATING PIPELINES

RATING	CIN	CDP	SHORT TITLE	NEC	LOCATION	CL
AD	D-601-2711	834D	CHSSE PP/REL SYS	8303	HM 12	95
	D-601-2715	183Z	MHSSE PP/REL SYS	8303	HM 12	99
	D-601-2710	411B	RHSS P/P REL SYS	8304	HM 12	92
	E-601-0310	908H	E2C2PPRELSYSPL	8305	VAW 110	94
	D-601-0410	828U	EC130 PP/REL	8317	VQ 14	44
	D-601-0420	847A	C130 PP/REL SYS	8318	VQ 4	46
	E-601-0420	920S	C130 PP/REL	8318	HC 30	41
	D-601-1110	5722	P3 PP/REL SYS	8319	VP 30	60
	E-601-1110	524F	P3 PP/REL SYS	8319	VP 31	73
	E-601-1510	511M	A7E PWR PLANTS	8327	VA 122	53
	D-601-0710	5771	A6 PP/REL SYS	8331	VA 42	74
	E-601-0710	544M	A6 PP/REL SYS	8331	VA 129	79
	E-601-1810	909E	AD POWER PLANTS	8332	VAQ 129	45
	D-601-1612	7028	F14A+/D PP SYS	8335	VF 101	50
	E-601-1612	914N	F14A+/D PPO PL	8335	VF 124	65
	D-601-0611	828H	FA18 PP/REL SYS	8342	VFA 106	50
	E-601-0611	823S	FA18 P/P REL SYS	8342	VFA 125	57
	D-601-1611	416W	F 14 PP/REL SYS	8345	VF 101	50
	E-601-1611	524H	P/PRELSYSSPEC PL	8345	VF 124	54
	D-601-1710	194C	S3 POWER PLANTS	8346	VS 27	54
	E-601-1710	347A	S3A POWER PLANTS	8346	VS 41	57
	D-601-2210	818C	A-3 PWR PLANTS	8357	VAQ 33	50
	D-601-0911	541N	SH2 PP/REL SYS	8375	HSL 30	51
→	E-601-0911	325P	SH2 AD PIPE	8375	HSL 31	81
	D-601-0811	865A	SH3B PP/REL SYS	8376	HSL 40	65
→	E-601-0811	845A	PP/REL SYS MAINT	8376	HSL 41	78
→	D-601-0510	5749	SH3 PP/REL SYS	8377	HS 1	53
	E-601-0510	524D	SH3-3 POWER PLANT	8377	HS 10	74
→	E-601-2410	471F	H46 PP REL SYS O	8379	HC 3	59
	D-601-2010	809Q	UH1N PP/REL SYS	8380	HC 16	32
	D-601-2717	186H	AMCM MECH SYS	8391	HM 12	79
	D-600-2724	6864	AMCM CONFIG	8391	HM 12	31
→	E-601-0510	918U	SH-3 POWER PLANT	8377	HC 1	68
AE	D-602-2752	834C	CHSSE ELECT/INST	8303	HM 12	115
	D-602-2758	186E	MHSSE E/I SYS	8303	HM 12	141
	D-602-2750	411C	RHSS ELECT/INST	8304	HM 12	120
	D-601-0310	223A	E2/C2 PP/REL SYS	8305	VAW 120	71
	D-602-0350	4208	E2C E/I SYS	8306	VAW 120	92
	E-602-0350	908E	E2CELECINSTSYSPL	8306	VAW 110	110
	E-602-2351	908C	C2 ELEC/INSTSYSPL	8307	VAW 110	68
	D-602-0450	828V	EC130 E/I	8317	VQ 4	110
	D-602-0456	847X	C130 ELEC/INST	8318	VQ 4	89
→	E-602-0456	920R	C130 ELEC/INST	8318	HC 30	107
	E-602-1551	514L	A7E ELECT/INST	8327	VA 122	79
	D-602-0751	5776	A6 E/I SYS	8331	VA 42	114
	E-602-0751	532X	A6 E/I SYS	8331	VA 128	119
	E-602-1851	909F	AE ELECT INST	8332	VAQ 129	95
	D-602-1630	7030	F14D ELECT SYS	8335	VF 101	92
	E-602-1630	920Y	F14D ELECTRIC PL	8335	VF 124	86
	D-602-0650	7030	FL4D ELECT SYS	8335	VF 101	92
	E-602-0650	823V	FA18 E/I SYS	8342	VFA 125	93
	D-602-1652	418T	F14 ELEC SYS	8345	VF 101	108

CNTECETRANOTE 1514

14 SEP 1990

RATING	CIN	CDF	SHORT TITLE	NEC	LOCATION	CL
AE	E-602-1652	524Q	ELECTSYSMAINT PL	8345	VF 124	114
	D-602-1750	229H	S-3 ELEC/INST	8346	VS 27	110
	E-602-1750	412Z	S3 E/I SYS MAINT	8346	VS 41	115
	D-602-2250	917Y	A3 ELECTINSTMAINT	8357	VAQ 33	57
	D-602-0951	541T	SH2 E/I SYSTEMS	8375	HSL 30	74
	E-602-0951	325Q	SH2 AE PIPE	8375	HSL 31	79
	D-602-0851	865C	SH60B E/I AFCS	8376	HSL 40	101
	E-602-0851	944R	ELECT SYS MAINT	8376	HSL 41	123
	D-602-0550	5755	SH3 E/I SYS	8377	[illegible]	87
	E-602-0550	8369	SH-3 ELECT INSTS	8377	HS 10	87
	E-602-0550	918X	SH-3 ELECT INST S	8377	HC 1	95
	E-602-2450	471E	H46 ELEC SYS O	8379	HC 5	103
	D-602-2050	809S	UH1N E/I SYS	8380	HC 16	59
	D-602-2760	175T	AMCM ELECTRICAL	8391	HM 12	113
AME	E- 2-0260	908F	E2C2 ENVIRSYSMAPL	8305	VAW 110	80
	D- 3-0460	828W	EC13: ENVIRON	8317	VQ 4	30
	D-c '-0465	849B	C130 /IR SYS	8318	VQ 4	25
	D-6. .-1161	5724	P3 EN. IR SYS	8319	VP 30	36
	E-602-1161	524L	P3 ENVIRON SYS	8319	VP 31	41
	E-602-1560	511N	A7E ENV SYS	8327	VA 122	36
	D-602-0760	504B	A6 ENVIRON SYS	8331	VA 42	66
	E-602-0760	532Y	A6 ENVIRON SYS	8331	VA 128	67
	E-602-1860	909H	AME EA6B ENVSYS	8332	VAQ 129	82
	D-602-0660	828K	FA18 SAFETY EQ	8342	VFA 106	36
	E-602-0660	825T	FA18 SAFETY EQ	8342	VFA 125	59
	D-602-1661	417A	F14 ENVIR SYS	8345	VF 101	46
	E-602-1661	524S	ENV/ESCSYSSPECPL	8345	VF 124	54
	D-602-1760	193W	S3 ENVIRON SYS	8346	VS 27	45
	E-602-1760	347E	S3 ENVIRON SYS	8346	VS 41	52
	D-602-2260	818E	A-3 ENVI/ESCAPE	8357	VAQ 33	50
	D-602-0590	889S	SH3 SURV/ENVIR	8377	HS 1	16
	E-602-0590	919C	SH-3 SAF/SUR SYS	8377	HC 1	25
AMH	D-602-2785	186B	MH53E AF/HYD SYS	8303	HM 12	71
	D-602-2783	834B	CH53E AF/HYD SYS	8303	HM 12	73
	D-602-2780	411E	RH 53D AF/HYD SYS	8304	HM 12	85
	E-602-0381	908D	E2C2AFHYDSYSPL	8305	VAW 110	110
	D-602-0480	828X	EC130 A/F/HYD	8317	VQ 4	36
	D-602-0485	849A	C130 AF/HYD SYS	8318	VQ 4	31
	D-602-1080	5723	P3 AF/HYD SYS	8319	VP 30	46
	E-602-1080	524M	P3 AF/ HYD SYS	8319	VP 31	54
	E-602-1580	511P	A7E AF/HYD SYS	8327	VA 122	51
	D-602-0780	465U	A6 AF/HYD SYS	8331	VA 42	62
	E-602-0780	532Z	A6 AF/HYD SYS	8331	VA 128	82
	E-602-1881	909J	AMH/S SYS MAINT	8332	VAQ 129	57
	D-602-0681	828L	FA18 HYD AF/ SYS	8342	VFA 106	85
	E-602-0681	825B	FA18 AF MAINT	8342	VFA 125	88
	D-602-1681	417J	F14 AF/HYD SYS	8345	VF 101	57
	E-602-1[illegible]1	524U	A/F [illegible]DSYSMAIN PL	8345	VF 124	68
	D-602-1[illegible]	193X	S3 HYD SYS	8346	VS 27	57
	E-602-1[illegible]	463X	S3 HYD SYS	8346	VS 41	64
	D-602-2[illegible]	818B	A-3 /F HYD SYS	8357	VAQ 33	50
	D-602-0981	541Q	SH2 AF/HYD MAINT	8375	HSL 30	68
	E-602-0981	325B	SH2 AM H/S PIPE	8375	HSL 31	71

CNTECHTRANOTE 1514
14 SEP 1990

RATING	CIN	CDP	SHORT TITLE	NEC	LOCATION	CL
AMH	D-602-0620	864W	SH60B AF/REL SYS	8376	HSL 40	67
	D-602-0880	844M	AF/REL SYS MAINT	8376	HSL 41	99
	D-602-0580	575I	SH3 AF/HYD	8377	HS 1	58
	E-602-2480	471C	H46 HYD/STR O-L	8379	HC 3	94
	D-602-2080	809T	UH1N AF/HYD SYS	8380	HC 16	26
	D-601-2721	183F	AMCM STRUCT/HYD	8391	HM 12	99
AMS	D-602-2785	156B	MH53E AF/HYD SYS	8303	HM 12	71
	D-602-2783	834B	CH53E AF/HYD SYS	8303	HM 12	77
	D-602-2790	411E	RH53D AF/HYD SYS	8304	HM 12	85
	E-602-0381	908D	E2C2AFHYDSYSPL	8308	VAW 110	110
	D-602-0480	828X	EC130 A/F/HYD	8317	VQ 4	56
	D-602-0485	849A	C130 AF/HYD SYS	8318	VQ 4	71
	D-602-1080	572J	P3 AF/HYD SYS	8319	VP 30	46
	E-602-1080	524M	P3 AF/HYD SYS	8319	VP 31	54
	E-602-1580	511P	A7E AF/HYD SYS	8327	VA 122	51
	D-602-0780	465U	A6 AF/HYD SYS	8331	VA 42	83
	E-602-0780	552I	A6 AF/HYD SYS	8331	VA 128	82
	E-602-1881	909J	AMH/S SYS MAINT	8332	VAQ 129	57
	D-602-0681	828L	FA18 HYD/AF SYS	8342	VFA 106	85
	E-602-0681	823R	FA18 AF MAINT	8342	VFA 125	89
	D-602-1681	417J	F14 AF/HYD SYS	8345	VF 101	57
	E-602-1681	527U	A/F HYDSYSMAINPL	8345	VF 124	68
	D-602-1780	193X	S3 AF/HYD SYS	8346	VS 27	57
	E-602-1780	463X	S3 AF/HYD SYS	8346	VS 41	64
	D-602-2280	818B	A-3 A/F HYD SYS	8357	VAQ 33	50
	D-602-0981	541Q	SH2 AF/HYD MAINT	8375	HSL 30	68
	E-602-0981	325R	SH2 AMH/S PIPE	8375	HSL 31	71
	D-602-0880	864W	SH60B AF/REL SYS	8376	HSL 40	67
	E-602-0880	844M	AF/REL SYS MAINT	8376	HSL 41	99
	D-602-0580	575I	SH3 AF/HYD	8377	HS 1	58
	E-602-2480	471C	H46 HYD/STR O-L	8379	HC 3	94
	D-602-2080	809T	UH1N AF/HYD SYS	8380	HC 16	26
	D-601-2721	183F	AMCM STRUCT/HYD	8391	HM 12	99
AQ	E-646-1540	511Q	A7E ARM SYS	8327	VA 122	51
	D-646-0740	577S	A6 ARMAMENT SYS	8331	VA 42	92
	E-646-0740	533A	A6 ARMAMENT SYS	8331	VA 128	95
	E-646-1840	909B	AQ EA6B ARM SYS	8332	VAQ 129	65
	D-646-0641	828M	FA18 ARM SYS	8342	VFA 106	57
	E-646-0641	823W	FA18 ARM SYS	8342	VFA 125	60
	D-646-1641	416Y	F14 ARM SYS	8345	VF 101	54
	E-646-1641	526X	F14 ARMSYS MAINPL	8345	VF 124	79
	E-646-1740	347G	S3 ARM SYS MAINT	8346	VS 41	63
	D-646-0540	175P	SH3 ARM/REL SYS	8377	HS 1	55
	E-646-0540	524V	SH-3 ARMAMENT SYS	8377	HS 10	60
	E-646-0540	919F	SH-3 ARMAMENT SYS	8377	HC 10	47
AQ	E-104-1531	511H	A7E WPNS SYS O	8327	VA 122	72
	D-112-1640	703I	F14D WPS CTL SYS	8335	VF 101	81
	E-112-0630	823X	FA18 FIRE CONTROL	8342	VFA 125	81
	D-112-0630	827T	FA18 FIRE CONTROL	8342	VFA 106	50

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RATING	CIN	CDP	SHORT TITLE	NEC	LOCATION	CL
AT	D-102-2722	849D	CH53E COM/NAV/ID	8303	HM 12	64
	D-102-2725	126C	MH53E CNI SYS	8303	HM 12	57
	D-102-2720	411D	RH53 COM/NAV/IDN	8304	HM 12	57
	D-102-0321	467E	E2C SAS AV CRSMA	8306	VAW 120	106
	E-102-0321	908A	E2 CB ASAVSYSMANPL	8306	VAW 110	83
	D-102-0420	812R	TIP2 COMM MAINT	8317	VQ 4	15=
	D-102-0452	848Y	C130 ELECT MAINT	8318	VQ 4	61
	E-102-1520	511E	A7E ELECTRON SYS	8327	VA 122	79
	D-102-0720	577J	A6 ELECT SYS	8331	VA 42	102
	E-102-0720	532U	A6 ELECT SYS	8331	VA 128	110
	E-102-1923	909D	DATA LINK ICAPII	8332	VAQ 129	102
	D-102-1630	7029	F14D ELECT SYS OR	8335	VF 101	91
	D-102-0620	827S	FA18 COM/NAV/ECM	8342	VFA 106	53
	E-102-0620	823U	FA18 COM/NAV/EC	8342	VFA 125	75
	D-102-1621	416X	F14 AVIONIC SYS	8345	VF 101	67
	E-102-1621	856Z	FA18 AT PJT	0000	VFA 125	22
→	E-102-1720	412R	S3 ELECTRONIC SY	8346	VS 41	102
	D-102-2220	819D	A3 CNI SYS MAINT	8357	VAQ 33	71
	D-130-0931	541R	SH2 ASW SYSTEM	8375	HSL 30	67
→	E-130-0931	807H	SH2F AT/X PIPE	8375	HSL 31	67
	D-102-0820	864Y	SH60B ELECT SYS	8376	HSL 40	106
→	E-102-0820	844W	H60 AVIONICS SYS	8376	HSL 41	120
	D-600-0805	0638	DETACHMENT CPO	8376	HSL 40	43
	D-102-0521	8897	SH3 WEAPON SYS	8377	HS 1	74
	E-102-0521	8375	SH-3 WEAPS SYS M	8377	HS 10	95
→	E-102-0521	918D	SH-3 WEAPS SYS M	8377	HC 1	90
→	E-102-2420	471D	H46 ELECTRON MAI	8379	HC 33	50
	D-102-2020	809B	UH1N COM/NAV SYS	8380	HC 16	23
	D-102-2727	175W	AMCM ELECT TECH	8391	HM 12	60
AX →	E-102-1730	346W	S3 ASW SYS MAINT	8346	VS 41	98
	D-130-0931	541R	SH2 ASW SYSTEMS	8375	HSL 30	67
	E-130-0931	807H	SH2F AT/X PIPE	8375	HSL 31	67
	D-102-0820	864Y	SH60B ELECT SYS	8376	HSL 40	106
	E-102-0820	844W	H60 AVIONICS SYS	8376	HSL 41	120
	D-600-0805	0638	DETACHMENT CPO	8376	HSL 40	43
	D-102-0521	8897	SH3 WEAPONS SYS	8377	HS 1	74
	E-102-0521	8375	SH-3 WEAPS SYS M	8377	HS 10	95
→	E-102-0521	918D	SH-3 WEAPS SYS M	8377	HC 1	90

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MAILING	CIN	CDP	SHORT TITLE	NEC	LOCATION	C/L
ST 6YO	A-651-0080	016Y	ST PROP PLT MAIN	0	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	24
CTM	A-102-0323	136G	WBAA MAINTENANCE	9251	NTTC CORRY STA	271
	A-102-0322	136F	HGDF MAINTENANCE	9252	NTTC CORRY STA	212
	A-102-0321	136H	RFD MAINTENANCE	9256	NTTC CORRY STA	96
	A-102-0363	0549	OCS MAINTENANCE	9258	NTTC CORRY STA	62
	A-102-0362	0548	SCSS MAINTENANCE	9259	NTTC CORRY STA	138
	A-102-0337	152P	MUSIC/TICC MAINTENANCE	9267	NTTC CORRY STA	138
	A-102-0237	8498	TACINTEL MAINTENANCE	9280	NTTC CORRY STA	68
	A-102-0285	049P	FES MAINTENANCE	9282	NTTC CORRY STA	47
	A-102-0325	137X	OB II MAINTENANCE	9249	NTTC CORRY STA	52
	A-102-0324	137W	CCSS MAINTENANCE	9287	NTTC CORRY STA	19
	A-102-0298	363G	OB I MAINTENANCE	9281	NTTC CORRY STA	26
	A-233-0052	031N	AN/WLQ-4	9283	NAVSUBSCOL GROTN	215
	A-233-0075	191N	SUB DSE MAINTENANCE	9284	NAVSUBSCOL GROTN	40
	A-102-0264	8787	AN/UYA-7	9264	NTTCDET GOODFELL	17
	A-102-0364	0015	ASTW/IBM PC MAINTENANCE	9266	NTTCDET GOODFELL	12
	A-102-0308	090L	EXTEL MAINT	9269	NTTCDET GOODFELL	26
	A-102-0365	0550	MXT/DELTA DATA	9269	NTTCDET GOODFELL	16
	A-102-0204	4321	STREAMLINER MAINTENANCE	9270	NTTCDET GOODFELL	161
	A-102-0347	192H	GPCP MAINTENANCE	9271	NTTCDET GOODFELL	30
	A-102-0348	192J	DCS MAINTENANCE	9271	NTTCDET GOODFELL	59
	A-102-0365	0550	MXT/DELTA DATA	9271	NTTCDET GOODFELL	16
	A-102-0370	9678	WOLFERS/ROCKETEER MAINT	9244	NTTCDET GOODFELL	22
	N/A		ELECTRONIC EQ (US ARMY)	9296	FT. HUACHUCA, AZ	
	A-102-0371	1990	KEELAN MAINTENANCE	9273	NTTCDET GOODFELL	109
	A-102-0372	1991	LIFEMAN/SEIGEL MAINT	9263	NTTCDET GOODFELL	131
	A-102-0373	1992	ANNULET/DTSS MAINT	9274	NTTCDET GOODFELL	109
	A-102-0376	363W	CHAINWORK MAINTENANCE	9286	NTTCDET GOODFELL	22
	A-102-0377	203X	CSU SYSTEMS MAINT	9285	NTTCDET GOODFELL	19
	A-102-0351	1742	CRITICOM STA TIM	0	NCOMMTRA KEESLER	28
	A-102-0352	1743	SMC-200/210	9271	NCOMMTRA KEESLER	19
	A-160-0089	029N	KY 57/38	1446	FTC NORVA	5
	A-160-0089	034N	KY 57/38	1446	COMBATSYSTECH MI	5
	A-160-0052	3259	MOD-28	2346	FTC NORVA	15
→	A-160-0052	3274	MOD-28	2346	~~SERVSCOLCOM SD~~	14
	A-160-0052	051W	MOD-28	2346	FTG PEARL HARBOR	14
	A-160-0109	131D	KG-84	1444	COMBATSYSTECH MI	6
	A-160-0109	1906	KG-84	1444	FTC NORVA	6
	A-160-0087	019L	KY-65A/75A	1445	FTC NORVA	10
	A-160-0087	8606	KY-65A/75A	1445	COMBATSYSTECH MI	10
	A-198-0032	413K	ADV MICRO MEAS	1588	NAVU LOWRY FREC	20
	A-160-0103	056C	CRYP KG-30 (LIM)	1442	NTTCDET COR LAFB	5
	A-102-0339	152N	MOD-40 TTY MAINT	9268	NCTCDET SHEPPARD	32
	A-101-0069	347K	SHORE COM SYS MA	1415	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	43
	A-198-0030	4388	ESS MAINT	4749	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	45

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RATING	CIN	CDP	SHORT TITLE	NEC	LOCATION	CYL
CIO	A-280-0028	4405	STREAMLINER OP	9185	NTTCDET GOODFELL	24
	A-231-0052	031A	TACOP	9185	NTTC CORRY STA	19
CTR	A-231-0094	1008	BULLSEYE OUTSTATION OPR	9112	NTTC CORRY STA	59
	A-231-0054	031C	OB I OP	9125	NTTC CORRY STA	43
CTT	A-231-0094	1008	BULLSEYE O/S OP	9112	NTTC CORRY STA	59
	A-231-0077	167K	HF N/M COLL OP	9154	NTTC CORRY STA	45
	A-231-0028	3197	CTT ELINT	9140	NTTC CORRY STA	58
	A-231-0054	031C	OB I OP	9125	NTTC CORRY STA	64
	S-231-0001	910H	CW COL SYS OPR	9171	NSGA WINTER HARB	48
	S-231-0002	910J	CW NET SYS OPR	9173	NSGA WINTER HARB	40
	S-231-0003	910K	CW REP SYS OPR	9175	NSGA WINTER HARB	46
DP	A-532-0015	470P	COBOL PROG	2742	MCDEC QUANTICO	36
	J-243-0991	222A	OBU SYS MGT	2708	NMITC DAM NECK	23
	J-531-0365	2248	ASWOC DATA PROC	2706	FCTCL DAM NECK	50
	J-531-0394	221R	CV-ASWM 4.2 OP	2757	FCTCL DAM NECK	45
	AFE4AST49151-000		WWMCCS OPER	2703	KEESLER AFB	
	E1ASC49151-000		WWMCCS OPER	2703	KEESLER AFB	
DS	A-150-0017	1155	NTDS LINKS DS MAI	1623	COMBATSYSTECH MI	79
	A-150-0051	1399	USQ-20 SYS MAINT	1668	COMBATSYSTECH MI	160
	A-150-0096	3438	UYK-7/CGN-38/DDG	1667	COMBATSYSTECH MI	135
	A-150-0109	4349	UYK7/DD 963 PERIP	1672	COMBATSYSTECH MI	125
	A-150-0121	4408	LHA ITAWDS MAINT	1674	COMBATSYSTECH MI	155
	A-150-0127	4330	UYK-7 LHA	1673	COMBATSYSTECH MI	155
	A-150-0135	401W	UYK-7 FFG-7	1671	COMBATSYSTECH MI	95
	A-150-0136	402A	FFG-7 DISPLAY	1681	COMBATSYSTECH MI	115
	A-150-0137	401Z	DD-963 DISPLAY	1682	COMBATSYSTECH MI	140
	A-150-0138	401Y	CGN-38 DISPLAY	1683	COMBATSYSTECH MI	156
	A-150-0139	401X	UYA-4 DISPLAY	1665	COMBATSYSTECH MI	115
	A-150-0230	094Y	SNAP 1 SYSTEM MA	1664	COMBATSYSTECH MI	105
	A-150-0260	161D	CV/CVN C/P MAINT	1622	COMBATSYSTECH MI	115
	A-150-0261	161C	CV/CVN Q21 MAINT	1624	COMBATSYSTECH MI	157
	A-150-0262	169A	CG/CGN 194A MAIN	1684	COMBATSYSTECH MI	177
	A-150-0269	169B	CG/CGN C/P MAIN	1622	COMBATSYSTECH MI	115
	A-150-0275	1869	CV-ASWM SYS MAIN	0	COMBATSYSTECH MI	35
	A-150-0200	041C	TRI CCS LEVEL 1	1306	TRITRAFAC BANGOR	73
	J-150-0366	2249	ASWOC DS MAINT	1634	FCTCL DAM NECK	115
	J-150-0397	221U	FDDS MAINT TECH	1614	FCTCL DAM NECK	70
	J-150-0398	221V	4.1 DS MAINT TEC	1622	FCTCL DAM NECK	42
→	A-101-0264	192Z	AN/USQ-74 SYS	1440	SSC ANNEX SD	50
	A-101-0264	196A	AN/USQ-74 SYS	1440	FTC NORVA	50
	A-150-0095	131T	UYK-7 FHLT MAINT	0	COMBATSYSTECH MI	40
	A-101-0262	214X	SSIXS II	1645	FTC NORVA	124
	J-221-0389	0320	FHLT MAINT	1647	FCTCL DAM NECK	117
	J-150-0372	462A	ASWMOND DATA	1655	FCTCL DAM NECK	100
	A-150-0255	147T	AN/UYK-62	1416	FTC NORVA	24
→	A-150-0255	149B	AN/UYK-62	1416	SSC ANNEX SD	24

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RATING	CIN	CDP	SHORT TITLE	NECs	LOCATION	CAL
DT	B-300-0053	3399	DT FIELD DEN TECH	8707	MCS FMS LEJUNE	[illegible]
	B-300-0053	3390	DT FIELD DENTAL	8707	MCS FMS PENDLTON	[illegible]
	B-195-0013	3378	DT EQUIP REPAIR	8732	SDAT HS DET CA	[illegible]
	B-331-0016	3375	DT LAB/BASIC	8732	SDAT HS DET CA	[illegible]
EM(NF)	A-661-0010	130E	NUC PWR	0	NAVNUCPWR$COL OR	[illegible]
	A-661-0013	1310	NPPO ELECTRICAL	3354	NAVNUCPWRTRAU ID	[illegible]
	A-661-0013	1312	NPPO ELECTRICAL	3354	NAVNUCPWRTRAU NY	[illegible]
	A-661-0013	1314	NPPO ELECTRICAL	3354	NAVNUCPWRTRAU WI	[illegible]
ET-AEF	A-101-0163	020E	AVSS MAINT	1486	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-101-0163	9578	AVSS MAINT	1486	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]
	A-160-0089	029N	KY 57/58 MAINT	1446	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-160-0089	034N	KY 57/58 MAINT	1446	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-101-0163	020E	AVSS MAINT	1486	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-101-0163	9578	AVSS MAINT	1486	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]
	A-102-0295	066J	FFG-7 NAV MAINT	1491	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-102-0295	066K	FFG-7 NAV MAINT	1491	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]
	A-102-0077	3690	AN/SRN-12/12A MA	0	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-102-0077	7769	AN/SRN-12/12A MA	0	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]
	A-102-0239	4256	AN/URN-25 MAINT	1471	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-102-0239	4257	AN/URN-25 MAINT	1471	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]
	A-102-0266	017I	AN/SRN-19 MAINT	0	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-102-0266	018E	AN/SRN-19 MAINT	0	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]
	A-104-0129	7827	AN/SPA-25,SB1505	0	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-104-0129	7828	AN/SPA-25,SB1505	0	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]
	A-104-0162	3505	AN/SPS-55 MAIN	1504	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-104-0162	018I	AN/SPS-55 MAIN	1504	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]
	A-104-0176	408F	AN/SPS-49 MAIN	1503	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-104-0176	408G	AN/SPS-49 MAIN	1503	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]
	A-104-0162	3508	AN/SPS-55 MAIN	1504	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-104-0162	018I	AN/SPS-55 MAIN	1504	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]
	A-104-0177	408D	AN/SPS-67 (V)	1507	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]
	A-104-0177	408E	AN/SPS-67 (V)	1507	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-104-0183	8979	AN/SPS-40 DMTI	1508	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-104-0183	119T	AN/SPS-40 DMTI	1508	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]
	A-104-0179	4581	AN/SPS-65 MAIN	1509	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]
	A-104-0209	151H	AN/SPS-49 (V) 5	1510	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-104-0209	151T	AN/SPS-49 (V) 5	1510	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]
	A-104-0199	352U	AN/SPS-40E	1511	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-104-0133	340E	AN/SPS-40 B.C.D	1516	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]
	A-104-0133	4970	AN/SPS-40 B,C,D	1516	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-102-0062	4600	AIMS MK XII	1572	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]
	A-102-0062	4784	AIMS MK XII	1572	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-198-0031	413J	ADV ELEC/ELET M	0	NAVU LOWRY PREC	[illegible]
	A-198-0032	413K	ADV MICRO MEAS	1588	NAVU LOWRY PREC	[illegible]
	A-100-0072	350T	MIN ELECT REPAIR	9527	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-100-0072	061Y	MIN ELECT REPAIR	9527	FAMWTC CHASN SC	[illegible]
	A-100-0072	092U	MIN ELECT REPAIR	9527	FTC MAYPORT FL	[illegible]
	A-100-0072	093X	MIN ELECT REPAIR	9527	FTG PEARL HARBOR	[illegible]
	A-100-0072	266P	MIN ELECT REPAIR	9527	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]
	A-100-0073	061X	MICRO ELECT REP.	9526	FAMWTC CHASN SC	[illegible]
	A-100-0073	8706	MICRO ELECT REP.	9526	FTC NORVA	[illegible]
	A-100-0073	092V	MICRO ELECT REP.	9526	FTC MAYPORT FL	[illegible]
	A-100-0073	093Y	MICRO ELECT REP.	9526	FTG PEARL HARBOR	[illegible]
	A-100-0073	8705	MICRO ELECT REP.	9526	SSC ANNEX SD	[illegible]

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RATING	CIN	CDP	SHORT TITLE	NEC	LOCATION	C/L
ET-AEF	A-100-0072	350T	MIN ELECT REPAIR	9527	FTC NORVA	26
	A-100-0072	061Y	MIN ELECT REPAIR	9527	FAMWTC CHASN SC	26
	A-100-0072	092U	MIN ELECT REPAIR	9527	FTC MAYPORT FL	26
	A-100-0072	093X	MIN ELECT REPAIR	9527	FTG PEARL HARBOR	26
	A-100-0072	266P	MIN ELECT REPAIR	9527	SSC ANNEX SD	26
	A-670-0020	2103	RADIAC MAINT	9597	NTTC SAN FRAN CA	26
	A-101-0052	7743	AN/FRT-83-84-85	1403	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	68
	A-101-0069	347K	SHORE COM SYS MA	1415	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	59
	A-101-0254	214Z	DMCS MAINT	1418	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	54
	A-150-0255	147T	AN/UYK-62 MAIN	1416	FTC NORVA	26
	A-150-0255	149B	AN/UYK-62 MAIN	1416	SSC ANNEX SD	26
	A-101-0250	187D	EMC TECH	1419	FTC NORVA	26
	A-101-0258	1867	HF SYS TECH	1420	FTC NORVA	82
	A-101-0258	192N	HF SYS TECH	1420	SSC ANNEX SD	75
	A-101-0209	073E	AN/SRQ-4 MAINT	1424	FTC NORVA	20
	A-101-0209	070F	AN/SRQ-4 MAINT	1424	SSC ANNEX SD	26
	A-101-0138	4323	AN/WSC-3 MAINT	1425	FTC NORVA	61
	A-101-0138	4324	AN/WSC-3 MAINT	1425	SSC ANNEX SD	61
	A-101-0164	8751	UHF DAMA MAINT	0	SSC ANNEX SD	19
	A-101-0164	8752	UHF DAMA MAINT	0	FTC NORVA	19
	A-101-0217	066G	FFG-7 COMM	1428	FTC NORVA	278
	A-101-0217	066H	FFG-7 COMM	1428	SSC ANNEX SD	250
	A-101-0063	4814	AN/VRC-46 MAINT	0	SSC ANNEX SD	12
	A-101-0063	4931	AN/VRC-46 MAINT	0	FTC NORVA	12
	A-101-0089	408U	NAVMACS V2/V3	1453	FTC NORVA	89
	A-101-0089	4114	NAVMACS V2/V3	1453	SSC ANNEX SD	96
	A-101-0138	4323	AN/WSC-3 MAINT	1425	FTC NORVA	61
	A-101-0128	4324	AN/WSC-3 MAINT	1425	SSC ANNEX SD	61
	A-101-0222	147F	AN/USQ-74 MAINT	0	SSC ANNEX SD	26
	A-101-0222	147G	AN/USQ-74 MAINT	0	FTC NORVA	26
	A-101-0258	1867	HF SYS TECH	1420	FTC NORVA	82
	A-101-0258	192N	HF SYS TECH	1420	SSC ANNEX SD	75
	A-101-0210	056V	AN/SRC-47 MAINT	1429	SSC ANNEX SD	40
	A-101-0210	171S	AN/SRC-47 MAINT	1429	FTC NORVA	19
	A-101-0264	192Z	AN/USQ-74 SYS	1440	SSC ANNEX SD	68
	A-101-0264	196A	AN/USQ-74 SYS	1440	FTC NORVA	68
	A-101-0089	408U	NAVMACS V2/3	0	FTC NORVA	89
	A-101-0089	4114	NAVMAC V2/3	0	SSC ANNEX SD	96
	A-101-0236	160E	AN/SYQ-7(V)5	1450	SSC ANNEX SD	33
	A-101-0236	160F	AN/SYQ-7(V)5	1450	FTC NORVA	33
	A-101-0089	4114	NAVMACS V2/3	1453	SSC ANNEX SD	96
	A-101-0089	408U	NAVMACS V2/3	1453	FTC NORVA	89
	A-101-0096	4355	DD-963 COMM	1454	SSC ANNEX SD	85
	A-101-0082	544U	CUDIXS MAINT	1456	SSC ANNEX SD	157
	A-101-0140	9929	I SABPS MAINT	1458	FTC NORVA	103
	A-101-0149	4260	AN/WSC-6 MAINT	1468	FTC NORVA	54

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RATING	CIN	CDP	SHORT TITLE	NEC	LOCATION	C/L
ET-AEF	A-102-0267	029S	AN/SRN-9/18	1470	SSC ANNEX SD	26
	A-102-0267	029L	AN/SRN-9/18	1470	FTC NORVA	26
	A-102-0239	4256	AN/URN-25 MAIN	1471	FTC NORVA	33
	A-102-0239	4257	AN/URN-25 MAIN	1471	SSC ANNEX	33
	A-102-0034	3465	AN/URN-20 MAIN	1473	FTC NORVA	38
	A-102-0034	3507	AN/URN-20 MAIN	1473	SSC ANNEX SD	38
	A-198-0050	8746	DMSP ET MAINT	1451	NAVU LOWRY PREC	114
	A-102-0045	3064	TACAN MAINT	1472	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	24
	A-193-0374	1892	CVNS OPS & MAINT	1479	COMBATSYSTECH MI	105
	A-101-0257	179B	LHA EXCOMM MAINT	1457	COMBATSYSTECH MI	75
	A-101-0148	4202	NTD LINK ET MAI	1427	COMBATSYSTECH MI	96
	A-198-0030	4388	ESS MAINT	4749	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	45
	A-160-0089	029N	TSEC/KY57/58 LIM	1446	FTC NORVA	5
	A-160-0089	034N	TSEC/KY57/58 LIM	1446	COMBATSYSTECH MI	5
	A-102-0273	406T	AN/FSC-75/79 MAI	1461	NSCSDET FTGORDON	54
	A-102-0276	129H	AN/VSC-28 MAINT	1464	NSCSDET FTGORDON	54
	A-160-0107	243E	KG-30 LIM MAINT	1442	NSCSDET FTGORDON	10
	A-160-0109	131D	KG-84 FAMILY LIM	1444	COMBATSYSTECH MI	6
	A-160-0109	1906	KG-84 FAMILY LIM	1444	FTC NORVA	8
	A-160-0118	212A	CRYP KG-30 DEPOT	1443	NTTCDET COR LAFB	51
	A-160-0100	032Z	TSEC/KW-46 LIMIT	1447	COMBATSYSTECH MI	8
	A-102-0344	179S	AN/GSC-52 MAINT	1465	NSCSDET FTGORDON	53
	A-160-0087	019L	KY 65A/75A-USC43	1445	FTC NORVA	10
	A-160-0087	8606	KY 65A/75A-USC43	1445	COMBATSYSTECH MI	10
	A-160-0059	472P	CRYP KI-IA MAINT	1573	NSCSDET FTGORDON	50
ET(NF)	A-661-0010	130E	NUC PWR	0	NAVNUCPWRTRAU OR	170
	A-661-0012	1304	NPPO REACTOR	3353	NAVNUCPWRTRAU ID	180
	A-661-0012	1306	NPPO REACTOR	3353	NAVNUCPWRTRAU NY	180
	A-661-0012	1308	NPPO REACTOR	3353	NAVNUCPWRTRAU WI	180
ET(SS)	A-233-0061	1331	WLR-1H(V)1 MAINT	14BA	NAVSUBSCOL GRTN	33
	A-233-0046	414R	ESM TECH 688 CL	14EB	NAVSUBSCOL GRTN	89
	A-233-0046	414R	ESM TECH 688 CL	14EB	NAVSUBSCOL GRTN	89
	A-102-0249	039J	WLR-8(V) BAS OP	14FA	TRITRAFAC BANGOR	38
	A-233-0055	062B	ESM TECH 637 TP2	14HB	NAVSUBSCOL GRTN	103
	A-193-0372	171B	NAVTECH TP2 637CL	14RD	NAVSUBSCOL GRTN	159
	A-193-0372	171B	NAVTEC TP2 637CL	14RD	NAVSUBSCOL GRTN	159
	A-193-0103	469C	NAVTEC 594-2 688C	14SF	NAVSUBSCOL GRTN	110
	A-193-0363	050D	NAVTEC 637/688C	14TG	NAVSUBSCOL GRTN	96
ET(NAV)SS	A-193-0026	1760	SINS	3324	NAVGSCOL DMNECK	149
	A-193-0028	1761	CNC	3322	NAVGSCOL DMNECK	128
	A-193-0034	1762	NAVAIDS	3326	NAVGSCOL DMNECK	152
	A-193-0307	1759	SINS 2-7 TEC RPL	3324	TRITRAFAC BANGOR	150
	A-193-0308	1758	TRI CNC TEC RPL	3323	TRITRAFAC BANGOR	134
	A-193-0309	1757	ESGM/NAVAIDS RPL	3327	TRITRAFAC BANGOR	114

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RING	EIN	CDP	SHORT TITLE	NEC	LOCATION	C
SW	A-102-0211	018C	CV/CVN OPS	1741	NTTC CORRY STA	14
	A-102-0210	016C	SLQ-32 OPS	0	NTTC CORRY STA	25
	A-102-0215	016D	SLQ-32 (V2) MAINT	1733	NTTC CORRY STA	40
	A-102-0216	016F	SLQ-32 (V3) MAINT	1734	NTTC CORRY STA	30
	A-102-0217	018D	WLR-1H MAINT	1743	NTTC CORRY STA	35
	A-102-0218	017E	SLQ-17 MAINT	1723	NTTC CORRY STA	105
	A-102-0214	603A	EW ELTECH	0	NTTC CORRY STA	82
	A-102-0369	9689	SYS TEST EQUIP	0	NTTC CORRY STA	5
FC	A-113-0102	9684	MK 92 MOD 6 DIFF	1101	FTC SDIEGO	50
	A-113-0080	2967	FCS MK 92 MAINT	1102	FTCL DAM NECK	85
	A-113-0080	036X	FCS MK 92 MAINT	1102	FTC SDIEGO	160
	S-104-[illegible]192	035C	FCS/ORT CG 47-64	1106	AEGISTRACEN VA	125
	S-104-[illegible]191	035D	RADAR SYP-1A	1107	AEGISTRACEN VA	115
	J-121-0520	1934	TOMAHAWK VLS	1110	FCTCP SAN DIEGO	100
	J-121-0520	196K	TOMAHAWK VLS	1110	FCTCL DAM NECK	100
	J-121-0519	152B	TOMAHAWK SURF	1112	FCTCL DAM NECK	120
	J-121-0519	1342	TOMAHAWK SURF	1112	FCTCL DAM NECK	173
	A-121-0029	1071	TARTAR MK 4	1113	NAVGMSCOL DMNECK	80
	S-150-0239	035A	AEGIS COMP	1114	AEGISTRACEN VA	100
	S-150-0238	039B	AEGIS DISP	1115	AEGISTRACEN VA	70
	A-150-0245	192Y	TER NTU AN/SYR-1	1116	COMBATSYSTECH MI	115
	A-150-0253	189S	TAR WDS MK 14/NTU	1117	COMBATSYSTECH MI	120
	S-150-0273	198F	AEGIS DISP (BL 3/4)	1118	AEGISTRACEN VA	115
	S-104-0210	198K	RADAR SPY 1 B/D	1119	AEGISTRACEN VA	105
	A-113-0131	1006	MK160 MOD 4 GCS	0	NAVGMSCOL DMNECK	82
	A-113-0114	156A	CIWS MOD 15-11	1121	FTC SDIEGO	140
	A-113-0114	155I	CIWS MOD 15-11	1121	NAVGMSCOL DMNECK	140
	K-113-0109	116R	GFCS MK37	1123	FTC SDIEGO	40
	A-113-0105	119D	MK 152 DATA	1124	SERVSCOLC[illegible] GLKS	156
	J-113-0097	212V	MK 56 GFCS	1126	FCTCLUSCG[illegible]	124
	A-113-0078	124K	CIWS 15-1	1127	NAVGMSCOL [illegible]NECK	137
	A-113-0078	4292	CIWS 15-1	1127	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	137
	A-113-0078	035Z	CIWS 15-1	1127	FTC SDIEGO	137
	A-113-0098	106Y	MK 86 RADAR MAINT	1128	FTC SDIEGO	83
	A-113-0098	107W	MK 86 RADAR MAINT	1128	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	95
	A-113-0098	152Z	MK 86 RADAR MAINT	1128	FCTCL DAM NECK	85
	A-113-0099	107X	AN/UYK7 DATA GRP	1129	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	168
	A-113-0099	107Y	AN/UYK7 DATA GRP	1129	FTC SDIEGO	150
	A-113-0099	119U	AN/UYK7 DATA GRP	1129	FCTCL DAM NECK	150
	A-113-0093	051V	SPG-53F MODFIED	1132	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	97
	A-113-0073	461Q	MK 47 MOD 8	1133	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	84
	K-113-1185	118S	GFCS MK 38	1134	FTC SDIEGO	40
	A-104-0103	1258	SPS-39	1135	NAVGMSCOL DMNECK	104
	A-104-0188	032D	SPS-48C	1138	COMBATSYSTECH MI	170
	A-104-0214	9675	SPS-48C (DDC)	1138	NAVGMSCOL DMNECK	170
	A-[illegible]4-0206	0014	AN/SPS-48E	1140	NAVGMSCOL DMNECK	130
	A-[illegible]4-0206	180F	AN/SPS-48E	1140	COMBATSYSTECH MI	130
	A-[illegible]4-0181	4587	AN/SPS-52C	1142	COMBATSYSTECH MI	110
	S-104-0211	196J	FCS/ORT CG65-DDG	1143	AEGISTRACEN VA	85
	S-150-0274	198G	COM CG 65-DDG	1144	AEGISTRACEN VA	100
	A-121-0122	1381	BASIC POINT DEF MSL	1146	COMBATSYSTECH MI	78

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RATING	CIN	CDP	SHORT TITLE	NEC	LOCATION	C L
FC	A-104-0204	110K	NATO SEA SPARROW	1147	NAVGMSCOL DMNECK	150
	A-104-0204	192V	NATO SEA SPARROW	1147	COMBATSYSTECH MI	150
	A-121-0471	4584	MK-23 TAS	1149	COMBATSYSTECH MI	120
	A-113-0096	156Y	MK 68 MOD 19 MAINT	1151	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	87
	A-104-0207	187U	SPG-55B/10	1161	COMBATSYSTECH MI	155
	A-104-0207	192W	SPG-55B/10	1161	NAVGMSCOL DMNECK	150
	A-104-0201	110H	SPG-51C RDP UPGR	1162	COMBATSYSTECH MI	55
	A-104-0197	067S	AN/SPG-55 B/9	1163	NAVGMSCOL DMNECK	150
	A-104-0197	067R	AN/SPG-55 B/9	1163	COMBATSYSTECH MI	150
	A-104-0136	4809	AN/SPG-51C DU	1166	NAVGMSCOL DMNECK	115
	A-104-0196	189U	TARTAR MK74 MOD14 NTU	1167	COMBATSYSTECH MI	135
	J-113-1004	6937	AN/SWG 1A DIFF	1169	FTG PEARL HARBOR	10
	J-113-1004	0290	AN/SWG 1A DIFF	1169	FCTCL DAM NECK	10
	J-113-1004	197Y	AN/SWG 1A DIFF	1169	FTC NORVA	10
	J-113-1004	221K	AN/SWG 1A DIFF	1169	FAMNTC CHASN SC	10
	A-121-0493	067E	WDS MK 13 MOD 4	1183	COMBATSYSTECH MI	35
	A-150-0079	3694	TARTAR MK 152	1188	COMBATSYSTECH MI	93
	A-150-0079	3695	TARTAR MK 152	1188	NAVGMSCOL DMNECK	95
	A-150-0085	4699	TERRIER MK 152	1189	NAVGMSCOL DMNECK	97
FTB	A-121-0245	463U	FT 86	3303	NAVGMSCOL DMNECK	191
	A-121-0316	409K	FT 88	3305	NAVGMSCOL DMNECK	131
	A-121-0412	409P	TRIDENT FTB REPL	3305	TRITRAFAC BANGOR	115
	A-121-0505	1874	TRI II FTB REPLA	3307	TRITRAFAC KBAY	96
FTG(SS)	A-113-0113	129K	DCSCC	0	NAVSUBSCOL GROTN	124
	A-113-0132	0977	CCS MK 1 MAINT	1177	NAVSUBSCOL GROTN	154
	A-130-0300	108T	AD CAP MAINT	1175	NAVSUBSCOL GROTN	12
	A-130-0301	108U	VLS MAINT	1174	NAVSUBSCOL GROTN	54
	A-130-0227	040W	TRI DWS LEVEL 1	1301	TRITRAFAC BANGOR	86
	A-150-0200	041C	TRI CCS LEVEL 1	1306	TRITRAFAC BANGOR	101
	A-130-0146	325Y	FC 113 C/E CM	0	NAVSUBSCOL GROTN	124
	A-130-0149	324W	FC 113 9 AN MA	1196	NAVSUBSCOL GROTN	82
GM	A-113-0115	125U	GMT S-54	0879	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	115
	A-113-0115	131X	GMT S-54	0879	FTC SDIEGO	115
	A-121-0043	3019	MK 11	0987	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	159
	J-113-0100	352V	GMT S-38	0872	FCTCL USCG YKTN	40
	A-121-0011	169L	MK 26	0989	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	152
	A-113-0054	1269	GMTS - 54/D	0877	FCTCL DAM NECK	117
	A-121-0010	3017	MK 16	0891	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	89
	A-113-0044	3696	GMT S-54/10	0876	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	145
	A-113-0044	010A	GMT S-54/10	0876	FTC SDIEGO	145
	A-121-0522	166S	MK 41 VLS	0981	NAVGMSCOL DMNECK	136
	A-121-0522	1865	MK 41 VLS	0981	NSWSES PHA CA	136
	A-121-0522	1993	MK 41 VLS	0981	FTC SDIEGO	136
	A-121-0044	3186	MK 13	0988	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	152
	A-121-0046	3018	MK 10 ANALOG DIFF	0986	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	152
	A-121-0474	017S	MK 13-4	0991	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	131
	A-121-0546	189E	MICRO FUND	0	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	19
	A-121-0490	056P	DD 963 AWHS	0893	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	54
	A-121-0552	1012	MK 10/13	0985	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	152

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RATING	CIN	CDP	SHORT TITLE	NEC	LOCATION	C/L
HM	B-300-0013	3387	HM FIELD MED TEC	8404	MCS FM LEJUNE	37
	B-300-0013	3388	HM FIELD MED TEC	8404	MCS FM PENDLTON	37
	B-300-0017	3301	HM - AERO MED	8406	NAMI PENSACOLA	70
	B-322-0010	3374	RAD HELTH TECH	8407	NUMI HS DET CA	62
	B-300-0018	3302	HM - CP	8408	NSHS BETHESDA	378
	B-300-0018	3380	HM - CP	8408	NSHS SDIEGO	378
	B-311-A016	3306	HM-NUC MED/CLIN 1	0	NSHS BETHESDA	139
	B-300-0021	8052	HM-OCULAR ADV	8445	NSHS SDIEGO	UNK
	B-300-0024	3S1F	HM - ENT	8446	NSHS SDIEGO	154
	B-313-0025	8058	HM - XRAY BASIC	8451	NSHS SD DET OAKL	82
	B-313-0026	3322	HM - XRAY ADVANCED	8452	NSHS SDIEGO	363
	B-313-0026	3326	HM - XRAY ADVANCED	8452	NSHS HS DET VA	363
	B-302-0043	3334	HM - EEG	8454	NSHS BETHESDA	180
	B-311-0023	3382	HM - OPTICIAN	8463	OPHAL SUPPTRACT	180
	B-303-A051	300J	PHY THER PHASE 1	0	NSHSBETDETFTSAM	120
	B-400-0010	3339	HM - PHOTO	8472	NSHS BETHESDA	208
	B-198-0010	3385	HM - REPAIR BASIC	8479	MEDTECH NRS DENV	266
	B-312-0025	3340	HM - PHARMACY	8482	NSHS HS DET VA	159
	B-312-0025	3341	HM - PHARMACY	8482	NSHS SDIEGO	159
	B-301-0033	3342	HM - OR	8483	NSHS BETHESDA	180
	B-301-0033	3343	HM - OR	8483	NSHS SDIEGO	180
	B-301-0033	3347	HM - OR	8483	NSHS SD DET OAKL	180
	B-301-0033	3350	HM - OR	8483	NSHS HS DET VA	180
	B-302-A045	4359	PSYCH PHASE 1	0	NSHSBETHDETFTSAM	40
	B-300-0025	3359	HM - UROLOGY	8486	NSHS HS DT VA	180
	B-300-0025	3360	HM - UROLOGY	8486	NSHS SDIEGO	180
	B-300-0029	8497	HM - DERM	8495	NSHS SDIEGO	UNK
	B-311-0011	8998	HM - LAB/BASIC	8501	NSHSBETHDETFTSAM	105
	B-311-0039	804C	HM - HISTOPATH	8503	NSHS BETHESDA	UNK
	B-311-0036	305B	CYTOLOGY TECH	8505	NSHSBETHDETFTSAM	364
	B-311-0018	3308	HM LAB ADVANCED	8506	NSHS BETHSDA	378
	B-311-0018	3309	HM LAB ADVANCED	8506	NSHS SDIEGO	378
	B-300-1423	8905	HM - RESP THER 1	8541	NSHSBETHDETFTSAM	222
MT-ATF	A-701-0026	8737	GEN/MAINT/WELD	4954	SSC ANNEX SD	54
	A-701-0026	8887	GEN/MAINT/WELD	4954	NSYD PTMTH VA	54
IC	A-623-0080	043P	TRI SH CON/LEVI	4735	TRITRAFAC BANGOR	61
MM(NF)	A-661-0010	130E	NUC PWR	0	NAVNUCPWRSCOL OR	170
	A-661-0014	1316	NPPO MECHANICAL	3355	NAVNUCPWRTRAU ID	180
	A-661-0014	1318	NPPO MECHANICAL	3355	NAVNUCPWRTRAU NY	180
	A-661-0014	1320	NPPO MECHANICAL	3355	NAVNUCPWRTRAU WI	180
MM 6YO	A-651-0114	076H	MM PROP PLT MAIN	0	SERVSCOLCOM GLKS	26
MT	A-121-0250	461T	MT POS	3313	NAVGMSCOL DMNECK	151
	A-121-0329	409H	MTTRT	3315	NAVGMSCOL DMNECK	121
	A-121-0441	411B	TRIDENT MT REPL	3317	TRITRAFAC BANGOR	145
	A-121-0534	353L	TRI II MT REPLA	3319	TRITRAFAC KBAY	157

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RATING	CIN	CDP	SHORT TITLE	NEC	LOCATION	C/L
PR	D-602-1161	5724	P3 ENVIR SYS	8319	VP 30	35
	D-602-0590	8895	SH3 SURV/ENVIR	8377	HS 1	15
RM	A-160-0023	3087	TTY 28 ASR MAINT	2342	SERVSCOL COM SD	82
	A-160-0023	3189	TTY 28 ASR MAINT	2342	FTC NORVA	85
	A-160-0023	5116	TTY 28 ASR MAINT	2342	FTG PEARL HARBOR	82
	A-160-0052	3259	TTY LOW LEV-MAI	2346	FTC NORVA	15
	A-160-0052	3274	TTY LOW LEV-MAI	2346	SERVSCOL COM SD	14
	A-160-0052	051W	TTY LOW LEV-MAI	2346	FTG PEARL HARBOR	14
	A-260-0031	063C	SSIXS II OPR	2354	FTC NORVA	15
	A-260-0035	063B	VERDIN/ISARPS OP	2378	FTC NORVA	15
	A-260-0068	213G	RIXT/SRT	2370	SERVSCOL COM SD	12
	A-260-0068	213H	RIXT/SRT	2370	FTC NORVA	12
	A-202-0024	2904	LHA CMCS/MMTG OP	2374	COMBATSYSTECH MI	25
RM(SS)	A-101-0133	544C	TACTICOM	23JH	NAVSUBSCOL GROTN	82
	A-101-0265	191G	STRATCOMM TECH	23EW	NAVSUBSCOL GROTN	62
	A-101-0061	3191	COMM EQP CMB MA	23NJ	NAVSUBSCOL GROTN	109
	A-101-0168	038U	TRI ECS RPL LVL1	23TA	TRITRAFAC BANGOR	78
STG (4YO)	K-130-0097	6118	SQQ23 PAIR OPBAS	0	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	33
	K-130-1114	1431	SQR-18A (V) 2OP	0	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	42
	K-130-0269	608F	SQQ-89 (V) OPER	0406	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	68
	K-130-0283	610E	ANSQQ89V1OPERAT	0413	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	103
STG (6YO)	K-130-0046	3240	SQS-26BX MAINT	0452	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	187
	K-130-0047	3088	SQS-26AXR/CX MAI	0454	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	243
	K-130-0056	5039	UWFCG MK111 MAI	0431	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	152
	K-130-0057	3235	UWFCG MK114 MAI	0434	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	89
	K-130-0060	339V	RELAY TRANS MK60	0435	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	11
	K-130-0069	7782	SQS-35 (V) MAINT	0456	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	116
	K-130-0071	339W	SQS-38 MAINT	0	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	137
	K-130-0096	304X	SQQ28 PAIR MAINT	0459	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	200
	K-130-0097	6118	SQQ23 PAIR OPBAS	0	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	33
	K-130-0265	067L	SQQ28 (V) MAINT	0404	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	145
	K-130-0269	608F	SQQ-89 (V)2 OPER	0406	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	68
	K-130-0273	073B	SQQ89VCMEQP MA	0	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	110
	K-130-0281	091E	MK116 MOD7 MAINT	0430	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	236
	K-130-0282	091F	SQS53B MAI LEVII	0414	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	208
	K-130-0283	610E	SQQ-89 (V) 1/3 OPR	0413	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	103
	K-130-0099	413P	MK-309 OPR/MAINT	0	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	12
	K-130-0102	340J	SQS-53 MAINT	0457	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	313
	K-130-0245	052D	FFG7 SONAR LEVII	0402	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	168
	K-130-0247	062G	MK-116 MOD4 MAINT	0436	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	192
	K-130-1106	140F	SQS-53C MAINT	0	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	103
	K-130-1107	140S	SQR-18A (V)1 MAIN	0449	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	138
	K-130-1108	141D	SQR-19 MAINT	0407	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	124
	K-130-1093	083Z	INT SURF ACOU AN	0445	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	40
	K-130-1112	1420	MK114ACMK53/20/M	0	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	131
	K-130-1114	1431	SQR-18A (V) 2OP	0	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	42
	K-130-1115	1432	SQR-18A (V)2 MADIF	0451	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	56
	K-130-1119	0588	FF 1052 SONAR SU	0467	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	24
	K-130-1122	0608	UYQ-25A (V) 1/3 MA	0	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	5

CNTECHTRANOTE 1514

14 SEP 1990

RATING	CIN	CDP	SHORT TITLE	NEC	LOCATION	C/L
JTS(SS)	A-130-0188	6402	OA1283 BAS OPR	0	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	26
	A-130-0203	8612	SSBN SNR CMB MA	0428	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	103
	A-130-0188	6402	OA1283 BAS OPR	0	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	26
	A-130-0172	4497	SONAR AUX CMB MA	0421	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	145
	A-130-0172	4497	SONAR AUX CMB MA	0421	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	145
	A-130-0208	4537	BQQ5 SER CMB BAS	0412	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	110
	A-130-0208	4537	BQQ5 SER CMB BAS	0412	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	110
	A-130-0208	4537	BQQ5 SER CMB BAS	0412	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	110
	A-130-0209	4538	BQQ5 SERIES ADV	0422	FLEASWTRACEN PAC	208
	A-130-0126	040G	BQQ6 O/M LEVEL	0423	TRITRAFAC BANGOR	140
TM(SS)	A-121-0146	3659	ASROC IM	0718	SERVSCOLCOM ORLA	19
	A-123-0140	3671	TORP MK48 IM	0748	SERVSCOLCOM OR A	103
	A-123-0174	032M	TORP MK46 MODS IM	0746	SERVSCOLCOM O A	89

208

2. For FY90, in each of the "C" schools located at NTC San Diego, what was the percentage of students who came directly to attend these "C" schools from "A" schools at NTC San Diego? What was the percentage of students who came directly from "A" schools located at sites other than NTC San Diego? What was the percentage of students who came from the fleet at San Diego rather than from an "A" school? Of those students who did not come directly from "A" schools, what was the percentage who came from duty stations outside the San Diego area?

Unknown, data not readily available. To answer this question accurately, a special query of the Enlisted Master File data base must be conducted and then summarized. Estimated completion 2-3 weeks.

3. In FY90, what was the total number of recruits graduating from RTC San Diego and how many of these went directly to "A" schools at NTC San Diego? How many went directly to "A" schools located in the San Diego area, but not at NTC San Diego? How many went directly to "A" schools located outside the San Diego area?

20,849 recruits graduated from RTC San Diego in FY90. Follow-on orders for 3,291 of these recruits is not known due to data base errors/inconsistencies. Of the remaining 17,558 graduated recruits, 3,784 reported directly to Service Schools Command (SSC) San Diego. The following reported to San Diego area "A" schools not aligned with NTC San Diego: 813 to HM (Corpsman) "A" school; 199 to DT (Dental Tech) "A" school; and 296 to Fleet ASW Training Center. 4,029 reported to "A" schools outside the San Diego area.

4. Of the total number of recruits graduating in FY90 from RTC San Diego, how many did not go to an "A" school and went either directly to the fleet or shore duty; or went through an apprentice follow-on school, and then went directly to the fleet or shore duty? Of these, what percentage were assigned their first duty to the fleet in San Diego or to shore duty in San Diego, and what percentage were assigned to a fleet ported elsewhere in the Navy or shore duty elsewhere?

20,849 graduated from RTC San Diego in FY90.
3,291 unknown destination due to data base errors/inconsistencies.
4,250 attended Apprentice training.
2,087 reported direct to fleet commands.
11,221 attended "A" schools.
Fleet assignment data is not readily available. Estimate 2-3 weeks to retrieve data, if desired.

5. Of the recruits graduating from RTC San Diego during FY90, how many went to "A" schools located at NTC Great Lakes? To "A" schools located at NTC Orlando?

11,221 FY90 RTC San Diego graduates attended "A" school. 150 attended "A" school in Great Lakes and 53 attended "A" school in Orlando.

6. Of those students graduating during FY90 from "A" schools located at NTC San Diego, how many were assigned for their next duty to the fleet ported at San Diego? How many were assigned for their next duty to a fleet ported at some other location than San Diego? How many were assigned to duty at some location other than with a fleet, i.e., another school or shore duty? Of those who graduated from an "A" school at NTC San Diego during FY90, who were assigned duty other than with a fleet command, what percentage were assigned to duty at a school or other command in San Diego, and what percentage were assigned for duty elsewhere in the Navy outside of San Diego?

"A" school graduate fleet assignment data is not readily available. Estimate 2-3 weeks, if desired.

We estimate 30%-35% (1,350-1,575) NTC San Diego "A" school graduates were assigned to fleet units in San Diego. Therefore, 65%-70% (2,925-3,150) are assigned duty elsewhere.

This is based on the following approximations provided for consideration:

Assumption:

1. Navy's split 50/50 east coast/west coast.
2. 60%-70% of west coast Navy based in San Diego area.
3. Sea duty/shore duty split out of "A" school is 80/20.

7. In a memorandum for the Base Closure and Realignment Commission dated 14 June 1991, Rear Admiral Drennon submitted "Revisions to COBRA Analyses for RTC San Diego and RTC Orlando." For the COBRA Analysis of RTC San Diego, this revision added $3.3 million in mission costs at NTC Great Lakes "to account for the increased cost of moving graduates from RTC Great Lakes to San Diego for "A" school training at NTC San Diego." Specifically, how were these costs computed and what assumptions were used with regard to the number of students who would be required to make this travel who would not if RTC San Diego remained open? Is the assumption that the number of recruit graduates involved in this travel would remain static?

The COBRA revisions submitted on RTC San Diego and RTC Orlando added $3.3 million and $3.6 million, respectively, to the mission costs of NTC Great Lakes. In both cases, this is our estimate of the increased travel costs asociated with closure of an RTC. These costs demonstrate the benefit of collocating RTCs with NTCs. The estimates were made using our accession projections for FY97 and assumed that each RTC would be loaded at the same percentage as they are today. The cost for Orlando is slightly higher because their load is slightly higher than San Diego.

8. In total, Navy-wide, how many "A" schools and how many "C" schools are there? Frequently the term "course" seems used interchangeably with "school" in Navy parlance; if the number of "A" and "C" courses is different from the number of "schools", please state the number of "courses" as well.

Presently, there are 3,008 "C" schools (courses) that produce in varying combination 1,120 (NECs)

Navy Enlisted Classification Code

9. How many of the "C" courses taught at schools at NTC San Diego are taught at other locations in the Navy? Of these, how many are taught at more than one other location? Are any of them taught at NTC Great Lakes or NTC Orlando?

104 "C" schools are taught at NTC San Diego.
76 are taught at more than one location.
12 are taught at NTC Great Lakes.
4 are taught at NTC Orlando.

10. How many of the courses taught at "A" schools at NTC San Diego are taught at other locations? Of these, how many are taught at more than one other location? Are any of them taught at NTC Great Lakes or NTC Orlando?

The "A" schools at NTC San Diego are single-sited and not offered elsewhere. HM (Corpsman) "A" school, however, is taught at the Naval Hospital San Diego and is also taught at Naval Hospital Great Lakes.

11. How much was spent by the Navy on travel in FY90 to send recruits graduating from RTC Great Lakes to "A" schools located elsewhere than NTC Great Lakes? To send recruits graduating from RTC San Diego to "A" schools elsewhere than NTC San Diego? To send recruits graduating from RTC Orlando to "A" schools elsewhere than NTC Orlando?

In FY90 RTC Great Lakes graduated 27,038 recruits, over 7500 attended "A" school outside the NTC Great Lakes area at an estimated cost of $4.5M.*

In FY90 RTC San Diego graduated 20,849 recruits, over 5800 attended "A" school outside the NTC San Diego area at an estimated cost of $3.5M.*

In FY90 RTC Orlando graduated 25,792 recruits, over 6500 attended "A" school outside the NTC Orlando area at an estimated cost of $3.9M.*

* Travel costs are estimated utilizing a standard $600/student to execute travel from RTC to "A" school.

Ser 931C3/119-91
26 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: OP-44 BASE CLOSURE CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY

Ref: (a) Cong. McCollum Letter of 24 June 1991 to ASN(I&E)

1. The following information pertaining to medical is provided in accordance with reference (a).

a. Question # 12. If Orlando Naval Hospital is closed, has a final determination been made as to where active duty personnel assigned to that hospital will be transferred (including physicians, nurses, etc.)? If so please advise the projected new duty assignments by category of billet.

Answer. A final determination has not been made. A detailed migration plan, by specialty/sub-specialty, will be done after the FY 91 BRCC selections are made and before execution.

b. Question #13. In FY 90 how many military retirees were treated at Orlando Naval Hospital? At Great Lakes Naval Hospital? Of these in each case how many were under the age of 65?

Answer.

	FY 90 RETIREE VISITS	
	Outpatient	Inpatient
Orlando	26,521	704 (445 < age 65)
Great Lakes	11,797	355 (152 < age 65)

Note: Age data not collected on outpatient visits

c. Question #14. Of the total number of military retirees seen at Naval Hospitals and clinics throughout the system, what percentage were under the age of 65 in FY 90 or in the most recent year for which such statistics are available?

Answer.

	FY 90 TOTAL RETIREES VISITS
OUTPATIENT	681,169
INPATIENT	20,051 (54% < age 65)

Note: Age data not collected on outpatient visits

d. Question #15. During FY 90 what was the total number of dependents treated at Orlando Naval Hospital and its associated clinics? Please give the same statistic for FY 89.

Answer.

	FY 89	FY 90
OUTPATIENT	62,906	66,668
INPATIENT	1,672	1,889

e. Question #16. For FY 89 and FY 90 please state the total number of military retirees who had prescriptions filled at Orlando Naval Hospital. At Great Lakes Naval Hospital.

Answer. Data on prescriptions by type beneficiary is not readily available. However, data on total prescriptions filled for both Naval Hospitals Orlando and Great Lakes is provided.

	FY 89	FY 90
NH Orlando	428,644	478,290
NH Great Lakes	331,723	343,513

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