OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE

DEFENSE [illegible]

BASE REALIGNMENT [illegible]

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BUSINESS MEETING

Part I of II Parts

PART II of II PARTS

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DEFENSE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

BUSINESS MEETING

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1988

Room 310

1825 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20006

The business meeting was called to order at 9:06 a.m., Hon. Abraham Ribicoff and Hon. Jack Edwards, Co-Chairmen, jointly presiding.

PRESENT:

HON. JACK EDWARDS, Co-Chairman

HON. ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Co-Chairman

LOUIS CABOT

HON. W. GRAHAM CLAYTOR, JR.

DONALD F. CRAIB, JR.

HON. MARTIN R. HOFFMANN

GENERAL BRYCE POE, II, USAF (Ret.)

GENERAL DONN A. STARRY, USA (Ret.)

HON. RUSSELL E. TRAIN

DR. JAMES SMITH

VICE ADMIRAL ROWDEN

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1 ALSO PRESENT:

2 HAYDEN BRYAN, Executive Director

3 DOUGLAS HANSEN, Research Director

4 RUSSEL MILNES, Counsel

5 JAY WINIK, Deputy Executive Director

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. BRYAN: What I'd like to do is ask for comments on Chapters 1 through 5 and 7 through 9 first, understanding that what has happened is that we have incorporated as many of the comments of the Commissiners as possible. The resulting accumulation is not as smooth as we would like it, but we are working on sorting that out, so hopefully we can ignore some of the missing comments and misspelled words or whatever and focus on whatever you think is substantive and yet missing in the report or what is in there and needs to be taken out.

GENERAL POE: If I may, as far as the subcommittee is going to go over this thing -- I think it may apply to you, too -- I have been involved pretty heavily last night and early this morning on this force structure reference as to how much we have saved, and I just have to say that I need to go through this. I have read it, but I haven't gone through it carefully, and I will before I leave today, but I haven't done it yet.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Let me just ask kind of a general question. Chapters 1 through 5 have been sent to us at one time or another. We've had chances to scratch in the margin and that sort of thing. It's been sent back up here. It's been, as you said, generally incorporated into this draft.

I guess my big question is -- I'll ask this about

all the chapters -- is there any major change in Chapter 1 that we haven't seen before?

MR. BRYAN: In terms of substance, no. We've rearranged a great deal of the report to make it more readable. One of the problems that we ran into when we incorporated everybody's comments was where they were incorporated and where we stuck them originally in our text led to a situation where it was incoherent.

So what we have done is we have moved some of the sections out of that chapter into other chapters to make it a more readable presentation, to make a more logical flow. So some of that may have happened. So Chapter 1 may be significantly different, but you will probably find most of it in another chapter.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I'm talking about substance now. Brice and Jim and I are going to have to go through this and that's fine, but all I want to know up front is is there any major change in any of these chapters that is something we haven't seen before.

MR. BRYAN: We have not plugged in any new significant substantive information -- ideas, concepts, et cetera -- except what was asked for by the Commission.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I know you have substantially rewritten Chapter 9 and I heartily approve of that. Have you substantially rewritten anything else?

MR. BRYAN: Four is different. Again, that was a move-around from Chapter 3, Force Structure. A lot of what we had originally listed as force structure --

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I don't care if you moved it from one chapter to another. I just want to know are there any surprises in here.

MR. BRYAN: I don't believe there are any surprises.

ADMIRAL ROWDEN: In the force structure chapter, Chapter 3, I don't believe that the forces are adequately described. There was an earlier version which described the Air Force as consisting of a series of wings of certain types, that sort of thing, the Navy consisting of carrier battle groups and so forth and so on, and similarly for the Army.

I think it needs that kind of treatment and I would be perfectly willing to write that part for the Navy. I think we need to describe the force structure of the services better than they are now presented.

GENERAL STARRY: It needs a chart. In fact, I suggested that on my scribbling on the first edition of that -- a chart would solve that problem visually without having to write a bunch of prose.

MR. BRYAN: Could I suggest we had it in there originally and intended to have a fairly detailed description so that all of the detail was there. We took it out because it

didn't read well. It was a series. Let me suggest that we try an appendix. We are trying to avoid side bars and tables.

GENERAL STARRY: I again suggest, Hayden, thatyou put in a chart because the thing that choked me when I read it was the prose, not that the prose couldn't have been cleaned up but the fact is that a visual display of those things is usually easier to glance at than trying to read.

MR. BRYAN: I would just propose we put it in the appendix.

GENERAL STARRY: Wherever it goes.

CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: I think it's important that we get Admiral Rowden and General Starry to make some suggestions because descriptions mean nothing to me, but it should be accurate from the military standpoint, and if we have an Admiral and a General here I'll take their offer.

MR. STERNBERG: That was one of the problems when we began to make it more accurate in the text. We came into pieces of wings that were active and reserve and it just got very, very convoluted. So I think an appendix would be a good way to do it.

CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: They have to be correct in the appendix, too.

MR. HOFFMANN: I agree. I think the diagram notion is a very valuable one.

Secondly, I think the notion of having a very brief

1 chapter. The only problem I had with this was it was not
2 stated with word selection and stuff that you are used to
3 dealing with. It was not a professionally-crafted statement
4 with all the right buzz words in it. If we could get over
5 that, which I suggest we do -- if the Admiral writes the
6 Navy you take on the Army and you write the Air Force -- just
7 a piece, I think we can avoid a long, rambling appendix and
8 just have a hard-hitting thing with a couple of charts and
9 that would take care of it.
10 Our point is that it's linked to the force structure,
11 but to provide a basis for every subsequent evaluation we make
12 in here and analysis is going to be impossible. So let's just
13 highlight here the way this is.
14 CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: I l ike the tight chapters and
15 I think the chapters flow very well. I think it's an excellent
16 job you've done. It's clear, it's simple, it's readable.
17 MR. HOFFMANN: It just needs to be powerized up a
18 little bit.
19 I've got one kind of generic comment. I think in the
20 Executive Summary and back in the chapter on the Commission
21 and another one in the analysis we have reflected several
22 times as we have sat here how constrained we are by the
23 process, and as we wonder what people are going to think when
24 they look back at the old chestnut list and they say, hey,
25 these guys didn't lay a glove on these, okay, we have had a

1 whole series of things we wanted to put in here that I can't
2 find -- the shortness of time, the length of time it took to
3 get the legislation passed so the services would get serious,
4 the inhibition on our looking at lists and individual facilities
5 until a time certain, the disposal of the property.
6 MR. TRAIN: The six-year payback.
7 MR. HOFFMANN: I think all of those things ought to
8 be chunked in there in one place because I think one message
9 that we should have coming out of this report is that this
10 was a terribly eccentric exercise. It does not and should not
11 represent the real world, and what really ought to happen is
12 that you ought to have somebody that is as knowledgeable at
13 least as we got in the final hours, but mainly an embedded
14 process for doing this. It allowed you to make sophisticated
15 tradeoffs and deal in smaller units.
16 MR. CABOT: May I comment on that?
17 MR. HOFFMANN: Yes.
18 MR. CABOT: I agree with what you said, but I think
19 we ought to make sure that we don't weaken our case too much
20 with it. In other words, put it in there for how the next
21 guys should do it, but let's don't sound as if we don't really
22 believe our own recommendation here. We don't want to do
23 that.
24 MR. HOFFMANN: I think we believe in our own
25 recommendations. My point is we were sent out on the course

with an 8-iron and a wedge and a putter.

MR. CABOT: But let's done admit we have done a lousy job.

MR. HOFFMANN: We've done very well within the ground rules we were given, but in effect our ability to operate was circumscribed and that illustrates that this is at best a jerry-rigged and temporary procedure.

MR. CABOT: What are we trying to do, defend ourselves from looking stupid or to defend this thing from attack from the outside?

MR. HOFFMANN: Put our process in context and indicate what the ground rules were.

MR. CABOT: I'm in favor of saying what the ground rules were, but I hate us to sound as if we think there might be something wrong with what we have come up with.

MR. HOFFMANN: NO. That is not the point at all. It strengthens what we came up with to say that we had what we consider a short time, some very cramped rules, and a rather narrow jurisdiction, and even within that we found this much. Relax any one of those rules, and we could have had a better product.

MR. CLAYTOR: And a larger product.

MR. HOFFMANN: A better product not only in the sense of larger, but better thought out, more analytic. It's your and my thought that there's more out there. There's more out

there in the Army labs.If we had had a chance to really get into that earlier and look at specific locations and shaken those cookie jars a little harder, we would have gotten some of the mice out of there.

MR. CABOT: Fine.

GENERAL POE: Maybe that's the way to start it, is to say that while we are confident with what we've come across here, given more time and lacking such and such restrictions we feel that there is much more.

MR. CLAYTOR: That's the point I think we need to make.

MR. TRAIN: I'm also satisfied from what I've been hearing that no matter what changes in the rules the universe of closure and realignment is nowhere as big as some of those on the outside have led the public to believe -- $5 billion or whatever, $2 billion to $5 billion. I don't know to what extent we could comment on that. I would hope that we would not be perceived as having labored and brought forth a mouse when the public has been led to believe that a whole bunch of tigers will be brought to heel.

I don't know quite how you deal with that.

MR. HOFFMANN: Well, as we observed yesterday, one highwater mark is if you take the period of time over which -- if you take our payback limitation, which is six years, you have got to keep going through this rather rapidly. Take

our payback period, which is six years, figure out we have got $600 million out of steady state savings, multiply that by six. You've got $3.6 billion over six years. It may not be attached to anything but it's coherent.

MR. TRAIN: Well, we made that point early, suggesting that perhaps a longer period, the accumulated savings over five or ten years or six years, whatever -- I think we ought to do that, too, but that may be separate from the point I just made.

GENERAL POE: The other thing is which figures are we going to use -- inflated?

MR. BRYAN: I would prefer to use the non-inflated figures.

MR. HOFFMANN: I'll tell you one more inhibition was that we accepted the services' definition of their missions and we did not intrude on any mission functions.

MR. BRYAN: On force structure questions, force structure assumptions?

MR. HOFFMANN: Force structure/mission assumptions. THat's a big one.

MR. BRYAN: Let me just say a lot of this is in there. What you are saying is going to consolidate it in one place and hit it hard?

MR. HOFFMANN: No. I think you want to kind of weave it in there because I think it's important that nobody

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1 get the idea well this is my own idea. I think anybody that
2 would look at this exercise and say this is the way to
3 manage your base structure is out of his gourd. I think it's
4 terrible public policy. I think that the notion that we're
5 going to perpetuate and do this every ten years is nutty.
6 When the structure starts shrinking and let's assume
7 that over the next ten, fifteen years you reach some kind of
8 an accommodation with the Soviet Union, particularly on
9 conventional forces, you are going to see some tough decisions
10 when it comes to shrinking the size of that structure because,
11 as we have found, there is going to be new construction out
12 there. There is going to be units securely bedded down,
13 politically well dug in, and all these sorts of things.
14 And to get the notion that, hey, every ten years we
15 will have a commission take a look at this I don't think is in
16 the national interest at all. Somehow it's got to get back
17 into the mainstream of the management of public affairs.
18 CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: I think there's a chapter on
19 that.
20 MR. HOFFMANN: That's why I am saying I think you
21 need to highlight it in your Executive Summary. I'll talk about
22 in terms of the Commission and its functioning.
23 Obviously when you get into the analysis portion you
24 are going to have these things further explained there with
25 further facts.

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1 MR. CABOT: In doing that, who are we talking to
2 -- the Congress?
3 MR. HOFFMANN: I think we're talking basically both
4 to the DOD and the Congress, but mainly to the taxpayer.
5 MR. CABOT: There are two parts of the problem.
6 One is to reencourage the services to do this themselves,
7 which they used to do better than they have in the last ten
8 years. And the other is to talk to the problem of how do you
9 keep logrolling from interfering too much. They are two
10 separate problems, as I see it.
11 MR. HOFFMANN: I think that's right, but the log-
12 rolling aspect -- anybody that looks at procurement reform,
13 which is going to be a big number in the next two years, it's
14 got to be almost the number one prerequisite there to back
15 the Congress out of the micromanagement role, and then get
16 the Executive operating on a full visibility basis so people
17 can evaluate what's going on.
18 What I'm saying is we need to set up that resonance
19 in this report, that that is one aspect of this process
20 where you have to break the cycle. You've got to restore
21 that credibility. You have got to restore arm's length
22 operations and both of those institutions of our government
23 have to go back to serving the taxpayer by being able to
24 work on the basing structure in a coherent, public-spirited
25 way without logrolling and without fear of favor or punishment.

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1 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Well, we have addressed that on
2 page 28 and if you feel like it needs to be improved, why then
3 that's what we'll be going over today. But I think there is
4 a mechanism that's proposed -- well, that's the hearding, "A
5 Proposed Mechanism" -- but there is a mechanism proposed that
6 probably is as good as I can think of and it throws the monkey
7 back on DOD and the Congress, by and large, to get together
8 and work these things out.
9 It suggests an external group who could kind of look
10 over the shoulder, but the real answer to the problems that we
11 have been coping with for the last six months lies in the
12 Pentagon doing a credible job of realigning and restructuring
13 from time to time and doing it in the context of the
14 Congressional leadership understanding what it's all about.
15 And a lot of that has to do with the confidence that
16 each has in the other as far as political decisionmaking is
17 concerned. I think we have addressed it. I don't say it's
18 perfect, but it gives you a place to scratch on if you want
19 to work on it.
20 GENERAL STARRY: Mr. Chairman, may I suggest we had
21 words in Chapter 9 originally that dealt with the problem of
22 the need for larger maneuver and range areas for battalion,
23 brigade and division level maneuvers and joint training with
24 the Air Forces. It disappeared from Chapter 9. I can't find
25 it in the rest of the report. I would suggest that a couple

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of paragraphs, one paragraph or two perhaps, of not too great length could cover that adequately, and probably the right place for it is Chapter 9.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I thought I had seen it recently.

ADMIRAL ROWDEN: I think it's in Chapter 4.

GENERAL STARRY: Is it adequate? I don't know.

MR. CABOT: I think you are right. It ought to be in Chapter 9. When you are looking ahead, that's work to be done in the future and it's a long problem.

We mentioned it only in connection with sort of current needs.

GENERAL STARRY: Where is it in 4? There is some of it on page 11?

MR. HOFFMANN: And 10.

GENERAL STARRY: We had it in 9 in the first place, as I recall, and it was too long. It's on page 9, some of it. It may be all right to say that there, but it seems to me absent a recommendation about this, which we're in no position to make, it needs to be emphasized again, in Chapter 9. A paragraph would probably solve it.

ADMIRAL ROWDEN: There's a little squib at the top of page 10.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Maybe we can pull it together a little better, but I think the points were made in there. They may just not be in the right place.

1 MR. CABOT: May I bring up another subject, which is
2 in the discussion about environmental considerations I find
3 the language in there a little too -- well, I'm afraid that
4 somebody can take some sentences in there and use them as a
5 justification to go right back and have all the same kind of
6 destructive procedures as has been the problem in the past.
7 MR. BRYAN: What page are you on?
8 MR. CABOT: Let's take page 2 of the Executive
9 Summary, the second paragraph in the second column. The
10 last couple of sentences say the Commission of course antici-
11 pates full public scrutiny of environmental impacts. Now what
12 does "full public scrutiny mean"? Does it mean going right
13 back to the whole business of preparing environmental impacts
14 and fighting it out?
15 Now in other places in the report we talk about that,
16 but you can quote certain sentences out of here out of context
17 and I think use them maybe not even very much out of context.
18 They are not precise enough. They are not careful enough to
19 prevent, I think, a problem that we all know exists. So I
20 would like to see that section in the Executive Summary chapter
21 and then over there in the environmental chapter, somebody
22 should read that carefully with the idea now let's don't let
23 anybody use this against the process.
24 I'm not suggesting that we shouldn't have the
25 Defense Department do the things necessary to deal with the

environmental problem, but I am concerned about anything that sort of invites the public to come in and mess it up.

MR. TRAIN: I don't think it goes beyond exactly what the statute calls for.

MR. CABOT: I think the statute's a little vague. It says on the one hand and on the other hand, and you can take either hand and prove your point. And so we need to deal with that as precisely as we can.

MR. TRAIN: Well, we can take another look at it. Russ, let's sit down and take another look at it from that standpoint. We looked at it about five times now.

MR. CABOT: The place that really bothered me the most was page 18, the second column, most of that first paragraph on the second column. You ask yourself what does this really mean you have to do and what does it mean you don't have to do. It's just not clear from reading that.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Do you all want to take another look at that?

MR. TRAIN: We'll take another look at that.

MR. HOFFMANN: I agree with that.

MR. TRAIN: We exactly quoted the statute. If the statute is ambiguous in some way, we ought to try to spell out what it means.

GENERAL POE: You may change the words, but you have to support the fact that we followed that procedure or we're

1 dead.

2 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Train looked at all of it, and

3 there's no need for anybody to look at anything again.

4 MR. TRAIN: That won't be too hard.

5 (Laughter.)

6 MR. HOFFMANN: What is the sentence? The oracle

7 having spoken, the Commission went on to other matters.

8 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Or the oracle having spake.

9 MR. TRAIN: You've got a little bit of a dilemma

10 here because you do want to convey the sense that while certain

11 environmental rules have been relaxed, yet at the same time

12 the process is such as should fully relieve any concerns about

13 whether or not the environmental factors have been fully taken

14 into account.

15 MR. CABOT: You have just put it exactly right.

16 I don't think that the language we have got here quite does

17 that.

18 MR. TRAIN: Let's see if we can't --

19 MR. HOFFMANN: We just captured that sentence. If

20 you will just mark where that is, we will get that out of

21 there.

22 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Any other comments?

23 I think this is helpful, ans as the drafting

24 committee goes through this and the rest of you are around here

25 and reading and you come up with things, why don't hesitate

to let us know.

MR. TRAIN: Could we in Chapter 1 or wherever pick up the thought that we were discussing when we first sat down on the problem that the Department has and the services have of trying to move 18 people from here to there or whatever? Can we be specific? In Chapter 1 we talk about the difficulty of closure. We mentioned realignment once.

But maybe we can get down to what the ordinary person can understand and say actually moving.

MR. HOFFMANN: There are two points I'd like to put in there, and taht is one of them, right down to the five- and six-man move to consolidate a function. But the other one I think we talked about is the fact that over this hiatus between closures there has been a capital investment at some marginal installations that reduce future flexibility to seeing them being able to consolidate the base in a cost-effective manner.

GENERAL POE: Even more than capital investments, force structure moves into those stations, because we could throw out the capital investments, but when they've been tied to mission changes -- maybe not mission changes but individual unit assignments -- that's the hard thing. That's why we've got people at Loring.

ADMIRAL ROWDEN: Tied to mission execution.

GENERAL POE: That's a good way to put it.

1 Those things have driven mission execution and financial
2 obligation.
3 MR. HOFFMANN: But I think if we could get you and
4 Donn Starry to write up the micromanagement sentences, maybe
5 two of them, so that is really kind of little gems sitting
6 there, that would be helpful, because I don't really have --
7 MR. TRAIN: The little gems is what we need.
8 MR. HOFFMANN: It's little points of light,
9 Russell. You know, we've got to keep with the ethos of the
10 day. It's kind of a gentler report.
11 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Any other pertinent comments?
12 MR. CABOT: I have a few more. I hope you'll think
13 they are pertinent.
14 On Chapter 4 there's a sentence at the top of the
15 second column of page 9 about 83,000 acres necessary to
16 practice standard maneuvers. I think the lay person, the
17 way that's written, would say, well, then, hell, most of the
18 bases we didn't close aren't any good because a lot of the
19 bases don't have 83,000 acres. I think we need to elaborate
20 just a little bit on that.
21 GENERAL POE: I had a question on that, because I
22 had learned on one of my trips they needed 200,000 acres.
23 MR. TRAIN: At least 83,000 acres.
24 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: That sounds so precise, 83,000.
25 Where does that number come from?

1 MR. STERNBERG: It came from the Secretary of the
2 Army's testimony at that hearing we had.
3 GENERAL POE: The generic figure he used was
4 450,000 acres for a brigade and 200,000 acres for a battalion.
5 MR. BRYAN: THe 200,000 acres also includes
6 rotation.
7 MR. CABOT: Maybe it's just not relevant or not
8 relevant enough.
9 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I think it's very relevant. It
10 ties into the Ft. Erwin concept and the need for more maneuver
11 areas and everything else.
12 MR. CABOT: It doesn't apply to all bases.
13 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Yes, but not all bases are
14 practicing maneuvers.
15 MR. HOFFMANN: We can clean that up. We also ought
16 to use the World War II standard because the Civil War
17 standard is just irrelevant. Just put the World War II
18 standard.
19 ADMIRAL ROWDEN: Inherent in the statement is the
20 fact that a Civil War brigade or battalion is the same as a
21 battalion today, and I think that's probably somewhat falacious
22 Certainly the weapons are enormously different and that's what
23 drives the area, really.
24 MR. TRAIN: Why use it at all?
25 MR. HOFFMANN: It gets back to the continuing notion

1 that the base structure was sized during World War II when we
2 had some 8.5 or 8.6 million men under arms, and the continuing
3 myth is that you can shrink that beyond a point. What we want
4 to say here is that unlike World War II you now have the
5 expanded lethality, you have more requirement for maneuver,
6 et cetera, and I think it's a good concept.
7 We just need to get it more precise.
8 MR. CLAYTOR: Using World War II rather than the
9 Civil War makes a lot of sense.
10 MR. HOFFMANN: Let's delegate that to Donn Starry.
11 GENERAL POE: Although it's covered in the next
12 paragraph, we might add a sentence, another statistical state-
13 ment about aircraft to make a turn or something of this nature.
14 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Maybe you described something in
15 a hearing or maybe in a meeting about how many seconds it
16 takes a jet before it runs out of the maneuver area.
17 MR. BRYAN: It's in there.
18 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I think that's kind of startling.
19 If you can come up with a number that startles, it would be
20 worthwhile.
21 GENERAL POE: Plus, of course, the supersonic
22 problem of blowing everybody out.
23 MR. CABOT: May I make a couple more points?
24 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Sure.
25 MR. CABOT: On page 11, the base structure chapter,

1 the first paragraph on the first column of page 11 talks about
2 growing competition for valuable land pitted local interests
3 against military requirements. It's particularly evident
4 near deepwater ports, et cetera.
5 We didn't do anything. Our actual recommendations
6 were not affected by that particular observation about the
7 deepwater ports that I can remember. I think we kind of weaken
8 the results we came up with by highlighting that particular
9 issue.
10 Also, over on the second column on that same page
11 where we talk about the ancient buildings at the Pacific Fleet
12 Antisubmarine Warfare Training Center, we didn't do anything
13 about that. Here we specified it in a chapter about
14 facilities, but it's not one of our recommendations, is it?
15 MR. BRYAN: Both of those issues were addressed in
16 the process of coming to the recommendations.
17 MR. CABOT: I understand that, but since no
18 recommendation related to either one of those I just wonder
19 whether we wouldn't be better off not to put it in this chapter
20 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Maybe we should substitute there
21 the two Army facilities that we did deal with that are based
22 on World War II barracks situations. -- McClellan and Bliss.
23 MR. BRYAN: One of the reasons for the question on
24 the ports, one of the reasons we didn't do a lot of realigning
25 with the Navy is there isn't a lot of room in their existing

1 large deepwater ports, like Norfolk, and we thought that was
2 an important consideration to insert in there in case anybody
3 wondered why we didn't just wipe out all of them.
4 MR. CABOT: Well, that's okay. I see your point.
5 MR. HOFFMANN: I think it came up in the Boston situ-
6 ation where you shut down that Navy yard. That whole environ-
7 ment cramps up. You'll never get back into Boston.
8 MR. CABOT: In that same chapter it seems to me there
9 ought to be a paragraph about capacity and over-capacity. Now
10 you get into capacity and over-capacity as part of your
11 formula discussion of the process, but I think that you need
12 to say that we did find in some categories there is over-
13 capacity, therefore, room for some closures in this chapter
14 4.
15 GENERAL POE: Before we leave this thing about
16 antiquated housing, though, I think any time we bring up a
17 subject like that we ought to make it either generic or we
18 ought to pick examples from two or more of the services.
19 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Again, you could refer to the
20 Army barracks there and even say in some cases we were able
21 to deal with it and in some cases we weren't.
22 MR. STERNBERG: We could come up with an Air Force
23 example that provided encroachment around. You know, we did
24 something about (inaudible), which have similar problems with
25 deepwater ports.

1 MR. CRAIB: In some cases where there is current
2 overcapacity we took into consideration the mobilization needs
3 in the future. I don't recall seeing mobilization mentioned
4 here, but that came up several times.
5 MR. BRYAN: It's mentioned in several places in
6 this report and not necessarily here.
7 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I see you have got a couple more
8 yellow tabs sticking out there.
9 MR. CABOT: We talked on page 15, the second
10 colum, about halway down the page, about the potential
11 receiving bases for individual units or categories were not
12 limited to a single category or service.
13 Well, they weren't limited to a single category,
14 but I can't remember any case where we actually went across
15 to a different service for any relocation. If we didn't do
16 that, maybe we shouldn't say that we did here.
17 MR. TRAIN: We looked at some.
18 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I guess that was Jim's early
19 point a month or two ago that we never really did it, did we?
20 There is no example in here.
21 MR. BRYAN: We never managed to execute one. We did
22 look at possibilities.
23 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: We'll look at that.
24 MR. CABOT: I just suggest you look at that in light
25 of what we actually did.

1 MR. HOFFMANN: We impinged in at last one, the
2 interservice aspects at Ft. Dix. I lost the vote to my left
3 because the Air Force would have collapsed at this impressive
4 base.
5 MR. BRYAN: We did do cross-category but not cross
6 service.
7 GENERAL POE: Mather has a Navy unit on it, so if
8 we close that down that unit has to go somewhere. Maybe we
9 need to say it somewhere so it isn't just a receiving base.
10 ADMIRAL ROWDEN: You look at the potential also of
11 El Toro to George. Now that was not done, but certainly was a
12 cross-service situation. We looked at that very clearly.
13 MR. CLAYTOR: Well, at Mather we are moving the Navy
14 navigation school along with the rest to the new Air Force
15 base.
16 GENERAL POE: I think it's an Air Force Navigation
17 School, but there's a Navy squadron there.
18 MR. CLAYTOR: That's right, it is. It's our navi-
19 gation school, too.
20 GENERAL POE: That's right. The Navy uses the same
21 school.
22 MR. CLAYTOR: It uses the same school and the Navy
23 is going to be moved when we move yours. We would be moving
24 with it. I assumed that all the way through. I've been
25 there. It's quite a place.

1 MR. CABOT: If we did it, I'm all in favor of putting
2 it in there because there are a lot of people out there in the
3 world who think that's an opportunity that we should have
4 taken.
5 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Your point is well taken. We'll
6 see if we can't put that in.
7 MR. CABOT: Now on that same page, the last sentence
8 that goes over halfway down the next page, the end of the
9 next page, read it and tell me what it says because it's an
10 unclear sentence. It has something to do with the way we
11 figured the payback period, but it just doesn't say anything
12 that I can comprehend.
13 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I'll tell you one thing. If you
14 can't understand it, I'm not even going to try. I know smart
15 when I see it. Who's got a comment on that?
16 MR. CABOT: It's not just the issue of what the
17 formula is. The sentence itself doesn't read right.
18 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: We'll look at it. We'll see if
19 the three of us can figure out what it means.
20 MR. HOFFMANN: This Chapter 5, I think, Mr. Chairman
21 is kind of the heart of the matter. Everybody whose base was
22 closed, future generations of folks are going to be studying
23 this, so we need to write this defensively just like the
24 environmental chapter. I'm ashamed to say I went through it
25 before. I haven't been back through it.

1 GENERAL POE: They are going to read sentences out
2 of context.
3 MR. HOFFMANN: That's right, in the whole thing.
4 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Is that the end of your yellow
5 tabs?
6 MR. CABOT: Yes, sir.
7 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Anybody else?
8 Is this up here for a reason?
9 MR. BRYAN: That's for later presentation.
10 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Are we ready for presentations?
11 We are getting down to the point of being ready to vote, right?
12 MR. HANSEN: We're waiting for some information
13 to come in from the Army regarding some analyses being done
14 last night and we're still working on the sheet you asked us
15 for spreading it out by state. May I suggest a short break?
16 GENERAL POE: I have one subject that I think we
17 ought to bring up, Mr. Chairman, especially in the light of our
18 wanting to be extremely prudent about overstating our case.
19 Yesterday evening the Air Force responded to the
20 request to take a look at the credit for force structure and
21 one bright guy over there called me last night and said, hey,
22 you know, I think maybe you are double-dipping on this and you
23 ought to be careful, and we went through it rather carefully.
24 It looks to me like we are. What we have gotten,
25 for example, at a place like -- if I can read my late-night

notes --

MR. HANSEN: I've got the numbers here, sir.

GENERAL POE: At a place like Pease, the FB-111s were going to [redacted] B-1 [redacted] to replace [redacted] All that was in the POM and all that is being announced to the Congress and they know about it already on the sixth of January as part of the force modernization and inventory reductions.

That we really can't take credit for. The 52s that were going to go out of Mather to the boneyard, that was going to happen whether we got closed or not. NOw you see the difference -- and these are inflated figures -- the difference on the right and the left, you know, I would hope we could maybe dig up another $2 million somewhere and make that $400 million, and I'm serious about that.

The Air Force has cut the cost of these moves from $337 mililion to $168 million and they're still working the problem. And they have raised the annual savings from $414 to $436 because they found some things, and those figures aren't quite final yet. They are still working the problem.

I guess what I'm saying is that somebody could bounce right up and say, wait a minute, you're taking credit for these particular items. That was already going to happen, and I think that what that does for us, there is a positive thing,

1 it allows us to say something on the order of the Air Force
2 worked to align their current force structure to drawn it
3 down driven by fiscal restraints and other economic consider-
4 ations, not only draw down force structure but conslidation
5 like Chanute, gave the Commission the best opportunity to find
6 candidates for base closure.
7 So although you don't take credit for this thing,
8 what you do is recognize the real life thing that when these
9 people begin to do this drawdown and work that future problem
10 that gave us the opportunity to make the decisions. And, to
11 be quite honest with you, that might solve an Air Force
12 problem where they say, you know, the last thing we want is
13 for you to go in and way we offered these things up. They
14 really didn't offer them up. They were dragooned into it by
15 folks like us.
16 But the thing I'm most concerned about is if we take
17 the force structure -- and it's a great temptation for the
18 Air Force as well as ourselves to take it -- if we take that
19 then somebody's going to come out and say you're double-
20 dipping.
21 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: If you take the chart on the left,
22 which I guess is the one we saw -- I mean on our right, the
23 one we saw yesterday, and with a proper asterisk say what
24 you have just said, it deosn't seem to me that's an unfair way
25 to present it. I mean, in truth while we were in the process

1 of doing our business the Air Force has announced that it is
2 going to do this. That's what I think I hear you saying.
3 GENERAL POE: It's in the program; the program
4 objective and budget estimate submission reflect these further
5 cuts. That's an annual force structure public announcement.
6 It will go out on the sixth of January, but it's been in work
7 and been in place at OSD and places like that for months, and
8 the Congresisonal staffers have seen it and things of that
9 nature.
10 That's why I think we ought to go into this with
11 our eyes open before we try and take credit for something like
12 that. I think it might be better to say, because of this, this
13 gave us an opportunity, and this will help the Navy, I believe,
14 as well, because you see the same thing. The Navy had the
15 homeporting, if I quote this right, which locked out some of
16 the things that they could not do or did not feel they could
17 do some of the things or had to do some of the things that
18 the Air Force was forced to do.
19 In other words, their homeporting has been approved.
20 People are talking about paying them for it and doing that
21 work. The Air Force has been told very bluntly that they are
22 only going to get a certain amount of money, so they began
23 to accommodate to that. I don't know if that would help
24 balance this or not.
25 MR. HOFFMANN: What is the double dip? Tell me

1 again what the douple dip is.

2 GENERAL POE: The double dip is, let's take Mather.

3 We say that we're going to get some savings there because we

4 are taking 14 B-52s and throwing them away, and that was

5 going to happen whether we had a base closing or not. That's

6 the difference between 123 and 73. Is that correct?

7 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: But it all enters into our

8 decision as to the relocations and realignments of all of this.

9 Whether they are doing it or not, it entered into our decision.

10 GENERAL POE: Yes.

11 MR. HOFFMANN: I think what we're saying here is

12 that this is reflective of a level of saving, not whether we

13 did it or not. We'd like it in there because we have to make

14 that point, too. But if you flag it that this includes, you

15 know, the cost of X, Y and Z, I think that's a fair way to do

16 do it because we are stating an overall result.

17 ADMIRAL ROWDEN: Isn't that what the footnote says?

18 Doesn't the footnote say exactly what you just said?

19 GENERAL POE: It says that there were other forces

20 that caused those things to occur. It's just that I think

21 this Lieutenant General who called this to my attention was

22 sincere. He says we don't want you to get trapped by this.

23 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: We don't want to be trapped. I

24 think we can stay out of the trap with footnotes rather than

25 reducing the numbers.

1 MR. CLAYTOR: That's what I would do.

2 MR. HOFFMANN: I think we can make it a disclosure

3 issue.

4 GENERAL POE: The other thing is these are inflated

5 figures, and in your chapter you are using uninflated figures.

6 MR. HANSEN: We use inflated and discount.

7 GENERAL POE: You've got uninflated figures in this

8 thing, I think, haven't you?

9 MR. BRYAN: You are talking about the Air Force

10 situation? Well, it was the older inflated figures.

11 GENERAL POE: I don't care which way we go, but I

12 think we have to say are they inflated or are they uninflated.

13 MR. BRYAN: I think you need to take a look at the way

14 this is going to be perceived. There is a dichotomy here

15 between what the press is going to pick up and what the people

16 on the Hill are upset about. The press is going to pick up

17 the higher number. They always do. That will be the number

18 that will be out there and people will tend to look at.

19 Other people who have had bases closed will attack

20 us first on our numbers, saying that that was already saved.

21 The Commission did not do that. And our number is therefore

22 inappropriate. Or they will use stronger words.

23 MR. HOFFMANN: But does the closure walk in six

24 years if you take the number out?

25 MR. HANSEN: Two, yes. That's this chart over here,

1 sir.

2 MR. BRYAN: The other thing is we assumed force
3 structure. We did not make changes in force structure. This
4 is a force structure change that we would be taking credit for.

5 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: But we've been made aware of it.

6 GENERAL POE: I think no matter what we decide on
7 this I think we should make the point that the decisions to
8 make changes in force structure and consolidations, because of
9 the drawdown in money and financial support, gave us that
10 opportunity, and I'm back again to some of the other services.
11 Those opportunities did not exist, if I quote it correctly,
12 in the same sense where these guys said hey, yes, you're
13 going to get homeporting. Just before we recessed we said
14 we're going to support that.

15 And that may make this whole thing a little more
16 pallatible when people think it is so misbalanced.

17 MR. HOFFMANN: But, you see, it adds to our point
18 that you have to have the structure evaluation embedded in the
19 ongoing management process at DOD and the Congress because
20 this is the time to make the closures, when you have a force
21 structure shift, and if you are precluded from making a force
22 structure adjustment or the basing structure adjustment to
23 your force structure adjustment you will not be able to
24 streamline this base. If you can't move these three or four
25 people even, you won't be able to move the unit.

1 GENERAL POE: We could use this as an example in
2 Chapter 9, for example, in a half paragraph or something as to
3 one of the reasons that. It would seem to me it would appear
4 to be more fertile ground was found in, was because of.
5 MR. HOFFMANN: Who on the staff is taking note of
6 these things. Is anyone on the staff taking notes? Do we have
7 some faithful recorders back there? Otherwise we'll have to be
8 our own clerks and we'll lose some of these gems that are
9 flying out.
10 GENERAL POE: The first time they flow they are much
11 better than when we think about them.
12 MR. HOFFMANN: That's right. We've got it in the
13 record over there.
14 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: You may not see that for a week.
15 GENERAL POE: I thought I'd better bring that up.
16 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Anything else for the good of the
17 order?
18 DR. SMITH: On the report, Mr. Chairman, two issues.
19 Is there a schedule for printing? Is there going to be another
20 opportunity to see the edited thing, the Commission see the
21 thing as it has been edited before it's in final-final and
22 we can't do anythign else with it?
23 MR. BRYAN: Well, we can send you another copy
24 probably -- well, we have to go in the can on the 20th. What
25 kind of turnaround are you talking about?

We'll have another draft. We'll have a series of drafts as we move through this weekend. If you'd like to see something sent out to you, say tomorrow night --

DR. SMITH: We're going to spend today trying to get final edits into this thing. Then there will be another cut. Is it the pleasure of the Commission to see it again and have one more opportunity before the thing goes, if that opportunity is available?

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: The Commission ought to have that opportunity.

DR. SMITH: I agree. If I were in your shoes, I'd want the change to look at it and want to see the final copy.

MR. BRYAN: Chairman Ribicoff had asked for a copy of whatever we had done and I was planning to do that tomorrow night.

CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: I would appreciate it no matter what stage, because I'll be out of the loop now until the 26th.

MR. BRYAN: We can Federal Express to him and any other Commissioner.

DR. SMITH: I would say less Chapter 6.

MR. BRYAN: That's standard format anyway.

DR. SMITH: So the Commissioners know then it's going to print on the 20th, and they will have three days to call in comments. That's one more opportunity.

1 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Don't depend on the mail.

2 MR. BRYAN: The Fax is on the letterhead, the tele-
3 phone, whatever.

4 DR. SMITH: I think that way every Commissioner gets
5 a chance to see the final product and General Poe and I are
6 going to change it all up to date.

7 GENERAL POE: I feel much more comfortable about
8 slashing through this thing if I knew we were going to have a
9 chance to look at it.

10 DR. SMITH: One other thing. Senator Eagleton has
11 asked to have additional views filed. What's the order of the
12 day? Are we going to permit those by all Commissioners and
13 what's the deadline if we're going to do it, and how are you
14 going to handle that?

15 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Let me say first that I personally
16 hope that we will not end up with additional views, anything
17 that looks like a minority view, whether that's what they
18 are or not. Eagleton said to me here that if in fact we
19 could incorporate the substance of his views into the work
20 that that was satisfactory with him. He wasn't holding out
21 for additional views.

22 So I would hope that we can incorporate the views
23 into the work. I mean, if somebody, once that effort is done,
24 is still concerned about something, then it's certainly your
25 right to have additional views or minority views. But I'd

like to come out of here with a view.

MR. TRAIN: So would I.

GENERAL POE: Mr. Chairman, one of his views is presented -- I haven't read it, but it was in an earlier letter from him -- very much concerns me. And that is if the perception is given that the staff was not independent of the Pentagon we are in terrible trouble. I do not believe that they were dependent upon the Pentagon, and I think we should try to make sure that nobody else gets that idea.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: We've looked at that and his assumption is wrong.

MR. CLAYTOR: Have we been able to convince him of that?

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: We just looked at it after he left. But I may end up having to call him. But we're not going to break faith with him. We're going to try to deal with his three issues in here.

GENERAL POE: We can certainly say in Chapter 9 that it is essential that, as in this case, the staff be independent of the services and other government agencies that might bring to bear opinion or however you want to put it.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: The truth is I guess we were close to 50/50 on staff, give or take -- that is, 50 percent have a Pentagon background and 50 percent who don't. Is that a fair way to say it?

1 MR. BRYAN: There was a specific requirement in the
2 law that 50 percent of the staff be not employed by the Penta-
3 gon during calendar year 1988.
4 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: That's the definition and we met
5 that. If there was a failing, in my judgment it was in that
6 we didn't meet that early enough, and there are many reasons
7 why we didn't. First of all, we didn't have legislation
8 until way towards the end of the year, but there was a
9 difficulty in finding people who were perceived as either
10 not Pentagon or not Pentagon-oriented.
11 I mean, we could have found some civilians who
12 nevertheless have very strong Pentagon biases, and so it has
13 not been easy. I guess if we were ever aske dto do this
14 again and we started with legislation in place knowing
15 exactly where we were going, we could have ended up with a
16 lot different structure, but we had to get started somewhere
17 and the somewhere was getting information out of the Pentagon
18 with people who could understand it.
19 MR. CABOT: Couldn't we also make the point that
20 staff, after all, they don't vote in the sense that if two
21 more people were in the service than out then it changes the
22 decisions of the staff. The decisions were being made by
23 civilians who weren't in the Pentagon, hadn't been for quite
24 a while, and they were the ones who were calling the signals.
25 MR. CLAYTOR: That's absolutely correct.

1 MR. HANSEN: I fall into the DOD category. I was
2 employed by the Department before I came here.
3 MR. CABOT: In 1988?
4 MR. HANSEN: Yes.
5 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: And in fact was probably the
6 one who at the request of Carlucci and down the line started
7 putting this whole thing together.
8 MR. HANSEN: Required by law, sir. The Federal
9 Advisory Committee Act requires that an employee of the Depart-
10 ment that's forming that committee have a designated employee.
11 I was required to be at every meeting. Not that I may or may
12 not have, but I had the right to close the meeting if I felt
13 that something was amiss, and that is designed into the law.
14 I am that designated Federal official.
15 I think the issue, to be a little emotional about it,
16 goes beyond the issue of whether or not people are beholden
17 to the department for jobs or not. It's just whether or not
18 I have the personal integrity to be my own person, and I can
19 assure you that the staff had integrity, worked without the
20 Department and worked with the Department, too, because they
21 had the numbers.
22 MR. CABOT: Can't we as a Commission certify that
23 that in fact happened?
24 GENERAL POE: To be honest, Mr. Chairman, I am
25 concerned that we may have to protect some of these people whe

1 they go back home again, seriously.

2 ADMIRAL ROWDEN: If you want to assure the Chairman

3 of their independence, go over and talk to the staff over at

4 the Pentagon.

5 GENERAL POE: We may find all these people assembled

6 in Adak in their new assignments.

7 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I think the point is we ought not

8 to belabor this in the report but it's apparently something that

9 we at least need to comment on.

10 GENERAL POE: Especially if we've got to respond to

11 that note from the Senator.

12 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Sorry, Jim. You had the floor.

13 DR. SMITH: I was just asking about how you were going

14 to handle the additional views. I haven't decided yet whether

15 I want to file additional views. If I do, is there a deadline?

16 I may want to.

17 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I guess the 20th, obviously. But

18 if you're going to do it, then I guess we need to look at them.

19 Again, you've got the right to file whatever you want to file,

20 but maybe if, once we finish our work today, you feel still

21 inclined we could still have you submit those back to the

22 drafting committee and see if we could make peace with you.

23 DR. SMITH: I'm not suggesting that I will, but I

24 think we need to establish the understanding with everybody

25 if you are going to do that what's the deadline.

1 MR. HOFFMANN: But, you see, as collegial organi-
2 zations go, and this is Commissions outside the government and
3 Commissions inside the government, I think we tried from the
4 outset under our very able leadership to emerge with a con-
5 sensus. Therefore, if someone feels unsatisfied or feels that
6 the points he raised during debate have not been given voice
7 in the report then really the spirit of collegiality is you
8 can't kind of pop those out on the 19th and say hooray. We
9 deserve a crack at you to see if we can bring you to ground on
10 it.
11 DR. SMITH: I hear you, but they are all on the
12 record. What's going to happen with this record of proceed-
13 ings that we've had at all of our executive sessions? Is that
14 going to hit the shredder?
15 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I don't know the answer to that.
16 What is the answer?
17 MR. BRYAN: I've asked counsel to look into what the
18 options might be. We're required to keep a record of our
19 proceedings, but the exact amount of detail is open to question
20 and we are researching that.
21 DR. SMITH: Because my point is if it hits the
22 record -- I mean, we have been candid and open with each other.
23 We know where we agree and where we disagree. All of it is
24 going to be a matter of public record anyhow. If that trans-
25 cript becomes public, and I don't know how you address that

1 issue. I think it's something that we ought to talk about.

2 GENERAL STARRY: The transcript remains secret or

3 not?

4 MR. BRYAN: The transcript is secret because we were

5 not aware of the level of conversation. Many pages in there are

6 obviously not secret, but not knowing where the conversation

7 might go in the course of the discussion among the Commis-

8 sioners we decided to play it safe.

9 GENERAL STARRY: That's kind of an important decision

10 -- not that you can keep secrets in this town at all, but if

11 the document turns out to be classified then it really isn't

12 in the public domain.

13 MR. BRYAN: It would be available to any Members of

14 Congress.

15 DR. SMITH: Any Congressional staffer with clearance

16 will be able to get their hands on it. They will quote from

17 it and they will come back and say is it classified that

18 so and so agreed with this or disagreed with that, and they

19 will quote great portions of this thing if we leave it as a

20 document regardless of whether it's classified or not.

21 GENERAL STARRY: It might be well if it's not

22 classified for that very reason. They will think we want to

23 hide something.

24 GENERAL POE: So the trouble is you have to go

25 through page after page and you are going to get into some of

1 these things like missile flight times.

2 DR. SMITH: My only point is that if the transcript

3 of our proceedings stays as a document, classified or not, it's

4 going to get in the public domain and there's nothing you can

5 do about it.

6 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: You're right, and in fact we'll

7 probably be asked for it.

8 MR. HOFFMANN: There's no question we'll be asked

9 for it.

10 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: We'll need a view or an opinion

11 because on the 29th when we go to the media I can guarantee

12 you some of the more enterprising types will want to see it.

13 GENERAL POE: Is there any way of saying in the view

14 of the Commission in order to protect the subjectivity of

15 future commissions we felt this quite candid exercise of

16 debate should not be made public or retained, for that matter?

17 MR. CLAYTOR: That would certainly be my view, if

18 you can do it, but I think you've got to ask counsel.

19 MR. HOFFMANN: See, that argument usually does not

20 work if you are trying to close a meeting. The classic argu-

21 ment is that the Congress evaluated the need between public

22 disclosure and private candor and came out on the side of

23 public disclosure. That's the usual thing you get if you are

24 arguing that a meeting ought to be kept open.

25 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: The doors have been open. Have

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1 we ever run anybody out of here?

2 MR. BRYAN: No.

3 MR. HOFFMANN: My own understanding was that we were
4 in executive session for the purpose of writing our document
5 and doing our deliberations for all the reasons of sensiti-
6 vity inherent in the process, that we wanted a full and
7 candid discussion and this was therefore an executive session
8 and therefore probably wouldn't even be transcribed as far as
9 we know.

10 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: That ought to be the view.

11 DR. SMITH: The reason I bring it up is --

12 MR. HOFFMANN: Which way does that push you?

13 DR. SMITH: If this document becomes public or gets
14 widespread distribution -- by the document I mean the trans-
15 cript of our proceedings -- there is probably no reason to
16 write additional views because I have certainly not been
17 reticent in making my views known in this process.

18 But if this document is going to be shredded or
19 not made public, then I think there are certain issues that I
20 have tried to bring up where I think we are doing a dis-
21 service to the Secretary of Defense in not going far enough
22 on some of the things that we've looked at that I feel
23 ought to be brought up. And I think I can do it in a
24 fashion which is not critical of anybody or any thing but just
25 says I don't think the Commission went far enough.

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1 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Well, even there we may all
2 agree we didn't go far enough, but we went as far as we thought
3 we could based on what we had and the time we had to do it.
4 DR. SMITH: And I don't argue with that. I just
5 disagree with it.
6 MR. MILNES: Mr. Chairman, we are doing the
7 research on the issue of the transcript. I could tell you at
8 this point that all parts of the transcript, if we retain a
9 transcript, that related to bases that were not closed, that
10 were discussed but not closed, and options that were talked
11 about but were not followed through on would be withheld from
12 the public, and that was the very reason why the meetings were
13 closed, because of the fact that you would impugn a lot of
14 communities out there that ultimately will not be closed, and
15 it would tie the hands of the Secretary in future delibera-
16 tions if that kind of information becomes public.
17 So a large part of the transcript would be protected
18 Now whether it would be protected in total or whether we are
19 required to have one in the record file is the question that
20 we are looking at right now.
21 ADMIRAL ROWDEN: What about bases that were
22 realigned as opposed to closed? Would they be in the record?
23 MR. MILNES: Yes, sir. As it stands right now,
24 anything that would end up in our final report, the basis for
25 that would be available for public comment. It's the things

1 that did not end up in the final report that we would not be
2 required to divulge. But that does not clear the total
3 question of what about the transcript and every single word.
4 DR. SMITH: Russ, how are you going to protect it?
5 MR. MILNES: First of all, the Advisory Committee
6 Act does not appear to require that you keep a transcript in
7 your records overall, but that's a question that we want to
8 make sure that we understand. It does require that you have
9 minutes, as the Executive Director has mentioned, which means
10 you summarize all your actions.
11 Itdoes require in the case of closed meetings that
12 you record what you did, which is exactly what the report
13 is all about, on the 31st of December. So the question is
14 whether or not we have to retain and in-total transcript of
15 our closed meetings, which we were using basically to make
16 sure we captured all of your ideas. That was the purpose of
17 keeping those transcripts.
18 So it may be that we are permitted to summarize them
19 and then discard them, but we want to make sure about that
20 before we take that action.
21 GENERAL POE: My reaction is that if you publish
22 a verbatim and allow that in the public domain you'll never
23 get another commission to sit down around the table.
24 MR. CLAYTOR: I think that's plainly so.
25 GENERAL POE: We've been very, very candid about

1 individuals in the government and about that sort of thing.

2 GENERAL STARRY: And if you don't publish about

3 the bases that you didn't close, the discussions that went on

4 and show the reasons for not closing, you will get more

5 questions about those than you will about the ones you did

6 close.

7 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Let me ask you, Jim, just as an

8 off-the-wall question, if it's concluded that we will not

9 publish this but it will result in minutes being prepared of

10 the meetings or a limited kind of thing, and in those minutes

11 it is said that at some frequent interval Mr. Smith, being

12 the Banty rooster that he is, raised cain about so and so,

13 is that the kind of thing? Would that satisfy you?

14 DR. SMITH: Until you could see what you could do

15 in that regard, I think it would be much simpler just to do

16 a couple pages on the things that I think we've missed than

17 to try to intersperse it in minutes. It would make more

18 sense.

19 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: As far as that goes, you may

20 want to do a couple of pages and we'll all agree with you.

21 MR. CLAYTOR: Why don't you try it?

22 MR. HOFFMANN: The problem I see is this. You may

23 have wished to go a third again farther or even half again

24 farther, and it could be accurately reflected in the majority

25 report that there were those who felt we ought to go farther,

1 of which I am one. But I think that there is a significant
2 public purpose to be achieved in our reporting what we've got
3 and sending that forward and that it will not help that beyond
4 a general statement or even a more particular statement that
5 several of the Commissioners felt that we didn't go far
6 enough, felt hemmed in by the restrictions, et cetera.
7 Because I think the point of the thing is not to
8 give anybody an extra lever on this damn thing but to get a
9 report that goes through and starts a process.
10 GENERAL POE: There are several places, as you know,
11 where I agree with you that the difference between us is I
12 was perhaps more concerned about the fact that since it was
13 all or nothing we might jeopardize the "all". Now whether
14 that's a valid concern or not, that was one of my concerns.
15 DR. SMITH: I share that concern precisely, but 180
16 degrees out. I feel like what we have done may be so minimal
17 that the Secretary of Defense may throw it away and say that
18 was a waste of time. We're not getting anything out of that.
19 We're not going to do it. Or, more likely, the Nunns and
20 the Aspins of the world will say my god, if this is the best
21 we can do, let's go ahead and disapprove this and reestablish
22 the thing and try again.
23 Because I don't think we've gone far enough.
24 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Well, I have had, for whatever
25 it's worth, conversations with the three people you mentioned,

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1 not divulging what we're doing but talking in terms of the
2 fact that we in a sense have been set up by the loose terms
3 of the Grace Commission and by the U.S. news and other things,
4 and that I want to disabuse their minds early on as to whether
5 we're going to come in with a $2 billion to $5 billion program.
6 I've said to all of them we just can't do it.
7 We're not going to do it. Not that our hearts are not in the
8 right place, but we just can't meet those goals. And they all
9 understand that.
10 Carlucci clearly understands. In conversation Aspin
11 -- he's more concerned about geography and --
12 MR. CLAYTOR: Going too far?
13 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: No. He is very supportive and
14 very open about it. So I don't sense that as being a problem
15 from that side of it. The problem there, in my judgment, is
16 going to be a media problem. That's where we may have --
17 where we are probably going to have to defend ourselves, and
18 we have said we are prepared to do that.
19 DR. SMITH: Marty, I understand. If there is any
20 way I can make this thing without doing additional comments
21 I certainly want to get there becuase I certainly don't want
22 to be perceived as somebody who was a naysayer the whole time.
23 MR. HOFFMANN: I think it's helpful to the report to
24 have a statement in there that we did have extremely robust
25 discussions and while this represents a consensus of the

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1 Commission there were several Commissioners who feel we did
2 not go far enough and that we weren't tough enough, et cetera,
3 et cetera.
4 MR. CABOT: There's more out there. We all feel
5 that.
6 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: We all recognize it. I don't
7 think we ought to hide that. We recognize that there are
8 future facilities that ought to be --
9 MR. HOFFMANN: You see, I think in retrospect there
10 is one aspect of our process that really kind of caught us at
11 the end, and that is the fact that we only analyzed the bases
12 that came up on the bottom of the scale. Now once we had
13 gotten into that process we didn't have a chance to go back
14 and recycle that whole category.
15 Now Ft. Dix is a perfect example. All of a sudden,
16 at the last minute, here come all these appealing strategic
17 inter-service, et cetera, arguments. Okay. But if you look
18 at the overall stack of those bases and go back and say okay,
19 those are good criteria, let's play those back across the
20 whole list and see where you are, you're going to get a
21 different result and I think that's true throughout the
22 services, with the possible exception of the Air Force bases
23 because I think we did get in there and see how the process
24 could have worked in that case.
25 You know, that makes me almost more anxious than

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1 having failed to wind off on a specific case, and I think it's
2 a function of the fact that our time was circumscribed both
3 by our charter and then the passage of the bill and then
4 that kind of crazy inhibition on don't look at a particular
5 base until a week after the election.
6 So we are a child of politics and I think as a
7 child of politics we ought to say what we think about the
8 process and indicate that, hey, we're a little frustrated.
9 We were just hitting stride about the time we got shot down,
10 which is how I feel about it, very frankly.
11 MR. TRAIN: Part of the problem is also we were
12 constrained by, it seems to me, having to deal basically with
13 the facts given us in terms of financial and cost aspects
14 and had very little opportunity to go behind any of those
15 numbers. I think maybe where Jim was troubled as much as
16 anything else, we were constrained by the six-year payback
17 rule. I think, Jim, you kept feeling in your gut, goddam it,
18 this is a cost-effective thing to do, but within the
19 constraints of a six-year payback and the cost and benefit
20 figures that were given us I think the rest of felt we just
21 couldn't operate by gut.
22 We were talking yesterday -- and anybody that knows
23 Lake Forest knows damn well that an acre of land there is
24 worth more than $43,000. It doesn't require much gut to
25 know that. More like $200,000. But absent the opportunity

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1 and the time to do an independent cost analysis in all of
2 these cases I don't know what the hell else a Commission like
3 this could do.
4 DR. SMITH: I'd like to capture the essence of that
5 in our report because we were captive of cost figures given
6 to us by the Pentagon. We did no independent assessment of
7 these cost figures and we ended up making decisions based on
8 numbers that I am convinced were contrived to build a case.
9 MR. TRAIN: To what extent were these numbers --
10 MR. BRYAN: The numbers that ran through our model
11 were the result of a standard set of numbers that are
12 generally available to everybody in the Pentagon and they are
13 not high quality in the sense that they are budget quality.
14 But we used some standard assumptions that are traditionally
15 used in calculating the costs of movement and construction and
16 so forth.
17 GENERAL POE: I'd like to see us maybe use Chapter
18 9 as a vehicle to do this, to look in the future rather than
19 give anybody a toehold into saying, well, you know, they said
20 that this wasn't enough time. They said they didn't have
21 enough chance to do this, so this is really not a very good
22 exercise and we shouldn't close these places or realign.
23 But in 9 we can take this business about a commission
24 that has more time, the ability to go deeper into the impact on
25 models, because sometimes a small number makes a very large

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1 impact, thus, thus, and thus, and would make more sense in
2 the long run and provide better savings and less, if any
3 impact, on the mission and the rest of it.
4 If you make those good words in a positive way at
5 the end of the thing -- and I don't know, is anybody else
6 saying maybe they should do this every four years?
7 MR. WINIK: If I could, one thing we do say is that
8 we don't think government ought to be run by commission, but
9 we would like to have an ongoing thorough process, and perhaps
10 some of the thoughts that you and some of the other
11 Commisisoners are expressing can be incorporated and inte-
12 grated into what can be a sustained process.
13 GENERAL POE: Could we have this portion of your
14 work lifted out and given the three of us as quickly as we
15 can? Is that fair?
16 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I was just getting ready to ask
17 if that's possible, to get these tapes flowing over to
18 whoever types them so that they can be turned out because I
19 agree that the first comment out of the mouth frequently is
20 much better than something you then sit down and try to
21 write.
22 MR. HOFFMANN: I think you're going to find that
23 a lot of Senator Eagleton's problems are bound up in a gut
24 feel on his part that we were not getting the kind of
25 analysis that he felt comfortable with.

1 Now as you know I think the staff has done a super
2 job, but they are a staff hastily assembled to rig up and do
3 a very quick job, and I don't think anybody expected you guys
4 were going to be able to go over and go toe to toe with the
5 Pentagon and come up with much more than we got. I think that's
6 just axiomatic. But that does give rise to a gut feel that
7 analytically we have not had the best of a series of numbers
8 to work on, and I think your little adventure today shows that
9 if you take a couple guys with a couple days and an expert
10 or two from the Army, cross examining him and asking him the
11 question we could have done away with that rascal because
12 some of it's unnecessary.
13 Some of it can far better be done in other existing
14 facilities and some of it ought to be contracted out. It's
15 very simple and no compromising somebody's mission. And
16 that's the kind of thing we're talking about if we'd had a
17 chance to really go back through it.
18 MR. WINIK: If I could just say one thing about that,
19 there are really two separate issues. One is the raw data and
20 the raw numbers. What you're talking about is really a larger
21 conceptual issue of how did we get hold of the labs in
22 general and how do we even think about it. At least on the
23 question of Amtel I went back and I had staff scrub and scrub
24 and scrub numerous times because of potential doubts that I
25 may have had.

1 So at least on the question of specific instances
2 where we felt uncomfortable I in an almost adversarial way
3 said please go back and take a look at this and, believe me,
4 I was very thorough about it, as were the Commissioners.
5 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: But the larger question was that
6 there was no way for us to do that with 400 facilities in any
7 case. But we had to get on down to the workable number
8 quicker than one might have liked.
9 MR. CABOT: I think there's another point that you
10 made earlier, Marty, that's part of this, and that is we also
11 had to accept in many cases Pentagon say-so about how well the
12 mission was being performed, and that's a very subjective
13 thing. It sure as hell is subjective on these labs, but it's
14 also subjective on some other things.
15 That's not the same as force structure. Those are
16 two different problems.
17 MR. HOFFMANN: Well, it's even true as to what you
18 do with that force structure and the basing. I mean, if you
19 had sat down and really worked through it with some people
20 that were knowledgeable you could come up with some different
21 results. Well, I think we're beating this horse to death,
22 Mr. Chairman, but I understand exactly what you mean.
23 And I think that some element of fractiousness as
24 to the result is not a bad thing, provided, as you say, that
25 it does not curve around so that it can be used against the

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final result, becuase if anything we need to get done these albeit few things.

But those things need to get through as sort of an ordeal by combat here.

GENEARL POE: Can we say that although we may not have gone far enough on these places that what we say we want to do everybody is in agreement that that at least should be done? Can you agree with that?

MR. CRAIB: I think it's important to say that; otherwise, we are going to leave the door wide open for people to walk through and discredit the entire report and give them a basis for rejecting the entire report and say we really didn't give these guys enough time, we didn't give them the right kind of staff, and so forth. Let's do it all over again and then ten years down the line --

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: If you can say something like there's a unanimous view that what we have done should be done, could we have done more? Yes, given certain circumstances. That's really what we're saying. you don't have any objection to, for example, what we've done?

DR. SMITH: With one exception, and I hope to take a little time to talk about that, and that's Ft. Dix and the basic training situation. I think it will take five or ten minutes to reconsider that if the Commission will indulge me, and we could look at a few numbers at the

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appropriate time. I think we made a horrendous mistake yesterday with our decision on scrambling the basic training in the Army.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Are you guys getting about ready?

DR. SMITH: Let me ask, before we close out on the report, my understanding is that we will get a ruling sometime on whether or not this tape is going to be kept or shredded?

MR. BRYAN: We will advise you.

DR. SMITH: When?

MR. BRYAN: Friday. It's going to take some time to get an answer.

DR. SMITH: Whether we know that this tape is going to become something that's going to be retained and inevitably distributed or whether the tapes are going to be shredded?

GENERAL POE: Not to be cute, but I think that you want to be careful who you ask the question. You may get an answer you don't want. You want to get an authoritative source but don't get one of these people that doesn't ever know how to make a decision.

MR. BRYAN: Our official source is our Commission counsel.

MR. HOFFMANN: Who's going to litigate the matter? Is it the Department of Defense or the Justice Department?

1 MR. BRYAN: Justice, no doubt.

2 MR. HOFFMANN: I would suggest you do a little quiet

3 -- once you get your result, I think that's a good admonition.

4 Don't go to somebody that's going to give you the wrong

5 answer.

6 DR. SMITH: Is it appropriate to get the Commission's

7 views? I mean, can we vote to shred the tape?

8 MR. MILNES: I think really sir it's a matter of

9 the interpretation of the Advisory Committee Act. It really

10 isn't in the purview of the Commission to decide what to

11 do with its own records. They really are part of the

12 department. At least that's my considered view at this point.

13 Maybe we'll discover something in the next couple of days

14 that gives us some leeway there.

15 MR. BRYAN: I don't mind having the Commission on

16 record that they have a preference in case we get an answer

17 that gives us the flexibility.

18 DR. SMITH: I think it's a very sticky issue. If

19 we keep that tape, it's going to be public, and we've talked

20 about all kinds of bases that we're not touching. We've

21 talked about people and very sensitive issues that are going

22 to make this thing very, very difficult to implement.

23 MR. WINIK: You probably wouldn't want it floating

24 around until after 1995.

25 ADMIRAL ROWDEN: It will float in 1989.

GENERAL STARRY: It's like the White House tapes? Is that what you are suggesting?

MR. CRAIB: We should shred it and then ask if we did the right thing.

MR. BRYAN: We'll get back to you as soon as possible on that.

MR. Chairman, do you want to vote on the issue of Commission preference on how this transcript is to be handled?

CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: We'll wait until Jack comes back.

GENERAL STARRY: I think we need to be informed more on the legal aspects of the Act. I know what I think about this, but that's irrelevant to what's the law say. And then what do you think about it.

MR. BRYAN: We could poll the Commission in a couple of days.

GENERAL STARRY: I personally feel I need more information from Russ about what the law does say and then we can make a judgment based on that information.

MR. WINIK: But absent the law there's no reason, I should think, that the Commission can't express its feelings that it might have been inhibited were it to have known this sort of thing would be completely unadulterated out there as kind of a public document the day after the

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1 report is released. That's certainly within your purview.

2 GENERAL STARRY: I wouldn't have felt inhibited.

3 DR. SMITH: I think I would. I think there's just

4 too much in there on bases that we were talking about that

5 would just be agony if it were made public ,and it would be,

6 inevitably. Somebody trying to defend their base would say

7 you guys didn't give consideration to this base. Hell,

8 here are three or four of your Commissioners telling you

9 you you didn't, and you didn't even go back and look at it.

10 So those kinds of internal deliberations I think

11 can just be used to mess us up.

12 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Has any of it been typed yet or

13 is it still untyped?

14 MR. BRYAN: It's all been typed -- everything but

15 the last two days.

16 GENERAL POE: And some of us -- and I'm as bad or

17 worse than any -- some statements taken out of context and

18 say well, they weren't even taking it seriously. They were

19 joking about it or something of this nature, things that

20 caused hundreds of jobs to be lost were treated with

21 frivolity.

22 DR. SMITH: Do we know how other commissions have

23 handled their executive transcripts?

24 MR. MILNES: In most cases where they have had

25 transcripts they have either been classified in the sense

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1 that they were talking about national security secrets, in
2 which case they remained classified, or they just made
3 minutes of what they were doing. It was not so detailed
4 that they couldn't just have a simple recorder summarize
5 things as they went along.
6 DR. SMITH: There is the precedent not to have a
7 verbatim transcript?
8 MR. MILNES: There is precedent not to have a
9 verbatim transcript;in cases where there have been verbatim
10 transcripts that have been kept, there has been litigation
11 over whether they could get those transcripts or not, and
12 then it went down to what was in them, and if what was in
13 them, if a meeting could be open, for example, for a portion
14 of those things discussed, then that part would normally be
15 disclosable.
16 So it's kind of a fine line, but most commissions
17 that we researched were not dealing in this kind of informatior
18 A lot of it is also tied to the timing of when the
19 deliberations were occurring. In other words, it would not
20 be reasonable for the public to be viewing something as it is
21 happening, but after it's happened is another thing. So
22 there's all those different distinctions that we are looking
23 at to see exactly how far we can go.
24 MR. HOFFMANN: But your position is that the
25 transcript is not required?

MR. MILNES: It is not required. It is discussed in the Federal Advisory Committee Act, but it is not required.

MR. HOFFMANN: For that purpose, Mr. Chairman, may I recommend we go off the record?

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: At this moment, okay.

(A discussion was held off the record.)

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS; Is Doug about ready?

MR. BRYAN: Could we have a five-minute break?

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Yes, sure.

(A brief recess was taken.)

MR. HANSEN: Sorry for the delay, sir. We were hoping to get the usual vugraphs, but the material came to us over the fax machine and it is not of good enough quality to do that. So we did it with Xeroxes.

Let me start with what I know about the Ft. Meade move. To sum up yesterday, the Commission's decision was to sell the south 40, which is the south 9,000 acres, and use the proceeds of that sale to do the realignments necessary to backfill Ft. Devens and get the Intel School out of Ft. Devens. And the linkage on that was going to be move the First Army headquarters from Ft. Meade to Ft. Devens, causing us to be able to combine the two bases together in an economic equation.

On the wall here is the map of the cantonment area or the north 40, if you would, of Ft. Meade. That's a bigger version of the map we put on the wall yesterday.

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BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

BUSINESS MEETING

PART II of II PARTS

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1 The green, labeled I, is in fact the area that is
2 currently occupied by NSA. The red II is the buffer zone for
3 security reasons.
4 MR. TRAIN: They don't own that now. I thought that
5 was one they wanted to acquire.
6 MR. HANSEN: It may very well be. It's owned. The
7 Army owns it.
8 And the III blocks are the main post, if you will,
9 and the water treatment plant is the other portions there --
10 sewage treatment -- and there is housing in there. There is,
11 of course, the headquarters buildings. There is storage and
12 warehousing. There is AAFES -- clubs, exchanges, so forth and
13 so on.
14 There is more of the post, if you will, over on the
15 righthand side, more housing and, it looks like, more storage.
16 They have drawn, I hope -- I'm not sure why -- but they've
17 drawn the blue line outside the consolidated mess, which I wou
18 have thought they would want to keep.
19 I am remiss in not telling you where this came from.
20 This came from NSA themselves, officially saying if you are
21 going to do this here's what we'd like to keep control over,
22 and they have left a few other things out. So I think the
23 Commission's direction or my recommendation would be for the
24 north part of the post -- the recommendation would be that th
25 Secretary be given some leeway in implementing this because

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1 the Commission -- there are too many nuances.

2 Last night our contact point at NSA was called and

3 told of the Commission's tentative decision and asked to run

4 it up his chain. He got all the way to the Deputy Director

5 and called back and said that the main concern they had was

6 financial. If the Army was going to leave Ft. Meade, they

7 didn't have the money to do it, and I assured him that we would

8 not leave him without operating funds, if that was the

9 decision.

10 But the second one was that they are an intelligence

11 organization. They don't have any part of their organization

12 that manages any piece of real estate, and that would be a

13 tough learning experience for them and they would love to

14 have the Army stay as their host. I don't think there's a

15 problem there. There are Army tenants there. There is

16 laboratories there. There is the National Capitol Region

17 drug lab. There is other Army labs there. There are other

18 tenants that are not associated with First Army there.

19 So I think there's a real possibility in implementing

20 that the Army could be asked, as Mr. Smith says, to have a

21 Colonel come in and manage the installation management infra-

22 structure -- somebody from the engineer field that would know

23 how to do it. So it's as simple as that. NSA is not allowed

24 to own any property, but I do know of defense agencies who

25 operate on their own behalf, like DLA activities.

They own property with the Army as the owner, so it is possible. But I don't see any efficient reason to do it that way. It seems to me more efficient to let the Army stay and run it.

GENERAL POE: I talked to some people yesterday about the military presence out there -- it is considerable -- connected with NSA. And for an organization that size we usually would have an AAFES. Of course, the AAFES building runs the Army-Air Force Exchange Service. We would have the exchange and those kinds of amenities for -- what do you call the small outfits you have all over Germany -- kaserne-- so a kaserne-type operation there to support those military people would probably be a requirement.

MR. HANSEN: And there's probably retirees in the area. To the best of my knowledge, none of the morale and welfare recreation is north for quite a distance. South of there there is some stuff in Bethesda and, of course, [redacted] Force Base and the National Capitol Region.

Now the Commission has asked us for the numbers on moving the First Army headquarters, so forth and so on. I am sorry that I don't have them at this moment because they are still working on them.

The figures that we had before on the payback from the Meade closure was $17 million in annual steady state savings. Immediate payback would come from the high value of

the property, the 9,000 acres, which might even be increased if other properties north of the 40 are not necessary for the NSA and Army support. So there's plenty of resources able to fill up Devens.

We would be taking roughly 500 people out of Ft. Meade in the First Army. We are moving the ISC into Devens. And Devens -- actually, under the First Army option Devens grows by 500 people, so our backfill was very successful for a number of reasons. The first is consolidation of the Intel school training. The second is consolidation of ISC command.

CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: What is that again?

MR. HANSEN: The Information Systems Command.

CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: How many people there?

MR. HANSEN: Total from four sites looks like about 3,000. No, 2,500.

CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: 2,500 from different places?

MR. HANSEN: Four different sites. The sites are Ft. Belvoir, Ft. McPherson -- a very small number -- Ft. Monmouth, and Ft. Huachuca. Ft. Huachuca, oddly enough, grows also.

MR. CABOT: Because of moving the intel school out.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Are you sitting on the copies, Marty?

MR. HOFFMANN: Yes, I am, Mr. Chairman. It wasn't

1 intentional. I was trying to read one and have not yet
2 succeeded.
3 MR. HANSEN: I apologize. It's faxed, again, and it
4 is not very clear. But the order of magnitude, three digits,
5 are less than 1,000, four digits are 1,000.
6 (Laughter.)
7 We have to put a good light on everything.
8 And therefore it's a very good move. Again, I don't
9 have the exact figures, but it will clearly pay back in one or
10 two years and make a lot of operational changes. It does
11 one thing, however -- well, it does two things.
12 The Army was not too happy with a done deal. The
13 south 9,000 has been sold. But the other I'd like to raise as
14 an option -- the movement of the First Army headequarters to
15 Ft. Devens was, to me anyway, a connection issue. We had to
16 find a way to properly connect these two. The Army has
17 proposed another option. The Army has a Criminal Investigation
18 Directorate. It's a command, two-star command, that is
19 currently located in various places in the National Capital
20 Region. They are in leased space in the National Capital
21 Region. They are at Ft. Meade, they are at Ft. Holabird. In
22 fact, one of the Commission's moves was to move some of them
23 from Ft. Holabird to Ft. Meade.
24 They also have programmed some construction at Ft.
25 Meade in order to consolidate that command at Ft. Meade.

An option would then be to go ahead and do exactly everything else that I have briefed you, with the exception of substitute this Criminal Investigations Division for the First Army headquarters.

CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: How many in the Criminal Investigations?

MR. HANSEN: 322, it looks like, as opposed to almost 500. So it's a difference of about 175.

MR. BRYAN: Explain where you are substituting.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: You put First Army at Meade and put the criminals up in Devens?

MR. HANSEN: Put the First Army in Meade and take the criminals out of Meade and put them in Devens, and they come from other places.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I understand that, but instead of sending the First Army to Devens you would leave them at Meade and you would put all the criminals up in Devens?

MR. HOFFMANN: But you are not going to have the head of the CID way the hell up at Devens.

VOICE: No, sir. He is currently at Ft. Meade, and the construction is programmed into Ft. Meade in the FY 90 time frame.

MR. HANSEN: Would the flag to up to Devens? Would the CID flag go up to Devens? Would the person himself actually physically go up there, the two-star go up?

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1 MR. HOFFMANN: That sounds nutty as hell to me.

2 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Well, let's hear it all first.

3 I agree if you are going to separate the flag from his people

4 that that is nutty. Is that what you are saying?

5 COLONEL YANKOUPE: CIDC command consolidates at Ft.

6 Belvoir under this option.

7 MR. HANSEN: Oh, I misunderstood that, then. I'm

8 sorry.

9 COLONEL YANKOUPE: I think you have the second

10 CIDC option and although you can't see all the numbers here

11 really well, to simplify it, the Huachuca Intel school realign-

12 ment still takes place. The ISC realignments still take

13 place into Ft. Devens. Now ISC, remember, is at Ft. Belvoir

14 in fairly big numbers, and they are these numbers here, about

15 1,300 people, that would be going to Ft. Devens. NOw they

16 were going to go there originally.

17 What we have at Ft. Belvoir in the facility that

18 they currently occupy, we have the ability to move into and

19 to consolidate the operations of the Criminal Investigation

20 Directorate Command, the two-star command, from Ft. Holabird,

21 which is their records center, CID-leased space, and Ft.

22 Meade, which would currently be consolidating into a building

23 at Ft. Meade in the FY 90 time frame, to the tune of about

24 $8 million to $10 million worth of construction.

25 So they would be relocating to Ft. Belvoir. Ft.

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1 Belvoir would still be moving and consolidating at Ft. Devens.
2 The Information Systems Command, which would also be consoli-
3 dating, remember, from Monmouth, from Huachuca in a swap with
4 the intel school there, and from Ft. McPherson, with a net
5 change of about plus 500 into Ft. Devens.
6 So what we do with this is we avoid about $10 million
7 worth of construction at Ft. Meade in FY 90. We avoid
8 $500,000 worth of leased space expenses here in the National
9 Capital Region -- in fact, that's the NASA building, which
10 has a component of CID command in it.
11 We consolidate the command at Ft. Belvoir in build-
12 ings adjacent to each other -- the records center, the leased
13 space, and the people from Ft. Meade. With the construction
14 at Ft. Meade we would have had a split function in any case,
15 because the records center from Holabird that is consolidating
16 there would be across post from it at Ft. Meade. All the
17 other consolidations would be taking place as we have previously
18 described them -- the intel school, Huachuca, ICS from four
19 locations falling in on Devens.
20 We avoid $12 million worth of construction costs for
21 First Army command at Ft. Devens because remember ICS will
22 occupy the buildings that would be vacated by the intel
23 school.
24 MR. HOFFMANN: No, we don't remember that. That's
25 new news. We had been told, we were operating on the assumptio

1 yesterday you've got two new buildings up there for that
2 school and the ISC fills one of them and the headquarters
3 fills the other.
4 COLONEL YANKOUPE: I think ISC would end up taking
5 virtually all of those and then the portion left over would
6 be not sufficient to take all of the First Army headquarters.
7 MR. CABOT: There's a bunch of fairly old buildings,
8 perfectly servicable but old, that the intel school was going
9 to move out of into the new buildings that they were building,
10 and I had not heard -- they didn't have any very firm plans
11 as to what they were going to do with it. They are not air
12 conditioned, but they are typical New England sort of college
13 dormitory -- college office space kind of buildings.
14 GENERAL POE: Built in World War II, do you think?
15 MR. CABOT: Built in the '20s.
16 MR. HANSEN: Are they brick?
17 MR. CABOT: Brick -- maybe the '30s. But anyway
18 they are pre-war.
19 MR. HANSEN: So the mistake I made, sir, was I
20 then forgot the double move, which was Criminal Investigations
21 stays in the Washington area and gets together, which is
22 another plus.
23 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: At Belvoir.
24 MR. HANSEN: And then the connection becomes a three
25 base connection -- the connection between Meade and Devens

goes through Belvoir, which we have done before in other areas.

CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: Maybe I'm thick. I'm not getting this. The CID is staying at Belvoir? I thought you said you were transferring them to Devens.

MR. HANSEN: I was mistaken.

MR. CLAYTOR: He said he made a mistake on it. It's not.

MR. HANSEN: No. I misspoke.

CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: So what you are sending to Devens is --

MR. CLAYTOR: ISC -- Information Systems.

MR. CABOT: What else?

MR. HANSEN: Into Devens? Basically that's it.

MR. CRAIB: Why doesn't the Army want to transfer the First Army headquarters to Devens?

MR. HANSEN: Primarily there's no operational benefit and all it does is incur costs. And, to be honest with you, they think they want the flag close to the White House.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Let me ask if you leave the First Army at Meade, they would be in the III blue area, right?

MR. HANSEN: Yes, they are now.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: But you would not leave any of them in the 9,000 acres below?

COLONEL YANKOUPE: No.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Would they be a tenant or would

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1 they then run the base?

2 MR. HANSEN: They would run the base. They do now.

3 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: That would answer NSA's problems?

4 MR. HANSEN: Oh, sure. I don't think they need to

5 have the First Army headquarters there running the base, but

6 they would like some Army headquarters there to run the base.

7 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: If we leave them here, then obvious-

8 ly the threes are saturated, more or less, up here, the blue

9 area. If you move them to Devens, as we talked about yester-

10 day, then what's going to happen to that big III? Is it going

11 to be available, or is it still going to be used?

12 MR. HANSEN: In implementation I think the Secretary

13 would be presented with a difficult situation. He'd have a

14 less than fully utilized portion of the base that his intelli-

15 gence people say has got to remain in government control

16 because of security reasons. We have a new commission being

17 formed as we speak called the Alternate Use Commission, whose

18 job it is to determine what to do with excess or underutilized

19 Department of Defense facilities -- to turn over to prisons,

20 homeless, et cetera.

21 We would surely get involved with the homeless and

22 prisons up there.

23 I have one other thing I'm just working on. If you

24 recall the Ft. Holabird discussion, we had two activities at

25 Ft. Holabird we had the criminal records center of the

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1 criminal part which we voted to move or tentatively voted to
2 put into Ft. Meade, which now the move would be made all the
3 way to Belvoir, if this option is agreed to. And we couldn't
4 move the office people who do work for the Defense Investigat-
5 ive Service at the other Ft. Holabird site because they would
6 require a new building, whereas the criminal records center
7 was going into a rehabbed commissary.
8 Now consistency-wise, to be honest and point out all
9 the difficulties, if sizewise they were roughly the same, you
10 could rehab the commissary as office space for the Defense
11 Investigative Service, which I believe effects another
12 consolidation. This would be the Commission's great consoli-
13 dation package, right?
14 The problem is that we used the argument that convert-
15 ed warehouse or commercial space at Cameron Station was
16 unsuitable for human office habitation, et cetera, and we picked
17 it up and moved it out of there as one of the reasons for that,
18 and then as a matter of convenience created one ourselves at
19 Ft. Meade. So there is a problem with consistency there.
20 MR. CLAYTOR: But I thought we had taken it to
21 Belvoir.
22 MR. HANSEN: I'm talking now of even adding yet
23 another thing to the equation, which would be to close the rest
24 of Ft. Holabird and put the Defense Investigative Service at
25 Ft. Meade.

GENERAL POE: There's another reason for leaving a commissary there, isn't there?

MR. HANSEN: The Defense Investigative Service is civilians.

MR. CABOT: You're going to close Ft. Holabird now?

MR. HANSEN: WE've closed half of Ft. Holabird already in the criminal records, which is records storage. It is currently planned to go to Ft. Meade.

MR. CABOT: Where is Ft. Holabird?

MR. HANSEN: The Port of Baltimore.

Now there was another section of that which has office space and we were looking to move that to Meade also, but we couldn't do it because it wouldn't pay back, because they required new construction. Of course, any buildings that are freed up from any moves out of Area III I think NSA would dearly love to have them. They have got [redacted] B square feet of leased space in the National Capital Region, and that's a lot.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: NSA does?

MR. HANSEN: [redacted] B1 and they've got [redacted] B-1 of space for warehousing. That commissary may very well be a solution for that too.

Let me be fair to the Defense Investigative Service. THey were very concerned about moving out of Holabird from the disruption in personnel standpoint. The Commission remem-

bers that briefing.

MR. CABOT: Mr. Chairman, I think that we should not throw out the idea of moving the First Army headquarters to New England. New England is almost a foreign land. You know that. I think this would help bring New England back into the Union.

MR. TRAIN: Why?

(Laughter.)

MR. CLAYTOR: Why do we need to? Let's leave it there.

MR. CABOT: Gentlemen, it's not all bad in New England. It needs to be a better part of the Union than it is. We might even get a Republican governor there someday, or at least one who is not quite such a maverick.

CHAIRMAN EWARDS: Let me ask you. I don't want to try to be too specific, but just as a kind of general question, what you are laying out is total closure of Holabird. You are laying out a higher density use of north Ft. Meade, if you will. You are laying out a complement of military at Devens that keeps it viable, and you are saying that to put the First Army at Devens in fact would increase by 500 or thereabouts the number of people that you would put at Devens if you were going to move the First Army there.

In other words, if you don't put the First Army at Devens, are you leaving Devens pretty much in the status quo

as far as their numbers are concerned?

MR. HANSEN: Yes. In fact, the First Army move increases the density of Devens.

MR. CLAYTOR: Over what it is now.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: In the equation I just laid out for you, address the issue of NSA and leased space in Washington and would there be room at Meade's north quarter to take NSA in?

MR. HANSEN: Gee, it's hard to say.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I thought I heard you raise that point. Maybe I misunderstood.

MR. HANSEN: Yes, but I didn't intend it -- I did raise that point only by saying that any excess capacity at Meade that we create through a series of moves, there's a great deal of demand for that from an Agency that since they are already there has kind of like first dibs. And perhaps maybe moving DIS, the Defense Investigative Service, out of Ft. Holabird might not be a good idea.

All that we're doing is taking it away from NSA. There is only so much space there. As far as land, I would say yes, you could build up there. I see some blank spaces. Whether or not the Commission wanted to get into construction in order to get NSA out of leased space in the whole National Capital Region is perhaps feasible, not that that's a good idea based on what we learned. But I'm going to be

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1 hard-pressed to come up with any figures.

2 MR. HOFFMANN: Well, if we were being consistent,

3 what you are talking about in the long run is doing with Ft.

4 Meade what you are doing at Ft. Belvoir.

5 MR. HANSEN: Yes.

6 MR. HOFFMANN: And you are taking operational and

7 quasi-operational units out of there and making it kind of a

8 garrison for savings on leased space, consolidation of kind

9 of administrative type functions. NSA is high priority. It

10 is all those other good things.

11 So, you know, if you were consistent you would

12 probably say hey, take part of the 9,000, work a lease-

13 purchase deal like they are doing at Belvoir to accommodate

14 the NSA out of your leased space. Or take the golf course.

15 See where the letter III is up there? That whole central

16 portion is a golf course. And, as this is an urban impacted

17 situation, once that shrinks out of being a troop unit --

18 of course I'm about to kill off the course at Ft. Mac, but I

19 don't think that's going to last too long anyway -- then you

20 would have NSA able to get a whole campus there right in the

21 middle where they have that kind of insulation that they need.

22 But basically what the staff is telling us, without

23 having said it yet, is that the Commission's objective yes-

24 terday to close Ft. Meade cannot be done because the NSA says

25 we definitely need buffer zones, but we need operating people

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to survive here.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: See, that's what I'm hearing, and that's why I'm asking about the First Army's move or non-move. You don't need the First Army in Devens to make Devens work.

MR. HANSEN: No, you don't.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: See, I'm afraid we're going to leave this thing in a way where Meade is left with a very underutilized but non-disposable north quarter, and that's what bothers me.

MR. HOFFMANN: But I think, Mr. Chairman, that what happens is that you say that I should look at Belvoir and see the pioneering thinking that the Army has been doing there, that the same applies north when you look at Meade and the NSA, and all we're doing is anticipating that by redeploying units that are going to have to get out of there anyway to convert its status from being some kind of a permanent Army post with a big flag to an Army cantonment area that has a bunch of tenants and basically the NSA.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: And you're talking about unloading the property and leasing it back?

MR. HOFFMANN: Yes, because that's basically where you get the leverage to manage the building projects, and I assume that the Army at Belvoir has found that that is cost-effective, to turn loose of that land. I didn't understand

they were letting all of it go.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I don't mind any arrangement like that as long as we are not left with a valuable piece of military property underutilized. That's what bothers me. I don't care where the First Army is. Edwards doesn't care. And I'd like to see it wherever it can be best utilized as far as Devens and Meade are concerned and whatever else you can move around to Belvoir and all that. I think that's good.

MR. HANSEN: If I could sum up what I think the difference is between the two options, under the First Army move option Devens grows by 500 people, which is roughly the size of the First Army. Under the criminal option, Devens stays the same size, looses its --

CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: Under criminal you said you weren't going to send the criminal to Devens. Now it's going to Devens?

MR. HANSEN: I misspoke. It's going to Belvoir. You are taking the space that the Information Systems Command vacated, who is going to Devens, and the Information Systems Command moves into Devens, pretty close to exactly replacing the intel school that moves out, at least in terms of people.

CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: In other words, you've got a wash, about 2,500 people in the Information Systems and that goes to Devens, and you've got about 2,500 people in intelli-

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gence going out.

MR. HANSEN: Right.

DR. SMITH: Is there not another option? It sounds independent to me. Can't we do both? Why can't you do both? Move First Army to Meade and move the Criminal Command to the space at Ft. Belvoir? They sound like independent --

MR. CABOT: Move the First Army to where?

DR. SMITH: To Devens, and move the Criminal Command to Belvoir. Can't you do both? They are independent, aren't they?

MR. HANSEN: Yes.

DR. SMITH: You could do both. You could close Holabird. You would backfill Belvoir. It sounds to me like a very elegant solution. Let's do both.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Move --

MR. TRAIN: What's the military advantage of moving -- I don't hear any cost advantages of moving First Army to Devens and what's the military advantage?

DR. SMITH: It's Mr. Cabot's logic.

MR. TRAIN: This is the center of the United States right here. You ought to have the First Army nearby.

MR. CABOT: There are other Army headquarters fairly nearby.

MR. HOFFMANN: What is First Army's regional sweep?

MR. HANSEN: It covers New England for sure.

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1 MR. HOFFMANN: But where is it located -- way to the
2 south, in the center, or at the north end of the First Army?
3 MR. HANSEN: It's at the south end.
4 MR. HOFFMANN: It's way at the south end of the First
5 Army.
6 MR. CABOT: Where are the other Army headquarters?
7 MR. HOFFMANN: They like the amenities.
8 MR. CABOT: One's in Ft. Monroe, right -- no, Ft.
9 McPherson.
10 MR. CLAYTOR: That's Second Army.
11 GENERAL POE: Excuse me. Isn't the First Army the
12 only one that has an advance like the one at Devens? And that
13 was a politically-instituted advance? I would think there would
14 be some savings in personnel if they were put together either
15 at Meade or at Devens. I think the Army didn't want it split
16 up, did they?
17 GENERAL STARRY: I don't remember. I don't know.
18 GENERAL POE: I've been in one of these splits before.
19 It's a pain. Every Wednesday you go down to the other one and
20 back again.
21 CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: Now I'm ready to accede and now
22 you're taking something away that they still have.
23 GENERAL POE: They either both go up there or they
24 both come down, but I think there is a savings by having the
25 whole First Army in one place. Put them at Devens.

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1 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I'd like to hear Jim. You are
2 in favor, or at least you are talking in favor of moving the
3 First Army up. Tell me your picture of Meade then.
4 DR. SMITH: I think it's this picture, except that
5 I think that that III is much larger than NSA needs. What I
6 would suggest is kind of a play on what Mr. Hoffmann had
7 suggested.
8 NSA is now in what, over a million square feet of
9 leased space. Let's bring into the equation the option of
10 getting NSA all located on this space. There was a building
11 program approved for NSA, and I'm sure in their long-range
12 program they have plans to consolidate on that site. They can
13 sell that real estate off and get the proceeds that they need
14 to build on that site. They can get themselves consolidated
15 and out of leased space much sooner.
16 That is the same philosophy that we are promoting on
17 the Belvoir deal.
18 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: What is your comment on DIA at
19 Holabird?
20 DR. SMITH: The Criminal Command? It sounds to me
21 like an independent action. If it makes sense to backfill
22 them at Belvoir and close Holabird, let's do it.
23 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: CID would go to Belvoir under
24 your proposal, but what about DIS?
25 MR. HANSEN: The DIS is in HOlabird, but they have

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other activities at Meade.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: We've got two things we are talking about -- CID and DIS. CID under your latest proposal would go from Holabird to Belvoir.

MR. HANSEN: Meade to Belvoir.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: All right. It would go to Belvoir. YOu've got DIS at Holabird. Could it go to Meade?

MR. HANSEN: Yes.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Close all of Holabird?

MR. HANSEN: Yes.

DR. SMITH: Could it go to Belvoir?

MR. HANSEN: They were concerned about the disruption going only as far as Meade.

DR. SMITH: It's about 30 miles further to Belvoir.

MR. HANSEN: When you go through town there is rush hour considerations.

DR. SMITH: We're talking about closing Ft. Holabird and putting them at Ft. Belvoir.

MR. HANSEN: What do we gain from that?

DR. SMITH: What do you gain from moving them to Ft. Meade and closing Holabird?

COLONEL YANKOUPE: They do a lot of security investigations in the clearance areas and a lot of work is done within that area, sir.

MR. HANSEN: I'm not clear on that. I think it's

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1 the computerized version of hard copy records of security
2 investigations. It's my understanding of what they do at Ft.
3 Holabird. My understanding is also --
4 Kevin, can you fill us in? DIS has more activities
5 at Meade already. Why was the original plan to put DIS out of
6 Holabird into Meade?
7 MR. URBAN: Originally GSA did a survey and recommende
8 that Holabird be declared excess. It wasn't a split function
9 of DIS.
10 MR. HANSEN: It's a target of opportunity. Ft.
11 Meade was a target of opportunity.
12 CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: How about CID going to Devens if
13 you want to keep the First Army at Meade?
14 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: We've taken care of Devens in the
15 sense that we're moving intel out and ISC and Devens is even
16 and okay. The only question is whether we want to load them
17 up and be able to justify that -- load them up with the First
18 Army.
19 MR. HANSEN: Which reduces the overall savings
20 because it basically incurs a cost to do that.
21 MR. CABOT: That golf course will never go as long as
22 First Army is there, but it might if they weren't.
23 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: If we can craft the language
24 similar I guess to Belvoir for Meade and move the First Army
25 to Devens, shut down Holabird -- and I don't care where DIS

goes, whichever place is best -- haven't we really done something of value?

MR. HANSEN: Yes, because the thing you do is you leave capacity in the north 40 at Meade for NSA to consolidate into.

GENERAL POE: And then close Holabird?

MR. HANSEN: Yes, close the other half of Holabird.

MR. CLAYTOR: That's good. Close it altogether and that saves more money than closing half by a good deal.

COLONEL YANKOUPE: I think what's happened, sir, if we can just go back, we need time at Ft. Devens to put the money up there to make this come about, so the First Army thing came out as one of the ways of doing that. We can roll the things together for analysis. The Army in looking at this -- and we've said it before -- doesn't have an awful lot of operational support for doing that kind of a move, picking an Army headquarters up and moving it up to a location on the other end of the area that is operates in, and it said that to us.

We have gone back to the drawing board here with the option of having the CID command, needing some construction anyway at Ft. Meade, and saying wait a minute, maybe we can work another comprehensive swap and do effectively the same thing, becuase, one, we want to leave that First Army headquarters at Ft. Meade. We think we've got problems legally

with making sure that a DOD agency who operates that property up there in any case will end up having to own it and operate it, we end up with an operational reason for having that piece on the property.

If we close Ft. Meade, that portion south of the line, and then we add in another whole load of push-arounds, and end up with the status quo essentially that we had before. That's what they are coming back with.

The anchor point is they think they want to leave First Army headquarters at Ft. Meade because they have already put a two-star up at Ft. Devens.

DR. SMITH: This recommendation is to put CID and CRC at Ft. Belvoir.

COLONEL YANKOUPE: Yes, sir.

MR. TRAIN: This agrees to everything but moving First Army to Devens.

MR. HANSEN: And saves more money because it takes advantage of construction costs that we can count as avoidances and it creates another consolidated activity even more than we had before. Our list of consolidated activities grows. The only real difference is whether you put First Army up there, too.

CHAIRMAN EWARDS: If you leave First Army at Meade, would you have any room to move other NSA leased-space stuff into Meade over a period of time?

MR. HANSEN: They've got [redacted] B1 people in leased space in [redacted] B1 activities, so even if we move First Army's 500, that's [redacted] E1 percent of what they need up there. They've got a real problem. There is land to build there, but it's going -- I don't think we can capture that. It's a long-term plan. I'm amazed how big these people are. They are not far away, by the way. They are at teh airport just down the road.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: You can close Holabird. You can do a better job at Belvoir. You can keep Devens on a status quo, and the whole question before us really is what to do with the First Army.

MR. HANSEN: Yes. As far as writing it up, for the staff to write it up, it boils down to what are you going to do with the First Army.

GENERAL POE: You save more money if you don't move the First Army.

MR. HANSEN: Yes.

DR. SMITH: I don't think that's accurate, because you free up a whole lot more at Ft. Meade if you can get First Army out of there and can convince NSA that it's in their best interests not to take all of that area but to sell it off and use the proceeds to do office space for them, to get them out of the leased space.

So if you can get First Army flag out of Ft. Meade, I contend you can close a hell of a lot more of Ft. Meade th

1 you can if you leave that flag there and still leave the buffer
2 they want. You see, their activity is really in that green
3 area and you can build the office space that they need in that
4 green I area. I'm sure it's been master-planned and I'm a
5 little out of date on the construction at NSA, but three or
6 four years ago there were plans to get all of their people out
7 of leased space into office complexes, and those are office
8 complexes.
9 Now whether you need to keep all of that family
10 housing and the commissary and all of the stuff that's in that
11 area III in my judgment is something that somebody is going to
12 have to take a good strong look at.
13 GENERAL POE: Was it area III that NSA came back and
14 said they wanted?
15 DR. SMITH: Yes. But that's becasue they do have a
16 lot of military people and they wanted to keep the family
17 housing.
18 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Find that map. Weren't you look-
19 ing for the map of the Army headquarters?
20 MR. HANSEN: The only other issue involved, which
21 isn't so much a space issue as a high ground issue, they wanted
22 control of the high ground.
23 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Show us the region we're talking
24 about.
25 COLONEL YANKOUPE: We're talking about this region

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that's outlined here in the dark. It's actually offset. This is the area.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: It includes Virginia?

COLONEL YANKOUPE: Including the state of Virginia, down to Carolina, and then of course on up to Maine. Looking at the density of units that you find in that area, you find a very high density through here, very high density through here (indicating), and not so much into Maine, high density in western New York and down through here (indicating).

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Let me ask maybe, I guess, a final question. If we put the First Army in Devens, does that sort of settle forever the issue of Devens? I mean, if we have all of that activity up there, is that then kind of a chock-a-block facility? That's an issue that DOD in the future would not --

MR. HANSEN: It's not a flag issue. The Commission has closed two flag posts -- Presidio and Ft. Sheridan -- and moved those flags, and Ft. Meade. So the flag isn't really what protects it. It would be close to fully utilized.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I mean activity.

MR. HANSEN: It would be close to fully utilized anyway. The difference is whether it's 8,500 people or 9,000 people. It's not that much difference.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: So it comes down to where can we get the most bang for the buck and what is left, and it seems

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to me I agree it's going to cost more money to move them up there, but it seems to me that we are in a position where Devens is set whether we move them or not. We're not going to make any savings off of Devens. That's kind of set now.

So the only way to really make some major savings would be to move the First Army up there and really be able to deal with Ft. Meade.

COLONEL YANKOUPE: Moving ISC up there is going to put another two-star in there, sir.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I don't understand. What's the good or bad about that?

ADMIRAL ROWDEN: At the bottom of page two it says "The consolidation of the three-star Information Systems Command at Ft. Devens will" --

VOICE: A three-star.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: What does that mean to you as far as the military is concerned? Is that bad or good?

COLONEL YANKOUPE: He's got as much horsepower as the First Army commander, who is a three-star also. So you have put a three-star command into Ft. Devens already. By doing this, if you move First Army up there, you have got two three-star commands.

MR. TRAIN: Will they fight with each other, two three-stars in the same place?

COLONEL YANKOUPE: It's 9,000 acres.

1 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Is that the point you are making?

2 COLONEL YANKOUPE: My point is that I think sub

3 rosa to the discussion is how do we beef up Devens and create

4 a web here which makes good sense so we can expand as far as

5 we can, and it still needs to make operational sense, I think.

6 We are putting good support on the installation up there for

7 the future for consolidating the numbers of functions that we

8 have there, and frankly I think it's telling the Army how to do

9 business to tell it where to put its First Army commander.

10 ISC represents the center of gravity of where that

11 whole operation can consolidate, and we're pulling it all

12 together.

13 CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: Tell me what ISC is in simple

14 words. What does ISC encompass?

15 COLONEL YANKOUPE: Information Systems Command, sir.

16 It is the interlink of all the Army computer systems.

17 CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: For what area, the whole country?

18 COLONEL YANKOUPE: The whole country.

19 DR. SMITH: Computers, communication.

20 CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: Where you have to have high

21 technical knowledge, which would be well suited for the Boston

22 area, which is very well suited for the Boston area anyway.

23 This is one of the computer centers of the world.

24 GENERAL POE: My guess, Mr. Chairman, is -- and I defer

25 to Donn -- it's like the similar outfit in the United States Air

Force. It would become a much more immovable organization than the flag of the First Army. Once it got its roots up there and it established its information services, that thing is almost going to be cast in concrete.

CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: Is that more important than the intelligence unit that will be moved from Devens to Arizona?

MR. CABOT: The intelligence unit there now is only part of the intelligence unit, most of which is already at Ft. Huachuca.

CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: And this ISC is for the entire country.

MR. CLAYTOR: For the entire country, yes.

MR. HANSEN: Some corrections on numbers. It turns out that the ISC consolidation -- they are both plussed up. In other words, either option you are plussing up. One you plus up by about 500, and if you move the First Army you add another 500. So it's about a 1,000-plus-up to Devens.

MR. CABOT: Doug, I think maybe even that is understated because the 2,500 that you are moving out with the intelligence school is 1,800 students and 700 permanent staff. The ISC, they are all permanent, aren't they? So it's a difference. One of them is in barracks and they come and go and the other will be a permanent installation.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: If you all are worrying about Devens, quit worrying. Devens is coming through this goldarn

1 thing like gangbusters.

2 CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: I don't want to seem petty

3 about it. As long as it's about the same I would say I'm not

4 looking for kudos. I'm looking for what is the best interest.

5 Now from there on you make your decisions what you do with

6 Meade and Devens on what the overall picture is best for this

7 Commission and the Army, and I will certainly accede to that and

8 I hope you would too.

9 MR. CABOT: I would, sir. I think they have shown on

10 the First Army what it really boils down to is not so much what

11 I said about New England but it has to do with whether we can

12 get that golf course.

13 CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: You said there would be a

14 three-star command then?

15 MR. HANSEN: It would be a three-star command. If

16 you put the First Army, it would be a two-three-star command.

17 GENERAL POE: You've already got a three-star up

18 there.

19 CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: Which do you think is the best

20 for our Commission?

21 MR. CABOT: I think it really boils down to what you

22 get for Ft. Meade by moving the First Army out of there, and

23 that I don't know.

24 GENERAL STARRY: Mr. Chairman, I really don't think

25 -- you've got a $12 million cost, according to the Johnson

letter for moving headquarters, First Army to Ft. Devens bcause of the added population at Ft. Devens, that's the first thing. The second thing is I really don't believe the Commission ought to be in the position of telling the Army where to put its flags.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Even though we have done it twice?

GENERAL STARRY: There were mitigating circumstances in the other cases, but here, where there is no clearcut imperative, it seems to me the Commission should not do that.

MR. CABOT: I think there is also in this letter clear indication that the Army is trying to hang onto Ft. Meade with all its might, and whether that's a good idea or not we have to decide.

GENERAL POE: But isn't it de facto? Don't they say that the law requires that NSA cannot run this thing themselves?

GENERAL STARRY: What we are saying is that given that NSA has to stay there, then --

MR. HANSEN: Somebody's got to help them out, if not for legal reasons then for efficiency reasons. It's not smart to turn the intelligence community over to managing buildings.

GENERAL POE: It says: NSA is precluded from being a highly visible landowner and facilities operator by Title

1 10, Section, U.S. Code." If that's correct, it's a de facto
2 thing that somebody's got to run it for them.
3 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I reserve the right to blow hot
4 and cold on this thing. I thought I had it in my head and all
5 figured out, and then you show me 500 people that are going to
6 Devens over what I thought. In other words, Devens is going
7 to come out 500 to the good without First Army.
8 MR. HANSEN: Right. That's the latest we have.
9 MR. CLAYTOR: I think that's all right. I'd quit
10 right there.
11 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I think I've done all I want to
12 do for Devens.
13 MR. CABOT: That has the further benefit of accepting
14 Secretary Johnson's letter, so there would be a blessing on
15 everything.
16 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: What's your will?
17 MR. CLAYTOR: Let's leave the First Army headquarters
18 where it is and do the rest of it.
19 MR. HOFFMANN: Are we going to put in language as to
20 what we see happening here, that this ought to become NASA land?
21 MR. HANSEN: It's can't be NASA land. We'd have to
22 say designed for the main intention of supporting NSA. It
23 cannot be NSA land.
24 MR. HOFFMANN: That's right.
25 MR. HANSEN: I keep saying NASA. That's my fault.

1 It's NSA cannot own land.

2 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Have you got a motion or some-

3 thing?

4 MR. CLAYTOR: I'll move it.

5 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: It encompasses closing Holabird

6 and moving everybody like we have talked. It encompasses

7 ISC to Devens. It leaves First Army, your proposal, at Meade.

8 What about language on Meade?

9 MR. CLAYTOR: Sell as much as of it as they

10 possibly can.

11 MR. HANSEN: Can I make a suggestion?

12 MR. CLAYTOR: At a minimum the separate portion,

13 the south portion, as a minimum, and as much of the other as

14 you can work out?

15 MR. HANSEN: Could I make a suggestion, sir? We

16 clearly want to close the south 9,000. I think Mr. Smith's

17 suggestion and Mr. Hoffmann's suggestion that Meade be left

18 to be another Ft. Belvoir type thing, where it's a magnet

19 to accept leased space, it's land that would be able to be

20 converted to office space and get us out of our leased space

21 problems.

22 MR. CLAYTOR: We should recommend that.

23 CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: When you write up this option,

24 you refer to it as Belvoir and Meade as likely candidates.

25 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: What you are really saying is

that property that First Army doesn't use at Meade would be available for this Belvoir-type --

MR. CLAYTOR: It should be property First Army doesn't need as distinguished from use. They use the golf course.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: All right. How are you going to tie it down, the language here? That's what drove me temporarily out of my mind at Devens. I struggled with language. How are you going to tie down the First Army to a given area? How are you going to tie down what's available in the Ft. Belvoir kind of language?

MR. HANSEN: I don't believe we can.

MR. BRYAN: You can describe the area.

MR. HANSEN: Let me craft the thought. We start off. The discussion is Ft. Meade is the linchpin. The Commission wants to consolidate a bunch of split activities, named, and to do so is using an activity at Ft. Meade, which is the Criminal Investigation Division, avoiding construction cost -- all the good things we can say about that -- and consolidating activities at Huachuca, consolidating Information Systems at Devens, consolidating criminal records at Belvoir, and then it just becomes a series of moves.

I think that the suggestion that we have in front of us states it perfectly well.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: LEt me just tell you my concern

1 and why I think we need to say it as clearly as we know how.
2 My concern is that if you leave the First Army at Ft. Meade
3 and you don't put a fence around it in a sense that they are
4 going to start creeping out all over the place and the first
5 thing you know what we have tried to do at Ft. Meade is not
6 happening.
7 MR. HANSEN: I understand.
8 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: That's just bureaucracy, the
9 way it works.
10 MR. HANSEN: Perhaps what we do is clearly the south
11 9,000 is off limits. It's sold, and in fact it would be
12 probably one of the few instances where we actually use the
13 word "sold". The north 40, we would couch that in terms of
14 the Ft. Belvoir. There is space there in order to build and
15 get us out of lease arrangements, much the same as at the
16 Engineer Proving Ground and at Ft. Belvoir. And we note
17 that NSA is in a significant amount of leased space at high
18 cost or whatever we want to say about it, so forth and so on,
19 and that the Secretary manage Ft. Meade as an activity suppor-
20 ting movements out of leased space, that First Army continue
21 to be the host.
22 Now there are only 500 people, so I don't think we
23 have to say anything about consolidate down into a few.
24 GENERAL POE: Their primary mission is support of
25 NSA.

1 MR. HANSEN: Their primary mission, aside from other
2 missions, is to support NSA. That is a significant number of
3 people.
4 MR. HOFFMANN: Let me add one more descriptor. I
5 think the significant thing about Ft. Belvoir is that you are
6 removing the flags, that you are no longer managing that as an
7 active Army garrison type post. It becomes an administrative
8 enclave in an urbanizing environment, and what you want to have
9 is the same language as to Meade and you want to say it's got
10 to be managed in such a way as to diminish its character as
11 an active Army garrison-type post and to become an administra-
12 tive enclave. That should take care of confining First Army,
13 doing away with the golf course and that sort of thing.
14 And it captures the history of which General Starry
15 is so fond.
16 MR. CABOT: General Starry did say we shouldn't tell
17 Army where to locate its flags. But I have to point out that
18 that becomes just as frozen in concrete by the political
19 situation as anything else, so if we ever want to do it, we
20 have got an option now. We won't have it and they won't be
21 able to do it later.
22 I am not saying that because I want you to move the
23 First Army to Devens for regional reasons, but I just think if
24 we are really serious about what Mr. Hoffmann just said, we
25 will put an impediment that otherwise wouldn't be there if we

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1 don't move the First Army, and I can't evaluate that.

2 MR. CLAYTOR: We can put an impediment on them.

3 MR. HOFFMANN: See, I think that the move up to

4 Devens, it just really doesn't have much military necessity and

5 costs us a bunch of dollars. Let's just hang in there with

6 the bucks.

7 MR. CLAYTOR: That's right.

8 DR. SMITH: But at the same time I think what we are

9 swinging on is can we or can we not close Ft. Meade. If we

10 leave the flag at Ft. Meade, we can't use the words "close

11 Ft. Meade." If you can get that flag out of there you can

12 say "close Ft. Meade", and I think that's going to be a very

13 subtle difference that's going to be very important to us. I

14 don't think it will make any difference whether you put the

15 flag at Ft. Monmouth or, heaven forbid, Ft. Dix, or anywhere.

16 But if you could get it out of Ft. Meade and say close Ft.

17 Meade and make it an NSA enclave that you will have precluded

18 them from going back in there.

19 We have still got the whole list of tenants to

20 worry about. Every time somebody sees a piece of real estate,

21 they will want to go back in here. You have got a whole air-

22 field at this base. Right now they are saying we don't need

23 that airfield and we can close it off, but if you keep the

24 First Army headquarters there --

25 MR. HOFFMANN: We dropped the air field out of there

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1 didn't we? Didn't it go?

2 DR. SMITH: Under this scenario it's out because

3 First Army headquarters is out, but if you keep First Army

4 headquarters there I will guarantee you that they will keep

5 the air field there.

6 MR. CLAYTOR: The air field in the south 40?

7 DR. SMITH: No. The air field is in the north 40.

8 It's right here just below the blue III (indicating).

9 MR. HANSEN: It's on the edge of the south 40, but it

10 could be easily carved out.

11 MR. HOFFMANN: Why they can't from Meade get a

12 facility up on the Friendship airport or whatever it is.

13 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: BWI.

14 MR. HOFFMANN: It beats the hell out of me.

15 DR. SMITH: They can, but it's nice to have your own

16 airport.

17 GENERAL POE: HOw would you approach the housekeeping

18 function?

19 DR. SMITH: I think it has to stay as an Army enclave

20 if you will, where the Army runs it for NSA. I think we need

21 to build incentives in for NSA to keep as little of that real

22 estate as necessary. Do we know the number of military, how

23 many military at NSA? Is that something we can talk about?

24 VOICE: No.

25 DR. SMITH: There are enough military in there to make

it worthwhile, I think, to keep some housing and they propose to keep some housing, but I don't know why you would keep a hospital. I mean, they are 30 minutes from Walter Reed and Bethesda, the best hospitals in the country. Keep a clinic there but refer the people. And they propose to keep those kinds of things.

I think if we could build the incentives in to say hey, if you can sell all that off, you can use the money that you get to build your office space that you need and get out of leased space, but I think we need to subtly say close Ft. Meade, and to close Ft. Meade I think you've got to get that flag out of there.

GENERAL STARRY: Have you flipped again, Mr. Chairman?

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: No, I haven't flipped. I share your concern about whether in fact we are closing Ft. Meade if we leave the First Army there, whether we can contain it.

GENERAL POE: I think if it goes to Devens, with all due respect, now we've got -- we're back in perception again. I think the Information Services Command is going to assure Devens' future. I think if you put much else up there you are going to give the perception that you are deliberately trying to ensure their future. I really believe that.

Devens has got a lightning rod on it.

DR. SMITH: Let's put it at Ft. Monmouth. It's

1 500 people, $12 million. I mean, you could put it almost
2 anywhere.
3 MR. HOFFMANN: Be careful of that now. Let's not
4 open a whole new wave because General Starry wants to put it
5 at Ft. Dix.
6 GENERAL STARRY: I think it's fine the way it is.
7 Let it alone. Close the south 9,000 and let it alone and make
8 some language that will restrict the situation.
9 MR. HOFFMANN: I'd rather have the $12 million,
10 very frankly, number one. Number two, I'm not sure how much
11 better we can do besides a direction to manage the sucker so
12 it becomes as quickly as feasible a Belvoir-like apparition
13 adjoining the National Capital.
14 COLONEL YANKOUPE: I think that's essentially what
15 it is now.
16 MR. HOFFMANN: No, no, no. My dear fellow, you are
17 missing a lot of conversation about here as to what the flag
18 does for you. Don't worry about it. There are colors and
19 beings out there that are not easily comprehended. It takes
20 many years. we just got through trying to get Belvoir the hel
21 squared away. Now don't let's screw that up.
22 As long as First Army is there, it has a totally
23 different character in the mind of the U.S. Army, and that's
24 why they really need a kick in the fanny to get them to manage
25 that sucker the way it ought to be managed, which is to head

1 toward a Belvoir. Get the engineer stuff out of there, and
2 in this case get First Army out of there.
3 GENERAL POE: Get rid of the golf course and First
4 Army will go.
5 MR. HOFFMANN: There's a lot of thinking in the
6 Army. If you take the golf course and the airport, they
7 sure as hell will go.
8 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Show me on the map where the
9 First Army is. I mean, is it south of the golf course?
10 COLONEL YANKOUPE: First Army is located in this
11 headquarters right here. I think this complex over here --
12 MR. HOFFMANN: It's the old post headquarters
13 building, isn't it?
14 COLONEL YANKOUPE: ANd this is the golf course
15 area here.
16 MR. HOFFMANN: See, the commander that looks out
17 his front window and sees a parade ground and a golf course is
18 in a whole different state of mind than one who looks out
19 and sees leased buildings, parking areas, and commercial
20 establishments. It's a whole different state of mind.
21 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Don't go away. Show me again.
22 You've shown me one building. Is that it?
23 COLONEL YANKOUPE: It's in this complex, sir, but
24 headquarters itself is here (indicating). But I'm sure, as
25 with all these installations, like your visit down to Ft.

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Monroe, none of these were built with the idea that we would have 1,600 people inside of an office complex building like we now have at FORCECOM. That move down at FORCECOM was ideal because it unites the entire staff, creates synergism, what have you. Over the years what we have come to live with on the older posts now, we haven't had the luxury of moving into new air bases and things like that.

So we consolidate these things slowly over time. What we end up with are collages of buildings, and I'm sure you will find the photo facility is going to be up over here, the PAC, the personnel assistance administration center that will support a large number of these people here, is going to be patchwork-quilted all over the installation, with the headquarters being here.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: And all of them totalling 500 people?

COLONEL YANKOUPE: Yes, sir, but remember that there will be some post support staff stuff like the directorate of engineering and housing that does the base operations stuff that will drive its funding through First Army headquarters, so that link becomes more diffused as you go further down.

The one thing I think we can say is that the bulk of everything that seems to be associated with operating the post seems to be certainly north of the piece of property we have been looking at closing.

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1 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: See, what I am hearing you say
2 is that you could give them about 25 acres in there and say
3 this is going to be the First Army headquarters.
4 COLONEL YANKOUPE: I think we have got 63 or 64
5 tenants on the installation, and how they spread out I'm not
6 sure at this point in time.
7 I think that housing is up over here and housing
8 here, and housing out over here (indicating). They are typi-
9 cally on an installation located in the satellite areas, and
10 I think quickly somebody would want to hold on to that because
11 that represents significant investment in facilities that are
12 very difficult to build today, particularly in today's
13 programming environment. We are not building a whole lot of
14 new housing.
15 GENERAL POE: Maybe if you had words that would say
16 in addition to the savings from this it is anticipated that
17 -- something could be quoted, legislation and all, that
18 anticipated that, that there is sufficient ground in there
19 to, and go on to what Doug had to say about with priority to
20 NSA, provide ways to download leases here and there, and
21 under such circumstances as described in it relating to
22 Belvoir. Then you know it's there. It's put there as an
23 expected and anticipated thing from the Commission and
24 presumably the Secretary of Defense agreed to it and the
25 following Secretary would be held to that by the Congress.

1 I hate to see us try to do this thing street by
2 street or line by line even though I am perfectly willing to
3 cover the golf course with NSA buildings.
4 MR. HOFFMANN: Is there a set of descriptions of
5 different classes of Army property where one is a post camp
6 and station and then one is -- there is a list of those, and
7 what we want to do is find that descriptive list and downrate.
8 Say Mr. Smith wants to downrate the facilities so you can no
9 longer justify maintaining the garrison-like aura, the head-
10 quarters-like aura and turn it into a simple administrative
11 enclave.
12 Somewhere the engineers have a classification of
13 bases and if you have a Class IV it's entitled to this many
14 flagpoles and landing field and a golf course and if you go
15 down to Class V or VI you can't have those things added and
16 that's the direction we want to manage this sucker.
17 GENERAL POE: There's a question there.
18 MR. HOFFMANN: It's like if you would go and find
19 out what class if a base East St. Louis is -- no golf course,
20 no parade ground, administrative areas, housing for a few in
21 the administrative functions. That's what we want to do with
22 this guy.
23 GENERAL POE: See, that may turn on the flag. In
24 the Air Force as a colonel I had general officers as my tenants.
25 You can't have that, can you, if you have got a general on that

1 base. He's the guy that runs the place; is that correct?

2 MR. HOFFMANN: I don't think so because you have

3 post commanders.

4 GENERAL POE: In fact, that's just what you wanted

5 when you were a colonel was having two or three generals on

6 your station to help you.

7 (Laughter.)

8 That's what you need. If you could set it up so you

9 had a station commander, we could put the words in there, that

10 first was a tenant organization.

11 GENERAL STARRY: You've got to have a garrison

12 commander in any event of the Army headquarters as well as

13 NSA, so he would be a garrison commander and his charge would

14 be to support NSA and support the Army headquarters.

15 MR. HOFFMANN: You've got that out there anyway,

16 but we want to keep it down.

17 GENERAL POE: See, at Ft. Hood, the three-star is

18 the Ft. Hood commander/corps commander.

19 GENERAL STARRY: But he also has a guy who is the

20 garrison commander.

21 GENERAL POE: And he has a garrison commander who

22 works for him.

23 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: We're talking about getting a vote

24 and getting on with this thing. My frustration is that I see

25 whatever that number of acres is up there that just bugs the

1 hell out of me because I don't see any need for an Army head-
2 quarters, from what I've seen so far -- and I Know how some
3 of them get spread out all over hell -- I don't see any need
4 for an Army headquarters to have over 25 or 50 acres of a
5 piece of property somewhere.
6 I don't know why, if we are going to do this, leave
7 them here, I don't know why we can't define an area of Meade
8 and say this is First Army headquarters, period. The rest
9 will go the Ft. Belvoir route. I would feel a lot more
10 comfortable. I just have this sense that First Army is all
11 over that lot and they are going to stay all over that lot.
12 MR. HANSEN: The Ft. Belvoir route. Now Ft. Belvoir
13 is two pieces. The main post --
14 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: We've come to use terms now. We
15 are talking about the arrangement for leasing space and all.
16 MR. HANSEN: But the other side is also being filled
17 up in another way using more regular construction means,
18 military construction and all that. It's also being filled
19 up and all the houses at Belvoir are used to house the
20 military in the National Capital Region because it's a high-
21 cost area.
22 GENERAL POE: Or you could work it the other
23 direction. Instead of trying to tell people what areas and
24 draw lines, you could say it is anticipated that a minimum of
25 X acres will be made available for this type of program out

1 of the 9,000 acres.

2 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I'd be inclined to say if the
3 Secretary of the Army doesn't like designating 100 acres or
4 whatever it is, that he can then look at Monmouth or he can
5 look at somewhere else for the headquarters. I mean, I don't
6 know how many acres that is, but somebody has got an awful
7 lot of acres tied up in the name of the First Army.

8 MR. HANSEN: Sir, the First Army is going to be the
9 host to the complex and be there for the manager of the real
10 property maintenance accounts and all that sort of stuff.
11 They have shops they will need. They have a lot of other
12 stuff they will need. Ft. Sheridan was almost 700 acres,
13 two major commands, but nevertheless 100 seems low to me.

14 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I don't care what the number is,
15 as long as we designate something that is reasonable.

16 MR. HANSEN: Consolidated into a suficient area to
17 support First Army and the infrastructure requirements for
18 NSA and other tenants or something?

19 MR. CABOT: Aren't you talking about building new
20 buildings the minute you start moving First Army around on
21 that site? So you haven't saved the $12 million.

22 MR. TRAIN: Is there military outside the blue lines?

23 MR. HOFFMANN: Yes.

24 MR. TRAIN: This is just what NSA wants to keep?

25 MR. HOFFMANN: And that's kind of an arbitrary line

in which they say this is what we need to run our kit because a lot of it is buffer zone.

MR. TRAIN: What is all this stuff out here?

MR. HOFFMANN: YOu've got a tremendous amount of housing. You have got administrative buildings. You have got a hospital in there someplace. You have got the PX on there someplace.

DR. SMITH: Let me suggest a possible compromise.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Give us an out. We've got to get on.

DR. SMITH: Here's the compromise. Let's make the decision to close Ft. Meade, to create a garrison for NSA. Army, do with First Army headquarters what you want. You can make it a tenant at the garrison at what used to be Ft. Meade, or you can relocate the First Army flag wherever you want to relocate it. It's such a small piece of the action here that we don't have to specify what they do with the First Army flag. And then combine the First Army flag to some piece of real estate, 100 acres, 200 acres, whatever you want.

I think that in that case we have taken the step we need, which is close Ft. Meade and create a garrison for NSA. We have dodged the question of moving the Army's flag. We'll let the Army decide where they want the flag themselves and give them the option of keeping the flag on the NSA garrison.

GENERAL STARRY: That's not closing Ft. Meade. That

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1 what we will be accused of, is saying we're going to close
2 Ft. Meade, but, by the way, we're going to keep a garrison
3 there.
4 MR. HOFFMANN: We could do that if we could down-
5 grade it. If we had that ladder of different categories of
6 bases and downgrade it to this other thing, and then follow
7 with your language, I would say an NSA enclave until we find
8 out what the right word is.
9 DR. SMITH: Everything's a fort now. I don't think
10 Ft. Indian Town Gap is a fort. There is no hierarchy.
11 MR. HOFFMANN: See, they upgraded everything into
12 being a fort in order to keep it so it was permanent. But
13 you still have camps and you still have this and that. I
14 would go look for it myself if the staff can't.
15 Excuse me. That was intemperate and I withdraw it,
16 Mr. Chairman.
17 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Well, we will destroy the record.
18 (Laughter.)
19 COLONEL YANKOUPE: If I could just offer an
20 additional suggestion in that area, one of our vehicles for
21 controlling what happens to the installations is through
22 their master planning/base development process. It would see
23 to me that we can do this by finding the appropriate wording.
24 We will have to work this. We just need to take a shot at
25 what wording would be such that we would recommend to the

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1 before he initiates the implementation process to develop a
2 master plan for that north 40 area that embodies the follow-
3 ing Commission guidelines -- that it be used for, that it be
4 dedicated to, that First Army be this, that and the other
5 thing -- and that when that plan is developed it becomes the
6 basis upon which he executes his implementation.
7 We should see, unless he is in total ignorance of
8 the Commission's guidance, that reflected in the master plan.
9 But we need a shot at doing things like calling Mr. Johnson,
10 who signed the letter and so forth.
11 MR. HANSEN: I'd also make two, I think, pertinent
12 points. The first is, if we don't designate where something
13 goes, there is no money out of the account to make it happen.
14 Therefore, we would leave the Secretary of the Army or the
15 Secretary of Defense with the unenviable task of moving
16 a headquarters or consolidating into something else and no
17 money with which to do that.
18 The second is I'm not sure in a practical sense how
19 a colonel garrison commander in charge of Ft. Meade would
20 deal with a three-star who is on his post.
21 GENERAL POE: I've done that five times.
22 MR. HANSEN: He wouldn't work for him, though. That
23 a problem.
24 MR. HOFFMANN: That can be done. Don't worry about
25 it. That can be done.

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GENERAL POE: You just spend more time on his furniture than you do on your airplanes, but you can handle it.

MR. HOFFMANN: That can be handled. No problem.

DR. SMITH: And so can the former issue, just by saying $12 million from the proceeds of the sale will be made available for relocation of the Army flags, should it choose to do so.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Does that all sound sensible and doable? I won't ask the Colonel whether it's sensible. I will simply say is it doable.

COLONEL YANKOUPE: It's doable.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Are we close to agreement?

MR. HOFFMANN: I think we have agreed.

GENERAL STARRY: What have we agreed? We're going to tell the Secretary of the Army to put the flag anyplace he wants to? Is that what we are saying?

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: In a sense we are.

GENERAL STARRY: I just object to the cosmetics of saying we are closing Ft. Meade and then turning around on the other side of the coin and saying, oh, by the way, there is going to be a garrison there to do the following things. And, Mr. Secretary, if you want to plant that flag there, you can plant that flag there.

MR. HOFFMANN: I thought what we were going to try do is get the definition and say derate this from Ft. Meade

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1 to Meade administrative enclave, take it out of the fort
2 character and get it to whatever Belvoir is going to wind up
3 being, which may be called Ft. Belvoir, but it's going to be
4 a different set of dynamics.
5 GENERAL STARRY: WHy don't we call it Ft. Meade and
6 make some language in the report that enjoins the Secretary to
7 restrict the headquarters expansion and give priority to NSA?
8 MR. HOFFMANN: What we are trying to do is find a
9 preexisting framework in which to do that, and I think there is
10 one that lives in the Army in which you have forts and camps
11 and different kinds of installations.
12 VOICE: Military reservations?
13 VOICE: How about outposts?
14 GENERAL STARRY: I think it's cosmetic and I think
15 it's false cosmetics and I think you are going to get called to
16 task for it.
17 MR. HOFFMANN: We're not going to talk about closing.
18 What I'm talking about is not closing it but convert it to be
19 a different category so that it is clear that we mean for them
20 to build over the golf course. We mean for them to confine
21 First Army to a very rigorous little plot in there, and that
22 the rest of it is to be developed consistent with the aura of
23 Ft. Belvoir.
24 GENERAL POE: Maybe we could step into this and
25 vote on whether we're going to leave this thing with the flag

1 there and then determine how to do that. You could step into
2 this as long as we have the shadow of whether we're not going
3 to move that flag over. That's one more thing that is a
4 permutation and combination.
5 If we say okay, now we've reached the point where we
6 are going to leave the flag there, unless somebody wants to
7 move it or something of this nature, as far as we are concerned
8 we are going to leave it there, and then we have all these
9 other things we can vote on to do, and that's out of the way,
10 then we can figure out the wordage on this one and be at
11 least a step toward lunch.
12 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Y ou know, we are kind of in a
13 state of general discombobulation. Let us see if we can't
14 work on some language that will do this. I think we all know
15 what we are trying to do. Let us see if we can't come up
16 with something to serve the purpose and then we will
17 distribute it.
18 MR. CLAYTOR: I agree.
19 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: All right. Mr. Smith, you have
20 ten minutes, unless you have already used it.
21 DR. SMITH: I'll just ask you to put these on over
22 there for me. What I would like to do, with the Commission's
23 indulgence, is revisit the basic training at Ft. Dix, the
24 decision that we made yesterday, because that's the one
25 decision that I just totally disagree with. I think it is one

that we will be subject to a lot of criticism for.

(Slide.)

DR. SMITH: This is what we agreed to do yesterday. We're going to go all the way. We're going to spend $128 million to achieve $11 billion in savings, and we are going to do this in the name of it makes better sense in the training base. Now I think economically that decision just has to be questioned. We can't estimate that close in the first place, so your estimates can be off an order of magnitude.

I think that to do that in the name of dollars is going to subject us to lots of criticism, and if you look at the things that we are doing we are taking the [redacted] is the [redacted] That is where the [redacted] is, and we are taking them out of [redacted] and moving them to Ft. Dix, and that may make sense to some people. It doesn't make very good sense to me.

You are taking basic training out of Ft. Bliss, where you are putting trainees into the air defense business, where they have got the rest of the Army's air defense work being done, and moving them out of Ft. Bliss. So this is what we have agreed to do.

Now this is the option which we agreed not to do. This is the close Ft. Dix option, and if you look at this -- you don't need to look at the details -- there are a couple of

1 things I want to point out. We get into steady state savings
2 of $79 million a year. We save three-quarters of a billion
3 dollars over 20 years, and this is the one we decided not to
4 do.
5 You also save as part of those numbers 1,856 militar
6 spaces and 1,479 civilian spaces. Those military spaces are
7 able to go back into the force structure. That's two
8 battalions of soldiers that you would save if you would go
9 ahead and do Ft. Dix.
10 The alternative that we agreed to saves 310 militar
11 people and 38 civilians, so we save a little over almost
12 two companies' worth of soldiers under what we agreed to.
13 Now I would suggest there is an option that we ougl
14 to seriously consider, and that's the option of doing both
15 of these. Let me show you, using the numbers that we have
16 gotten from the Army and the Commission staff, what those
17 numbers look like.
18 (Slide.)
19 DR. SMITH: Okay. This is what we agreed to
20 yesterday and let me explain what this is. It's another way
21 of displaying what we had seen earlier. This is the A1, A2,
22 A3, A4, that were the options that were presented on that
23 previous chart. The next column is what we are affecting.
24 [redacted]. We're moving 259 military, 46
25

civilian, and 1,680 students. That is the way you read this.

If you go to the rest of the options, that's what we said that we want to do. These are the numbers of people that we are talking about moving.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: What does the question mark represent?

DR. SMITH: That means there was no information in the data as to the numbers of people that wer were moving. When I looked at the push-around chart, it didn't have the numbers.

COLONEL YANKOUPE: Those push-arounds go to Ft. Dix.

DR. SMITH: No, Bliss to Jackson. If you go back and put this one up on the far side, it says Bliss to Jackson and there are no numbers in anything that I saw that have to do with Bliss to Jackson.

COLONEL YANKOUPE: The major migration chart that had the arrows on it had those going to Bliss and Ft. Dix. That chart there has that typo error.

DR. SMITH: Put back up for me the histogram chart over there that shows the options, the same thing as this shows.

(Slide.)

DR. SMITH: These two things say the same thing.

MR. HANSEN: That's correct. That wasn't the

GENERAL STARRY: What he was saying is in the base block across the bottom that says Ft. Bliss to Ft. Jackson and you've got nothing in the migration diagram that follows that logic, and so there are no numbers in his Bliss to Jackson line.

COLONEL YANKOUPE: Exactly, because, as I indicated, those from Bliss should be going to Ft. Dix.

GENERAL STARRY: The histogram chart is in error; is that correct?

COLONEL YANKOUPE: Yes, sir. As this one showed over here, when we moved 800 training load into Ft. Dix, which is the basis for the calculation.

DR. SMITH: It's still not going to make a big difference.

NOw if you look at the close option, this is the kinds of people that you are talking about moving. You move 1,600 trainees to Ft. Knox. You move 4,800 trainees to Ft. Jackson. YOu move 1,000 to Ft. Leonard Wood. This is the close option.

Now, what I contend is you can do the Starry push-arounds just like he has proposed them and still close Ft. Dix with some minor exceptions. In the first place, don't move basic training out of [redacted] where they do it now. Leave it at [redacted]

The move from Bliss to Jackson you can still do. If

it's Bliss to Dix, you can't, and you'd have to either leave it at Bliss or find another home for it. So if that's a mistake in the original chart, I continue to accommodate that situation.

You could make the Dix to Jackson move, if you close Ft. Dix. Obviously you can make the Leonard Wood to Jackson. It's independent of what you do at Ft. Dix.

So everything that General Starry's proposal can do you can do under this option, with the exception of you would have to leave the people at [redacted] the [redacted] that are training at [redacted] now, and you'd have to find some other place to do [redacted] The 94 Bravo are cooks, and the proposal was to take them from Ft. Lee and from Ft. Jackson and move them to Ft. Dix.

Now I contend you can train the cooks either at Ft. Jackson or at Ft. Lee. Ft. Lee is what I used in doing my rough analysis because that's the home of the Quartermaster. It would make some logical sense to me to train the cooks at Ft. Lee.

MR. HOFFMANN: And you may have less facilities construction cost.

DR. SMITH: You would have less cost. So I say you can do everything that's in the Starry plan that we agreed to yesterday, except at [redacted] and except for the cooks, and the cooks were way down on the long payback anyhow and probably do it better. And this is the impact on each of these

installations.

(Slide.)

DR. SMITH: What I've done here is to take each of the bases. The numbers here are population of the base. This is right off the migration diagram, the total population. The second column is the population of that base if you close Ft. Dix in accordance with the option that we didn't look at. The third column is the impact of both closing Ft. Dix and doing the Starry push-arounds, as modified here for cooks and MPs.

So you can see that Knox has no difference between the close and the push-arounds. Leonard Wood has very little difference. Benjamin Harrison has very little difference. Ft. Lee increases because we put the cooks at Ft. Lee. Ft. Jackson actually comes down a little bit, 600. [redacted] stays the same, except remember [redacted] and move them to Ft. Dix, and Ft. Bliss I don't know what the numbers are because they weren't in this diagram.

So I am contending that you can do both, essentially do both, and that we can save the money that was shown for Ft. Dix, and save the money that was shown for what General Starry recommended that we have agreed to already.

MR. TRAIN: YOu've got 13,000-some people at Dix now. You are taking 13,000 away. They don't all appear in

1 the rest of that.

2 DR. SMITH: That's the beauty of closing it, because
3 you have economies of scale and you take these numbers of
4 people that I talked about and put them back into the system
5 -- 1,856 military and 1,479 civilians that go back into the
6 force structure. You have savings as a result of consolida-
7 tion.

8 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: It sounds like you have given us
9 the best of both worlds. What's wrong with it, anybody?

10 MR. CRAIB: What's the 561 that's left at Dix?

11 DR. SMITH: I can't answer that. I assume there is
12 some tenant activities. Under my proposal I would propose that
13 we keep the real estate at Ft. Dix and that Ft. Dix become
14 an A.P.Hill.

15 MR. CLAYTOR: You've got the hospital there. That
16 may be part of the hospital.

17 DR. SMITH: I think you need to look at those kinds
18 of issues and decide if you are going to take 12,000 people
19 out do you need to continue the hospital or do you close the
20 hospital and upgrade the clinic space at McGuire. But those
21 kinds of issues have to be addressed.

22 Under this option I assume they are already in the
23 numbers that we were given on closing Ft. Dix.

24 ADMIRAL ROWDEN: Let me see if I understand what Mr.
25 Train said. If you took the 13,470, subtracted the 561,

leaving you 12,900, subtract from that the people that you say are going back into the force, about 3,000 --

DR. SMITH: Right.

ADMIRAL ROWDEN: Roughly, you would render a number of around 9,000 people. Those 9,000 people now are spread in Knox, Leonard Wood, [redacted] and so forth?

DR. SMITH: Yes.

GENERAL STARRY: The problem with this -- I don't know. I'm not willing to say that the numbers are wrong, nor am I willing to say they are right. The problem with this thing is that this whole migration pattern is one of a dozen or more alternatives that have been proposed over the years for a number of reasons. This one was selected as the best from the standpoint of improving the effectiveness of the training base.

If you go back to the Ft. Dix issue, if you say that Ft. Dix is going to stay open for all the reasons that we cited yesterday -- expansion of the training base, mobilization and all the other things -- then you have got one set of circumstances in the rest of the training base which these numbers reflect, one solution for what you want to do with the training base.

If you say that you are going to do anything else with Ft. Dix -- keep it open under our National Guard management or whatever or close it -- then these numbers all change

1 How much they change I'm not sure, but they change and some
2 of them dramatically.
3 There is an additional set of military construction
4 costs related to the places from which we took basic training
5 because we had to get them out of unsatisfactory housing in
6 order to create sufficient housing someplace else to put the
7 basic training load. In other words, there's a whole -- it
8 isn't as simple as this analysis would indicate. It's a very
9 complex issue and it involves a whole lot of economics that
10 are not included by just moving the numbers around on the
11 migration diagram.
12 I don't know whether it's right or wrong. I don't
13 think he's right, but I can't certify to it because I don't
14 know the magnitude of the changes that would be incurred if
15 you had to go back and take a base closure assumption at Dix
16 and do something else with the loads or a drawdown on the base
17 at Dix and do something with the loads.
18 The other thing is that in order to keep a base open
19 the first 500 people -- first 100 people, really -- costs you
20 most of your base operating costs; given the support of the
21 air base and the other things that we furnished to McGuire,
22 you are paying for the first 1,000 people, let's say, or any
23 major fraction thereof, you are paying a half to two-thirds of
24 the base operating costs. So the cost savings in this option
25 are not $79 million. I don't know what they are, but they are

1 certainly not $79 million.

2 My experience with this sort of thing tells me that
3 they are somewhat less than half that you can save by drawing
4 down to some level that is not as great as the total operating
5 load but still keeps the base open to do certain things,
6 because those things will expand, just like the Ft. Meade
7 argument.

8 MR. HOFFMANN: But think these are Army numbers,
9 aren't they?

10 DR. SMITH: These are Army numbers and General
11 Starry and I talked this morning and he and I have agreed to
12 disagree and I won't put any credence in the numbers we
13 got from the Army or the numbers that I'm showing here,
14 except to say they are from the same statistical base. I am
15 much more confident that we are going to achieve significant
16 savings with the option of doing both and I think we can do
17 almost everything that's in both options, with the two
18 wrinkles that I've talked about here and save significant
19 dollars.

20 Now I don't know whether the $79 million annual
21 steady-state saving goes to $50 million or goes to $40 millio
22 but in any event it is a significant number. It's big bucks.
23 It frees up that piece of real estate for just exactly the
24 kind of thing we were talking about. That's to bring troops
25 back from Europe, that sort of thing.

1 So in my mind what we would do under this approach,
2 if we move basic trainees out of [redacted] into Ft. Dix
3 and if we move basic trainees out of other places, we are just
4 tying the anchor around Ft. Dix forever. You are never going
5 to look at a change in Ft. Dix again.
6 My opinion is that we ought to go on and take the
7 best of both worlds. I am convinced, without being able to
8 do the detailed cost studies, that this yields significant
9 savings and still does the kind of training push-around
10 things that we talked about doing yesterday.
11 MR. HOFFMANN: Let me illustrate one thing I said
12 earlier. Look down at [redacted] there. Okay? There is
13 a nice level of operation there. You pull basic training out
14 of there and you have taken one of the major props out from
15 under the mission of that base and that's why I am saying
16 that our process here precluded us, when we took a look at
17 those lower bases, which in this case we took a look at the
18 lower-rated bases, found Ft. Dix to be at the lowest end.
19 We said if you are going to tighten the belt some-
20 where you tighten it at Ft. Dix. Then we got showered with
21 a whole bunch of strategic reasons and other reasons why you
22 can't do that. But we haven't gone back and looked at any-
23 thing else in that stack.
24 Now my hope had been -- and this is kind of a
25 typically lyric sort of thing you have come to expect by way

of analysis -- but my hope has been if we took a prisoner there and they decided we had taken the wrong prisoner that they would come up with something to give us the benefit of having taken a prisoner, and by God we all know it's in there. They haven't done that.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Yes, they did. They gave us Devens.

MR. HOFFMANN: But, see, I think this is a very intriguing solution. It's based on the Army's own numbers. It fulfills the essence of their logic and it follows out the Secretary of Defense's direction to us to go and get some savings out of what he perceived to be an oversize base.

MR. HANSEN: Having not been able to analyze this totally I just have two points. Just taking the third column, sir -- and please correct me if I'm looking at it wrong -- that's the training load, actually, the last column?

DR. SMITH: That third column is 259 military, 46 civilian and 1,680 students, and that's off the Army's push-around diagram.

MR. HANSEN: So it's basically mostly the students and the permanent part of that, and clearly if we didn't have Dix open any more then the second question mark has to be Bliss to Jackson also.

DR. SMITH: That's the way it was presented to us yesterday and we approved moving basic training from Bliss to

1 Jackson.

2 MR. HANSEN: For the Commission's information, that
3 number is around 800 in the third number over, so I Just
4 added up all of the ones in that list that said to Jackson,
5 and it adds to 8,000-something, 8,341 to Jackson.

6 Now assume that something was there already.

7 DR. SMITH: You want the Jackson number? That is the
8 end strength numbers at Jackson. You started at 16,619 today.
9 If you close Dix, using the ARmy's numbers, you go to 22,705.
10 If you go to the combination of closing Dix and doing the
11 Starry push-arounds, you drop that number to 22,114.

12 MR. HANSEN: Oh, I see. Okay.

13 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: So you are going to do that
14 increase at Jackson anyway.

15 DR. SMITH: Yes. You had that increase at Ft.
16 Jackson in the plan anyway, if you have closed Ft. Dix and
17 you had the push-arounds shown here. We have got stuff going
18 into Jackson and stuff coming out of Jackson to make the
19 training base a better fit to what we feel like it ought to
20 be.

21 MR. HANSEN: Then, based on what I said, then, the
22 question mark would drop 800 out of Bliss and add it to
23 Jackson. So that put back some of them.

24 DR. SMITH: Roughly.

25 MR. HANSEN: The only other point I guess I'd make

is I wonder if Dix would make a good prison or drug rehabilitation center or home for the homeless, because I think that's where it is headed for.

MR. CLAYTOR: Well, it's not available for sale under this assumption.

MR. HANSEN: The law requires us to look at underutilized properties.

MR. CABOT: If that's the law of the land, that's the law of the land.

MR. CLAYTOR: Underutilized is a nice, flexible word but it's got to be used for surge, for returning troops from Europe or something else. I'll stand up and defend that one anytime anybody wants to bring a suit on it.

DR. SMITH: And if you buy that argument, we ought to go in and sell Ft. Dix and get the money from the sale. It just makes the economics all that much better. I don't think we want to do that. I'm not worried about putting the homeless and prisons at Ft. Dix.

MR. CLAYTOR: I'm not worried about that one either.

GENERAL POE: We just state the requirement for it as a caretaker, just like we didn't close [redacted]

MR. CLAYTOR: That's right, the same thing.

COLONEL YANKOUPE: If we could just review what we did yesterday, it seemed to me that we decided that needs for the future, flexibility, three bases tied together -- NAS, Mc-

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1 Guire, Ft. Dix -- provided a reasonable example of joint
2 operation. We decided its current capabilities were such we
3 ought to maximize those. Having decided that, we then said
4 all right, there are some options for some push-arounds which
5 I Haven't had the luxury of examining all these numbers yet.
6 DR. SMITH: They are your numbers.
7 COLONEL YANKOUPE: I haven't understood how you put
8 them together, sir.
9 DR. SMITH: Maybe I need to go through them again.
10 They are not very difficult.
11 COLONEL YANKOUPE: But what we did do then was
12 decide that, based on the need for the thing as we painted it
13 -- notice we didn't get into the training load discussions and
14 all of that, which we were never able to get past before, but
15 we presented the base as it existed and the decision taken
16 on that, plus the added enhancement of doing this within the
17 total training base, a lot of the training base, as Mr. Smith
18 points out, enhances the operational efficiency of the local
19 training base. We may be able to do all these but the problem
20 we have had with doing these things is that they haven't been
21 necessarily tied to anything before.
22 We may be able to tie them to this also. But the
23 last thing that we do is we take out all the flexibility that
24 we have in the training base itself. Into the future if we go
25 to recruiting more CAT IVs, we go to a draft, we are going to

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reopen Ft. Dix.

MR. CLAYTOR: Precisely. That's the whole focus of it.

COLONEL YANKOUPE: And we'll pay a bill to do that.

MR. CLAYTOR: Absolutely, and when that happens we are prepared to pay the bill. That's not happening tomorrow, but if it happens we have the capability to do that.

GENERAL STARRY: Let me make the point again. If you confront TRADOC with the notion that they don't have Ft. Bliss as a training base any more, then this whole mechanism that we have gone through here changes. It may or may not be the way to do things, and it may or may not be the TRADOC choice because of the absence of Ft. Dix. So what you have to do when you do something like this is don't do the puts and takes on the basis of an alternative. You have to kind of wipe the slate clean and start all over.

MR. HOFFMANN: See, I have difficulty with moving stuff out to Ft. Bliss anyway just on the general thesis that, number one, they are training people down there for the anti-aircraft, the air defense mission and, secondly, that our whole thrust has been, hey, let's get out west where we have room to do these things. You talk about impinging on training areas and this and that and the other thing, and we ought to be headed out to Ft. Bliss and we ought to be taking some of our fine New England soldiers when we recruit them

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and get them out into the great American west and show them the real values they are protecting with their lives.

And I would say that's a good direction to be going and I would support you in that, General Starry. I don't think we should take the basic training out of Ft. Bliss. I think we should move some training out of Jackson and head it out that way so that Jackson stays a comfortable sized training establishment for doing basic training year after year.

If you are going to build new facilities down in Jackson to do any of this, I would suggest building them down at Bliss. You've got the land. You've got the territory. You've got the training areas there, and it's co-located with the air defense school.

COLONEL YANKOUPE: The 2,400 that we are talking about moving out are already being done at Ft. Hood.

MR. HOFFMANN: You are probably going to have to build some new facilities to accommodate some of that. You may want to leave some flexibility as to where those things go.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Are you all getting close to voting?

MR. CLAYTOR: I'm with you.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Let me just ask a quick question. You've heard a few comments around the table. Before we vote,

is there anything you would suggest changing about your own chart?

DR. SMITH: My recommendation that we consider is that we close Ft. Dix, maintain Ft. Dix in a caretaker status for Guard and Reserve training and for mobilization, force structure changes that might necessitate bringing Ft. Dix into active status, that we do what we agreed to do yesterday in the Starry push-arounds, as I called it here, with the exception that we leave basic training at [redacted] we consolidate the cooks training at the most logical place to be consolidated -- whether that's Ft. Lee or Ft. Jackson; it appears to me to be Ft. Lee, but I don't think we ought to prejudge that -- and that that's the direction that we go.

CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: Do you have any comments to make?

GENERAL STARRY: Yes. I object to that rationale because I don't have any reassurance that it's viable. What you are doing is you are moving numbers around within one course of action. That course of action is based on the fact that you have got Ft. Dix as an operating training base. If you take Ft. Dix away as an operating training base, then all of these numbers will change. How significantly they will change, I don't know.

But some of them will be significant. And my argument would be you can't make an informed decision on something like this without running the economics of this thing

1 through again and asking the Army what they would do if Ft.
2 Dix were no longer available as a training base.
3 So what we have here is not a viable option, in my
4 judgment, simply because the economics and the numbers are
5 based on an alternative which assumed that Ft. Dix was open
6 as a training installation.
7 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Let me ask Doug about the
8 economics of the original proposal to close Dix. Was that
9 an economically feasible proposal, to close Dix?
10 MR. HANSEN: Oh, yes.
11 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: So it seems, Donn, what we are
12 doing is an economically feasible proposal to close Dix and
13 taking your proposals about moving things around, and there
14 may be some numbers that don't quite fit, but I think that's
15 probably true about everything we have done.
16 MR. HANSEN: May I make a suggestion? We don't have
17 the numbers in front of us. The suggestion I would make is
18 to try and put together Mr. Smith's proposal and, I think, the
19 desire of the Commission to go to closure on all activities,
20 but also to support General Starry's notion that the Army
21 ought to get a shot at this, that we write up the proposal
22 and we turn it over to them and say shoot as you will,
23 response due tomorrow or something. We mail that out with a
24 polling slip, maybe with staff comments or something. I don't
25 know.

1 There's no way we can get an Army response unless
2 we call the Secretary of the Army or the chief or something.
3 MR. HOFFMANN: I think we can have that in a couple
4 of hours. They have been doing all of these things. I Mean,
5 every base closure package in the last 15, 20 years has
6 included the closure of Ft. Dix. They know what the hell that
7 will do.
8 GENERAL STARRY: These move-arounds, these puts and
9 takes were based on the presence of Ft. Dix. It may well be
10 that if Ft. Dix is no longer available as a training base, what
11 I'm saying is these things may no longer be feasible.
12 DR. SMITH: They are entirely feasible. If you
13 look at the puts and takes, we've got some that are totally
14 independent of whether Ft. Dix is in the system or not.
15 MR. HOFFMANN: What you don't have there is where you
16 have to build new facilities to accommodate the ones you are
17 moving out of Ft. Dix. Now I assume those were in the Starry
18 push-arounds.
19 I'm saying even if you have to build something, you
20 probably are within your cost-effective range. We're trying to
21 get rid of these old World War II barracks. Let's go down to
22 Bliss and build some new barracks and put a new cluster in
23 there. But, Donn, you can't gainsay the fact that if you can
24 close Dix you save a hell of a lot of military slots and you
25 save a hell of a lot of civilian slots. And that's worth some-

GENERAL STARRY: I don't know whether you do or not. That's what I'm saying. I don't know whether you do or not, because what we're using is an alternative -- the savings that he has postulated, the 1,400 military and whatever --

DR. SMITH: I didn't postulate those. Those are Army numbers and they are the Army push-around given to us by the staff.

GENERAL STARRY: Hear me out. I understand what you are saying, but what I'm saying is that those numbers are based on a migration pattern that comes from the fact that Ft. Dix is either open or closed and you don't know what the cost of doing the moveouts will be at the other bases.

MR. HOFFMANN: I think you know what the costs are because you can't justify your own plan unless you go along with those costs. What you are worried about is you don't know the overall cost of putting together a base that cannot be saturated as quickly without Dix. That's what you are worried about -- surplus capacity in the basic training base, a worthy worry. Okay.

I'm saying that you've got other places you can go and reconstruct these facilities, and if we can pull this thing off you will be in better political things as to that which you and the chief are worried about than you would be under your notion of pushing everybody around, pushing everything around.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: May I suggest that we have here a lot of the numbers, that we consider this issue, vote yea or nay on it. If we conclude that we ought to do what we will now call the Smith plan, that we give the Army the day to take a look at the numbers in addition to what numbers we may have.

The only part of it that bothers me is whether the great increase at Ft. Jackson can be accommodated. Let them take a particular look at that kind of a problem and come back with some answers or some recommendations. I think we have probably debated the thing about as much as anybody is going to.

All right. Then I guess the question is on whether we will reconsider the vote yesterday and vote in favor of the Smith plan, perhaps as I outlined it.

In favor?

(A show of hands.)

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Eight. Opposed?

(A show of hands.)

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Eight to three.

GENERAL POE: We're going to see the Army figures?

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Yes. The answer is yes, you are going to see the Army figures. I would have to think the vote suggests, unless the Army comes back with something so wild we can't deal with it, we have kind of made up our minds what we are going to do.

1 Okay. Let's eat. Wait a minute. Sorry.

2 Is there anything else to come up? Smith, have you

3 had your ten minutes?

4 CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: He doesn't need any more.

5 DR. SMITH: While I'm on a roll I might take another

6 issue or two here.

7 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: If you promise not to complain

8 and carry on too much, why don't we put the summary up on

9 the screen or however you've got it and vote on it?

10 MR. HANSEN: Now of course we don't have this latest

11 change. First view for everybody. Me, too.

12 (Slide.)

13 MR. HOFFMANN: Why didn't you pass that around?

14 MR. HANSEN: This is by state, so the first impact

15 state is Alaska. We're making copies right now to pass

16 around.

17 MR. CLAYTOR: This is geographical impact we are

18 looking at now?

19 MR. HANSEN: LEt me try and point it out. The first

20 column just says the service that caused the action to happen.

21 In this case we have the Air Force doing the action, and it

22 affects Eilson Air Force Base in Alaska. Personnel out, none;

23 personnel in, adding 264 people. Because Eilson was not a

24 closure candidate and it's only a receiver, we have no

25 information on savings, et cetera.

The next line is a summary line for the State of Alaska. It says Alaska there. No outs, 264 in, and because this is positive we have increased the defense population or defense employment presence, if you will, by about one percent.

The next state is Alabama. We have four actions in Alabama, two of which are closures -- Alabama Plant and Cousa River. They were both inactive, although this guy is going to probably be upset to hear he was inactive. McClellan is a receiver, not necessarily from these -- I mean a loser. Under the Smith plan they are not losers any more. Redstone Arsenal is a small gainer. Then these are the statistics again that you have already seen on closing it. The overall state impact would have been dropping defense presence by 3.8, but now it will be virtually zero impact.

The next state is Arkansas. Air Force is the only thing. It's a small number of personnel in, increasing presence by a tenth of a percent.

The next state is Arizona. We have quite a few actions involved here, a net increase in defense presence of 2.6 percent.

The next state -- we have to go to the next page -- to roll up California. If I could, I will try to do that from here now. California, the impact on the defense presence in California is minus 5 percent, which shows what General

1 Poe said the other day as most of the push-arounds occurred
2 within the state.
3 The next state is Colorado. Impact of, a positive
4 impact of less than one percent in defense presence. I'm only
5 going over the numbers that are new, not the numbers that are
6 old.
7 Florida, no change in defense impact. We closed one
8 site that didn't have anybody on it.
9 Georgia might as well be no change.
10 Hawaii, virtually no change.
11 Idaho increased 25 percent, so there's our first
12 significant impact on a state, is an increase in Idaho of
13 25 percent.
14 GENERAL POE: I think a good deal of that would have
15 happened whether we did this or not.
16 MR. HANSEN: Yes. These numbers include the force
17 structure changes that we have agreed it would include. So,
18 to be consistent, we are accepting the credit and taking the
19 blame for whatever.
20 The next state is Illinois, a state of concern. The
21 impact is about minus ten percent in defense presence in that
22 state, and the impact, if you will, in socio-economic impact
23 of about three percent of employment in the region around
24 Chanute Air Force Base.
25 These are no access.

MR. CABOT: Would Chanute have gone anyway?

GENERAL POE: Chanute was a consolidation that the Air Force would have wanted to do but would have been prevented from by politics. It is a pure example of what the Commission --

MR. CABOT: So we are to totally get all the credit and all the blame for that one?

GENERAL POE: Yes.

MR. HANSEN: We are responsible for that one.

GENERAL POE: No force structure involved with Chanute. In fact, I noticed in yesterday's Air Force Times they were talking about moving a school to Chanute to take advantage of the engines being there.

MR. HANSEN: If I could correct something, correct me if I'm wrong, Jeff, Mountain Home is a receiver and a loser and it's a net gain of 25 percent. So those, I believe, are active forces moving around.

GENERAL POE: [redacted]

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MR. HANSEN: The next state is Iowa, no impact.

The next state is Indiana, a positive impact of about five percent.

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The next state is Kentucky, a negative impact of two percent.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Excuse me. That's a nine-year payback?

MR. HANSEN: No. Tom, you've got a nine-year payback on Lexington. That's not correct, is it?

MR. HOFFMANN: Nice eye, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I thought I was standing on my head.

MR. HANSEN: The next state is Louisiana, less than a percent negative impact on defense presence.

The next state is Massachusetts. We show it as a positive seven percent, and I suspect that number has grown with the new options.

VOICE: There's something wrong. Defense went up $1.8 million and it shows up as a positive impact.

MR. HANSEN: THere's no totals on this page at all -- military, civilian?

MR. CABOT: Is this with the Information Systems Command?

MR. HANSEN: Yes. This should be the First Army move.

MR. CABOT: ANd the Information Systems Command?

MR. HANSEN: Yes. The original charge to the staff, so it comes down a little bit, by 500. I'm sorry.

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1 The next state is Maryland, negligible impact.

2 MR. CABOT: That doesn't have all the Meade in it,

3 does it?

4 MR. HANSEN: Well, we're not moving First Army,

5 necessarily, so that will be a small change and shouldn't

6 matter any at all. Holabird increases only slightly, a couple

7 hundred people. So the Maryland impact will grow maybe into

8 one or two percent -- just guessing.

9 The next state is Michigan, less than a tenth of

10 one percent impact.

11 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Refresh my memory on the Detroit

12 tank plant. What is that plus?

13 MR. HANSEN: That's coming from the AMTEL lab. That'

14 one of the three places that things went to out of the AMTEL

15 lab in Massachusetts.

16 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: The Detroit tank plant is an

17 Army facility?

18 MR. HANSEN: The Army facility and the heavy metals

19 research that AMTEL is doing is going up there where they also

20 do research on tanks and stuff like that. It's not only a

21 plant. I'm not even sure that's correctly phrased.

22 MR. HOFFMANN: That tank plant, is it part of that

23 TACOM complex up there?

24 GENERAL STARRY: Yes. It's a GOCO plant.

25 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Is that where General Dynamics

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1 builds?

2 GENERAL STARRY: It's nearby, not too far from
3 Taylor. It's not co-located, but it is a manufacturing loca-
4 tion.

5 MR. HOFFMANN: So this is a geographical rather than
6 functional description of what's going to happen.

7 MR. HANSEN: The next state is Missouri, a slight
8 positive impact.

9 Mississippi, a slight positive impact.

10 New Hampshire, significant negative impact, mitiga-
11 ted by Pease Air Force Base is on the FAA hit list as a
12 regional airport and Jeff's going to look up right now what
13 they say in dollar terms it is going to save the State of
14 New Hampshire. $40 million in estimated capital investment for
15 an airport if they take over Pease Air Force Base. So while
16 it is clear they are probably going to be our most negative
17 impact --

18 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: But with a positive story if we
19 tell it right.

20 MR. HANSEN: If we tell it right, and we might want
21 to take credit for $40 million in estimated local capital
22 investment. I don't know.

23 ADMIRAL ROWDEN: HOw do we figure the defense
24 presence? There is a naval shipyard in Portsmouth, New Hamp-
25 shire with about 8,000 employees, if I remember correctly, and

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1 you've got here 1,500 civilians. Maybe it's at Kittering,
2 Maine.
3 MR. CLAYTOR: It's on the other side of the river.
4 That sure would help out that number a lot.
5 MR. HANSEN: To answer your question as to where we
6 got the defense presence numbers, we got them out of the
7 Defense '88 book which is the big public affairs book that
8 the Secretary puts out, and we just took off the defense
9 presence by state.
10 MR. HOFFMANN: I will tell you the other thing. If
11 you look at Orlando, Florida, which is the base that was
12 converted, you will find a wealth of economic activity that
13 went in there once that base closed. That is a real plus
14 for the state.
15 MR. HANSEN: Now is this something that, given the
16 impact, we should write into the final report -- about the
17 FAA hit list and all that? I wouldn't call it that, obviously.
18 MR. HOFFMANN: I would put that in your summary,
19 absolutely, in the back.
20 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: That's important, because that is
21 one thing we are going to have an answer for.
22 MR. CABOT: It's already in the draft that we saw
23 this morning that it's going to be used for a civilian air-
24 port.
25 MR. HANSEN: How about the dollar impact?

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CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I think we ought to make a minor case out of it.

MR. HANSEN: But not add it to our totals?

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Not add it to the total.

MR. HOFFMANN: We didn't lay a glove on Maine.

GENERAL POE: So you are not including the no-impact states?

MR. HANSEN: No impact states, no.

Would you like me to?

GENERAL POE: Well, you did Iowa.

MR. HANSEN: There was some impact on Iowa. Oh, I see. We did it because we affected it in the sense that the name Ft. DesMoines will pop up in our report, but there weren't any people there. So, if you like, we must have hit most of the states. It wouldn't be too much for us to add a state.

New Jersey, again numbers subject to change. We will end up with clearly a negative. I don't know what size yet. Well, let's see if I can figure it out. It looks like 6,000 permanent party and nobody in -- 12 percent, minus 12 percent. That's a very rough guess, but minus 12 percent.

New Mexico, plus eight percent.

Nevada, negligible.

New York is the next state, coming over here.

(Slide.)

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1 MR. HANSEN: It is negligible.

2 Ohio, negligible.

3 Oregon, minus six percent.

4 Pennsylvania, negligible, most of that being a

5 hospital offset by increases at the depot and out in the

6 country, I guess.

7 South Carolina, numbers subject to change, which

8 will go positive if the Smith plan is eventually vote-approved.

9 Texas, negligible.

10 MR. HOFFMANN: I think your phraseology is the Smith

11 plan stands. It has already gone through.

12 MR. HANSEN: All right, sir.

13 (Slide.)

14 MR. HOFFMANN: The termites remove what the

15 architects have put in place, I think.

16 MR. HANSEN: We're talking negligible impact on

17 Virginia, negligible impact at this time, going to change,

18 but I can't imagine by much. More goes into Belvoir, I think,

19 so in fact that might turn into a small positive.

20 And Washington, minus two percent.

21 We didn't run totals on the total impact, but from

22 what I could tell the impact between the pluses and the

23 minuses and the fact that they are small number overall, my

24 guess is we have made a cumulative zero impact in the nation

25 -- very little impact on the nation, because of the pluses and

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minuses. We weren't eliminating much.

Now for the grand totals. On one-time savings, the grand total is a cost of $700 million to gain steady state savings of $700 million. Land values freed up of $1.3 billion, and a 20-year net present value of $6 billion.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Anybody got any argument? Question Comments? Are we ready to vote on the package?

All in favor of the package, say aye.

(A chorus of ayes.)

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Opposed by the same sign?

GENERAL STARRY: Opposed.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Who said that? Is it your view that you will always be opposed to the way it's written?

GENERAL STARRY: Well, unless the reworked numbers on Ft. Dix come out differently than I expect them to, I just think Commissioner Smith thought we made a bad mistake yesterday; I think we have made a worse one today, and nothing much can change that unless the numbers come out to show a clear advantage.

MR. HOFFMANN: Well, let us wait for the numbers, but let us also exhort the Army to make some lemonade out of this situation, which they will immediately perceive as a lemon. But those things will move around and head west, I am sure.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I would like to find a way -- I

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1 don't want to preempt your vote at all -- I'd like to find a
2 way where you could say that you would vote yes on the pack-
3 age. So as soon as we have all these numbers in I'd like for
4 you to have a chance to look at them and hopefully we can come
5 out of here with a unanimous report.
6 GENERAL POE: Psychologically I would add the
7 unaffected states because a guy is going to be looking through
8 here trying to find his home town and if it's good news it's
9 another vote in favor of what we do. So I would add those
10 few states that are not affected.
11 MR. HANSEN: Is it the Commission's sense we are
12 going to put this in the report someplace?
13 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Just this?
14 MR. CABOT: Congress will see it anyway.
15 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I think it's got to be, and the
16 only question is whether there is anything in here or something
17 that is not in here that there ought to be that would cause
18 anybody to want to change this. You suggested putting in the
19 states that have not been touched. I will tell you, something
20 like this as a work sheet is going to be essential.
21 MR. CLAYTOR: Should we not put a star footnote on
22 New Hampshire about what's going to happen to the base for the
23 public to see right there, not just in the back of the thing
24 but right there? That's the only one that really stands out.
25 ADMIRAL ROWDEN: It does have the ameliorating issue

1 of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Many of those are drawn
2 from New Hampshire. I don't know exactly how to handle that.
3 MR. HANSEN: We can say that also.
4 MR. CLAYTOR: The majority of the people that work
5 at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard live in New Hampshire. The plant
6 happens to be across the river in Maine.
7 MR. HANSEN: Could I make just one other point? I
8 think I would recommend that the Commission leave this list
9 in the room.
10 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: It ought not to be carried out,
11 I agree. The question has been raised by Hayden as to whether
12 this ought to be in the report. Hayden suggests that it
13 would probably be better not to include it in the report but
14 just to have it available for use. I guess that's what you
15 said.
16 MR. BRYAN: Yes, sir. I just think that we made
17 an effort in writing the report not to throw in a lot of
18 numbers, any one of which could be focused on and picked
19 apart, and I think it would be death by a thousand cuts if
20 we have to publish all these numbers.
21 MR. HOFFMANN: I think as a practical matter what
22 will happen is that if you slide it to the DOD they will put
23 it out as explaining why they are going for it and the
24 minimal impact and all of that. Remember now, they are going
25 to have an interest in sweeping in behind us with all this

stuff, and explaining it and rationalizing it and making sure it's there. So I wouldn't worry about that. Let's have that as a working paper, send it to the DOD, and let them do what they want with it. We will have copies.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Well, we will, I assume, before we finish our work, this will be updated.

MR. HANSEN: Oh, yes, sir, and checked over.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I incidentally have asked the Secretary to hold off the Air Force because they are the only ones we have heard about who wanted to come in immediately with us in a sense and tell the Congress what we've done before the Congress even has a chance to see what we've done, and the Secretary said that the Air Force is grounded.

GENERAL POE: I didn't know that he went that far.

MR. CABOT: Mr. Chairman, I think we will undoubtedly be asked questions on that list in the very first press conference. You will probably want it for that.

MR. HANSEN: It will be ready.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I think it is going to have to be a Commission document. Whether it is part of the report or not is something else.

CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: Can you put it in the appendix?

MR. HOFFMANN: You could attach it to the press release.

MR. HANSEN: With the Commission's indulgence -- I

1 know that you are hungry -- but Mr. Craib just asked how many
2 bases did we close and what is the impact of what we just
3 did, and I had briefly put together a summary and I'll just
4 skip over that, but that gives you the numbers of installations
5 and properties we looked at and major bases and the task
6 forces, and the next category there is the criteria we used,
7 which I know you are clear on.
8 This just points out that we did two major things. We
9 developed a process and then we figured out how to validate
10 it, and I think our lessons learned are heavily strung through
11 the report, that what we found is for the most part bases are
12 heavily utilized. Air space and ground training areas are
13 congested. There is a general shortage of facilities,
14 increasing encroachment, but nevertheless we found excess
15 capacity and we used that excess capacity the best we could
16 but that the six-year payback was a very limiting endeavor.
17 These are the totals and let me think quickly about
18 -- these were made before the last two decisions. But these
19 should have included Meade. It doesn't include Dix.
20 So we go to 25 bases closed or realigned and savings
21 will grow. 63 facilities closed in Task Force 6. NOw that
22 includes 52 housing areas. Six properties sold. Those were
23 on the GSA excess list.
24 Other recommendations. That was the NCR leased
25 space plan. Annual savings will grow from that figure.

1 Over $800 million. $1.2 billion of property and all that
2 sort of thing.
3 GENERAL POE: And are those figures there and these
4 figures in here inflated?
5 MR. HANSEN: All the figures that come from our
6 model. Our model inflates, considers inflation and the
7 discounts for the value of money over time, so yes, they are
8 not budget level figures. They are decisionmaking figures.
9 GENERAL POE: What's the inflation factor?
10 MR. HANSEN: Three percent. The reason for that is
11 we were looking at the time streams of money, cash flow,
12 discounting and inflation are parts of that, and we used those
13 two techniques. What you end up with is dollars. You can
14 compare options, one option against the other. There is no
15 other way to do it and get through any scrutiny at all.
16 GENERAL POE: Mr. Chairman, with these slides up
17 here it might be a good time to ask, if we can, for guidance
18 as to how we respond in this period before the Secretary --
19 we know how to respond until this thing is turned over to
20 the Secretary. I would like a feel for what you would
21 recommend on the way we respond to queries and questions
22 from the time the Secretary gets it until he releases it and
23 and from the time it is released on.
24 CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I have a feeling that if we have
25 been as open to the media as we could possibly be through this

whole time, since May, and that we ought to take, for our own self preservation a position that now that we have finished our work it is being printed and it will be released on the 29th.

MR. CABOT: Is that a Friday?

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: Whatever day it is, and we just ought not to say anything more at this time. I know what's going to happen. Like in my case I am going to hear from a lot of my former colleagues and they are going to come privately with I'm going to be worried over Christmas kind of questions, and it is easier to say well, no, you really don't have a worry or you do have a worry.

CHAIRMAN RIBICOFF: I'll be out of the country.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: It seems if we take a position that we now have gone to press and that the report will be out on the 29th and you'll just have to read it, what do you think? Does anybody have a different view on that?

MR. HOFFMANN: I think that's essential.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I Mean, it's dynamite out there from this day forward.

MR. HOFFMANN: That goes hand in hand with the collegiality of what we are trying to do. I think the following question is what do we do between the time that we lay down the report and the Secretary sends it, and what

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do we do after the Secretary sends it and the Congress finishes approval?

MR. CLAYTOR: As a member of the committee, I will say the report speaks for itself and I'm not going to discuss anything about how we reached the decisions or anything else. I'm sorry, no comment. I'm not going to talk about it.

Now if everybody sort of discusses individual questions that are pitched to you and say well, some of those guys were different but this is the way we went, boy, nothing is greater news than to generate a row, and my feeling is I just won't talk about it.

MR. CABOT: Do we need a coach to decide who goes in and what plays? Will you give us some guidance in the next three months as to whether to testify or not?

MR. CLAYTOR: You may not have any choice.

MR. BRYAN: Whether you testify will be up to Congress.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: I think that's going to mess us up, so we'll keep you on the payroll a little longer.

MR. CABOT: You will give us some guidance, some place to call?

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: By the time we go to the Secretary on the 29th we will have all these papers done, the report done. We will have the work sheet done and probably ought to have printed what you just showed us on the board,

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the summary. And that will be our bible and that's it and we will have the press confernce after we meet with Taft on the 29th, and then I am going to go home and enjoy New Year's.

ADMIRAL ROWDEN: Will we be expected t o sign the report or will it be signed only by you?

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: IS this report going to be signed?

MR. BRYAN: By the two co-chairs and forwarded.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: We don't need signatures from everybody?

MR. BRYAN: No, sir.

GENERAL POE: So we can deny it all.

CHAIRMAN EDWARDS: All right. Let's eat.

(Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the Commission adjourned.)